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THE TENUOUS MAJORITY
The Effect of Two-Party Competition on 
the House of Representatives
BY: John P. Meiers 
MAJOR PROFESSOR: Ronald M. Peters, Jr.
ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the effects o f two-party competition on the House of 
Representatives in the 1990s. Specifically, it analyzes how the competitive fights for 
majority control by the two parties are altering House elections, the party cultures o f the two 
parties on Capitol Hill, and the governing process. Two-Party competition for the House of 
Representatives in the 103"^105* (1993-1998) Congresses has fundamentally altered the 
electoral and institutional politics of the House, from how candidates are selected and elected 
to how congressional parties conduct themselves on Capitol Hill. In particular, congressional 
leaders are increasingly intervening in the recruitment process o f House candidates, in order 
to produce the most electable candidates capable of helping secure control o f the House. In 
addition, the party cultures of the Republican Conference and the Democratic Caucus are 
adapting to the incentives of two-party competition. Meanwhile, the governing process is 
being altered as well to the demands o f intense competition through triangulation, shutdown 
politics, and more partisan governing tactics.
This dissertation relies on interviews of members o f Congress and their staff, in 
conjunction with the historical record, to illustrate how the new race for the House and the
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new era o f tenuous, narrow House majorities is affecting American politics and the House 
of Representatives. The developments in House politics emanating from the new era of two- 
party competition challenge many of the existing theories and explanations o f how the House 
of Representatives operates, both institutionally and electorally. Two-Party competition for 
the House, despite the problems in governance it brings to the House institutionally, is 
primarily a positive development, and presents new challenges for congressional scholarship, 
American government, and House politics.
Xll
CHAPTER ONE
The Race for the House:
Theoretical, Analytical, and Historical Background
An era o f intense two-party competition has descended upon the House of 
Representatives. From 1954 until 1994, one-party Democratic rule prevailed in the House. 
In 1994 House Republicans took control of the House after years o f aggressive efforts to 
capture majority status. In 1996 and 1998, House Democrats came within striking distance 
of House control in fiercely contested campaigns for majority control. Control o f the House 
of Representatives is now up for grabs, and the pressures and demands o f two-party 
competition are altering the political and legislative milieu of the institution. The intense 
drive by the two parties to secure House majorities is a new motivator of congressional 
action and behavior. Over a three-election cycle ( 1994-1998), these changes can be detected 
through the variables of congressional elections, party culture, and the governing process. 
In this dissertation, 1 will show how two-party competition can be used as an analytical tool 
to help us better understand the activities and behavior of the Congresses o f the 1990s and 
beyond. I will also illustrate how competitive pressures to obtain House majorities have 
tangibly altered the nature and character of the House o f Representatives, from how members 
are elected to the House to their activities as politicians and legislators on Capitol Hill.
The fervent battle for House control by the two parties has characterized 
congressional elections since the 1994 midterm election, and continues into the 21” century 
with competitive fights for House control in 2000 and 2002. In the 1996 congressional 
elections. House Republicans won 48.9% of the total vote, while House Democrats won
48.5% of the total vote. This is the closest parity for House control since the elections of 
1950 and 1952, when the two parties vied evenly for control of the House.' After me 1998 
elections, a mere five seats separated the two parties in the House for control of the chamber. 
This is the closest majority seat margin since the 83"^  Congress (1953-54). As illustrated in 
Table 1-1, over the course of the 1990s the majority party margin in the House has shrunk 
from 49 to five.
Table 1-1: Majority Party Margin, 102'"'-106“' Congresses
Majority
Party
Minority
Party
Majority 
Party Margin
102'*’ Congress 
(1991-1992)
267 (D) 167 (R) 49
103"* Congress 
(1993-1994)
256 (D) 178 (R) 38
104“ Congress 
(1995-1996)
236 (R) 198 (D) 18
105“ Congress 
(1997-1998)
228 (R) 206 (D) 10
106'" Congress 
(1999-2000)
223 (R) 211 (D) 5
The competitive race for the House is, at its core, a fight for power between the two 
parties. This struggle for power is entirely consistent with the vision of the Framers of the 
U.S. Constitution and the foundations they laid for the American constitutionally separated 
system. The Founding Fathers expected all Americans to be politically active and to
' In 1950, each party won 48.9% o f the total vote, but the Democrats maintained control 
of the House. In 1952, the Republicans won 49.3% of the total vote and the Democrats 
won 49.2%, but the Republicans captured control o f the chamber. Norman J. Omstein, 
et. al.. Vital Statistics on Congress: 1997-98 (Washington, D C.: Congressional Quarterly, 
Inc.), p. 52.
participate fully in the political process. The open system o f government they created enlists 
the raw ambition of individuals to safeguard liberty. The Founding Fathers expected 
House o f Representatives to be the conduit tfirough which this ambition is channeled so 
citizens could have a direct voice in the composition of their government. James Madison 
argued in Federalist #52 that the House o f Representatives “should have an immediate 
dependence on, & an intimate sympathy with the people. Frequent elections are 
unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and sympathy can be effectually 
secured.” Madison further stated in Federalist #57 that “The House of Representatives is so 
constituted as to support in the members, a habitual recollection o f their dependence on the 
people.” Frequent House elections still remain an important method for Americans to protect 
and advance their individual freedom. House races, and by extension the fight for majority 
control, are the purest form of representation the Framers injected into the constitutional 
veins o f the United States. Through biennial House races, citizens have a direct control of 
one branch of the federal government in a bicameral, separated system. Today, political 
parties are the mechanisms in which ambition is organized in terms of control and 
organization of the House of Representatives.
The Race for the House in the 1990s
The new era o f two-party competition for the House has spanned the decade of the 
1990s, from the 103"  ^(1993-1994) Congress to the 106* (1999-2000) Congress. The two 
parties in these Congresses have struggled to deal with the competing demands and pressures 
of legislating and governing amidst a larger war for majority control of the House. The 
transition from a previous era o f one-party rule to a new era o f competitiveness has been
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messy, and has accompanied a decline in public confidence in the “people’s House.’’* Public 
opinion polls show that the public frequently expresses more confidence in used-car 
salesmen than in the House of Representatives as a governing institution. It is easy to see 
why. From 1989 to i 999, the House of Representatives has experienced the demise of three 
successive Speakers of the House - Jim Wright (D-TX), Tom Foley (D-WA), and Newt 
Gingrich (R-GA) - in circumstances directly related to the fight for the House. Unstable 
speakerships, unstable House majorities, and fierce fights over the direction of public policy 
have become the hallmarks o f this new competitive era for House control. Each o f these 
developments have left an indelible mark on the House as a democratic and governing 
institution.
Consider the trauma that has descended on the House of Representatives in the 1990s 
as it entered a new period of competitiveness for House control: institutional tumult, 
resignations o f key congressional leaders, ethics scandals, incivility between elected officials, 
indecision, and government shutdowns; the House, it seems, has consistently lurched from 
one political and governing crisis to the next. For an illustration of the changes in the 
legislative process in the House in this new era o f two-party competition, pick up a 
newspaper or magazine and read the end-of-the-Congress wrap-ups for any Congress of the 
1990s. Invariably, you will read the same disappointments. The House, it appears, is in 
chaos.
The 101" Congress ( 1989-1990) witnessed the resignation o f Speaker Wright, budget
* John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, Congress as Public Enemv (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 31-36.
failures, indecision, and increased partisan caviling/ Gridlock, sagging poll ratings, ethics 
scandals, and meager legislative accomplishments crippled the “deadlocked” 102"  ^Congress 
(1991-1992)/ For the 103"^  Congress (1993-1994), the criticism is even worse. Partisanship, 
obstructionism, and the inability of a unified Democratic government to govern hobbled this 
Congress as the Republicans swept the 1994 midterm election to assume power, producing 
the most incumbent defeats since the Watergate election o f 1974.’ Extended government 
shutdowns, intense partisan fighting over the ethics and politics of Speaker Gingrich (R-GA), 
an intense polarization of the two parties in the House, and diminished civility besmirched 
the 104* Congress (1995-1996).* The 105* Congress (1997-1998) experienced a coup 
attempt against Speaker Gingrich by House Republicans, meager legislative 
accomplishments, the frequent inability of a slim Republican majority to govern, the threat 
of a government shutdown in 1998, and the resignation o f Speaker Gingrich after a 
disappointing loss for Republicans in the 1998 midterm election. In 1990, one observer 
wrote that the Congress was imitating the work habits of a college student who writes every
’ “101st Congress Leaves Behind Plenty of Laws, Criticisms,” Congressional Ouarterlv, 3 
November 1990, p. 3683.
“Partisanship, Purse Strings Hobbled the 102"',” Congressional Ouarterlv, 31 October 
1992,p p .3451-55.
’ “End of the Session Marked by Partisan Stalemate,” Congressional Ouarterlv, 8 October 
1994, pp. 2847-51.
* “From Revolution to Realism: the 104* Bids Farewell,” Congressional Quarterly, 5 
October 1996, pp. 2832-44.
term paper the night before it is due/ This apt observation could also be applied to the other 
Congresses o f the 1990s.
These developments could be viewed as the breakdown of a dysfunctional legislative 
institution. This dissertation refuses to adopt this pessimistic perspective. Instead, as 
political scientists and observers of the modem Congress, we must view these developments 
as the messy consequences of the House leaving one era of stable non-competition and 
entering a new era of fierce two-party competition for majority control. The competitive 
requirements o f two-party competition, an era o f tenuous majorities, has sparked 
fundamental changes in how House elections are fought and the House itself is governed. 
The U.S. Congress is primarily a reactive legislative body which institutionally absorbs larger 
contextual changes in American society and politics and infuses them into congressional 
politics, both internally and externally. When we view the political developments in the 
House from the prism of two-party competition, we see an institution that is merely 
responding to the political realities of a new institutional and electoral regime.* The roller­
coaster ride o f House politics in the 1990s is the inevitable result of a legislative body 
adapting to the contours of new competitive demands and pressures. These electoral and 
institutional changes emanating from two-party competition are in turn having a cathartic
 ^See Janet Hook, “ 101** Congress Leaves Behind Plenty o f Laws, Criticisms,” 
Congressional Ouarterlv. 3 November 1990, p. 3684.
* Allen D. Hertzke and Ronald M. Peters, Jr., The Atomistic Congress: An Interpretation
of Congressional Change (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1992), pp. 10-22. 
This dissertation adopts the theoretical framework o f congressional change presented by 
Hertzke and Peters, but adapts it to the centralizing aspects o f competitive House politics 
in both the Capitol and on the campaign trail in the 1990s.
effect on the House, both institutionally and electorally.
Competition for the House is a new prism through which congressional action zr.i 
behavior in House politics, both within the House institutionally and on the campaign trail, 
can be viewed. Party competition for the House in modem times is a new and interesting 
political development that has important consequences regarding the direction o f the federal 
government and the character of the governing process. In this context, the race for the 
House affects the life o f every American, although this battle is raging behind the scenes and 
out of view to most Americans. The two parties differ substantially in terms o f what they 
have done, and will do, with a House majority. They push different agendas, different 
legislative priorities, and appeal to different bases of support in the country when they control 
the House.’ These stark partisan differences drive the fierce fight for House control by the 
two parties. This dissertation seeks to bring this panoply o f conflict for House control into 
full view. In addition to changing contemporary American politics and the House, the race 
for the House also impacts contemporary political science theories which guide our thinking 
of the modem House of Representatives. Congressional scholars must account for the 
theoretical implications of this new period of two-party competition and the effects it has on 
the House and American politics.
The tenuous House majorities of the 1990 and the new era of two-party competition 
raise several compelling questions that strike at the core o f the U.S. experiment in self
’ The increasing homogeneity within the Democratic Caucus fueled many of these 
changes during the 1970s and 1980s, transforming the House into a more partisan body as 
House Democrats became more uniformly liberal and the Republican party became more 
uniformly conservative. See David W. Rhode, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform 
House (Chicago: The University o f Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 14-16,40-58.
governance:
In a competitive two-party system, when control o f the House is up for grabs, what 
do the two parties do to try to capture the House and maintain control?
How does two-party competition for the House alter congressional elections, 
especially in determining who runs and how elections are organized?
How are the two parties changing internally and culturally during this process of 
majority-formation for House control and majority-retention?
How does the process of majority-formation and majority-retention impact the 
governing process?
What changes are Republicans making to the House as an institution to solidify their 
slim majorities?
What might a future Democratic House look like?
Contemporary Congressional Scholarship: Governing and Electoral Dimensions
The race for the House demands a re-examination of congressional theories and the 
bodies o f research which currently frame our understanding of how the House operates, both 
internally and externally. For 40 uninterrupted years the Democratic party controlled the 
House, which coincided with the blossoming of congressional scholarship and political 
science in the post World War II period. Congressional scholarship o f the House o f 
Representatives provided a fairly stable yet evolving view of the Democratic House of 
Representatives House as it transformed from the sleepy House o f Sam Rayburn in the 1950s 
to the more partisan House of Jim Wright and Newt Gingrich in the 1980s and 1990s. Since 
the Democratic party enjoyed a perpetual tenure o f majority status in the House, many 
congressional scholars accepted this as fact and then examined and explained the House of 
Representatives through the prism of one-party rule.
The current period of contestation for House control demands that we view existing 
congressional theories through a competitive prism in order to augment their explanatory 
power in the 1990s and beyond. This is not to state that previous examinations and theories
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of the House are wrong, but only that their insights are colored from a non-competitive 
perspective. The current fight for the House is driving the incentive structures o f the two 
parties in different directions than during the previous period of non-competition. The 
insights provided by previous examinations of the House provide a stable foundation for 
examining the current fight for majority control, and this dissertation builds on this solid 
scholarly foundation to help provide theoretical guidance. During the period of one-party 
Democratic rule, the Democratic majority enjoyed the logic o f non-competition and was 
rarely jeopardized at the polls. After the midterm of 1958, House Democrats cemented their 
New Deal House majority with a stable majority of 283. After 1958, the Democratic House 
majority rarely dipped below a stable majority of 250.
By looking at the House from the perspective of intense two-party competition, 
additional insights into the House as a political institution can be gained. These insights 
augment the collective endeavor of congressional scholarship o f providing a more thorough 
understanding o f how the House works both internally and electorally. This process of 
looking at legislative institutions from other viewpoints is not confined to the U.S. House of 
Representatives. For instance, the scholarly commimity has recently focused attention on the 
health and performance of democratic legislative institutions amidst broader cultural and 
societal changes o f the late 20'” century. Putnam’s study of the role o f civic associations in 
democratic societies, for instance, discovered the important role played by social capital in
sustaining and nurturing successful representative institu tions.O ther analyses have focused 
on the impact o f cultural and contextual developments on institutional changes in the U.S. 
Congress. My examination of the House of Representatives focuses on the variable of 
competition for House control beginning in the 103"* (1993-1994) Congress and continuing 
through the 1990s. Through this analysis, 1 seek to broaden our understanding of how the 
House of Representatives is functioning, and being altered, amidst larger shifts in the 
tectonics of House politics. Intense two-party competition for the House has emerged as one 
of the key driving forces behind congressional action and behavior in the 1990s. As a new- 
political phenomenon, this activity has not been adequately examined by the existing 
congressional literature.
T wo immense bodies of research have emerged in congressional scholarship which 
provide the collective foundation of contemporary knowledge o f the House. One stream of 
literature has examined the House institutionally in terms of internal House governance. 
This body o f research has probed the governing dimension o f the Democratic House of 
Representatives, and has provided a changing view of the House as it transformed from the 
“textbook” Congress of the 1950s and 1960s to the more party-centered House o f the 1980s 
and early 1990s. This literature presented the contemporary House of the post-reform period 
of the 1970s as a partisan and atomized institution led by coalitional party leaders. House 
leaders in the 1980s and 1990s aggregated member demands through strong procedural and
Robert Putnam, Making Democracv Work: Civic Traditions in Modem Italv 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993); Robert Putnam, “Bowling 
Alone: America's Declining Social Capital,” Journal o f Democracv 6 (1), 1995; Robert 
Putnam, “Turning in. Tuning out: the Strange Disappearance o f Social Capital in 
.America,” P.S.: Political Science and Politics 28 (4), 1995.
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agenda control of the House floor and a decentralized committee system. This literature, in 
addition to accepting Democratic rule o f Uie House as the natural political order, also 
analyzed the House tlirough the unique cultural template placed on the institution of the 
House by the majority House Democrats.
Another stream of literature has examined the House externally, through 
congressional elections and campaigns. This body o f research has analyzed the electoral 
dimension of the House, presenting a stable view o f House elections as candidate-centered 
affairs revolving around local issues, the emergence or absence o f quality candidates, and the 
absence o f exogenous party influence or national issues. The insights provided by these two 
bodies accurately captured the dynamics of the House of Representatives internally and 
externally over the past fifty years. Very rarely did these two bodies of literature intersect. 
Congressional scholars who probed the governing dimension usually focused exclusively on 
internal House politics and governance, while congressional scholars probing the electoral 
dimension of the House focused almost exclusively on campaigns and elections. Meanwhile, 
the shadow of perpetual one-party Democratic rule in the House weighed heavily in each of 
these analyses. In reality, however, each of the theories and explanations provided by these 
two bodies of research are conditioned to the extent to which the two parties are in 
competition for House control.
The Governing Dimension
One body o f literature has focused exclusively on the internal governance of the 
House, both institutionally and politically. The “textbook” Congress accurately portrayed 
the House o f the 1950s and 1960s as a body where the Democrats were firmly entrenched
11
as a majority party, a strong committee system drove much o f the action in the House, and 
traditional norms of reciprocity, comity, and committee specialization dominated the 
institution. The “textbook” Congress also depicted a decentralized body where members 
exhibited bonds of comity and deference to committee seniority while eschewing strong party 
leadership. Over the past thirty years, new theories of the House have emerged which both 
built on the foundation laid by the “textbook” Congress and accounted for new political 
developments like the increasing power of party leaders and strong party rule in the House.
In the 1970s, congressional scholars analyzed the changes resulting from the post­
reform Congress. Mayhew’s “electoral connection”, Fenno’s “homestyle”, and Fiorina’s 
“bureaucratic theory” each helped to develop the re-election thesis." The re-election thesis 
presented members o f Congress as single-minded pursuers o f re-election, and postulated that 
congressional behavior can be best understood by this theoretical framework. This economic 
view of congressional action was buttressed in the 1990s by the discretion theory of Glenn 
Parker, which presented members o f Congress as single-minded pursuers of discretion. 
Each of these examinations viewed House members as relatively autonomous political 
operators who run their own entrepreneurial franchise operations in the House and display 
independence from party leaders and party influences in the House. Although the re-election 
thesis and discretion theory still account for much of congressional action and behavior in
" David Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale 
University Press, 1974); Richard Fenno, Homestvle: House Members in Their Districts 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1978); Morris P. Fiorina, Congress: Kevstone of the Washington 
Establishment (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1989).
Glenn R. Parker, Institutional Change. Discretion, and the Making of Modem Congress 
(Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University o f Michigan Press, 1992).
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the new competitive era, they are bereft o f explanatory power in terms o f accounting for the 
new party-centered thinking of House parties, nationalized campaigns, and increased 
meddling in House races by congressional parties and their leaders.
New theories of the House emerged in the 1990s to account for the stronger party 
control and party leadership control in the 1980s and early 1990s. Each o f these theories 
utilized strong parties and stronger procedural control of the House floor by the Democratic 
majority as a key variable for analysis. David Rhode presented a theory o f conditional party 
government in the House where electoral changes in the makeup o f the Democratic coalition 
encouraged stronger party leadership, stronger procedural control o f the House politically and 
procedurally. and the rise of a more partisan politics in the House between an increasingly 
liberal Democratic majority and an increasingly conservative Republican minority.'^ Keith 
Krehbiel advanced an information theory of congressional organization which presented the 
House as an information-seeking body which nurtures a strong committee system for the 
benefit of a member’s party and party leadership. Individual members collect individualized 
benefits from this specialization while simultaneously providing collective gains to their 
party and party leadership in the currency of increased knowledge and information on the 
issues confronting the majority party in the H ouse.In form ation  theory presents an image 
of House members extremely reliant on the judgment of their party leaders and fellow party
David W. Rhode, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House.
'■* Thomas Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel, “Organization of Informative Committees by a 
Rational Legislature,” American Journal of Political Science 34, 1990, pp. 531-64; Keith 
Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization (Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press, 1992).
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members on the different committees, to make the right choices on various procedural and 
policy areas.
These new perspectives o f the House o f Representative by congressional scholars in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s paid greater attention to the effectiveness o f parties in the 
House. They also focused on the degree to which electoral forces affected the behavior and 
actions of congressional parties. Douglass Arnold presented a theory of congressional action 
where electoral calculations shape the legislative, political, and policy actions of 
congressional parties and coalitional party leaders. Cox and McCubbins presented a theory 
of party-centered government in the House where the majority party serves as a legislative 
cartel that “stacks the deck” in its favor in order to continue majority con t ro l .Under  this 
theory, majority party leaders use strong procedural control of the House floor through the 
Rules Committee to guard the collective reputation of their party, insuring its viability as a 
safe electoral vehicle for members. Kiewiet and McCubbins likewise illustrated how 
congressional parties employ the legislative process to accomplish policy and electoral 
goals.'* In addition to focusing attention on stronger procedural control o f the House floor 
by majority party leaders, scholars also placed especial attention to the larger agenda-setting
Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization, pp. 66-84, 122-25.
R. Douglas Arnold, The Logic o f Congressional Action (New Haven, Connecticut: 
Yale University Press, 1990), pp. 6-15.
Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in 
the House (Berkeley, California: University' of California Press, 1993), pp. 85-86.
'* D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic o f Delegation: 
Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1991).
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process both in the House and in the Washington community at large.’’
The image that emerges from this body of research is a decentralized House of 
Representatives led by a Democratic majorit>’ increasingly availing itself to strong procedural 
control o f the chamber. The inherent tension between these two challenges, between 
decentralization and centralization in the House, presented increased challenges in governing 
the House to the prevailing Democratic majority. To protect their majority status. House 
Democrats used the perks o f majority power to build a Berlin Wall of political, institutional, 
and incumbency advantages in the House which often discouraged House Republicans from 
even attempting to fight for majority control. House Democrats increasingly ruled the House 
with a strong procedural fist in the 1980s and 1990s, while congressional committees and 
norms of seniority continued to thrive in their own respective decentralized spheres of 
influence. The Democratic majority’s major duties involved legislating and governing in a 
manner consistent with its own values and priorities.
Because House control was not seriously contested during this time, the Democratic 
House majority spent a large majority of its time managing internal party fissures and 
politics, especially in crafling legislative responses to policy concerns of the majority liberal 
Democrats within the Democratic Caucus. The reforms of the 1970s, both within the 
Democratic Caucus and in the House at large, focused on making the House as an institution 
more response to the policy concerns of the majority rank-and-file liberal Democratic 
majority. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, congressional scholarship focused on the
” John W. Kingdon, Agendas. Alternatives, and Public Policv (Boston: Little, Brown, 
and Company, 1984).
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increasing procedural control of the House by Democratic leaders to enact agenda items 
demanded by the increasing liberal majority wiüiin the Democratic caucus.
The Republican minority, meanwhile, received little attention from congressional 
scholars during this period. The logic of non-competition pervaded the thinking of 
politicians, pundits, and scholars from the 1960s to the early 1990s. The Republicans had 
last possessed a House majority in the first term of the Eisenhower administration, and 
political scientists rightly focused their scholarly attentions on the Democratic majority and 
its institutional control of the House. Generations of House Republican leaders decided to 
be good institutional players with the ruling House Democrats in order to cut deals and 
partake in a slice o f the legislative wealth in the House. Scholars o f the Republican House 
minority during this period aptly called this phenomenon a “minority party-mentality” or 
Stockholm Syndrome, where hostages sympathize with their captors and adopt their 
culture.*® House Republicans were viewed as inconsequential losers, and they were 
subsequently ignored except for the lonely scholarly efforts of Charles O. Jones and Connelly 
and Pitney.*'
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the House became even more partisan as the 
Republican minority increasingly abandoned the electoral dead-end o f acquiescence and 
brought intense combat directly to the House floor. Partisanship in the House between the
■“ The “minority mentality” phenomenon eventually played a prominent role in House 
Republican thinking in the early 1990s. See Representative Vernon J. Ehrlers, “Up in 
Michigan; Lessons for Becoming a Majority,” Catalvst Spring 1994.
*' Charles O. Jones, The Minority Partv in Congress (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970); 
William F. Connelly, Jr. and John J. Pitney, Jr., Congress’ Permanent Minoritv: 
Republicans in the U.S. House (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1994).
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two parties had increased dramatically since the end of the Vietnam War as the two parties 
became more internally homogeneous and more ideologically separate.^ Frustration with 
the gridlock o f divided government of the Reagan/Bush years created a new form of political 
combat between the two parties where scandal politics and independent counsels become key 
institutional weapons to inflict severe damage on the other party.*^ Increased partisanship, 
combined with increased willingness to use the politics o f RIP (revelation, investigation, 
prosecution), produced a running feud in Washington between the two parties reminiscent 
of the Hatfields and McCoys. The Reagan, Bush, and Clinton presidencies each witnessed 
a greater willingness by the two parties to resort to the politics of scandal and RIP, with 
casualties as diverse as the contentious nominations o f Republican Supreme Court nominees 
Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas, the resignations o f Speakers Wright and Gingrich, and 
the impeachment of President Clinton. The increased political combat between the two 
parties for power in the late 1980s and early 1990s were a precursor to many of the tactics 
and strategies employed by the two parties in the war for the House of the 1990s.^"
"  David Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House, pp. 1-39; Thomas Sowell 
provides a fascinating history o f the issues and politics separating an increasingly liberal 
Democratic party from an increasingly conservative Republican party fi-om the 1960s to 
the 1990s. See Thomas Sowell, The Vision o f the Anointed (New York: Basic Books, 
1995), pp. 104-142.
“  Benjamin Ginsberg and Martin Shefter, Politics bv Other Means: The Declining 
Importance o f Elections in America (New York: Basic Books, 1990); Suzanne Garment, 
Scandal: The Culture of Mistrust in American Politics (New York: Times Books, 1992).
For a taste o f the more partisan and “hardball” politics employed by members of the 
two parties in the 1980s and 1990s, see Eleanor Clift and Tom Brazaitis, War Without 
Bloodshed (New York: Scribner, 1996).
17
The Electoral Dimension
While one boJy of congressional scholarship examined the internal dynamics of the 
House procedural ly and politically through the perspective o f the Democratic majority, 
another body of congressional scholarship emerged to provide theories and explanations of 
House campaigns and elections. This body of literature presented a candidate-centered 
system of House elections where ambitious candidates recruit themselves, raise their own 
money, hire their own consultants, win their own primaries, nm campaigns based on local 
concerns, and owe their elections to the House to no one but themselves. Once in the House, 
incumbents are almost sure bets for re-election. Diligent constituent service, savvy use of 
office resources, and plum committee and subcommittee chairmanships helped all House 
incumbents, but especially House Democrats, build personal constituencies, raise campaign 
funds, and eventually become real players in the U.S. Congress.’^
Congressional scholarship probing the electoral dimensions of the House identified 
the decision by quality candidates to run for the House as the key determinant in whether a 
congressional race was competitive or not.“  Due to the importance of quality candidates in 
determining the competitive nature of localized fights for individual House seats, 
congressional scholars focused especial attention on candidate emergence and races for open 
House seats. The key factor affecting the competitiveness o f an individual House seat often
^  Alan Ehrenhalt, The United States o f Ambition: Politicians. Power, and the Pursuit of 
Office (New York; Times Books), p. 228.
For more on this subject, consult: Who Runs for Congress? Ambition. Context, and 
Candidate Emergence. Thomas A. Kazee, ed. (Washington, D C.: Congressional 
Quarterly, Inc., 1994).
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revolved around the decision by a quality candidate to run for office. Quality candidates 
became the omnipresent variable affecting House incumbency rates, the decline o f marginal 
districts, the competitiveness of House elections both individually and collectively, and even 
the occasional national tides that swept a large batch o f incumbents out of office like in 1974 
and 1980. National parties, national campaigns, and national party leaders were either bit 
players or non-existent in terms o f individual House races.
Due to the importance of quality candidates in determining the matrix of each House 
election, congressional scholars who explored the electoral dimension of the House carefully 
studied candidate decision-making processes. The overriding importance of quality 
candidates also encouraged congressional scholars to engage in the elusive search for the 
invisible decision of quality candidates to either run, or not run, for a House seat. When 
quality candidates did decide to run, their elections almost always revolved around local 
issues and concerns. Jacobson and Kemell unlocked one o f the mysteries of congressional 
elections when they presented a theory of strategic politicians who wait to nm for the House 
during the most optimum political environment for their party.*’
The Watergate election of 1974 provides an important example of Jacobson and 
KemelTs strategic politician thesis. In this pro-Democratic election following President 
Nixon’s resignation, which provided a nationwide strategic and political advantage to 
Democratic candidates while a harsh environment for Republicans, numerous quality
*’ Gary C. Jacobson and Samuel Kemell, Strateev and Choice in Congressional Elections 
(New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1983); Gary C. Jacobson, “Strategic 
Politicians and the Dynamics o f U.S. House Elections, 1946-86,” American Political 
Science Review 83 (3), September 1989, pp. 773-93.
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Republican House candidates strategically decided to wait out the 1974 election altogether 
and run in a more advantageous election later in the decade. In the candidate-centered House 
campaigns o f the post World War II era, strategic politicians and their Machiavellian 
calculations affected the presence of absence o f competition for individual House seats more 
than presidential popularity, national issues, or economic determinants. The theory of 
strategic politicians, coupled with the theories o f quality candidates and candidate-centered 
elections based on local issues, accurately captured many of the dynamics o f House races 
around the country during the period o f non-competitive, one-party rule in the 1954-1994 
period.
Localized, candidate-centered House races revolving around quality candidates aided 
the Democratic majority's efforts to continue its majority status in the House. Democrats 
thrived in an electoral environment consisting of localized elections, where they possessed 
the ideas, vision, and proven appeals to the electorate to win House seats based on local 
concerns. In addition. Democrats held an overwhelming advantage o f the state and local 
offices, providing a steady stream of quality candidates for House races. Politically talented 
House Democrats created a cottage industry o f securing and taming Republican-trending 
districts in the South, Midwest, and West. House Democratic incumbents and candidates 
made compelling arguments that a congressional district’s needs demanded a representative 
who could easily tap into the Democratic legislative pipelines o f Capitol Hill.
The freshmen Democratic class of 1974 provides one example o f how politically 
savvy Democrats could win and hold House seats through committee work, taking advantage 
of incumbency advantages, and divorcing themselves on the campaign trail fi-om party
2 0
leaders and national party agendas. House Democrats gained 49 seats in the Watergate 
election of 1974, boosting the Democratic House majority to 291. Of the 75-member 
predominantly liberal activist Democratic freshmen, 49 had won seats previously held by 
Republicans.’® To protect their seats in the non-Watergate elections o f the 1970s and 1980s, 
the freshmen Democrats of 1974 pacified their Republican-leaning districts to win re-election 
through localized campaigns, the advantages of incumbency, and the inability of Republicans 
to field quality candidates who could compete against the Berlin Wall of Democratic 
incumbency advantages. All but two of these 75 freshmen Democrats retained their seats in 
1976. By 1981. all but three of the remaining 44 House Democrats elected in 1974 either 
chaired a subcommittee or sat on one of the chamber’s “power” committees - Rules. 
Appropriations, and Ways and Means.’’ The House, institutionally and electorally. truly 
became a creature of the cultural imperatives of the long-serving Democratic majority. 
Watergate boosted and expanded the longevity of the Democratic House majority until the 
early 1990s, providing Democrats with the gains to survive the Reagan-Bush era of the 1980s 
and Republican capture of the Senate in 1980.
The Impact of Competition and Non-Competition on the House of Representatives
Party control of the House has changed fourteen times between the 39* Congress 
( 1865-67) and the 106* Congress ( 1999-2000). Thirteen of these changes occurred between 
1864 and 1954, as illustrated in Appendix A. The political and legislative milieu of the 
House has changed each time the institution has moved between periods of competition and
’* Burdett Loomis, The New American Politician (New York: Basic Books, 1988), p. 31. 
’’ Ibid.. p. 46.
21
non-competition for House control. Each period of competition or non-competition alters 
the legislative and political environment of the House in its own unique manner. Stable 
majorities provide an opportunity for the dominant party to imprint its culture and 
organization on the House as an institution. Incredibly narrow House majorities, on the other 
hand, can even inhibit the organization of the House itself. For instance. Republicans 
emerged with the narrowest House majorities in U.S. history in the elections o f 1916 (216), 
1930(218), and 1952 (221 ); the narrowness of the Republican majorities in 1916 and 1930 
prevented the GOP from even organizing the 65'*' (1917-1918) and 72"  ^ (1931-1933) 
Congresses.^®
The presence of a competitive or non-competitive environment for House control, 
combined with the size of a House majority, tangibly impacts the governing process in the 
House and the nation at large. For instance, between 1874 and 1894 control of the House 
“see-sawed” between the two parties, as control of the House shifted in the midst of a 
competitive post-Civil War electorate. During this competitive period, no majority endured 
beyond six years. House majorities became more adept at using the procedural advantages 
of the House to govern, while House minorities perfected sophisticated obstruction tactics 
designed to embarrass the majority party and regain control o f the House.^' During this
Charles O. Jones, The Minoritv Partv in Congress, p. 17.
Sarah A. Binder, Minoritv Rights. Maioritv Rule: Partisanship and the Development of 
Congress (Edinburgh, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 109-31; 
Ronald M. Peters, The American Speakership: The Office in Historical Perspective 
(Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press, 1990), pp. 52-91.
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period. Speakers Thomas Brackett Reed of Maine (1889-91/' and “Uncle Joe” Cannon of 
Illinois (1903-1910) instituted prerogatives for majority rule to comhat minority 
intransigence in the House.”  Reed engineered a series o f reforms in the 51 st Congress to 
place control of the House firmly in the hands of the majority party.”  Reed’s reforms 
crystallized the goal o f a majority party in the House: provide leadership, govern, and pass 
the party program.”  These changes in the organization of the House persist to the present 
day.
Another competitive era for House control emerged between 1946 and 1954, when 
control o f the House changed four times between the two parties (1946, 1948, 1952, 1954). 
But unlike other competitive periods for House control, partisan conflict in this period was 
less acrimonious. Republican leader Joe Martin (R-MA) and Democratic leader Sam 
Rayburn (D-TX) engaged in norms of reciprocity, comity, and civility. For instance, when 
the Democrats regained control of the House in 1955 after a period o f four party switches in 
eight years, Rayburn continued to keep the Minority Leader’s office and Martin kept the
”  Randall Strahan, “Thomas Brackett Reed and the Rise o f Party Government,” in 
Masters o f the House, ed. by Roger H. Davidson, Susan Webb Hammond, and Raymond 
W. Smock (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, Press, 1998); Ronald M. Peters, Jr., The 
American Speakership, p. 63.
”  Ronald M. Peters, Jr., The American Speakership, pp. 75-87.
”  The Reed Reforms included the ending o f dilatory motions by the minority, counting 
nonvoting members as “present” for the purpose o f establishing a quorum, reducing the 
necessary number of members to 100 for the purposes o f establishing a quorum, and 
reducing the necessary power to refer measures to committee without debate.
”  Ronald M. Peters, Jr., The American Speakership, pp. 63-72.
23
Speaker’s office.^* This period o f competition differs remarkably from the intensely partisan 
House of the competitive 1874-1894 period, and from the intensely competitive and partisan 
race for majority control in the 1990s. The political system channeled conflict in different 
ways in the three eras, illustrating the importance o f structural factors in determining the 
nature and tenor o f the race for the House. In the 1946-1954 period, the underlying 
foundations o f committee and seniority dominance within the House took the edge off of 
intense partisanship. By the 1990s, the House of Rayburn and Martin had changed into a 
different political institution. These structural changes in the management o f political 
conflict in the House play an important role in how the parties battle for House majorities.
Periods o f competition and non-competition affect not only the tenor o f the House, 
but also how the country is governed. The precedents from these periods o f competition and 
non-competition have become embedded into the historical lexicon and folklore o f the House 
of Representatives, from Sam Rayburn’s “go along to get along” to Newt Gingrich’s 
“politics is war without blood.” During the 67* Congress (1921-23), the Republicans 
possessed a large, 168-seat majority party margin in the House due to large Republican gains 
in the 1920 campaign. For the remainder of the 1920s, Republicans enjoyed healthy House 
majorities that allowed Republican policies, like tax cuts and reduction of the national debt, 
to be enacted in tandem with the Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover presidencies. A similar 
effect took place in the 1930s as the Great Depression fueled large Democratic House gains
“  Joe Martin, Mv First Fiffv Years in Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
Inc., 1960), pp. 8-9. 229.
24
in the 1930-1936 period.”  At the zenith o f this stable majority in the 75'*’ Congress (1937- 
1939), Democrats possessed a record-setting 244 seat margin in the House, with only 89 
Republicans serving in this Congress. The large and stable Democratic House majorities of 
the 1930s enabled Democrats, in tandem with President Franklin Roosevelt, to enact 
important Democratic policy goals emanating from the New Deal, like the Works Progress 
Administration, Social Security, and labor legislation.
The presence or absence o f competition for House control saturates the politics of the 
House, affecting everything from leadership races to how individual members view their role 
in the institution. The House Republican minority leadership races during the 1954-1994 
period provide one compelling example o f how the presence o f absence o f competition 
affects political behavior in the House. Republican inability to obtain a majority during the 
long, forty year period of Democratic rule sparked several internal House Republican 
leadership battles. In 1958, Republican disappointment over severe losses in the 1958 
midterm election led to the ouster of the more institutionally-minded Republican Minority 
Leader Joe Martin (R-MA) by the more confrontational Charlie Halleck (R-IN). Continued 
Republican frustration with minority status led to Gerald Ford’s (R-MI) ouster of Halleck in 
1964. In the 1980s, decades of fioistration by Republicans with their extended minority status 
fueled the rise o f Representative Newt Gingrich (R-GA) from minority backbencher to 
Minority Whip in 1989, and ultimately to Speaker in 1995. Republican thirst for a House 
majority fueled each of these leadership fights and ascensions.
”  Although Republicans held the House briefly for two separate two-year periods (1947- 
49 and 1953-55), these “deviating” victories were short-lived and did nothing to alter the 
underlying natural Democratic majority in the country.
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The recent 40-year period of non-competition for House control (1954-1994) is 
unique in American political history, and likewise had an indelible impact on the House as 
an institution. During this period, it was widely assumed in the political and academic 
communities that the Democrats had a perpetual grip on the House of Representatives that 
made House Republicans a “permanent minority” in the House.^* Republicans were a 
minority for an unprecedented 40 years, while no other House majority since the Civil War 
had breached 16 years. The House truly became the political preserve of the Democratic 
party, and many House Republicans gave up hope of ever achieving majority status. This 
long period o f Democratic rule in the House shaped the legislative process and political 
environment o f the House as it conformed to the imperatives o f one-party rule and non­
competition. In this non-competitive environment, action in the House shifted to internal 
House Democratic politics and the policymaking process that arose under the security of 
extended Democratic rule.
The incentives to escape minority status in the House are enormous. In the House, 
the majority party controls the floor through the Rules Committee, soaks up much of the staff 
and office resources, and shares little of the legislative wealth with the minority party. 
Speaker Thomas Brackett Reed once stated that the purpose o f the minority party in the 
House was to form a quorum, and its only right was to draw a salary. House minorities do 
not have the power, respect or prerogatives of members o f the minority party o f the Senate; 
the difference between the two minorities is between that o f serving as an outnumbered
^*William F. Connelly, Jr. and John J. Pitney, Jr., Congress’ Permanent Minoritv?: 
Republicans in the U.S. House, pp. 1-14.
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member of a corporate board and serving time in a prison cell. This difference negates the 
need for a bicameral focus in this dissertation and focuses analysis squarely on the House of 
Representatives and the intense competitive campaigns for House control waged by both 
parties.
To break free of the indignities of minority status, House minority parties in the 
1990s have utilized aggressive strategies and attack politics in the drive for House majorities, 
with the ethics process becoming a new weapon to gain majorities. From the 10 T' Congress 
(1989-1990) to the 103^ Congress (1993-1994), the Republican minority increasingly used 
attack politics and obstruction in its drive to end its long period in the minority. During these 
Congresses, the Republican Minority increasingly eschewed the acquiescent legislative role 
carved out for Republicans. Instead, House Republicans undermined the Democratic 
majority by transforming its Berlin Wall of incumbency advantages into its Maginot Line. 
The Berlin Wall that protected one-party rule and non-competition, and the efforts of Newt 
Gingrich and House Republicans to smash it, are pivotal to understanding the current era of 
partisan struggle for the House. Since 1994, the Democratic minority has adopted these same 
aggressive tactics and strategies in their fight to regain a House majority.
The rise o f a new era o f two-party competition is likewise affecting the House 
politically and institutionally, altering the political and legislative terrain upon which all 
House members and parties operate. During the previous era o f non-competition, the 
Democratic majority never fell below 242 seats. Since 1994, no House majority has 
breached 236 seats, producing some of the slimmest House majorities o f the 20th century. 
For the first time since the House was expanded to 435 members in 1913, a House majority
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has governed in three consecutive Congresses with majorities below 240, as shown in Table 
! -2. Narrow majorities provide lower majority party vote margins from which to govern and 
legislate in the House.
Table 1-2: Narrow House Majorities of the 20th Century
Year Majority Party House
Majority
1917-19 Republicans 216*
1923-25 Republicans 225
1931-33 Republicans 218*
1943-45 Democrats 222
1953-55 Republicans 221
1995-97 Republicans 230
1997-99 Republicans 227
1999-2000 Republicans 223
* House Democrats organized the House 
in these Congresses despite a slim GOP majority.
Sources of Two-Party Competition in the 1990s
Each period of viable two-party competition for the House arises from different 
political circumstances. For instance, during the competitive 1946-1954 period, a Solid 
Democratic South dueled a Republican North and industrial Midwest for control of the 
House. The era o f two-party competition that began in the 1990s arises from several recent 
and long-term structural political changes. The political factors fostering increased 
competitiveness for House control include the shift o f the Solid Democratic South into a new 
Republican South, the decline in party loyalty among American voters, and the rise of the 
new swing districts o f the 1990s. These developments have altered the political matrix of
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House seats in the country, transforming a previously non-competitive situation into an 
intensely competitive environment for House control.
Several cultural, political, and social trends from the 1950s to the 1990s have laid the 
foundation for increased competition for House control. In many respects, the political 
universe o f the 1990s is radically different from the political universe of the 1950s. In the 
1950s, for instance, American voters displayed a strong allegiance to political parties and 
received their news from one of the three major television networks. Politicians in this era, 
meanwhile, operated under different rules than politicians of the 1990s. For instance, the 
news media and individual journalists refused to report the sexual foibles of President John 
F. Kennedy. This political universe changed in the 1970s and 1980s as a result o f Watergate 
the Vietnam War. Voters became increasingly dis-engaged from party politics, with one- 
third of the electorate declaring themselves independents by the 1990s. C-SPAN, talk-radio, 
cable television, and Internet publications like the Drudge Report emerged in the 1980s and 
1990s to provide voters with other avenues to learn about political developments which were 
outside the control o f the three major networks. Investigative and attack journalism emerged 
in the post-Watergate era to probe scandal and the personal lives of politicians, from Iran- 
Contra to Gary Hart to Bill Clinton. The increased media outlets insured a means to 
communicate scandals and ethics violations to the public. Meanwhile, the increased use of 
television as a medium to communicate with voters fueled a money chase on Capitol Hill by 
politicians of both parties scrambling for advertising dollars for their campaigns.
Each o f these cultural and political trends laid the groundwork for attack politics in 
the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s. As these trends pushed politics in a decidedly
29
partisan direction, demographic changes laid the groundwork for increased competition in 
ilie individual House races. One important factor leading to increased competitive for House 
control in the 1990s is the shift of the old solid Democratic South to a new Republican 
South.^’ While the South has shifted to the GOP, the Northeast has increasingly gravitated 
toward the Democrats. The shift o f the South to the GOP has been the biggest catalyst of 
two-party competition, insuring the two parties with rough parity in terms of the seats they 
can expect to solidly control. In 1960, Republicans controlled six o f the 104 House seats in 
the South (.05%); after the 1996 elections Republicans controlled 71 of the 125 House seats 
in the South (56%). In the 1994 election alone, Republicans captured 21 southern 
Democratic House seats; in 1996, Republicans captured an additional eight southern 
Democratic House seats. As the South has become increasingly Republican turf. Democrats 
have increased their gains in the Northeast, solidified their hold on inner-city urban areas, 
and competed for seats on the Pacific coast and suburban areas with New Democrat House 
candidates.
These regional shifts have provided both parties with natural bases o f support. But 
both parties quickly reached saturation levels in terms o f the magnitude o f gains they could 
expect in their regions o f support. In this environment, the swing seats emanating from the 
1991 redistricting have arisen in prominence. The swing seats are those districts displaying 
loyalty to neither political party. Presidents and representatives o f differing political parties 
win the districts in different elections. The swing seats represent the true battleground in the
”  Earl Black and Merle Black, The Vital South (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1992, pp. 3-28.
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quest for House majorities in the current era o f two-party competition for House control. 
These districts represent ground zero in the aggressive drives by the two parties for House 
control, where nationalized campaigns, party agendas, the image of party leaders, and 
competing party philosophies each combine into a combustible political mixture. There are 
approximately 60 swing seats scattered across the United States which serve as a political 
barometer o f the country, as displayed in Appendix B.
The political story of America between 1988 and 1998 is contained in these swing 
seats. Fifty-one of these 60 House districts have experienced a change in party control in 
their representation in the U.S. House since 1990. These are the House districts that elected 
George Bush to the presidency in 1988 (54 of 60), helped elect Bill Clinton to the presidency 
in 1992 (50 out o f 60), and then re-elected Bill Clinton in 1996 (55 of 60). These districts 
have also tipped the balance of power in the House in the 1990s, and have reflected trends 
in the nationwide fight for House control in an era of two-party competition. House 
Democrats swept the swing seats in 1992 (44 of 60) as Bill Clinton won the presidency. 
House Republicans swept these seats in 1994 as they won control o f the House in their 
nationalized campaign (41 of 60). The aggressive Democratic campaign for House control 
in 1996 resulted in a swing seat victory of eight seats, with Republicans controlling 33 seats 
and Democrats winning 27 seats. In 1998, the two parties achieved virtual parity in their 
swing seat victories as Republicans won 32 seats and Democrats won 28 seats, mirroring the 
nationwide Democratic gain o f five House seats.
The two parties are currently fighting to increase their bases o f regional support while 
finding the center o f political gravity pivotal to win the swing seats. This creates interesting
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political problems as the parties appeal both to their hard-core base voters and the more
apolitical swing voters. Congressman Lee Hamilton (D-IN), a 34-year veteran o f the House,
described this change in American politics in the following manner:
The intensity' o f politics has gone up over the past few years. The more ideologically 
inclined individuals are being motivated to engage in political campaigns. Politicians, being 
politicians, naturally respond to these intense ideological groups. But the end result is that 
the parties are moving apart. The Democrats are being dragged to the left and the 
Republicans to the right. There is no one in the middle anymore, just a group of politicians 
who are responding to narrow ideological constituencies.'*®
To gin up their bases, both parties must often use the legislative process to energize 
their core constituencies and increase their turnout. Both parties have experienced the fate 
of ideological activists affecting primary outcomes and producing unelectable nominees for 
the general election campaign.*' The two parties must now appeal to swing, moderate voters 
while simultaneously appealing to their bases o f support on the right and left extremes. This 
delicate balancing act has left several political casualties and road-kill in its wake; there are 
few saints on the road to a House majority. Majority status has become the new cocaine of 
party politics, and this addiction drives the new race for House control. The changes 
resulting from the new race for the House are likely to persist in the next Democratic House, 
and the enduring repercussions of the tenuous majority will affect the House legislatively and 
politically for years to come.
*° Interview with Congressman Lee Hamilton (D-IN), 21 May 1998.
*' For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Aaron Wildavsky, Revolt Against the Masses 
(New York: Basic Books, 1971); Jeane Kirkpatrick, The New Presidential Elite (New 
York: Basic Books, 1976); and Nelson Polsby, Consequences o f Partv Reform (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1983). Unrepresentative nominating electorates have 
produced several ideologically pure but unelectable presidential candidates, like 
Republican Barry Goldwater in 1964 and Democrat George McGovern in 1972.
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During the lO]"', 104*, and 105* Congresses, both Democratic and Republican 
House majorities have been forced to deal with the political realities of increased two-party 
competition. The campaign operatives engaged in the incredibly competitive 1996 race for 
the Hou«;e have described it as “Armageddon,” “total warfare,” and “trench warfare,” — 
unrelenting warfare for every competitive district in the nation.'*^ House majorities face a 
perilous political course in this new era of two-party competition. Aggressive battles for 
majority status now accompany the traditional duties o f legislating and governing by a House 
majority. The imperatives of majority-formation and majority-retention activities provide 
structure to the House, altering it in the process. The Democratic majority o f the 103"* 
Congress, and the Republican majorities o f the 104* and 105* Congresses, have each 
encountered severe political problems as they have attempted to both govern and defend their 
majority. The parties now slug it out in no-holds-barred fights for House control, especially 
in the critical swing districts that determine who is going to sit in the Speaker’s chair. 
Research Design and Structure
This dissertation probes the new race for the House by analyzing how it has aAected 
three Congresses of the 1990s: the 103"* (1993-94), the 104* (1995-96), and the 105* (1997- 
98). It is based on three data sources: information gathered from the public record, 
interviews conducted with Members o f Congress and staff members on Capitol Hill, and 
observations from my experience as an American Political Science Association 
Congressional Fellow in the 105th Congress. This dissertation could not have been written 
without the fellowship experience in Washington, D C. The fellowship year provided
Interviews with DCCC and RNCC staffers, April-May 1998.
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invaluable immersion in the House as an institution during the throes o f two-party 
competition and jockeying for majority status. It also provided time to interview members 
of Congress to provide a more balanced and long-term view of the institution over time as 
it has adapted to the contours of two-party competition. In addition, I unabashedly gleaned 
as much information as possible from the Internet, tapping the research potential of the world 
wide web. 1 found Thomas (the home page of the House of Representatives) and the on-line 
home pages o f major newspapers like the New York Times. Roll Call. The Hill, the 
Washington Times, and the Washington Post to be invaluable soiuces of information.
In addition to the public record, 1 obtained valuable insights and quotations from 
interviews with Members o f Congress and their staffs. For this dissertation, I conducted 52 
interviews with Members o f Congress and their staffs between November 1997 and August 
1998, 30 interviews conducted with House members and 22 formal interviews conducted 
with congressional staffers. These interviews are listed in Appendix C. The interviews 1 
conducted with Members of Congress provided important background information and a 
road-map of larger trends in American politics and the new race for the House. In addition, 
I benefitted from numerous informal conversations with congressional staffers, political 
pollsters, and political strategists during my year on Capitol Hill. Many members requested 
anonymity in return for frank discussions of the politics involved in my dissertation topic. 
I am grateful to those members who agreed to be interviewed, and re-interviewed, to obtain 
their reactions to new developments. Almost all of the interview subjects requested off the 
record interviews, given the sensitive nature o f much of what was discussed (especially party 
strategies. Member’s views towards other Members, and behind-the-scenes politicking
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among Members and staff).
For each of Congress under review, I will examine the effects o f two-party 
competition for House control on House elections, party culture, and governance and 
leadership in the U.S. House. In terms of House elections, I will examine the tactics and 
strategies o f both parties used in the competitive contests for House control in the 1990s. 
The current era of competition for House control has wimessed nationalized campaigns by 
one or both parties in each of the Congresses under examination (103"’-105*). The 
prominence of these nationalized campaigns in the war for House control, especially for the 
critical swing seats, is adding a new dimension to our understanding of congressional 
elections, which during the previous era o f non-competition had been confined to the all- 
politics-is-local thesis. The nationalized campaigns of 1994, 1996, and 1998 provide 
important new templates for understanding and analyzing possible election strategies 
available to the new parties in periods o f competition and non-competition. In addition to 
examining the nationalized campaigns for House control in the 1990s, I will also examine 
the tactics employed by the two parties and their leaders to raise funds, recruit candidates, 
and provide campaign resources to increase the chances o f majority control. Quality 
congressional candidates are especially important in victories in the swing districts, where 
the strength o f individual candidates and their campaign messages are more important than 
party appeals. To obtain House majorities, leaders of both parties are intervening heavily in 
selected districts to recruit the best candidate to protect or grab key electoral plums, and 
training candidates how to win their elections.
In addition to examining election strategies and tactics, I will also examine the party
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cultures of the two parties and how they are changing and adapting in the midst of a 
competitive environment. The concept of culture makes an important contribution to 
political analysis, even though it has been given little attention in the literature and thus 
conceptually muddled. Political culture provides the context in which politics occurs, links 
individual and collective identities, defines and organizes political behavior within a distinct 
political entity, and provides a framework for interpreting the actions and motives of others. 
For instance, on a larger demographic level, every decade another ten members of the House 
represent predominantly suburban districts. These new suburban members come into the 
House of Representatives with a distinctly different cultural background than rural or urban 
members o f Congress.
For the purposes of this dissertation, party culture is used to capture two important, 
but often divergent, developments in the race for House control. On the one hand, there is 
an enduring party culture of House Democrats and House Republicans that animates 
fundamental differences between the two parties on policy, organization, ideology, and how 
their internal politics are conducted. Many Republican members o f the House, for instance, 
have strong roots in the business community and are unwilling to make service in the U.S. 
House a lifelong career.'*  ^ Many House Democrats, on the other hand, come to the House 
from a backgroimd of public service and have a belief in using the power o f the federal 
government to improve people’s lives. These differences, derived from the demographic 
trends which provide the electoral foundations o f the two parties, produce important.
Alan Ehrenhalt, The United States o f Ambition: Politicians. Power, and the Pursuit of 
Power (New York: Times Books, 1991), pp. 208-227.
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enduring and fundamental differences in party cultures in the House. In the 105* Congress, 
55% of House Republicans had careers in business or banking, compared to only 27% of 
House Democrats. Many House Republicans come to Congress for short “commando raids” 
against the growth o f the power and spending of the federal government. The enduring 
elements of the party cultures o f the two parties in the House, which are demographically 
based and change slowly over time due to tectonic demographic and political shifts in the 
country at large, are illustrated in Table 1-3.
Table 1-3: Enduring Elements of Republican and Democratic Culture in the House
Democratic Culture in the House Republican Culture in the House
Organization Coalition party, socially and 
politically heterogeneous with 
multiple power centers and 
demographic constituencies; party 
legitimacy determined by who you 
represent
More unitary, socially and politically 
homogeneous party comprised of leadership 
factions; expectation of being a “good 
solider” to the party cause; party legitimacy 
determined by who you know and which 
leadership faction you are associated
Values Strong federal government is 
necessary to counterbalance 
private economic domination; 
fairness as overriding value
Belief in free enterprise, limited government, 
and individual pursuit of their own dreams; 
individual success and limited government as 
overriding value; commitment to cultural 
conservatism by the Family Values Caucus
In addition to the enduring, demographically-driven elements of party culture, which 
are veiy difficult for party leaders and members to change or control, there is also another 
element o f party culture which can be altered and controlled by party leaders and members. 
This element of party culture involves internal cohesiveness, solidarity, and team work to 
achieve legislative and political goals. The demographically-controlled elements o f the party 
cultures o f the two parties are not dramatically changing in the current era o f competitive 
control. But the temporary party cultures revolving around group cohesiveness do change
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and alter from Congress to Congress as required by political developments and situations. 
For instance, during the rise of House Republicans to power in the early 1990s, Minority 
\^liip Newt Gingrich molded a distinct party culture o f teamwork for House Republicans 
which enabled them to think and act like a team to capture a majority. In the 103"^105* 
Congresses, House Republicans molded a distinct party culture based on the principles of 
party-building, loyalty to party and leadership factions, and working as a team to elect a 
Republican House majority. In the 104* and 105* Congresses, House Democratic leaders 
have likewise attempted to foster greater feelings o f teamwork and group camaraderie among 
Democratic members to secure a new House majority. My examination o f party culture will 
examine how party leaders, in the midst of competitive pressures to secure House majorities, 
are molding temporary adaptions to broader cultural frameworks.
In addition to elections and party cultures, 1 will also examine changes in the process 
of governing and legislating in the House during the current era of two-party competition. 
Agenda-control, leadership procedural control o f the chamber, and the types o f legislation 
and issues pushed in the House by the majority and minority parties each play prominent 
roles in the new race for the House. In addition to managing their internal coalitions in the 
House, majority and minority parties in the current competitive era use the governing process 
as an important electoral tool. Shutdown politics, triangulation, discharge petitions, and 
recess strategies are each representative o f the intersection of the governing process in the 
House and the new demands of party competition for House control. The party-centered 
theories o f congressional organization and action paid little attention to the goal o f capturing 
or defending a House majority and how this activity affected the governing process.
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Competitive incentives now play a powerful role in shaping the governing and legislative 
activities of the two parties in the House.
The 1994 and 1996 elections played a large role in spurring many of the ideas of this 
dissertation. This dissertation seeks to both provide a snapshot o f the competitive fights for 
House control in the 1990s and, in addition, illustrate how the electoral and institutional 
changes produced by intense two-party competition affect the House of Representatives. 
Although the activities in the 103^-105* Congresses are relatively recent, it is important that 
as political scientists and observers o f the modem House o f Representatives we understand 
and analyze the changes emanating from the new era o f two-party competition. In addition, 
as citizens who care about the state o f democratic institutions, it is imperative that we seek 
additional perspectives for long-term understanding of the House of Representatives, both 
historically and politically.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE 103"* CONGRESS AND THE 1994 CAMPAIGN:
The Republican Takeover o f the House 
and the New Era of Two-party Competition
The 103"* Congress and the 1994 campaign formally ushered in a new era o f two- 
party competition for House control. The 1994 election, in addition to ending 40 years of 
Democratic reign in the House, provided Republicans with a 52 seat net gain. During the 
103^ Congress, the two parties fashioned their governing and electoral strategies from 
differing assumptions, each with an eye toward attaining a House majority in the 1994 
elections. The Democratic majority, united with a Democratic president for the first time in 
12 years, intended to govern and pass into law several Democratic legislative priorities that 
had been stymied in the Reagan-Bush years. The Republican minority, sensing Democratic 
vulnerability on universal health care reform and Democratic tax and spend policies, 
unabashedly pursued majority status in the 1994 midterm election. House Republicans 
employed attack politics against the Democratic majority, focused their efforts on drawing 
sharp partisan distinctions, nationalized the 1994 congressional elections, and concentrated 
on farm team efforts to recruit, train, and elect scores o f Republicans to the U.S. House. 
Unlike previous decades, the political field had shifted in the 1990s, moving the House into 
a more competitive environment. As House Republicans took advantage of this new 
competitive playing field, the Democratic majority became blind-sided by the events o f the 
103"* Congress and the imperatives of defending a House majority in a competitive 
environment.
The 103"* Congress brought new challenges and opportunities for the Democratic
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House majority. Bill Clinton’s inauguration as president in 1993 ended 12 years o f divided 
government and gridlock, presenting Democrats with their first chance to govern since the 
Carter Administration in the 1970s.' House Democrats had high hopes they could pass into 
law Democratic policy priorities on the budget, health care, and domestic policy. Despite 
this opportunity to govern, the 1992 election presented ominous signals to the Democratic 
House majority that its long era of one-party rule was in jeopardy. The 1991 redistricting 
process shifted 19 House seats from the slower-growing, and Democratic-leaning, Northeast 
and Industrial Midwest regions to the faster-growing, and Republican-leaning, regions of the 
South and West. The 1992 elections witnessed an anti-incumbent attitude fueled by an 
economic recession, the defeat of President Bush for re-election, a protest vote of one-fifth 
of the electorate for independent candidate Ross Perot, and the election to the presidency of 
Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton with 43% of the vote.
Amidst the volatile politics of the 1992 presidential election. House Democrats lost 
a net ten seats, while 110 new House members poured into the House of Representatives. 
This was the largest influx of new members into the House since 1948. Many of the 63 new 
Democratic freshmen came to Washington stressing Perot’s themes o f reducing the 
burgeoning $290 billion federal deficit, implementing fiscal austerity to deal with looming 
entitlement problems, and congressional reform. Fifteen Democratic freshmen were elected 
to swing seats with under 55% of the vote, and four were elected to swing seats with under
' David S. Broder, “Good Overture From Clinton,” Washington Post 22 January 
1993, p A 21.
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50% of the vote.* Although voters gave Democrats control o f the presidency and the 
Congress, the foundations of this new power were weak. Democrats lost seats in the House, 
there was no net change in Senate seats, and Bill Clinton won a plurality victory in a three- 
way presidential race. Each o f these developments laid the groundwork for the competitive 
1994 election as voters soured on the Democratic agenda and President Clinton, while House 
Republicans went on the attack.
Much like the Titantic’s maiden voyage, silent icebergs awaited beyond the horizon 
to sink the high hopes that Democrats could deliver on an ambitious Democratic domestic 
policy agenda and survive the 1994 midterm. House Republicans effectively boycotted the 
governing process in the 103"' Congress, obstructing, undermining, and vilifying as much of 
the Democratic agenda as possible. Neither party in the House sought bipartisan compromise 
or governance. While Republicans boycotted the governing process, Democratic leaders 
pursued a partisan governing strategy of looking within their own caucus to pass budget, 
crime, and health care legislation. The Democratic majority subsequently moved to the left 
as its leaders searched for a working majority within its liberal-dominated caucus. This sharp 
move to the left on domestic policy created political problems for marginal House 
Democratic members facing tough races in 1994. This move to the left also provided House 
Republicans with an opening to attack Democrats throughout the 103"* Congress, and gave 
Republicans lethal ammunition for their 1994 nationalized campaign for House control.
Internal Democratic fissures, meanwhile, made agreement within the Democratic 
Caucus on large-scale policy initiatives like health care reform impossible. By the summer
* “Wave o f Diversity Spared Many Incumbents,” CO Almanac 1992. p. 15-A.
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of 1994, the Democratic House majority faced an inability to govern as its crime and health 
care proposals collapsed. In the 1994 midterm elections, Republicans bludgeoned the 
Democratic majority with its record on raising taxes, attempting to pass a national health care 
system, and refusing to pass welfare and congressional reform. These attacks allowed the 
GOP to gain 56 previously Democratic House seats, including 25 Democratic swing seats. 
The high-profile items of the Democratic agenda in the 103"' Congress, especially universal 
health care reform and the 1993 budget accord, boomeranged against all but the most liberal 
Democratic incumbents holding the safest liberal seats. House Democratic leaders did not 
fully realize the dangers to their House majority, especially to moderate and conservative 
Democratic candidates running in the non-urban areas, until it was too late.
While midterm elections are historically bad for presidents, the 1994 midterm 
represented a massive meltdown of Democratic campaigns and an unmitigated disaster for 
House Democrats.^ The defeat o f Speaker Thomas Foley (D-WA) marked the first time 
since 1860 that a Speaker of the House faced defeat in a re-election bid. Representative Jay 
Inslee (D-WA), one o f the 34 Democratic incumbents ousted in 1994, likened the election 
as “very similar to Mount St. Helens going off.” “ House Democrats lost 34 incumbents and 
the largest loss o f House seats in a midterm election since 1942. The Democratic majority 
of 258 in the 103"" Congress evaporated into a Republican majority o f 230 in the 104*
 ^See Harold W. Stanley, “The Parties, the President, and the 1994 Midterm Elections,” in 
Bert A. Rockman and Colin Campbell, eds.. The Clinton Presidencv: First Appraisals 
(Chatham, New Jersey; Chatham House Publishers, 1995), pp. 188-211.
Norah M. O’Donnell, “Still Recovering From 1994's GOP Eruption, Democrats In 
Washington State Target White, Metcalf, Smith Seats,” Roll Call Politics. 23 April 1998,
p. 26.
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Congress, with 73 new Republican freshmen flooding into the House and every Republican 
incumbent winning re-election. The Democratic loss o f open seats in 1994 was the largest 
loss of open House seats in 103 elections going back to 1790.’ In the critical swing seats, 
the Democratic swing-seat majority o f 44-16 transformed into a Republican swing-seat 
majority o f 41 -19. Republicans grabbed 21 conservative House seats in the South, West, and 
Midwest that had been previously represented by moderate or conservative Democrats. 
These seat gains provided a regional boost to Republicans in their natural bast of support - 
the South - and moved the battle for House control to the pivotal swing seats. For the 
remainder o f the 1990s, the two parties would fight on the campaign trail for majority control 
over a relatively modest number of swing and marginal seats.
Although the House was slowly moving into a period o f two-party competitiveness 
in the early 1990s, the Democratic majority continued to operate in the 103"* Congress as if 
the era o f non-competition would continue unabated into the 21st century. House 
Democratic leaders in the 1980s and early 1990s had used their strong procedural control of 
the House floor and the Rules Committee to structure the legislative process to block 
consideration o f initiatives opposed by liberals within the Democratic Caucus, like 
entitlement reforms, term limits, and deficit reduction based on domestic spending cuts. In 
the 103"  ^Congress, Democrats continued to govern in this manner, although they met stiff 
resistance from a newly aggressive Republican minority and moderate Democrats queasy 
about confronting voters without centrist legislative accomplishments. The middle class
’ Dave Kaplan and Juliana Gruenwald, “Longtime ‘Second’ Party Scores a Long List of 
GOP Firsts,” Congressional Ouarterlv. 12 November 1994, p. 3232.
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anger that ejected President Bush in the 1992 election did not dissipate in the 1994 election 
cycle; instead. House Republicans trained it on House Democratic incumbents and 
candidates in a nationalized campaign for House control. These competitive demands drove 
the dynamics o f the 103^ ** Congress, both within the House in terms of legislation and 
governing and on the campaign trail with the Republican’s nationalized campaign.
The 1993 Clinton budget, universal health care reform, and the 1994 crime bill 
defined the 103’^*' Congress and the fight for party control in 1994.* President Clinton and 
congressional Democratic leaders believed that an intense focus on domestic policy 
accomplishments would help all House Democrats nmning for re-election in 1994. In 
addition. House Democratic leaders decided that they would stress policy issues like health 
care reform and deficit reduction over more mundane internal house-keeping matters like 
congressional reform and lobbying reform. They also decided to eschew Republican 
involvement in the health, budget, and crime bills in order to produce more Democratic 
legislation, and used their procedural powers in the House to block measures that threatened 
the policy and political preferences of the liberal majority within the Democratic Caucus. 
As the Democratic majority governed firom the left both to craft policy and pass legislation, 
it shut down the legislative process to measures desperately needed by moderate and 
conservative House Democrats facing tough races in the swing seats or in the South and 
West. Each of these decisions laid the foundation for the electoral terrain of the 103"* 
Congress, and haunted the Democratic majority as it faced aggressive Republican attack
* For more on this subject consult: Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidencv
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994).
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campaigns in the 1994 midterm.
On August 5, 1993, House Democrats passed by a razor-thin margin of 218-216 the 
1993 Omnibus Budget-Reconciliation Act (PL 103-66). This legislation cut the deficit by 
$504.8 billion over five years, primarily through $250.1 billion in tax increases and cuts in 
military spending. Opponents of the 1993 budget accord in both parties attacked it for 
raising taxes too much and curbing domestic spending and entitlement spending too little. 
Forty-one House Democrats opposed this budget plan due to its over-reliance on tax 
increases and avoidance of domestic spending cuts. Every House Republican, meanwhile, 
opposed the 1993 budget and castigated it as the largest tax increase in the history of public 
finance, in addition to the deficit reduction package of 1993, the Clinton Administration 
made reform of the nation’s health care system a top priority. On September 22, 1993, 
President Clinton unveiled a 1,342 page health care reform proposal requiring universal 
health care for every American citizen, the creation of new health alliances, and employer 
mandates for health coverage of employees. Democrats were unable to find agreement on 
health care reform, and sustained opposition from congressional Republicans and outside 
interest groups helped to kill it at the end o f the 103"^  Congress. Once again. Republicans 
castigated the Clinton health care plan as a big-govemment power grab.
In addition to health care reform and reducing the deficit. Democratic leaders also 
tackled anti-crime legislation in the 103"* Congress to do something about crime in the wake 
o f the 1992 Los Angeles riots. On September 13, 1994, President Clinton signed into law 
a $30.2 billion, six-year anti-crime bill (PL 103-322) that provided money for new prisons, 
banned 19 types o f semi-automatic assault rifles, provided fimding for 100,000 new police
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officers, and extended the federal death penalty to dozens of new and existing federal crimes. 
Although the final version of the crime bill moved federal crime policy to the right. 
Republicans focused their attacks on the more liberal crime bill originally produced by the 
Democratic majority. While each of these high-profile legislative items tackled an important 
public policy issue - reducing the deficit, reforming health care, and addressing the crime 
issue - the manner in which the Democratic majority handled each issue politically and 
procedurally became hot issues for the Republican nationalized campaign of 1994. The 
Republican minority repeatedly framed each of Democratic domestic policy initiatives as a 
big-govemment power grab of raising taxes, coddling criminals, and launching new social 
programs.
As the Democratic majority stumbled in the 103^ "' Congress, House Republicans 
increasingly availed themselves to the attack politics advocated and preached by Republican 
Minority Whip Newt Gingrich. During the 1980s and 1990s, Gingrich schooled an entire 
generation o f House Republicans in aggressive majority-forming strategies and tactics, and 
advocated tough political street-fighting tactics to achieve a Republican House of 
Representatives. In the 103"* Congress, House Republicans had more to gain by obstructing 
and impeding the Democratic majority in order to gain a Republican majority in 1994 than 
in cooperating with Democrats to craft policy solutions that could lengthen their stay in the 
minority. Defiance supplanted acquiescence within House Republican ranks. The end of 
divided government in the 103"* Congress fi’eed House Republicans of the political handcuffs 
that had previously bound them to some modicum of responsibility for governance in the 
Reagan-Bush years. Unlike previous Congresses, where House Republicans helped make
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divided government work between Republican presidencies and Democratic Congresses, 
House Republicans pursued an aggressive strategy for achieving majority status in the 103"* 
Congress.
GOVERNING
The Democratic Majority Governs
House Democratic leaders confronted several daunting challenges as they constructed 
the Democratic legislative agenda for the 103"* Congress. House Democratic leaders faced 
a complex relationship with President Clinton, who ran for president in 1992 as an outsider 
“New Democrat” promising change and economic renewal amidst the recession of the early 
1990s. Clinton made several criticisms of the Democratically-controlled Congress in 1992, 
including a 30-second television advertisement in the New Hampshire primary that 
condemned the Democratic Congress’s recent congressional pay raise. In addition, 
candidate Clinton offered a third-way in American politics “neither conservative or liberal. 
Democratic or Republican,” while dodging numerous personal scandals on the road to the 
White House.^ After the 1992 election. House Democratic leaders were compelled to work 
closely with a president-elect untested in the ways o f Washington. Representative Tim 
Penny (D-MI) captured this complex relationship between House Democrats and Clinton, 
especially House Democratic concern of the “character issue,” when he stated “With Clinton,
’ William Schneider, “For Democrats, No News is Good News,” National Journal. 25 
July 1992, p. 1762; Richard E. Cohen, “Keeping Their Distance,” National Journal. 11 
April 1992, pp. 865-68; Richard E. Cohen, “No Honeymoon Cruise,” National Journal. 7 
November 1992, p. 2552.
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there is a fear that another shoe will drop.”*
As Clinton assumed office in 1993, House Democratic leaders confronted the 
challenge of forming a united Democratic legislative agenda that could keep the diverse 
House Democratic caucus together and provide a record for all House Democrats in the 1994 
campaign. Democratic leaders also confronted numerous public policy problems facing the 
United States in the short and long term, from reviving the sluggish economy to reducing the 
deficit and reforming the nation's health care system. In addition. Democratic House leaders 
were stripped with the safety provided by divided government they enjoyed in the Reagan- 
Bush years, where they possessed the perfect foil to deflect blame. The election of a 
Democratic president brought the power of unified government to House Democratic leaders. 
It also left the Democratic majority fully exposed to the scrutiny and demands o f governing 
responsibilities.
Speaker Foley, in conjunction with other House Democratic leaders, decided shortly 
after the 1992 election that Democrats would spend the 103"* Congress legislating a 
Democratic agenda in tandem with the new Clinton presidency. Providing tangible policy 
results became an important goal for House Democratic leaders, especially after the gridlock 
of the 102"  ^ Congress. In 1992, President Bush had vetoed 21 bills including several 
legislative items important to House Democrats like family leave, motor voter registration, 
and an urban tax bill.’ Democratic leaders reasoned that a healthy governing agenda that
* Richard E. Cohen, "Keeping Their Distance,” National Journal. 11 April 1992, pp. 865- 
68 .
’ “President Bush’s Vetoes.. A Near Perfect Record,” CO Almanac 1992. pp. 6-7.
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included health care reform, deficit reduction, and the passage of scores o f Democratic 
domestic policy priorities would provide a substantial legislative record for all House 
Democrats as they faced re-election in 1994, especially the 63 Democratic freshmen facing 
their first re-election races. In reality, the Democratic legislative agenda of the 103"^  
Congress, especially the budget and health care items, split the Democratic Caucus between 
its liberal and moderate wings, unified House Republicans in opposition, and energized 
conservative base voters important to Republican electoral hopes.
As part of this Democratic strategy to govern in a responsible fashion in order to 
provide a record for the 1994 election. Speaker Foley persuaded president-elect Clinton 
shortly after the 1992 election to make deficit-reduction a top legislative priority. The 
decision to tackle the deficit problem became the first key decision made by House 
Democratic leaders and President C lin to n .A  majority o f  the 1992 Democratic freshmen 
were deeply affected by the message of fiscal discipline articulated by Ross Perot in the 1992 
presidential campaign, including deficit reduction, fiscal austerity, and congressional 
reform." By addressing the deficit issue first, which animated the angry Perot voters in 
1992, Democratic leaders thought they would be making an important down payment on the 
pressing political needs of the Democratic freshmen for 1994.'^ To aid in the goal of deficit 
reduction, Clinton’s 1992 campaign promise o f a middle class tax cut was dropped even
Bob Woodward, The Agenda: Inside the Clinton White House (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1994), pp. 70-84.
" Graeme Browning, “The Gang of 114,” National Journal. 22 January 1994, p. 158.
'* Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge.fNew York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 61.
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before his inauguration in 1993.'^
The push for deficit reduction by Foley and Democratic House leaders dominated the 
Democratic agenda in 1993 as the Clinton Administration and congressional Democrats 
hammered out a budget accord that could reduce the deficit while attracting enough 
Democratic votes to pass. For House Democratic leaders, delivering on the big-ticket items 
of a Democratic domestic agenda, like deficit reduction and health care reform, superseded 
matters like congressional reform which they considered a boring institutional issue which 
voters did not care about. Throughout the 103'** Congress, Democratic leaders governed in 
a manner that minimized the potential for mischief not only by Republican attack but also 
within Democratic ranks. For instance. Democratic leaders believed that if  a popular reform 
like congressional reform passed early in the 103"* Congress, other key reforms like 
campaign finance reform would be ignored by Democratic members and therefore never be 
enacted. As a result, congressional accoimtability became the “train” for a unified 
Democratic reform package. When congressional reform did not materialize in a timely 
fashion, the entire Democratic reform effort was imdermined.
On health care reform, like the 1993 budget agreement. Democratic leaders governed 
from the left in pursuit of Democratic votes at the expense o f cutting Republicans out of the 
policymaking process. In the process. Democratic leaders ignored modest, bipartisan health 
care proposals produced by moderate and conservative House Democrats which attracted 
moderate Republican interest. Instead, Majority Leader Gephardt (D-MO) offered a
John M. Broder and Michael Ross, “Clinton Nominee Scales Back Promise o f 8 
Million New Jobs,” Los Angeles Times. 22 January 1993, p. A 26.
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leadership-drafted legislative health care proposal that attempted to meet President Clinton’s 
demand of universal coverage while still being able to attract enough Democratic votes to 
pass on the House. This legislation, unveiled on July 29, 1994, actually went farther to the 
left than the Clinton health care reform proposal in terms o f expanding the reach and scope 
of the federal government. Both the Clinton health care plan and the House Democratic 
health care reform package pursued the goal o f universal coverage, a new government 
entitlement program only popular with liberztl voters in the Democratic base. No health care 
reform passed in the 103"* Congress as rank-and-file House Democrats in tough re-election 
races abandoned both the Clinton health care reform proposal and the more liberal House 
Democratic leadership package of health care reforms. As Democratic leaders pursued a 
partisan liberal strategy on health care reform, they stoked the flames of opposition among 
House Republicans and laid the groundwork for the nationalized Republican campaign in the 
1994 campaign. Meanwhile, Democratic pursuit o f a solution to health care reform crowded 
out consideration o f President Bill Clinton’s 1992 election promise to reform the nation’s 
welfare system.
The Democratic majority in the 103"* Congress, dominated by the duty to govern, 
pursued substantive policy solutions to the deficit, crime, and health care problems 
confronting the United States. Despite this duty to govern. Democratic leaders led a party 
with little discipline and the difficulty o f marshaling an increasingly individualized caucus. 
Rampant House Democratic defections on each of the major Democratic agenda items forced 
narrow wins, typified by the narrow Democratic victory on the 1993 budget accord that relied 
on a razor-thin margin of 218 Democratic votes as the Clinton Administration and House
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Democratic leaders pried reluctant votes with every remedy available. On the crime bill. 
Democratic leaders pursued a similar strateg>- of operating within the Democratic caucus to 
find the votes for passage. Once again. House Democrats held a substantive debate within 
their ranks on crime policy, and crafted legislation without bipartisan input or Republican 
support. On health care reform. Democratic leaders followed the leadership o f President 
Clinton and the task force led by First Lady Hillary Clinton; when this effort collapsed, so 
did House Democratic efforts to enact major health care reform. On each of these legislative 
measures. House Democratic leaders took seriously their responsibility to govern and deliver 
on a post-Cold War domestic policy agenda. But on each issue. Democratic leaders became 
stymied and hamstrung as its flaccid majority became pulled in several competing directions, 
an aggressive minority attacked, and the Clinton presidency floundered.
Despite these problems, the Democratic majority governing strategy led to the 
enactment of a wide variety o f policy proposals into law. In addition to the 1993 budget and 
1994 crime bill, the Democratic majority enacted into law a $2.5 billion aid package for 
Russia, the Brady Bill, an expansion of the earned income tax credit, family and medical 
leave legislation, motor-voter legislation, the North American Free Trade Agreement, the 
reinventing government initiative, national service legislation, and Goals 2000. The 
Democratic majority also completed all the 13 must-pass appropriations bills on time, the 
first time since 1988. These legislative victories, however, were obscured by the larger hot- 
button issues o f the 103^ '* Congress, especially the debates surrounding Democratic health 
and budget policies.
While focusing legislative attention on their domestic agenda. House Democratic
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leaders exerted strong procedural control of the House floor and the Rules Committee to 
block serious consideration of congressional reform, welfare reform, and additional deficit 
reduction based on spending cuts.
These agenda items, strongly pushed by the Republican minority and a growing cadre 
of moderate and conservative Democrats, created political headaches for House Democratic 
leaders trying to maintain control of the legislative agenda. Democratic inaction on welfare 
reform and congressional reform provided additional political headaches for House 
Democrats running in marginal districts. Although House Democratic leaders kept a strong 
control of the legislative in the House, this strong control had the adverse effect o f denying 
House Democratic incumbents in tough races a forum to push issues o f concern in their 
respective districts. House Democratic leaders won the fight on the formal agenda on the 
House floor, but in many aspects lost the larger symbolic wars over the definition o f the 103"* 
Congress to base and swing voters in the 1994 campaign. Democratic management of the 
House, and the issues they selected to pursue in the 103"* Congress, became hot issues in for 
House Republicans in 1994 as they articulated anti-Clinton, anti-Democratic themes in their 
campaigns.
The fight over discharge petitions in the 103"* Congress presents a compelling 
example of how Democratic leaders fought to maintain control o f the legislative process in 
order to govern, but created political problems for House Democratic incumbents in 
competitive districts facing the brunt o f Republican attacks. House Democratic leaders and 
committee chairmen had traditionally kept tight control of the legislative process in order to 
govern effectively, and increasingly used this procedural control o f the chamber to block
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floor consideration of several items to conservative Democrats and Republicans, including 
term limits, the line-item veto, the balanced budget amendment, welfare reform, and 
congressional reform. A discharge petition provided the only legislative route for dissenting 
members to bj^pass the procedural control o f the House by congressional leaders and 
committee chairs. If 218 House members sign a discharge petition regarding a piece of 
legislation, then that legislation bypasses the committee and is immediately brought to the 
House floor for consideration. Since 1931, discharge petition signatures were secret pursuant 
to a ruling o f Speaker Nance Gamer (D-TX).
In 1993, House Democratic leaders fought a growing coalition o f  House Republicans 
and conservative Democrats, led by Representative James Inhofe (R-OK), over the secrecy 
requirement o f discharge petitions. House Republicans believed that opening the discharge 
petition signature process would provide an avenue to publicly illustrate the intransigence 
of the Democratic House majority on other issues important to Republicans and 
conservatives, like welfare reform, term limits, congressional reform, and spending cuts. 
House Republicans publicized the discharge petition issue through talk radio’s Rush 
Limbaugh show, Perot’s United We Stand America, and direct-mail fund-raising appeals.'* 
In the process, they succeeded in transforming a previously arcane procedural fight into a 
successful symbolic rallying point in the war for House control in the 103"* Congress, 
framing the issue as open, accountable government versus old-style congressional barons.
'■* *‘218 Votes for Sunshine,” Washington Post. 14 September 1993, p. A 20.
'* Thomas Mann and Norman Omstein, “No Smoke, No Barons,” Washington Post. 
27 September 1993, p. A 19; Mary Jacoby, “Surrender! Leaders Cave on Discharge,” 
Roll Call. 23 September 1993, p. 1.
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House Democratic leaders argued that ending the secrecy requirement would open 
the discharge petition process to abuse, place pressure on members from interest groups 
seeking discharge petition signatures, and deprive the committees and the majority party 
control o f both the legislative process and the legislative agenda. Energy and Commerce 
Committee chairman John Dingell (D-MI) opposed the discharge petition drive by stating 
“you lay the basis for the entire bypassing of the committee system.” '* Rules Committee 
chairman Joseph Moakley (D-MA) explained that the Republican media campaign, aimed 
at Perot voters and talk radio audiences, drove the dynamics o f the debate: “This secrecy 
thing Just took over, and nobody looked beyond it...Instead of the court o f last resort, they 
[discharge petitions] will become the court of first resort.””  The fight over ending the 
secrecy requirement o f discharge petitions, in addition to providing campaign ammunition 
for House Republicans, deprived Democratic leaders of an important procedural tool for 
governing the House.'* Discharge petitions would later be used by the Democratic minority 
in the 1 OS"* Congress to embarrass the Republican majority on campaign finance reform and 
managed care reform, just as the Republican minority used them in the 103"* Congress to 
embarrass the Democratic majority.
The discharge petition fight in the fall of 1993 created additional problems for
'* Mary Jacoby, “Surrender! Leaders Cave on Discharge.”
”  Ibid.
'* Mary Jacoby, “GOP Will Use Discharge Petitions To Bring Attention to Two Issues,’ 
Roll Call. 14 February 1994, p I; David E. Rosenbaum, “In Jargon-Filled Talk About 
Budgets, A Debate o f Politics Over Substance,” New York Times. 19 July 1994, p.
A 16.
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Democratic leaders as they struggled to maintain control o f the agenda in the fall of 1993 and 
the spring of 1994. After their defeat on discharge petitions. House Democratic leaders used 
their control o f the legislative and governing process to defeat a coalition o f fiscally 
conservative House Democrats and Republicans clamoring for more deficit reduction. 
Democratic leaders used their procedural powers and twisted arms to defeat two bipartisan 
deficit reduction measures, the “Penny-Kasich” and “A-to-Z” proposals. During 
consideration o f the 1993 budget plan. House Democratic leaders promised fiscally 
conservative House Democrats a chance to vote on additional deficit reduction and spending 
cuts before the end of 1993.” But this promise became a mirage to many conservative 
Democrats clamoring for political cover on deficit reduction before the 1994 elections. The 
fiscal year 1995 budget resolution passed by the House contained no new deficit reduction.
To keep their promise to Democratic deficit hawks on spending cuts, the Clinton 
Administration and Democratic leaders presented a $11.5 billion rescissions package in 
November of 1993 as part o f Vice President Gore’s “reinventing government” initiative. 
Deficit hawks Timothy Permy (D-MI) and John Kasich (R-OH) offered an amendment to this 
rescissions bill to cut an additional $90 billion over five years, primarily through cuts in 
Medicare and defense spending.^" House Democratic leaders and Clinton Administration 
officials mounted an aggressive campaign to kill the Penny-Kasich amendment by placing 
pressure on members about the deleterious effect of spending cuts on various federal
” “Congress Wrangles Over More Budget Cuts,” CO Almanac 1993. p. 140.
Donald Lambro, “Bipartisan Spending Scissorhands,” Washington Times. 4 November 
1993,p. A 16.
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operations.*' As a result o f this intense arm-twisting against further deficit reduction based 
on domestic spending cuts, the Penny-Kasich amendment narrowly failed, 213-219, on 
November 22, 1993.
After the death o f Penny-Kasich, House Republicans and conservative Democrats 
used the discharge petition process in an attempt to bring the “A-to-Z” deficit-reduction 
proposal to the floor, sponsored by Representatives Robert Andrews (D-NJ) and Bill Zeliff 
(R-NH). The “A-to-Z” plan called for devoting 56 hours o f floor time in the House for 
debate and votes on any spending cut amendment brought to the floor by members." As 
Democratic leaders and the Clinton administration continued to block additional deficit 
reduction on the House floor beyond the 1993 budget agreement, support for the “A-to-Z” 
deficit reduction plan grew among frustrated deficit hawk Democrats and among House 
Republicans.*^
Democratic leaders viewed the “A-to-Z” proposal as an irresponsible abridgment of 
the appropriations process and a publicity-seeking gambit by an aggressive minority party 
seeking the majority. House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO) charged that the 
“A-to-Z” plan would “turn the United States Congress into the United States Circus,” and
*' Eric Pianin, “Administration Steps Up Attack on Peimy-Kasich Spending Cuts,” 
Washington Post. 19 November 1993, p. A 27; Rick Henderson, “Deficit Chickens,” 
Reason. February 1994, p. 38; Michael Barone, “The Rocky Road Ahead for Clinton,” 
U.S. News & World Report. 6 December 1993, p. 36.
"  George Hager, “Appeal o f ‘A to Z’ Puts Leaders in a Precarious Position,” 
Congressional Ouarterlv. 25 Jime 1994, p. 1681.
^ House Democratic Leaders Block ‘A to Z’ Plan,” CO Almanac 1994. p. 88; Bill ZelifF, 
“Blocking A to Z Spending Cuts,” Washington Times. 5 May 1994, p. A 19.
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helped lead the successful Democratic leadership drive to kill the proposal by discouraging 
Democratic members from signing the discharge petition.^^ To stop the growing list of 
signatures to the “A-to-Z” discharge petition. Democratic leaders promised fiscally 
conservative House Democrats House floor votes on eight budget process votes dealing with 
spending cuts later in the lOS"' Congress. In the summer o f 1994, Democratic leaders 
employed king-of-the-hill procedures to structure the debate surrounding the promised 
budget process votes, blunting their intent and insuring no substantive action would be 
enacted into law before adjournment.*’ The “A-to-Z” proposal gained 204 of 218 needed 
discharge petition signatures before dying at the end of the 103"* Congress, while each of the 
budget-process bills passed by the House in 1994 died at the end of the 103"' Congress due 
to inaction in the Senate.
Through the discharge petition fights and the defeat of Penny-Kasich and “A-to-Z,” 
Democratic leaders protected their control of the legislative process, protected the primacy 
of their domestic agenda in the 103"* Congress, and defended the prerogative of their House 
majority to govern unimpeded by minority party mischief. But by protecting their procedtu-al
Patrice Hill, “House Democrats Maneuvering to Head Off Spending-Cut Session,” 
Washington Times. 18 June 1994, p. A 4.
■’ In the 1980s and 1990s, the Democratic Majority frequently used modified rules to 
procedurally structure activity on the House floor in a manner advantageous to all House 
Democratic incumbents. In the “king-of-the-hill” procedure. House Democratic leaders 
would allow members to vote on a series of amendments to a bill, but only the 
amendment that won last would ultimately be adopted. This procedure allowed members 
to vote for all the amendments offered, while Democratic leaders could insure their 
desired amendment could ultimately win out by simply making it the last amendment to 
receive a floor vote. The Republican majority o f the 104* and 105* Congresses used 
“queen-of-the-hill” procedures to similarly control the amending process. Under these 
procedures, the amendment garnering the most votes was ultimately adopted.
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control of the floor so the Democratic majority could govern. Democratic leaders ignored the 
larger policy concerns fueling these fights, like the drive to balance the budget and end 
decades o f deficit spending. By failing to more forcefully address the deficit issue beyond 
the 1993 budget agreement. Democratic leaders hurt vulnerable House Democrats in swing 
seats and in conservative districts as Republicans framed the political debate o f a “tax-and- 
spend” Democratic Congress that could not be trusted with the power of the purse.
The decision by House Democratic leaders to use their institutional and procedural 
powers to block welfare reform, congressional reform, Penny-Kasich, “A-to-Z,” and 
entitlement reforms provided an already aggressive House Republican minority with ready­
made campaign issues for continued attacks against Democratic incumbents and challengers 
running in marginal and conservative districts. In addition, vulnerable House Democrats on 
the front lines o f two-party competition in the 1994 campaign were deprived o f important 
political cover on the issues which animated Perot voters and Republican base voters like 
ending deficit spending and reforming Congress institutionally. A southern House Democrat 
placed this situation in perspective regarding the agenda of the 103"  ^Congress:
If Democrats had come in and pushed a balanced budget and welfare reform in the 103"*, we 
would still be the majority party today. The House Democratic leadership, the liberals, said 
absolutely not.’ But the real kicker is that much deeper cuts passed under the Republicans 
in the 104'*'. So we could have gotten away with the spending cuts in the 103"* and possibly 
saved the House.
House Democratic leaders decided that the House Democratic majority would govern 
from within the Democratic Caucus, in conjunction with the new Clinton presidency, to 
address Democratic policy concerns blocked during the Reagan-Bush years. With an 
acquiescent Republican minority intent on governing with the majority party, this strategy
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may have been successful in retaining the Democratic majority in the 1994 election. But in 
an era o f stiff two-party competition, this strategy failed to defend Democrats holding swing 
seats. Democrats defending conservative districts in the South, or for Democratic retention 
of the large number of Democratic open-seats in the South and across the nation. The three 
big-ticket items on the Democratic legislative agenda consisting o f the 1993 budget, the 
crime bill, and health care reform exhibited the limits o f the Democratic governing strategy 
of the 103^ Congress. The 1993 budget passed by a two vote margin of 218-216, the rule 
for the crime bill faced defeat on the House floor, and internal Democratic disputes and 
organized opposition by Republicans and other health-policy groups prevented health care 
reform legislation from even coming to the House floor.
The Republican Obstruction Strategy
The Republican minority of the 103^ Congress adopted an obstructionist strategy 
designed to paint clear party lines between the two parties for the 1994 elections. House 
Republicans made several decisions early in the 103^ Congress to both oppose the 
Democratic agenda and even attempt to kill it before it could be enacted into law. This 
strategy became intricately linked with Republican efforts to grab a House majority in 1994. 
House Republicans decided early on to oppose the major items of the Democratic agenda, 
including the 1993 budget plan and universal health care reform.'® These decisions 
contributed to the legislative train wreck at the end of 1994, as the entire Democratic 
legislative agenda came crashing down amidst internal House Democratic fissures,
Michael Rust, “The GOP Gropes for a Winning Agenda,” Insight on the News. 28 
February 1994, p. 18.
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Republican obstructionism, and aggressive attacks by House Republicans on the motives and 
policies o f the Democratic majority. This obstruction strategy represented the abandonment 
o f previous Republican acquiescence in the House and the adoption of negative attack 
politics to aggressively fight for a Republican House of Representatives.
In the Reagan-Bush era (1981-1992), House Republicans worked with the 
Democratic majority and a Republican White House to produce laws and make the 
legislative system work, especially with the 1986 tax reform law in the 99th Congress ( 1985- 
1986), the legislative deals of the 100* Congress ( 1987-1988), and in the formulation of the 
1990 deficit reduction accord in the 101* Congress ( 1989-1990). Republican control of the 
White House, combined with the leadership o f Republican Minority leader Bob Michel (R- 
IL), provided incentives for House Republicans to cooperate in the governing process. Even 
on legislative matters like the tax-increasing 1990 budget agreement, which violated the anti­
tax philosophy of most House Republicans, a majority of House Republicans worked with 
the Democratic majority and a Republican White House to tackle the deficit issue 
collectively. In the 103"* Congress, House Republicans gambled it was better to obstruct and 
attack the Democratic agenda o f increasing the size and scope o f the federal government 
instead of working with the Democratic majority to improve their policy proposals. In the 
1994 election. House Republicans used this opposition as the cornerstone of their 
nationalized campaign.*’
The death o f the Clinton health care plan illustrates the success o f the Republican
Tod Lindberg, “Capitol Gain: What Republicans will do if they win the Congress,” 
Policv Review. Summer 1994, p. 23.
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obstruction strategy of the 103"* Congress. House Republicans viewed the Clinton health 
care plan not only as a bad agenda item legislative, but also as a big-govemment power grab 
that threatened long-term GOP prospects for majority control at all levels o f government.'* 
In 1991, Gingrich predicted that passage of Democratic-sponsored national health care 
would culminate in middle-class dependence on a mammoth federal entitlement program, 
making the middle class politically indebted to the Democrats at election time.-’ House 
Republicans labeled the Clinton health care plan “Clintoncare,” a grand embodiment of 
contemporary big-govemment liberalism. Republican strategist William Kristol became one 
of the first pundits to publicly urge Republicans to oppose the Clinton health care plan, and 
called President Clinton’s health care effort a big-govemment power grab of 14% of the U.S. 
economy akin to the German decision to invade Russia in 1941. According to Kristol, if 
Clinton took Moscow by passing his health plan, the balance o f political power would 
permanently shift in the Democrats favor. If Republicans resisted universal health care 
reform and turned “Clintoncare” into the Democrat’s Stalingrad, then a hollow liberalism 
would lose everything in the 1994 elections.^"
Instead of working with House Democrats and the Clinton Administration to improve 
health care reform legislation. House Republicans followed Kristol’s advice and attacked the
■* Thomas Scarlett, “Killing Health Care Reform,” Campaigns & Elections. 
October/November 1994, pp. 34-37.
■’ Haynes Johnson and David S. Broder, The Svstem: The American Wav o f Politics at 
the Breaking Point (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1996), pp. 38-40.
Adam Meyerson, “Kristol Ball: William Kristol Looks at the Future of the GOP,” 
Policv Review. Winter 1994, p. 14.
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Clinton health plan as a big-govemment scheme to create 155 new bureaucracies, expand 47 
others, create 100 new federal regulations, and enact unpopular social policies through the 
back door.^' The 1,364 bill detailing the Clinton health plan, the product o f500 public policy 
experts in secrecy on First Lady Hillary Clinton’s Health Care Reform task force, became 
an easy target for attack. Republican Conference Secretary Dick Armey (R-TX) framed the 
Republican agenda against the Clinton care plan in blunt language that left no room for 
legislative compromise on health care reform. Framing the decision to adopt a universal 
health care system the choice between a free state and socialism, Armey stated “The new 
testament sets forth how people should live in about 180,000 words. The health care plan 
bill does it in 260,000.” -^
These aggressive tactics used by House Republicans were not confined solely to the 
Clinton health care plan. House Republicans used similar strategies and arguments to 
likewise frame the 1993 Clinton budget plan as a tax-and-spend budget that did nothing to 
tackle the deficit. Similarly, House Republicans framed the first version o f the Democrat’s 
1994 crime bill as a social spending bill which was weak on criminals.^^ Through these 
efforts. House Republicans eschewed policy-making roles with the Democratic majority and 
discovered there was greater political mileage, and a Republican House majority, through 
attack, opposition, and obstruction. For House Republicans, opposition and obstruction of
Dick Armey and Newt Gingrich, “The Welfarization of Health Care,” National Review. 
7 February 1994, pp. 53-56.
Ibid.. p. 54.
David S. Cloud, “Health Care’s Painful Demise Cast Pall on Clinton’s Agenda,” 
Congressional Quarterly. 5 November 1994, pp. 3142-45.
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the Democratic legislative agenda laid the groimdwork for their nationalized campaign for 
majority control.
As they campaigned for a House majority in the new era of two-party competition. 
House Republicans bypassed the legislative process in order to use symbolism to frame 
arguments and issue agendas against the Democratic House majority in media outlets. 
Representative John Boehner (R-OH), who successfully framed the House Bank scandal 
against the Democratic majority as a freshman member in the 102^ Congress, stressed the 
importance o f “taking your case to the public. Find a way to relate what you’re trying to do 
to the American public.’’”  Minority Whip Newt Gingrich (R-GA) articulated his media 
strategy against the Democratic majority, and the Republican focus on media symbolism, 
by stating:
If people ask, ’Why is he on TV all the time,’ my answer is ’That’s how you reach 260 
million people.’ If you’re out there taking the Democrats on, people say Why are you doing 
that?’ The answer is: That’s how you attract attention so people can tell who’s you and 
who’s them.”
In order to find and articulate symbolic issues that could resonate with the public at 
large and focus their attention on majority party in the House, required a different type of 
thinking by House Republicans regarding their role in the House. Instead of acquiescing, 
they attacked. Instead of legislating, they obstructed. Representative Bill Paxon (R-NY), 
NRCC Chairman in the 103"* Congress, captured this new minority party governing strategy 
by stating “During the ’80s, everyone was, in a way, their own leader. In winning the House,
”  Juliet Eilperin and Jim Vande Hei, “Some Wounds Never Heal: Today’s GOP 
Leadership Struggle Has Roots in ‘Guerrilla’ Warriors of the 1980s,” p. 27.
”  Ibid.
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we went from being guerrillas in the jungle to managing what became a very large army.” *^ 
Managing this army required new campaigning and media skills from Republican House 
leaders, rather than legislative aptitude and deal-making skills.
fhe obstruction and attack politics o f House Republican in the 103"* Congress 
culminated in the death of the Democratic legislative agenda at the end of the 103"* 
Congress.”  House Republicans, in conjunction with their Senate colleagues, openly killed 
much of the legislative agenda during the waning days of the 103^ Congress.^* The first 
salvo of this strategy was fired on August 11,1994 when Gingrich led a coalition of House 
Republicans, anti-gim control members, and black Democratic members to defeat the rule 
governing the crime bill. Although this bill later passed on August 21, 1994, House 
Republican leverage from the defeat o f the crime bill rule forced House Democratic leaders 
to restructure the bill to place less emphasis on crime prevention and more emphasis on 
criminal punishment. The crime bill hurt Democratic incumbents and challengers as 
Republican campaign appeals ridiculed social programs in the bill like “midnight 
basketball.” Despite the fact that House Democrats were passing into law massive anti-crime 
legislation. Republicans successfully painted them as weak on crime. Through these efforts, 
House Republicans successfully framed the crime bill as a big-govemment social program
Ibid., p. 26.
”  David S. Cloud, “End of Session Marked By Partisan Stalemate,” Congressional 
Quarterly. 8 October 1994, pp. 2847-49; “The October Massacre,” The New Republic. 24 
October 1994, p. 7.
Susan Feeney, “Gingrich’s Dream to Become Reality.” Dallas Morning News. 10 
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filled with pork barrel spending and liberal social engineering schemes. These 
characterizations provided important political ammunition to Republican House candidates 
all across the country in the 1994 campaign as they launched negative attacks on Democratic 
congressional candidates.
Republican victory on the crime bill emboldened further efforts in at the end of the 
103* Congress to decimate, obstruct, and impede the rest o f the Democratic legislative 
agenda. On September 26, 1994, Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell (D-ME) pulled 
the health care reform bill from the Senate floor due to this Republican obstruction, 
effectively killing health care reform for the 103* Congress.”  In addition. House 
Republicans, in conjunction with Senate Republicans utilizing their filibuster power, 
prevented consideration or passage of campaign finance reform, mining law overhaul, safe 
drinking water legislation, and Superflind environmental cleanup reform.'*® Republicans even 
obstructed consideration and passage of bills they supported as part o f this overall strategy 
to make the Democratic majority look incompetent and unable to govern. The GATT fi-ee 
trade accord, a lobbying gift ban, and a bill forcing Congress to comply with the laws of the 
land each died at the end of the session despite being supported by most House 
Republicans.'*'
”  “Clinton’s Health Care Plan Laid to Rest,” CO Almanac 1994. p. 319.
'*" “Assessing the 103* Congress...What Passed and What Didn’t.” CO Almanac 1994.
pp. 10-11.
'*' The GATT trade accord was passed into law in a special session of the 103* 
Congress held after the 1994 election. The Republican majority passed the rest o f these 
items into law in the 104* Congress.
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By deliberately obstructing these items. Republicans exploited the Democratic 
majority and made it appear unable to govern, which in turn laid the groundwork for the 
1994 Democratic meltdown. This strategy successfully transformed the stable, healthy 
Democratic House majority of 1993 into a tenuous and decaying majority in 1994. Through 
these majority-forming activities. House Republicans pioneered a new type of aggressive 
politics to obtain majority status in a more competitive environment. President Clinton 
complained that Republicans pursued an end-of-session strategy designed to “stop it, slow 
it, kill it or just talk it to death.” *^ But the obstructionism o f the end of the 103^ Congress 
served an important majority-attaining purpose for House Republicans because it provided 
a foundation for the attack politics o f the 1994 campaign."*^ Killing the Democratic House 
majority, and achieving a Republican House majority that could govern in an entirely 
different direction in the 104'*' Congress, became more important for House Republicans than 
helping Democrats enact legislative accomplishments into law in the 103"* Congress.
Although successful in derailing the 103"* Congress and the Democratic majority’s 
legislative agenda, this obstruction strategy set a precedent followed by the Democratic 
minority in the 104'*’ and lOS*** Congresses. The Republican template of the 103"* Congress 
and the 1994 election would be picked up and used by the Democratic minority of the 104* 
and 105*** Congresses. The incentive structures o f minority parties in this new period of two- 
party competition had shifted from governing with the majority party to cut the best
■'* Douglas Jehl, “Clinton Assails G.O.P. for Effort to ‘Kill It or Just Talk It to Death,’ 
New York Times. 8 October 1994, p. A 1.
William Schneider, “Will Obstruction Be Its Own Reward?,” National Journal. 15 
October 1994, p. 2434.
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legislative deal, to boycotting the legislative process entirely in order to deliberately sink the 
majority party’s legislative agenda.
PARTY CULTURE
Democratic Culture and the Need for Change
During the long period of non-competition and one-party Democratic rule (1954- 
1994). a distinct Democratic party culture emerged in the diverse and heterogeneous 
Democratic Caucus. This party culture stressed a more individualistic approach to individual 
campaigns and congressional careers, and encouraged a decentralized House managed by 
therapeutic Democratic House leaders adept in art o f coalition politics. As a congressional 
party. House Democrats have always been more diverse than their Republican colleagues, 
and this trend continued in the 103"*-105* Congresses. The Democratic Caucus of the 103"* 
Congress, for instance, contained 14 Hispanic members, 38 African-American members, and 
36 female members, while 90% of the members o f the Republican Conference in the lOT* 
Congress were white and male. In comparison, only 66% of the members o f the Democratic 
House majority were white and male. Additionally, the two parties differed on ideology, 
with the House Democratic Caucus becoming increasingly liberal and the House Republican 
Conference becoming increasingly more conservative. Each of these demographic 
differences between the two parties in the House sparked differing reactions in then- 
respective party cultures to the imperatives of two-party competition.
The principles of committee seniority and deference to committee and subcommittee 
chairmen played an integral role in Democratic party culture in the House during its long
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tenure as a majority party.'” Power in the Democratic House flowed upward from numerous 
subcommittee chairs and the independent standing committee chairs operating relatively 
autonomous committees. In addition, numerous legislative service organizations like the 
Congressional Black Caucus provided other independent forums for members in a 
decentralized House. The decentralized committee system and legislative service 
organizations allowed House Democratic members to stress their individual autonomy 
despite increzised leadership control of the House floor and the legislative agenda. This 
Democratic party culture, attuned to the needs of managing a diverse caucus in a heavily 
decentralized House, required a distinct type of management skills by Democratic House 
leaders based on deference to the committee chairs while instilling greater control on the 
House floor. As a result. Democratic House leaders spent a majority o f their time internally 
managing a decentralized House and a diverse Democratic Caucus. Although possessing 
powerful controls on the legislative agenda within the House, Democratic House leaders had 
little influence over the types o f agendas and issues advocated by individual House 
Democrats in their individual re-election races.
Democratic party culture nurtured a vast committee system to both manage the House 
and member preferences. This committee system rewarded seniority o f membership, the 
accrual o f informational knowledge on specific areas o f legislative concern through 
committee service, and the relative autonomy of committees vis-a-vis party leaders. The 
Democratic committee system served an important purpose in a decentralized House o f
■” Christopher J. Deering and Steven S. Smith, Committees in Congress (Washington, 
D C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1997), pp. 126-33.
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Representatives, rewarding members for focusing on their legislative business within their 
committees, and wielding individual power through committee and subcommittee 
chairmanships, in the seven Congresses between 1980 and 1994, the Democratic House 
majority organized the House o f Representatives with an average of 290 committees, 
including standing committees, subcommittees, select and special committees, joint 
committees, and subcommittees o f joint committees.
The proliferation of committees under Democratic rule tangibly shaped the legislative 
process in the House in the 103"" Congress. In the 103 Congress the Democratic majority, 
totaling 258 total Democratic members, utilized 258 total committees to conduct its work in 
the House. On the crime bill, for instance. Judiciary Chairman Jack Brooks (D-TX) 
incorporated the work of 13 House committees in a single, omnibus crime bill. In 
comparison, the Republican majority of the 104* Congress utilized only 198 total 
committees to organize House operations. House Democrats used this large committee 
system to legislate and govern, providing several perches for the accrual o f power by 
individual Democratic committee chairs and several informational sources for the creation 
of legislation. House Democratic leaders, meanwhile, used these committee inputs, in 
addition to their strong procedural control of the House floor, to address legislative matters 
in a congressional session.
Each of these elements of the Democratic House and the party culture it engendered 
provided an important buffer between the governing and electoral dimensions of the House. 
House Democrats secured their own election to the House, focused on their re-elections in 
candidate-centered campaigns, and built up their own loyal constituencies independent of
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House Democratic leaders. Each House Democrat focused on their own individual re- 
election campaigns separately instead of running as a unified party on party-based appeals. 
Incumbents used their own “homestyles” and personal constituencies to create layers of 
personally loyal constituencies and to win election in candidate-centered races. In a non­
competitive environment of one-party rule, this focus by House Democrats on their own 
races sufficed to re-elect the Democratic majority. The fate o f the average House Democrat 
was not tethered to other Democratic House races, and Democratic control o f the House was 
never viewed as being in jeopardy. This distinct Democratic party culture permeated the 
politics o f the House o f Representatives during the era o f unbroken Democratic majorities 
(1954-1994), culminating in individualized elections and the avoidance o f national 
Democratic party appeals to win re-election to the House.
This distinct Democratic party culture in the House, the result o f decades o f one-party 
rule and non-competition for House control, did not serve the needs o f retaining a 
Democratic majority in the intense two-party competition o f the 103"' Congress and the 1994 
campaign. The 1994 election and the change in power came as a stark surprise to several 
House Democrats who felt their majority would continue to flourish as it had for the previous 
four decades. In the race between Speaker o f the House Thomas Foley (D-WA) and 
Republican challenger George Nethercutt, for example, Foley campaigned hard on his ability 
to use his position as speaker to bring federal dollars to the Fifth District o f Washington."*’ 
But in a twist, Nethercutt used this pork-barrel mentality against Foley, especially the
Timothy Egan, “Foley Wages Lonely Fight to Keep Job o f 30 Years,” New York 
Times. 7 November 1994, p. B 10; Timothy Egan, “The No. 1 Congressman and His No. 
1 Test,” New York Times. 29 October 1994, p. A 1.
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nationalized Republican campaign themes of balancing the budget and limiting government
spending, to undercut Foley’s arguments for re-electing both himself as a member o f the
House and Speaker, and for re-electing a Democratic House majority. Nethercutt adopted
the larger Republican arguments used by Republican House candidates nationwide that these
pork barrel projects contributed to larger problems like increased federal deficits, larger
national debts, and the mortgaging of America’s economic future.*'* In the end, Foley’s
reliance on traditional Democratic arguments for re-election to the House failed, and
Nethercutt won 51%-49%. These arguments also failed for 33 other House Democratic
incumbents in 1994. A House Democrat from the Midwest articulated the challenges
confronting House Democrats in the 1994 campaign and the loss o f majority status:
The Democrats were naturally shellacked. Most had come from governing environments in 
the states where they were in the majority, and then had graduated to the House where they 
never knew anything but being in the majority. The were always used to being in charge, and 
never had to learn about what it meant to be in the minority. So of us were experienced 
being in the minority in our state legislative backgrounds, and 1 think we took 1994 better.
An attitude o f primogeniture prevailed among several members o f the House 
Democratic majority as a result of their stable House majority. For decades. House 
Democrats enjoyed the privileges and perks of this majority status, from control o f the floor 
to control o f committee and staff resources. The Democratic House of the 103* Congress 
contained 146 possible chairmanships of committees, creating lots o f opportunity to hold and 
wield power; the Republican House o f the 104* Congress contained only 110 possible 
chairmanships. Nineteen House Democrats chaired two or more standing committees or
^  Maureen Groppe, “After Democratic Boom in ‘92, Party Tries to Avoid a Bust,’ 
Congressional Ouarterlv. 29 October 1994, pp. 3092-94.
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subcommittees in the 103rd Congress, compared to only one House Republican in the 104*
Congress. One House Democrat described the psychological impact o f the loss o f majority
status for Democrats after the 1994 election by stating, “There was a severe depression
among Democrats in 1994. These guys had called all the shots forever, and now they were
powerless.” A senior House Democrat placed this problem in perspective:
There was a real fallout from the long period of Democratic rule in the House. The 
Democrats became lazy, and didn’t see the new dynamics developing in the House. For 
instance, the special orders were being used by Gingrich and COS to attack the institution 
in prime time to a C-SPAN audience. Gingrich was the first to challenge Democratic rule 
in the House, but House Democrats discounted him. Gingrich had no legislative record, 
never played a critical role in committee work, and we foolishly discounted what he was 
doing. But Gingrich successfully portrayed senior Democrats as irresponsible pork-barrelers, 
even though this is a stereotypical view because this is what Congress does! Gingrich bided 
his time until Michel’s retirement, and was like a mole carving out the strength of the 
Democratic majority. We didn’t see the full extent o f the damage until the 1994 election.
For several House Democrats, the longevity o f the Democratic majority in the 1954- 
1994 hurt the Democratic majority in 1994 by blinding it to the new realities o f two-party 
competition in the country at large, and against the increased competitiveness o f Republican 
attack politics in the 1990s. One House Democrat compared years o f Republican attack 
politics against the Democratic majority as being pelted with hand grenades without any 
political protection:
Forty years o f Democratic control was the precursor to the Gingrich ascension. It created 
unity within the Republican conference for support for Gingrich’s tactics. The Gingrich 
strategy of discrediting the Democratic majority by discrediting the institution of the House 
was irresponsible. It worked, but it was like pulling the pin on a hand grenade and throwing 
it down the subway. The damage wasn’t just contained to the Democrats. It also hit fellow 
Republican members, like in the House Bank scandal. The damage also haunted the GOP 
long term, because the House is the butt o f all the jokes. The repercussions o f public 
cynicism will haunt any majority - Republican and Democrat - for a long time to come.
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In addition to being blind-sided by the aggressive Republican campaign of 1994, the
traditional leadership style of House Democratic leaders came under fire from moderate and
conservative House Democrats who confronted tlic stiff two-party competition of the 1994
election. Tliese members believed that Democratic party culture, which emanated from the
long era of non-competition and which buttressed a decentralized House and localized re-
election efforts, no longer served the needs o f protecting the Democratic majority. As the
103^ Congress progressed, tensions grew between the needs o f endangered Democratic
incumbents seeking to maintain their seats, and the traditional mode of operation of the
Democratic House. Several defeated House Democrats, and those receiving close calls in
the 1994 campaign, expressed acrimony and bitterness at a Democratic party culture and
leadership they believed was not in tune with the new realities o f a two-party competitive
system for House control. Representative Eric Fingerhut (D-OH), a freshmen Democrat
representing a swing in Ohio who was defeated for re-election, assailed Democratic leaders
for their complicity in endangering the Democratic majority in the 1994 campaign:
Losing candidates are supposed to accept the blame for their defeat and maintain a dignified 
silence. I accept the blame, but as a victim of the so-called slaughter of the innocents -  
reform-minded Democratic freshmen of the 103"' Congress who were defeated for re-election 
—1 cannot stay silent...My anger is directed at the Democratic congressional leaders, some 
of whom were defeated on Nov. 8 and some o f whom were not. Rarely has a group of 
political leaders so richly deserved defeat.
Speaker T om Foley and his team completely misread the message o f the 1992 election. They 
chose to see it as a vindication of their opposition to the Reagan and Bush Administrations 
rather than as a call for sweeping change in Washington. They ignored the calls o f many 
freshman Democrats to move quickly on reform legislation, and some of these leaders even 
ridiculed our efforts and belittled us personally.^’
■*’ Eric Fingerhut, “A Democrat Throws Stones,” New York Times. 17 December 1994, 
Section 1, p. 23.
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In addition to Fingerhut, other House Democrats upset with the direction o f the 103"* 
Congress directed criticism at their party leadership. Representative Robert Andrews (D- 
N.J.), sponsor o f the “A-to-Z” deficit reduction plan, attacked the Democratic congressional 
leadership as being out-of-touch to the new political realities o f two-party competition and 
the politics o f the 1990s:
We are in the midst o f a middle-class political revolution in this country. That shouldn’t be 
news to anyone reading this, but it is big news to people in Washington and, in particular. 
Democrats...
...Unless Democrats do something to reduce government spending, we are going to become 
extinct. The issue facing Democrats today is whether we change or die, and I’m one of those 
Democrats who say it’s time we change. We must bring our party back in tune with the 
middle-class revolution that’s sweeping America.'**
These sentiments illustrate the depth to which several House Democrats felt their
leadership, and the party culture of the Democratic Caucus, had been lacking in the midst of
an extremely competitive environment for House control. One House Democrat complained
that the 1994 crime bill, in which Judiciary Committee member Charles Schumer (D-NY)
successfully included an assault-weapons ban popular to liberal members and in liberal
districts, hurt several o f his moderate and conservative Democratic colleagues running in
intensely competitive elections in 1994:
Schumer cost us the election in 1994. Why did he do it? Northeast liberals screwed the rest 
of us by imposing what’s popular in their districts on the rest o f America. That killed us in 
the South and West. 1 hope a future Democratic Congress will never do that.
Another Midwestern House Democrat commented on the left-ward drift o f the 103"*
Congress and its effect on the 1994 election;
■** Robert E. Andrews, “Democrats: Change or Die,” Wall Street Journal. 10 
November 1994, p. A 16.
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The 103"* Congress illustrates the problems created by the demise o f the old Southern 
committee chairs. The old committee chairs from the South, like Carl Vinson, protected and 
nurtured the Democratic majority. But beginning in the 1970s, Democrats moved too far to 
the left. It all started there. From the 1970s to 1994, the liberal Democrats ran the House 
and it moved too far left. The Democratic center moved to the Northeast, to the liberal wing.
The problems experienced by House Democrats in the 103"* Congress and the 1994 
campaign would become critical ingredients to efforts by leaders and members o f both 
parties to refashion their party’s culture toward the needs o f a more competitive era in the 
104* and 105* Congresses. In the process, principles of committee seniority and committee 
autonomy would be re-examined by both parties as they searched for a better way to navigate 
the stormy competitive politics of obtaining and retaining a House majority in the 1990s. 
Republican C ulture W orking for the M ajority
While House Democratic party culture eschewed party-based appeals and concepts 
of teamwork to defend the Democrat’s majority status, the party culture of House 
Republicans in the 103'** Congress increasingly became attimed to majority-forming goals 
and thinking. Although House Republicans were traditionally more homogeneous than their 
more heterogeneous House Democratic counterparts, they increasingly became more wedded 
to a concept o f party and the idea of working together as a unified team to achieve majority 
status. In addition to muting the internal differences between moderate and conservative 
Republicans in the House, House Republicans elected a relatively homogeneous conservative 
leadership team in the 103"* Congress dedicated to the pursuit o f a Republican House 
majority.
House Republicans became increasingly more ideological and confrontational in the 
102™* and 103"* Congresses. This new ideological focus became the foundation o f a new
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House Republican party culture that advocated fighting Democratic efforts to enlarge the 
federal government. After the defeat of President Bush in 1992, House Republicans faced 
the danger o f balkanization among differing factions without the unifying force of a 
Republican presidency.'*’ But as Democrats governed from the left in the 103"* Congress, 
Republican ideology in favor o f welfare reform, balancing the budget, and cutting taxes 
quickly displaced a Republican presidency as the source of unity and direction for the 
Republican minority.^® Unanimous Republican opposition in the House to the Clinton 
budget plan o f 1993 illustrated the primacy of ideology within House Republican ranks, 
transforming the 1993 budget into a Democratic budget plan. Near universal House 
Republican opposition to the Clinton stimulus plan, BTU energy tax proposals, VAT tax 
proposals, and the employer mandates of the Clinton health care plan also illustrated the 
importance of a more ideological focus within Republican party culture in the House.
House Minority Whip Newt Gingrich played a strong role in the formation of House 
Republican party culture based on the precepts o f party-building. These efforts were best 
exhibited by Gingrich’s efforts to recruit, train, and elect the farm team members of the 
Republican freshmen classes of the 1990-94 period. This new generation of Republican 
candidates and House freshmen possessed strong majority-forming attitudes inculcated by 
House Republican farm team efforts. Gingrich encouraged these attitudes by stating “My
”  Richard L. Berke, “G.O.P. Seeks Identity and a Message,” New York Times. 31 
January 1993, p. A 28; James A. Barnes, “Faction Fight,” National Journal. 19 December 
1992, p. 2888.
“  For an excellent analysis o f this change in the Republican Conference in the 1980- 
1995 period, see Douglas L. Koopman, Hostile Takeover (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers, Inc.), pp. 133-148.
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strategy was always that you just keep building momentum and building momentum and you 
would capture 70 or 80 percent o f the incoming freshmen every two year; and at some point 
you would have transformed the whole structure.”’' Many of these members had no prior 
legislative experience, supported term limits and the concept of limiting both government 
and the length of public service through term limits, and opposed many o f the attributes of 
the Democratic House like strong committee chairs and longevity o f congressional service. 
When Republicans took control of the House in 1995, the new Republican majority was 
comprised o f 122 members (53%) who had served for two years or less. Thirty-nine of the 
Republican freshmen elected in 1994 pledged to serve only a fixed number o f terms.’" In 
addition, 47% of the 73-member Republican freshmen class o f 1994 had never held elective 
office prior to their election to the House.”
The new Republican party culture engendered by Gingrich helped form the thinking 
of these new Republican recruits, and helped to nurture and instill majority-forming views 
and attitudes. The Republican freshmen of 1990-1994, in addition to being devoted to the 
principle of obtaining a Republican House majority, were also well-versed in articulating the 
nationalized ideological appeals of the Republican nationalized campaign o f 1994. The 19 
Republican freshmen of the 1990 election represented the first wave of an infusion of highly
” Dan Balz and Serge F. Kovaleski, “Gingrich Divided GOP, Conquered the Agenda; 
Revolt Gave Glimpses of Its Future,” Washington Post. 21 December 1994, p. A 1.
’* Benjamin Sheffrier, “Self-Imposed Term Limits Affect Nearly Half of House 
Freshmen,” Roll Call. 15 June 1995.
”  Robin Toner, “73 Mr. Smiths, o f the G.O.P., Go to Washington,” New York Times. 8 
January 1995, p. A 1.
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ideological House candidates inculcated in the majority-forming philosophy and precept laid 
down by Newt Gingrich’s farm team efforts. In the 102^ Congress, the “gang of nine” 
Republican freshmen, led by Republican freshman John Boehner (R-OH), gained notoriety 
by attacking the Democratic majority on the House Bank Scandal and transforming this 
attack into a Republican campaign issue in the 1992 elections. The 47-member House 
Republican freshmen class of 1992 played a similar role in the 103^ Congress.
These more aggressive freshmen, and the majority-forming party culture shaped by 
Gingrich which molded them into adept attack politicians, required a type o f Republican 
leadership team in the 103^ Congress. In the 1980s, “Old Bull” Republicans led by Minority 
Leader Bob Michel governed in tandem with House Democratic leaders. Michel’s career as 
both a member and congressional leader revolved around governing and legislating in 
tandem with the Democratic House majority and with Republican presidents. As a 
congressional leader, Michel prided his aptitude for legislative detail, his ability to influence 
and make a positive imprint on legislation, his friendships with Democratic Speakers Tom 
Foley and Tip O’Neill, and his firm grasp of the rules o f the legislative process in the 
House.”  Michel, for instance, gave the following advice to younger Republican House 
members: “Be gentlemanly and once you’ve made your point, get on the business with 
governing.””
The House Republican leadership races in preparation for the 103^ Congress
”  Janet Hook, “House GOP Hones a Sharper Edge as Michel Turns In His Sword,” 
Congressional Ouarterlv. 9 October 1993, pp. 2714-18.
”  Dan Balz, “Gingrich, Allies Made Waves and Impression: Conservative Rebels 
Harassed the House,” Washington Post. 20 December 1994, p. A I.
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witnessed the rise to power of a more aggressive and conservative leadership team devoted 
to the goal o f achieving a Republican House majority, with “Old Bulls” aligned with Michel 
being defeated in every leadership race below Minority Leader: Dick Armey (R-TX) defeated 
Jerry Lewis (R-CA) as GOP Conference Chairman, Tom DeLay (R-TX) defeated Bill 
Gradison (R-OH) as Conference Secretary, and Bill Paxon (R-NY) became the new chairman 
of the Republican National Congressional Committee after the primary election defeat of 
Representative Guy Vander Jagt (R-MI) in 1992. These leadership races played an important 
role in further shaping Republican party culture toward thinking and working as a team for 
majority status. The House Republican leadership team of Gingrich, Armey, DeLay, Paxon 
did not want to govern with the Democratic majority or legislate in tandem with the Senate 
and presidency. Instead, they wanted to force House Republicans to think as a unified team 
working to defeat the Democratic majority on the House floor, defeat Democrats at the polls, 
and elect a conservative Republican majority which could drive domestic policy in a different 
direction.^® A House Republican elected in 1992 recalled the change in focus and party 
culture brought about by Gingrich and the new generation of Republican leaders in the 103"* 
Congress:
Newt put discipline in the Republican party in the House. 1 came into the House in 1992, 
and even them I saw how much discipline was lacking. People went their own way and did 
whatever they wanted. Newt pulled me aside in 1994 and said he had a plan to make every 
Republican member either raise or contribute $65,000 to the campaigns o f other 
Republicans. Newt traveled to over 130 congressional districts. He raised over $ 100 million 
in 1994, either directly or over his signature on fund-raising letters. Visit just two or three 
congressional districts in a week and see how much work and energy it takes to do. Newt
Gloria Borger, “Welcome to Gingrich Nation,” U.S. News & World Report 21 
November 1994, p. 44; Jonathan Alter, “Spiro Agnew With Brains,” Newsweek. 28 
November 1994, p. 34.
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did it non-stop for several years straight. He did it as well in 1996 to protect the Republican 
majority.
This commitment to party exhibited by Gingrich contrasted greatly with the cultural 
view of Minority Leader Bob Michel, who saw his political role from the prism of 
governance and legislating with the Democratic majority. In the summer o f 1993, this 
younger leadership team comprised o f Newt Gingrich (R-GA), Dick Armey (R-TX), Tom 
DeLay (R-TX), John Boehner (R-OH), and Bill Paxon (R-NY) confronted Minority Leader 
Bob Michel (R-IL) with an ultimatum, informing him that if he did not leave, he would face 
a challenge from one o f them as House Republican leader in the 104* Congress.”  In the fall 
of 1993, Michel announced his retirement from the House at the end of the 103"* Congress. 
In an interview, a moderate House Republican captured the dynamics o f Michel’s retirement 
from the House in the 103"* Congress:
Michel knew a new generation was rising to power, and he knew to get out when he did in 
1994. Of course, a Michel speakership in the 104* Congress would have been different. 
There probably would not have been a government shutdown in 1995. There would not have 
been the incivility o f the 104* Congress. Each speaker sets their own style.
Each of the new Republican House leaders o f the 103"* Congress, especially Armey, 
DeLay, and Gingrich, campaigned hard for the new freshmen o f the classes of 1990-1994, 
and built strong ties with them electorally and ideologically." This new generation of 
Republican leadership and members exhibited a greater ideological focus, utilized attack 
politics to draw clear party lines against the “corruption” and “liberalism” of the Democratic
”  Juliet Eilperin and Jim Vande Hei, “Some Wounds Never Heal: Today’s GOP 
Leadership Struggle Has Roots in ‘Guerrilla’ Warriors of the 1980s,” Roll Call. 2 October 
1997, p. 27.
"  Fred Bames, “The Newtoids Cometh!,” The New Republic. 7 November 1994, p. 32.
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majority, and possessed a strong attachment to party and teamwork to obtain majority status. 
For instance, in speeches to Republican campaign activists, Gingrich complained that one 
of the great failings of the Republican party is “we don’t encourage you to be nasty.’’”  As 
a result, Gingrich urged Republicans to be more bold in attacking Democrats in their 
campaigns. Gingrich himself called President Clinton an “enemy of normal Americans,’’ 
labeled Democrats “cultural masochists,’’ called the AIDS crisis the result of “liberals who 
advocated free sex,” and advocated Communist Chinese leader Mao Tse-tung’s motto that 
“politics is war without blood.”^  Other House Republicans followed Gingrich’s aggressive 
lead. During the 1994 crime bill debate, Dick Armey told House Democrats “Your president 
is just not that important for us,” and told President Clinton that passage of his 1993 budget 
plan would make him a one-term president.*' A top Democratic staff aide in the 103"* 
Congress commented on the changes in congressional politics engendered by this new 
Republican aggressiveness by stating:
Gingrich engaged in the institutional victimization o f the House. He held the House to 
ridicule, and this was encouraged by other Republicans and picked up by talk radio. In terms 
of probity in the House, it is now gone, a victim of what the GOP reaped in their pursuit of 
majority status.
”  Peter Osterlund, “A Capitol Chameleon,” Los Angeles Times Magazine. 25 
August 1991, p. 37.
David Marannis, “No More Mr. Nice Guy,” Washington Post. 30 March 1990, p. 
A 16; Dale Russakoff, “Gingrich Lobs a Few More Bombs,” Washington PosL 10 
November 1994, p. A I; Ernest Tollerson, “Scholars View Gingrich’s Provocative 
Oratory as Brilliant But Polarizing,” New York Times. 17 December 1995, p. A 15; 
Benjamin Sheffiier, “Gingrich: “Politics Is War Without Blood,”’ Roll Call. 29 May 
1995, p. 9.
*' Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, The Almanac o f American Politics 1996 
(Washington, D C.: National Journal, 1995), p. 1328.
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Through these attacks, Gingrich and other House Republican leaders molded a new 
Republican party culture which encouraged negative attacks on Democrats to draw sharp 
party lines, force Republicans to think about winning majority control, and confront House 
Republicans with the need to govern as a majority party instead o f wallowing in minority 
status. Instead of every Republican incumbent going their own way in the House, they were 
suddenly united together as a common team advocating similar principles and political 
strategies to gain a House majority. These principles and strategies prominently displayed 
the sharpening o f party lines on issues like taxes and corruption, which in turn transformed 
the parties into warring camps.*^ These tactics and strategies were not amenable with the 
traditional House Republican mission of legislating with the Democratic majority to secure 
individualized gains. Representative Robert Walker (R-PA) justified this change in focus 
to the more confrontational politics by stating:
1 don’t see much evidence that Republicans won great victories when they were not 
confrontational but passive instead. In 34 years we were not able to get a majority; there’s 
no victory there.“
The drive for majority status by House Republicans in the 103^ Congress led to 
increasingly aggressive rhetoric against House Democrats, and even against Republicans who 
helped the Democratic majority govern. Representative Vin Weber (R-MN), a close 
Gingrich ally during the 1980s and early 1990s, articulated this majority-forming attitude of 
the Gingrich Republicans when he stated “We believed we had a chance to be a majority and
Thomas B. Edsall, “The Great Divider,” Washington Post. 23 March 1989, p. 
A 27.
Ronald D. Elving, “Gingrich Lieutenants Balance Political Style and Tactics,” 
C o n g re ss io n a l O u a r te r lv  8 April 1989.
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only two things stood in our way. The first thing was the Democrats. The second thing was 
the Republicans.”*” Gingrich articulated this same philosophy when he stated “For a great 
part o f its minority life, the Republican party has allowed itself to become co-opted as an arm 
of government. Too often it has allowed itself to be cajoled into providing the necessary 
votes for the majority party to win.”*^^
As the de facto leader of Republican efforts to gain a House majority in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, Gingrich used hostile rhetoric against the Democratic majority, labeling the 
Democratic House majority a “left-wing in the House...engaged in a conspiracy to avoid fair 
elections.”** Gingrich’s theory was simple: if the Democratic Congress could be portrayed 
as corrupt, then the Republicans could capitalize on this weakness to take the majority.*’ 
Gingrich had long advocated aggressive tactics, declaring in 1979 as a fi-eshman “If the 
majority party is content to run the House like a plantation, they can do so. But they can’t 
make me dress up and serve mint juleps with a smile.”** During his ascension to House 
Minority Whip in 1989, Gingrich openly scoffed the more acquiescent attitude o f House 
Republicans as he narrowly defeated “Old Bull” Edward Madigan (R-IL) by two votes in the
Dale Russakoff and Dan Balz, “After Political Victory, A Personal Revolution,” 
Washington Post. 19 December 1994, p. A 1.
** “Bauman & Co.: House Guerrilla Fighters...Attacking Spending, Taxes, Government,’ 
Congressional Ouarterlv. 7 July 1979, pp. 1442-43.
** Rhodes Cook, “Is Competition in Elections Becoming Obsolete?,” Congressional 
Ouarterlv. 6 May 1989, p. 1060.
*’ Rhodes Cook, “Self-Inflicted Wounds Cost GOP Majority in 1980s,” Congressional 
O uarterlv . 3 March 1990, p. 689.
** Ibid.
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race for Minority Whip:
The Old Guard tends to say, "Oh, gee, the Democrats are in charge. How can we be nice 
enough to them that they’ll let us pretend we’re part o f the game?’ I represent the wing o f the 
party that says ‘Fine, we’ll take up that challenge.’'*’
Instead of helping Democrats govern, Gingrich and like-minded House Republicans 
aggressively sought a House majority instead o f focusing on making the legislative process 
with the Democratic majority. In an interview, a House Republican involved in the 1994 
campaign praised the leadership role o f Gingrich:
Nobody worked harder for the majority than Gingrich. Gingrich is the visionary who saw 
the Republican Majority early on and worked to obtain it. Newt provided leadership, vision, 
and unified the party. He didn’t get any sleep the last three weeks o f the 1994 campaign 
because he was on the red-line, visiting lots o f congressional districts and being the number 
one booster o f our party. We knew the Sunday before the election in 1994 that we were 
going to have a fifty-two seat pick-up. By traveling through the districts, we were able to get 
a sense o f the country.
Increased House Republican unity led to greater homogeneity among the House 
Republican leadership structure in the 103"* Congress. The new Republican leadership team 
exhibited a common affinity for a shared conservative ideology and commitment to ideas like 
limited government.^® The ascendant House GOP leadership team of Gingrich, Armey, 
DeLay, Walker, and Faxon represented a homogenous group of House Republicans 
committed to attaining majority status in the House rather than cooperating with Democrats 
to help pass legislation or make the House run smoother. In 1994, 53 Republican 
incumbents contributed $2.7 million to a common pool for use in 1994 campaign. In
Jacob V. Lamar, “An Attack Dog, not a Lap Dog: House Republicans Make Feisty 
Newt Their No. 2 Man,’’ Time. 3 April 1989, p. 22.
™ Fred Barnes, “Revenge of the Squares,” The New Republic. 13 March 1995, p. 23.
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addition, 100 Republican incumbents in the 103"* Congress gave Frank Lucas $80,000 to 
help him win his special election in Oklahoma to grab an open Democratic seat. Republican 
candidate Ron Lewis received $102,000 from 115 Republican members to help him win his 
special election to win an open Democratic seat. Instead of working as a team to help govern 
and legislate with the Democratic majority, House Republican party culture encouraged the 
creation o f a new Republican House majority that could implement into law its own ideas, 
its own legislation, and its own priorities. Through this new thinking. House Republicans 
united as a quasi-parliamentary shadow government scheming how to govern with a majority 
instead o f being a diffuse group of individual politicians working hard to secure their own 
gains from an entrenched majority party.
ELECTIONS
Democratic Governing Strategy as Electoral Strategy
While House Republicans focused on attaining majority status, the Democratic 
majority’s governing strategy of producing legislation and making unified government work 
became its electoral strategy for the 1994 campaign. House Democratic leaders and 
members believed that by passing into law the Democratic agenda o f deficit-reduction, health 
care reform, the crime bill, family and medical leave, national service legislation, and gun 
control legislation, voters would reward Democrats in the 1994 midterm. But this strategy 
backfired as House Democrats confronted determined and aggressive Republican efforts to 
terminate the Democratic House majority. The determined threat to Democratic majority 
prospects in 1994 from Republican attack politics did not become fully apparent until after 
the dust settled in the 1994 election. House Democrats faced unmitigated disaster in 1994,
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losing 56 Democratic House seats to Republicans while only grabbing four open Republican 
House seats in return. Thirty-four House Democrats lost their re-election bids, including 
Speaker o f the House Thomas Foley (D-WA), House Ways and Means Committee Chairman 
Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL), and Judiciary Committee Chairman Jack Brooks (D-TX). The 
1994 election was truly the House Democratic majority’s political Pearl Harbor.
Like the sneak-attack at Pearl Harbor, the signs o f danger were either down-played 
or unknown until after the Republican attack in the 1994 election. As House Democrats 
entered the 1994 election cycle with relative tranquility of decades of non-competition for 
House control behind them. They also possessed the incumbency advantage of 40 years of 
majority status. House Democrats had not encountered serious competition for the majority 
since the elections o f 1980 and 1982, and this threat to their majority dissipated in 1982 with 
the gain o f 26 Democratic seats. In the 103* Congress, however, the Democratic majority 
was particularly vulnerable in 1994 in the pivotal swing seats and in conservative districts 
in the South and West where Democratic incumbents were either vacating their seats or 
confronting quality Republican challengers. O f the 34 House Democratic incumbents 
defeated in 1994,25 represented swing seats. House Democrats tried to save themselves and 
their majority in 1994 by protecting themselves with traditional incumbency advantages like 
localized races, personal name recognition, and running away from an unpopular Bill 
Clinton. But these majority-retaining tactics, which had previously shielded the Democratic 
majority in the 1970s and 1980s, did not work in 1994.
The most exposed House Democrats in 1994 were the moderate and conservative 
House Democrats representing seats that had slowly drifted into a conservative Republican
88
orbit or had become true swing seats. The Democratic majority had spent the 103'**
Congress legislating from the left, and compiled a record that hurt moderate and conservative
Democrats in marginal districts. Moderate and conservative House Democrats like Jim
Slattery (D-KS), Dave McCurdy (D-OK), and Larry LaRocco (D-ID) had spent most o f their
political careers making distinctions between their own moderate to conservative positions
and those o f the more liberal national Democratic party. As House Republicans drew sharp
partisan distinctions in the 103^ Congress, it became increasingly difficult for these
Democrats to articulate their own independent stances and voting records. One House
Democrat, talking about what went wrong for Democrats in 1994, stated:
The Democrats got arrogant with power, moved to the left with their liberalism, and the 
country reacted in a big way. You could have taken Joe Ignoramus and put him in charge 
of the Republican’s 1994 campaign and the GOP still would have demolished the Democrats. 
1994 was probably the toughest year to run as a Democrat in the past half century. Clinton 
had moved way too far to the left in 1993-94 with gays in the military, government-run 
health care, and a budget that increased taxes while doing nothing to eliminate the deficit.
Echoing this sentiment, a House Democratic aide described the 1994 election as:
an anti-Democratic blowout that occurs when a majority gets sloppy. This is a once-in-a- 
lifetime situation...Democrats were simply vulnerable on health care and tax and budget 
votes o f the 103"* Congress. Republicans took advantage o f these Democratic mishaps on 
health care, the crime bill, and the Clinton taxes. Bringing the first Clinton budget to the 
floor without a solidified majority was sloppy. Mezvinsky and several other Democrats paid 
for this sloppiness with their seats. Scores more lost their seats due to the sloppiness of the 
health care plan.
The 1994 election presented a temporary alignment o f political forces that cost House
Democrats their House majority. As one House Democratic member stated:
You won’t see anything like 1994 for a long, long time. You won’t see the Contract with 
America again. That was a good strategy at the time, when the coimtry was upset. The 
Democrats ruled the House well, but did a poor job ruling the country. Talk radio, 1994, 
what Gingrich did was all a reaction to that.
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In comparison to the years spent by House Republicans building and training a farm 
team of future House candidates, the House Democratic majority invested little time and 
effort in training and recruitment efforts. In the 1954-1994 period. House Democrats relied 
on the overwhelming Democratic advantages at the state and local level to produce the next 
generation of Democratic House candidates. During the 103^ Congress, however, a large 
number o f senior House Democrats decided to either retire or run for higher office, creating 
numerous open seat races difficult for the Democratic majority to defend.^' Twenty-eight 
House Democrats retired or ran for higher office in 1994, and Democrats had to defend a 
total o f 31 open seats in the 1994 campaign.
Traditionally, these seats would have been retained by the next generation of 
politically talented and savvy Democratic politicians from the state and local level. But in 
1994, these open seats were seriously contested not only with the usual crop of Democratic 
candidates, but from a wave of graduates of the newly ascendant Republican farm team effort 
to recruit, train, and elect Republican House candidates. In addition to confronting better 
trained Republican House candidates. Democrats had to defend many of these open seat 
vacancies in competitive political terrain, especially in the increasingly Republican South. 
For instance, ten southern House Democrats retired in 1994, opening conservative districts 
ripe for Republican takeovers. Republicans grabbed eight o f these seats in the 1994 
campaign. In 1992, Democrats won 58 of the 86 open House seats due to a numerous quality 
candidates, the strength of the Clinton-Gore ticket on the East and West coasts, and the
”  Michael Wines, “Many in Congress Are Deciding They Want Out, to the Democrat’s 
Dismay,” New York Times. 28 April 1994, p. A 1.
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weakness o f the Bush re-election effort.^ In 1994, by contrast. Republicans grabbed 22 of 
the 31 open Democratic seats, while Democrats only grabbed four o f the 21 open Republican 
seats.
The large number of Democratic open seats served yet another blow to Democratic 
efforts to maintain their House majority in 1994. Incumbents can normally hold their seats 
due to higher name recognition and personally loyal re-election constituencies. But these 
advantages disappear when seats become vacant. Open seats are more easily influenced by 
national tides and structural political changes within a district. During the 20 elections held 
between 1954 to 1992, an open seat was almost four times more likely to change parties than 
a seat held by an incumbent. Between 1954 and 1992,410 of the 7,832 incumbents running 
in a general election lost with the seat changing parties. During this same period, 203 of the 
798 open seats changed sides.^^ In previous decades, open-seat races to the House have 
contributed little to party shifts due to the small pool of open seats, the superior abilities of 
non-incumbent Democratic challengers able to hold open seats for their party, and favorable 
redistricting drawn in favor of Democrats.^'* In 1994, each of these open seat advantages 
which favored Democrats evaporated, contributing to massive Democratic meltdown 
nationwide. For decades, the Democratic majority relied on an all-volunteer force o f quality 
Democratic House candidates graduating from the state and local level. In 1994, the
^  Susan B. Glasser, “Democrats’ Open-Seat Victories in House Blocked GOP From 
Bigger Gains Overall,” Roll Call. 5 November 1992.
^  Calculations from Vital Statistics on Congress. 1997-1998.
Rhodes Cook, “GOP Counting on Open Seats To Deliver Major Gains,” Congressional 
Ouarterlv. 9 July 1994, p. 1883.
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conscripted Republican farm team, which produced scores o f quality candidates for 
Republican efforts to take the House, defeated the Democratic all-volunteer force o f House 
candidates.
In addition to losing 22 open seats to Republicans, the Democratic majority lost 34 
incumbents. Traditionally, the institutional and political advantages o f incumbency and the 
legacy of the Democratic party nurtured and protected Democratic incumbents. In 1994, 
however, these incumbency advantages failed for several Democratic incumbents, continuing 
a trend begun in 1992. The retirements o f 41 House Democrats in 1992 and 28 in 1994 were 
the largest numbers o f Democratic retirements in consecutive election cycles since the 1930s. 
These retirement decisions, in the midst of a period o f two-party competition, hurt the 
Democratic majority in 1992 and killed it in 1994 as Democrats were forced to defend too 
many open seats. In the 104'" and 105* Congresses, both parties would place special 
emphasis on urging senior members not to retire for fear o f losing critical open seats 
necessary to cobble together a House majority, or to retire early enough for the party to rally 
around the most viable candidate to retain the open seat.
House Democratic leaders in the 103"* Congress did little to stop the retirement flow 
that began in 1992 and which continued unabated in the 103"* Congress. House Democrats, 
relying on the inevitability o f a Democratic House majority, focused little time or effort on 
plugging potential dangers to their majority like the growing number of Democratic open 
seats to defend. While the Democratic majority slept electorally, the Republican minority 
feverishly devoted massive amounts o f time, energy, and money into nationwide farm team 
efforts to recruit, train, and elect Republican House candidates. In the 104“’ and 105*
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Congresses, House Democrats would place special emphasis on the nuts and bolts of 
recruiting quality Democratic candidates after the jolt o f their 1994 losses. In the 103^ 
Congress, however. Democratic leaders, and a majority o f members, focused on passing 
their legislative program and finding the votes in the Democratic Caucus to pass legislation 
in the House. The goal of protecting the Democratic majority on a seat-by-seat basis was not 
on the Democratic political radar screen.
Fund-raising advantages remained the one bright spot for House Democrats in the 
midst of the fiercely competitive race for majority control in the 103'*^  Congress. Despite 
the push by Gingrich and other House Republicans to deny House Democrats their traditional 
fund-raising advantages, a majority o f the funds in the 1994 campaign cycle went to the 
Democratic House majority. House Democrats continued to enjoy the traditional money 
advantage they had experienced in previous decades as a majority power. Former DCCC 
Chairman Tony Coelho (D-CA) defended this tactic o f Democratic dominance of PAC 
contributions by stating “We are going to be the majority party for a long time. So it doesn’t 
make good business sense to give to Republicans.””  Democrats enjoyed the fruits of 
majority status in their proven fund-raising appeals, and this fund-raising advantage 
continued into the 103^ Congress. But House Democrats raised funds individually, 
irrespective o f collective party needs. House Republicans harangued FACs and safe 
Republican incumbents to contribute to Republicans in tight races that could make the 
difference in party control. House Democrats, on the other hand, did not engage in this
Ruth Shalit, “The Undertaker: Tony Coelho and the Death o f the Democrats,” The New 
Republic. 2 January 1995, pp. 17-18.
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collective activity to help beleaguered Democratic candidates at the expense of safe 
Democratic incumbents.
Republicans on the Attack
House Republicans employed aggressive attack politics in their successful drive for 
House control in 1993 and 1994. House Republicans virulently attacked the Democratic 
majority and individual Democrats, used ethics as a political weapon against House 
Democrats, and aggressively contested for majority control o f the House. The nationalized 
Republican campaign for majority control in 1994 contrasted sharply with previous 
Republican campaign efforts, which traditionally mimicked the Democratic strategy of 
individual incumbent re-elections and localized campaigns. In addition to employing attack 
politics. House Republicans benefitted from the dividends o f long-term political investments 
made in the previous decade. These investments included the cultivation of a farm team of 
quality Republican House candidates, more aggressive fund-raising tactics, adoption of ethics 
attacks as viable tools to achieve majority status, and the use o f highly charged rhetoric to 
portray Democratic rule in the House as “corrupt”. Through these tactics. House 
Republicans increasingly cast their lot with the aggressive style o f majority-obtaining activity 
long advocated by Newt Gingrich since the 1970s. These majority-attaining tactics 
increasingly monopolized the time of House Republican members and leaders in the 103 
Congress. In the process, their structures were altered from the traditional tasks o f governing 
and legislating to plotting strategy to secure a Republican House majority for the 104* 
Congress.
To win majority control of the House in 1994, House Republicans nationalized the
94
election on anti-Democratic and anti-Clinton ideological appeals to supplant traditional 
Democratic incumbency advantages.’* Republican candidates and campaigns used an 
unpopular Bill Clinton as a blunt hammer against all House Democratic incumbents and 
Democratic open-seat candidates. Republican disappointments in House races in the 1980s 
fueled this new Republican willingness in 1994 to freely use attack politics to achieve 
majority status. If Republicans had maintained control o f all the House seats they had held 
at one point or another in the 1980s, they would have held a House majority in 1990.”  But 
inexperienced candidates and inept campaigns lacking in strategic focus and clear agendas 
cost Republicans a total of 55 House seats during the 1980s. Newt Gingrich emerged as one 
of the first House Republicans to argue that House Republicans could never win a House 
majority until they learned to coordinate their legislative and campaign strategies on the same 
themes and issues that had produced Republican presidential landslides in 1972, 1980, and 
1984. A senior House Republican involved in the 1994 takeover effort stated in an 
interview:
Before Gingrich and 1994, there was never an attempt to nationalize the elections, the GOP 
would look at the election as a district-by-district building process to gain the majority, much 
like the Democrats did. Part o f the problem was having Republican presidents - this made 
it difficult to nationalize the elections, especially in presidential years.
The nationalization strategy for House races, as advocated by Gingrich, was relatively 
straight-forward: first, undermine Democratic credibility by defining the party and its rule
’* David Maraniss and Michael Weisskopf, Tell Newt to Shut Up!. (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1996), pp. 4-10.
”  Rhodes Cook, “Self-Inflicted Wounds Cost GOP Majority in ‘80s,” Congressional 
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in the House as corrupt and too liberal for the United States; then, draw attention across the 
country to a positive message and image of Republican governance. Newt Gingrich served 
an important role as the Patton figure who propelled House Republicans to victory over 
several election cycles in the 1990s. Like Patton, Gingrich articulated aggressive strategies 
for victory, built and nurtured a fighting machine capable o f winning, was consistently 
bullish on success, and repeatedly urged his troops to see victory on the horizon. As the 
catalyst of the Republican victory, Gingrich personified the Republican takeover effort and 
became its focal point. This personification aided Republicans during their ascension to 
majority status in the House. But it also hurt Republicans in the 104* and 105* Congresses 
as the Democrats utilized aggressive anti-Gingrich strategies to hamper Republican efforts 
to hold their slim majorities.
During the 103"* Congress, House Republicans made an all-or-nothing gamble for a 
House majority. Instead of cooperating with House Democrats on policy matters. House 
Republicans openly attacked Democratic positions on the budget, on taxes, on health care 
reform, and on the crime bill. In September of 1994,367 House Republican incumbents and 
House candidates imveiled on the Capitol Steps the Contract With America, a campaign 
document promising House floor votes on 10 domestic policy reform items in the first 100 
days of a Republican 104* Congress.’* House Republicans had proposed a joint Capitol 
Steps event in 1992 in conjunction with President Bush, but Bush refused to participate for
’* David E. Rosenbaum, “With Band and Reagan’s Political Music, G.G.P. Goes for 
House,” New York Times. 28 September 1994, p. A 16.
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fear it might jeopardize his already troubled re-election campaign.™
The Contract With America personified the 1994 campaign and the all-out 
Republican effort to contest majority status and achieve a House majority in the 103"* 
Congress. The Contract laid down distinct partisan lines between the two parties, articulated 
a clear agenda for all Republican candidates, articulated partisan differences between a 
Republican and Democratic House majority in the 104* Congress, and sent important signals 
to Republican base voters on the need to terminate the Democratic majority and elect a 
Republican House majority. The Contract With America established a strong and clear 
ideological focus for Republicans in the 1994 campaign, especially its election promise to 
balance the budget, reform welfare, enact tax cuts, and pass congressional reform. The 
Contract With America not only defined the 1994 campaign, but provided a clear direction 
for a Republican-controlled 104* Congress by promising House floor votes on each of the 
ten items in the Contract within the first 100 days of the new Congress. Each o f the 367 
Republican candidates attending the Contract With America Capitol Steps ceremony signed 
an oath to keep their promise to bring each of the Contract items to a floor vote if the 
Republicans achieved a House majority. In addition. Republicans openly asked voters to 
vote a Republican House of Representatives out o f office in 1996 if Republicans did not keep 
their promise to vote on each of the legislative promises contained in the Contract With 
America.
The Contract With America united all Republican House candidates in a common
™ Steven Engelberg, Jeff Berth, and Katharine Q. Seelye, “Files Show How Gingrich 
Laid a Grand G.O.P. Plan,” New York Times. 3 December 1995, p. A 1.
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message against Democrats, against Bill Clinton’s first two years in office as president, and 
against the record o f the Democratic majority of the 103"* Congress. It also triggered the 
Republican’s nationalized campaign of 1994. Republican congressional candidates from all 
over the country campaigned on the themes of the Contract, arguing that a Republican- 
controlled Congress would be dramatically different fi-om the “liberalism” of the 
Democratic-controlled 103"* Congress.*® Congressman Bill McCollum (R-FL) placed the 
role o f the Contract in perspective:
Don’t underestimate the impact of the Contract with America. It was a brilliant maneuver 
that unified the Republican candidates running in 1994. It was very significant for our 
candidates to approach the voters and our campaign activists with a policy document that we 
could hand them and say ‘This is what we will do if you elect us.’*'
Another House Republican described the electoral importance o f the Contract With America
to Republican strategies to capture the House of Representatives by stating:
The Contract With America was not radical. It also wasn’t brilliance, either. The beauty of 
the Contact was that Newt Gingrich was able to take everyday axiomatic things and turn 
them into commonsense policies. For instance, ‘we should have a balanced budget,’ or ‘we 
should reform welfare.’ These are not controversial with the American people. They were 
supported by 80% of the public in the polls. The Contract provided energy for the 
Republican base that increased turnout. It also provided a governing document for when the 
Republicans gained the majority.
In addition to the Contract, Republican candidates launched negative attacks against 
President Clinton and House Democrats. Republican candidates from all across the country 
ran television commercials “morphing” the faces o f their Democratic opponents into 
Clinton’s face. The anti-Clinton strategy of linking a Democratic House candidate to the
*° Jeanne Cummings, “Gingrich Has Midas Touch for GOP Candidates,” The Atlanta 
Journal and Constitution. 28 October 1994, p. B 1.
*' Interview with Congressman Bill McCollum, 22 May 1998.
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unpopular Clinton, whose popularity ratings fell to a low of 37% in both the summer of 1993 
and 1994, began in the off-year elections of 1993 and the various special elections o f the 
103"^  Congress. President Clinton campaigned for Democratic candidates in six special and 
off-year elections in 1993, and each these offices went from Democratic to Republican.*^ 
Republican election victories in these races had a “snowball effect” of encouraging more 
aggressive anti-Clinton tactics in the next election. In June o f 1993, Republican Kay Bailey 
Hutchison captured a Democratic Senate vacancy in a Texas special election on anti-Clinton 
themes. In the 1993 off-year elections. Republicans captured mayor’s offices in Los Angeles 
and New York City and won Democratic governorships in Virginia and New Jersey.*^
The strategy of “morphing” a Democratic candidate into an unpopular Bill Clinton 
most clearly emerged in May of 1994, when Republicans captured two previously 
Democratic House seats in special elections using anti-Clinton themes. On May 10,1994, 
Republican Frank Lucas captured the 6th district of Oklahoma on anti-Clinton themes 
following the early retirement of Representative Glenn English (D-OK). On May 24,1994, 
Christian book-store owner and political neophyte Ron Lewis captured the second district 
of Kentucky in a special election following the death o f 84-year old William Natcher (D- 
KY), Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee.*^ Lewis aired TV ads “morphing”
*^  William Schneider, “Why Clinton Played the Perot Card,” National Journal. 13 
November 1993, p. 2756.
*^  Dave Kaplan and Elizabeth A. Palmer, “As Voters Clean House Again, Democrats Are 
Left in Dust,” Congressional Ouarterlv. 6 November 1993, pp. 3065-68.
*” “House Special Elections,” CO Almanac 1994. p. 592.
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his Democratic opponent’s face into Bill Clinton.*^ These victories energized House 
Republicans, and laid the groundwork for the anti-Clinton nationzilized campaign o f the 1994 
election. Don Sweitzer, political director for the Democratic National Committee, explained 
the success o f the Republican anti-Clinton strategy by stating “He [Clinton] has become the 
person you can point to for your anger over the state o f things, because he is the President.”** 
In addition to attacking House Democrats in a negative fashion. House Republicans 
capitalized on the two-party competition of the 1990s through their farm team efforts 
between 1987 and 1994. For decades, poor recruitment and a lack of quality candidates hurt 
Republican efforts to challenge open seat opportunities and Democratic incumbents. 
Through GOPAC, Republicans began training a bench o f Republican candidates for state 
legislative races capable o f graduating to, and winning, races for the U.S. House of 
Representatives. This farm team effort experienced growing success in the 1990-1994 
election cycles. Between 1987 and 1993, GOPAC trained 10,000 candidates all over the 
country in how to campaign for office and win election. Newt Gingrich justified the time 
and energy devoted to farm team efforts by stating;
In most election contests, the Republican party is still like a medium-sized college football 
team going to the Super Bowl. The Democratic coalition consists of the party, the big city 
machines, the labor unions, the left-wing activist groups, and the alliances with the news 
media and with academics on college campuses. They have both a bench and training skills 
that we can’t even begin to play against."
*^  Rhodes Cook, “Using Clinton as a Punching Bag...May Have Limits as a GOP Tactic,’ 
Congressional Ouarterlv. 22 October 1994, pp. 2992-93.
** Michael Kelly, “Clinton’s Escape Clause,” The New Yorker. 24 October 1994, p. 46. 
*’ Representative Newt Gingrich, “The Life o f the Party,” Policy Review. Winter 1990,
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The GOPAC fann team efforts concentrated on “doctrine creation.” This entailed 
creating and disseminating a domestic reform message that attracted conservative Republican 
candidates to run for office, which would eventually turn the Republican party into a majority 
party at every level o f government, including the U.S. House. GOPAC fashioned itself as 
the “Bell Labs” o f Republican politics, adopting the “teach them to fish model” of political 
candidate training. Instead of being an ATM machine dispensing campaign cash to 
Republican House campaigns, GOPAC trained Republican candidates in the nuts-and-bolts 
of winning elections. Few political organizations in Washington, D C. actually perform this 
pedagogical role for candidates on the mechanics o f winning a campaign. These farm team 
efforts, pivotal to Republican success in gaining a House majority in 1994, required lots of 
time and energy from House Republican leaders like Gingrich, DeLay, Armey, and 
McCollum. In the 104*'* and 1 OS* Congresses, the House Democratic minority would follow 
a similar strategy of diverting time and energy away from the task o f governing and 
legislating and toward the process o f recruiting candidates on a nationwide basis capable of 
winning a House majority.
Through GOPAC, Gingrich and other like-minded Republicans trained an entire 
generation of Republican candidates in the language, message, ideas, and campaign tactics 
of attack politics. The GOPAC audiotape program, for instance, sent thousands o f campaign 
training audiotapes to Republican candidates all over the covmtry instructing Republican 
candidates in the language of aggressive political combat. In 1990 alone, GOPAC trained 
over 2,800 activists in 32 states in political campaign techniques, and sent 36,000 campaign 
training tapes to Republican candidates running for office at every level o f government.
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These tapes provided a blueprint of aggressive political combat, encouraging Republican 
candidates to think in terms of an aspiring Republican House majority. These techniques 
included 'X^ision, strategies, projects, tactics,” “listen, learn, help, lead,” “wedges, magnets, 
shields, turf,” “we are the majority,” and “defining the left.”
Through audio-tapes, video-tapes, and language manuals, Gingrich taught Republican 
candidates how to “speak like Newt.”** On the tapes, Gingrich instructed Republican 
candidates to use negative words and language to adversely define Democratic opponents, 
including “sick,” “pathetic,” “traitors,” “greed,” “anti-family,” and “disgrace.”*’ Gingrich 
also encouraged Republican candidates to refer to Democratic policies using negative words 
like “decay,” “permissive,” “perpetual dependence,” “welfare cheaters,” “liberal,” and 
“bureaucratic welfare state.”’® He also advocated aggressive combat with Democrats, 
instructing Republican candidates that “political fights make news.” GOP AC’s aggressive 
campaign training techniques were modeled after TRADOC, the U.S. Army’s futuristic war- 
fighting doctrine, with the overall goal o f “capturing the U.S. House of Representatives.”’ ' 
A House Republican involved in these efforts stated:
** Stephen Engleberg, Jeff Gerth, and Katharine Q. Seelye, “Files Show How Gingrich 
Laid a Grand G.O.P. Plan,” New York Times. 3 December 1995, p. A 1.
*’ Michael Kranish, “Gingrich Rise to Power Fueled by PAC Money, Master Plan,” 
Boston Globe. 20 November 1994, p. 1.
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’• Damon Chappie, “Gingrich Enlists Army, But Top Official ‘Wary’,” Roll Call. 3 
October 1996, p. 1.
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You need a change in control o f the House because it brings in new ideas and new blood. 
Newt is the guy who went out into the desert during his first years here and learned Army 
command doctrine. He applied military doctrine to our 1994 campaign, and this really 
energized us in terms of dynamic leadership.
The new focus on candidate training and recruitment helped House Republicans 
achieve increasing success in defeating Democratic incumbents, retaining open Republican 
House seats, and capturing open Democratic House seats in the 1992-1994 period, as 
illustrated in Figure 2-1. In the 1986-1990 period. House Democrats gained a net of eight 
open seats and defeated nine more Republican incumbents than they lost. In the 1991-1994 
period, however, this situation reversed. House Republicans gained a net o f 23 open seats 
and defeated 42 more Democratic incumbents than they lost in the elections o f 1992 and 
1994. In 1994 alone. Republicans captured 39 of the 52 open seats, grabbing 22 open 
Democratic House seats. The farm team efforts of House Republicans played a role in the 
election of nine of the 18 Republican freshmen of 1990,40 of the 47 Republican freshmen
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Figure 2-1: GOP Farm Team Efforts. 
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in 1992, and 58 of the 73 new Republican freshmen in 1994.
Republican emphasis on gaining House seats and a House majority, including 
electing new House Republicans, winning open seats, and defeating Democratic House 
incumbents, did not come without a price. The massive amount o f time, energy, and 
resources spent by House Republican members and leaders to achieve a majority in the 1990- 
1994 period came at the expense of the governing and legislating process. A senior House 
Democrat placed the Republican farm team efforts, and the amount o f time they required, 
in perspective:
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What Gingrich did to recruit and train candidates took time and money. Gingrich did what 
the old political parties used to do, but ceased doing a long time ago. Political parties used 
to play this role that Gingrich did with the new Republican candidates and newly elected 
freshmen. No one else was doing the kinds o f things Gingrich was doing to get people 
involved in the process.
In addition to nationalized strategies and farm team efforts. House Republicans 
engaged in hardball fund-raising tactics in the 103"* Congress. In 1994, House Republicans 
pressured PACs and lobbying groups, which had traditionally given a majority of their 
campaign donations to Democratic House incumbents and lobbying groups, to contribute 
more extensively to Republican campaigns. Gingrich bluntly warned PAC representatives 
in 1994 that if he became House Speaker in January, 1995, “For anybody who’s not on board 
now it’s going to be the two coldest years in Washington.”^  Gingrich additionally 
encouraged businesses to donate money to Republican campaigns so they could “get even 
with the Clinton tax increase.’”  ^ Gingrich defended this hard-ball fund-raising strategy by 
stating “I say, ‘Don’t come in later after trying to prop up House Democratic incumbents who 
oppose your values and tell us you were secretly with us.’”^  Tom Davis (R-VA), who 
defeated Democratic incumbent Leslie Byrne (D-VA) in a swing seat race, applauded the 
new Republican tenacity in fund-raising by stating “I’ve really got to credit Gingrich. He got
Dan Balz, “Republican Leaders Play Hardball With PACs,” Washington Post. 13 
October 1994, p. A 1.
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these guys to give where they would want to anyway.””
In addition to raising money. House Republican leaders cajoled safe Republican 
incumbents to give money from their own campaign coffers to Republican races that could 
help Republicans achieve majority status. In early October, Gingrich sent a memo to 
Republican House colleagues in line for leadership posts or committee chairmanships, 
requesting them to contribute unneeded campaign money to winnable Republican races 
around the coimtry.”  Gingrich and NRCC Chairman Bill Paxon obtained the signatures of 
120 GOP Members who pledged to help Republican campaigns as part o f a “14 Weeks to 
Change the House” program.”  Several GOP incumbents subsequently contributed money 
to carefully targeted close races, helping winning challengers in swing seats like Brian 
Bilbray (R-CA), Rick White (R-WA), Andrea Seastrand (R-CA), and Frank Creamans (R- 
OH).
In the 103"  ^Congress, House Republicans abandoned their traditional role of trying 
to cut legislative deals with the Democratic majority and worked to supplant the Democratic 
majority in the 1994 elections. Instead o f focusing time and energy within the House 
chamber to work with the Democratic majority in the 103"* Congress, House Republicans 
aggressively pursued House control. A senior House Republican articulated the difference
Dan Balz, “GOP Uses Hardball in Fund-Raising Pitch,” Chicago Sun-Times. 16 
October 1994, p. 28.
”  Richard Keil, “Republicans Gave Generously to Colleagues in Tight Races,” 
Associated Press. 18 November 1994.
”  Timothy J. Burger, “GOP Leadership Hopefuls Dole Out Campaign Cash,” Roll Call. 3 
November 1994.
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in philosophy of House Republicans in the 103"* Congress and the 1994 campaign:
Nobody worked harder for the majority than Gingrich. Gingrich is the visionary who saw 
the Republican Majority early on and worked to obtain it. Newt provided leadership, vision, 
and unified the party. He didn’t get any sleep the last three weeks o f the 1994 campaign 
because he was on the red-line, visiting lots o f congressional districts and being the number 
one booster o f our party. We knew the Sunday before the election in 1994 that we were 
going to have a fifty-two seat pick-up. By traveling the districts, we were able to get a sense 
of the country.
In the fight for majority control in 1994, House Republicans employed aggressive 
tactics that painted House Democrats as corrupt, cajoled money out o f PACs and safe 
Republican incumbents, and demonized the policy decisions o f the Democratic majority. 
These more aggressive tactics had been display in the 1980s and early 1990s with the 
creation o f the Conservative Opportunity Society, the ethics campaign that led to the 
resignation o f Speaker Jim Wright in 1989, and use of the House Bank Scandal in the 102™^ 
Congress to portray the Democratic majority as corrupt. But these previous efforts to fight 
the Democratic majority were not fully endorsed by all House Republicans. In contrast to 
previous Congresses, the 103"^  Congress is different in that attack politics and campaigning 
for a majority at the expense of the governing process became acceptable for most House 
Republicans thirsty for a House majority.
Conclusion
The 103"* Congress witnessed an aggressive campaign for majority control by House 
Republicans at every level, from obstructing and attacking Democratic governance, to 
remolding their party culture into a majority-forming machine, to the farm team efforts and 
Contract With America agenda of the nationalized 1994 campaign. The Democratic 
majority, meanwhile, pursued a partisan governing strategy o f passing an ambitious
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Democratic legislative program from within the Democratic Caucus in order to present a 
party program for voters in the 1994 midterm election. More important than the fact that 
Republicans gained a House majority was how they obtained it electorally and institutionally. 
They did not obtain a House majority by being good institutional players or by letting 
individual Republican quality candidates self-select themselves and run campaigns in 1994 
based on local themes. Instead, House Republicans under the leadership of Newt Gingrich 
selected, recruited, and trained a farm team of Republican candidates, aggressively 
undermined the Democratic agenda, proposed an ambitious party platform in the form of the 
Contract With America, and then ran a nationalized campaign on anti-Democratic themes 
based on their farm team candidates running on Contract With America themes.
Contemporary theories of congressional organization cannot account for the success 
of this nationalized effort, which mitigated against many of the electoral precepts of the 
House during the period of non-competition like candidate-centered elections based on local 
issues. The Democratic majority, which continued to operate electorally and institutionally 
much like it had in previous decades of non-competitive rule, was demolished by these more 
aggressive, unorthodox Republican strategies and tactics. House Democrats relied on 
individual House Democrats to run their own localized races, raise their own money, stress 
their own localized themes in order to win re-election. This reliance on traditional election 
advantages was no match, however, for the nationalized strategies employed by Republicans 
in the 103"* Congress. To preserve the open Democratic seats. House Democrats relied on 
the traditional system of quality Democratic candidates percolating up from the state and 
local level to hold and secure the Democratic majority. But the Republican nationalized
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campaign undermined traditional Democratic incumbency advantages, and in the process 
provided a new election strategy for aggressive minority and majority parties to maintain or 
obtain House control.
In many respects, the 1994 election was a bellwether election for congressional 
politics. In addition to ending an unprecedented period of one-party rule, it also remade the 
politics of the 1990s and beyond through the introduction of a nationalized template for 
House elections. Few other congressional elections can compete with the 1994 election in 
terms of the massive institutional and political changes it imposed on the organizational 
matrix of the House. The 103"* Congress and the 1994 campaign served as important 
transformational catalysts in the new competitive era. In the 104* and 105* Congresses, 
these changes would dominate congressional politics as the two parties fought intense battles 
for majority control.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE 104“ CONGRESS AND THE 1996 CAMPAIGN
Armageddon: Competition for House 
Control in the 1990s
The intense two-party competition o f the 1994 election continued in the 104“ 
Congress and the 1996 election. Unlike the 103"* Congress, however, both parties in the 
104“ Congress diverted their political resources and strategies to the goal o f attaining House 
majorities. Like the Republican minority o f the 103"* Congress, the House Democratic 
minority o f the 104* Congress devoted itself to the goal o f capturing a House majority 
through attack politics, scandal politics against Speaker Gingrich, and a nationalized 1996 
campaign based on opposition to the budget policies o f the Republican majority. The new 
Republican majority of the 104“ Congress assumed power with an ambitious and sweeping 
policy agenda, including a seven-year balanced budget plan that proposed to dramatically 
downsize the size and scope of the federal government while providing a $245 billion tax 
cut. When this agenda became unpopular after the two government shutdowns of 1995- 
1996, the Republican majority shifted course in the summer o f 1996 and pursued a centrist 
strategy to focus on re-electing a Republican House majority at all cost. After the collapse 
of Republican majority’s budget strategy following the government shutdowns. House 
Democrats received an opening to contest majority control in the fiercely competitive 1996 
election.
The majority-forming and majority-retaining activities o f the new Democratic 
minority and the new Republican majority consumed the politics o f the 104“ Congress as the 
two parties diverted all available legislative and political resources toward the war for House
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control. House Democrats adopted many of the same tactics and strategies to achieve a 
House majority in 1996 that the Republican minority used in 1994. The Republican 
majority, meanwhile, intended to govern in the 104* Congress and move policy to the right, 
much like the Democratic majority o f the 103"* Congress decided to govern the country and 
move policy to the left. Unlike the Democratic majority o f the 103"* Congress, which never 
pulled back from its leftward governing strategy, the Republican majority o f the 104* 
Congress pulled back from its right-leaning agenda in 1996 to pursue a new strategy of 
bipartisan governance with President Clinton on several legislative items. House Republican 
strategy and tactics in 1996 revolved around the central organizing principle o f retaining 
Republican control o f the House of Representatives in the 1996 elections. By the end of the 
104* Congress, both parties had made capturing a House majority their defining purpose. 
In the quest for electoral victory, both parties attempted to limit their internal divisions while 
enhancing the differences between the parties through tough partisan appeals to their 
respective base voters. Both parties also conscripted the legislative process in the House, the 
committee system, and personal attacks against members o f the opposing party in the open 
warfare for House control.
The new Republican House majority came to power in 1995 with the belief that its 
1994 victory had launched a new period of Republican dominance in American politics.' 
Like the Democrats at the beginning of the 103"* Congress, the new House Republican 
majority firmly believed the previous election provided a mandate to legislate and govern the
' Janet Hook, “Republicans Step Up to Power In Historic 40-Year Shift,” Congressional 
Ouarterlv. 7 January 1995, pp. 7-11.
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country, although from the right instead of the left. For the new Republican majority, the 
promises made in the 1994 campaign with the nationalized appeals o f the Contract With 
America drove the congressional agenda at the beginning o f the 104* Congress. House 
Republicans had high hopes that they could pass their Contract With America agenda in 
1995, win the presidency and an enlarged Republican House majority in the 1996 elections, 
and cement a long-term national Republican majority in American politics.* But after 
bruising fights with the Clinton White House and congressional Democrats over the 
Republican balanced budget plan, especially the two government shutdowns. House 
Republicans suffered a tum-around in public perceptions and support that continued through 
the remainder of the 104* Congress.^
The 1996 elections produced a mixed verdict for both parties. Democrats gained nine 
seats in the House, Republicans gained two seats in the Senate, and President Clinton won 
re-election to the presidency with 49.3% of the vote. Republicans re-elected the first 
Republican House majority since 1928, but emerged with a House majority o f 227 in the 
105* Congress. This represented the smallest House majority since the Republican majority 
o f 221 in the 83rd Congress (1953-1955). Twenty Republican House incumbents won re- 
election in 1996 with 52% of the vote or less. President Clinton became the first Democrat 
since Franklin Roosevelt to be elected to two full successive terms, but also became the first 
president since Woodrow Wilson to win election and re-election with popular vote
* Donna Cassata, “Swift Progress o f ‘Contract’ Inspires Awe and Concern,” 
Congressional Ouarterlv. 1 April 1995, pp. 909-912.
 ^ Juliana Gruenwald and Deborah Kalb, “No Longer Ascendant, GOP Hopes to 
Keep Majority,” Congressional Ouarterlv. 19 October 1996, pp. 2964-68.
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pluralities. The demolition o f the Democratic majority in 1994, and the mixed verdict of the 
1996 elections, would each have a profound impact on the thinking o f two parties and how 
they confronted their roles in the House in the 105* Congress. Whereas 1994 ended one era 
of one-party rule, the 1996 elections insured another era of one-party rule would be delayed. 
Representative Martin Frost (D-TX), chairman o f the DCCC in the 104* and 105* 
Congresses, captured the new competitive era o f the 1994-2000 period when he stated 
“We’ve entered a new era in Congressional politics where the balance o f power is likely to 
shift back and forth between the parties, where a ten- or five- or three-seat majority is more 
the norm than the exception.’**
House Democratic leaders, in concurrence with most House Democratic members, 
made a decision early in the 104* Congress to oppose the Republican legislative agenda and 
fight for a new Democratic House majority. Much like the Republican House minority of 
the 103"* Congress, House Democratic leaders and a majority o f rank-and-file members 
eschewed governing and legislating with the Republican majority. Instead, they chose to 
obstruct, vilify, and attack as much of the Republican legislative agenda as possible before 
a Democratic recapture o f the House in 1996. In the 103"* Congress, House Republicans 
successfully stopped Democrats from passing into law universal health care reform by 
framing it as a big-govemment power grab. In the 104* Congress, House Democrats, in 
conjunction with President Clinton and Senate Democrats, succeeded in blocking 
Republicans from enacting into law their 1995 balanced budget plan by frnming it and other
■* Benjamin Sheffiier, “Two More Years, Two More Years: Republicans Hold Both 
Chambers,” Roll Call. 7 November 1996, p. 1.
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elements o f the Contract With America as an extremist victimization o f the most vulnerable 
elements o f society.’ Just as Republicans launched a negative campaign against President 
Clinton and made him the focal point o f opposition in their nationalized campaign of 1994, 
House Democrats pursued a negative “get-Newt” strategy that made Speaker Gingrich the 
focal point of their nationalized campaign of 1996. The Republican effort to implement the 
Contract With America, the government shutdowns, the specifics of the Republican’s 1995 
budget plan, and Speaker Gingrich’s ethics and personality each provided Democrats with 
a firm foundation to launch a nationalized campaign in 1996.
While House Democrats aggressively fought to escape their newfound minority 
status. House Republicans aggressively fought to save their majority status. After the failure 
of their shutdown strategy in 1995, House Republicans engaged in a survival strategy in 1996 
to preserve their majority amidst sustained attacks from President Clinton, House Democrats, 
labor unions, and other interest groups o f the left. Unlike the Democratic majority of the 
103"* Congress, which was unprepared for the competitive demands o f the 1994 campaign, 
the Republican majority o f the 104* Congress prepared for political combat to re-elect their 
majority using many of the same tactics and strategies that helped them secure a House 
majority in the first place. The House Republican majority abandoned the Dole presidential 
campaign, engaged in a risky and aggressive campaign to educate the public on the 
Republican Medicare plan, fought Democratic negative advertising against House
’ George Hayer, “House GOP Pushes Budget Cuts As Political Stakes Mount,” 
C o n g re ss io n a l O u a rte rlv . 18 March 1995, p p . 794-98; Jeffrey L. Katz, “Election Year 
‘Learning Curve’ Resulted in More Funding,” Congressional Ouarterlv. 2 November 
1996, p p . 3166-67.
114
Republicans through an aggressive nationwide effort to fight for every vulnerable Republican 
House seat, utilized the committee system to lure candidates who could grab conservative 
districts aroimd the coimtry to retain the Republican House majority, and painted new 
partisan lines between a Republican House majority and a Democratic House majority. 
While engaging in this fierce political combat. House Republicans also engaged in a flurry 
o f bipartisan deals with President Clinton in the summer of 1996 designed to provide all 
Republican House candidates with a positive record of achievement for the fall campaign. 
These bipartisan legislative accomplishments, which included raising the minimum wage, 
welfare reform, and health care portability, softened the edge o f the Republican revolution 
o f 1995 and provided centrist credentials to Republicans facing tough re-election campaigns 
against the Democratic nationalized campaign.
Much like the Democratic majority of 1993, which designed a deficit-reduction 
measure consistent with core Democratic principles, the Republican majority of 1995 
proposed an ambitious budget plan that both reduced the deficit and moved the federal 
budget’s priorities closer to Republican electoral objectives. The Republican budget plan 
o f 1995 balanced the budget by 2002 through $270 billion in Medicare savings, over $1 
trillion in domestic spending cuts, and the elimination o f284 government programs and 13 
government agencies. In addition. House Republican leaders proposed a $245 billion tax cut 
to permanently transfer power and money out of Washington, D.C., a top priority of 
Republican base voters and activists who helped elect the Republican majority in 1994. The 
Republican approach to cutting the deficit differed greatly to the Democratic approach to 
reduce the deficit. This disagreement between House Republicans and President Clinton led
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to the budget showdown of the fall of 1995 and the two government shutdowns of 1995- 
1996, the longest government shutdowns in U.S. history. A six day shutdown began on 
November 14,1995, furloughing 800,000 federal workers. A longer 21 day shutdown began 
on December 16, 1995, and furloughed 260,000 federal workers through the Christmas 
holidays. The four previous government shutdowns since 1981 had never lasted beyond one 
day.
As Republicans suffered political damage from the shutdowns, the gaffes and 
missteps o f Speaker Gingrich became a liability for Republicans and a boon for House 
Democrats seeking advantage in the 1996 elections. Speaker Gingrich’s public threats in the 
summer of 1995 to close down the government if Clinton did not accept Republican budget 
priorities, combined with his statement that the government shutdowns resulted from Clinton 
snubbing him on Air Force One, each laid the groundwork for the Democratic anti-Gingrich 
campaign of the 104* Congress. As the political momentum shifted toward the Democrats 
after the government shutdowns, the Democratic minority used the type o f hardball political 
tactics used by Gingrich to obtain a House majority in a negative campaign against 
Republican budget cuts, especially Medicare, and against the Republican’s increasingly 
unpopular speaker.
House Democrats nationalized the 1996 elections against the Republican balanced 
budget plan, especially as it curtailed spending on Medicare, Medicaid, the environment, and 
education (MMEE). Just as Republicans had perfected the “liberal” label to apply to all 
House Democrats, Democrats refined in the 104* Congress their own “extremist” label, as 
part of their nationalized campaign, to apply to all House Republicans, even moderate and
116
liberal Republicans from the Northeast/ Although House Democrats did not retake the 
House in 1996, their negative campaign against House Republicans was very effective in 
framing issues and public opinion against the new Republican majority. The 1996 election 
was the most competitive race for House control since the 1950s. House Democrats gained 
nine seats in 1996, half the seats needed for a Democratic recapture o f the House, and 
defeated 18 Republican incumbents, the largest number o f GOP incumbent defeats since 
1982. Republicans saved their narrow majority in the 1996 elections by defeating three 
Democratic incumbents and capturing a net o f six open Democratic House seats. 
GOVERNING
The Republican Majority: From Governing to Campaigning
The new Republican majority of the 104* Congress assumed power in 1995 with two 
large goals. First, they intended to govern and legislate with the majority they obtained in
1994 to move policy in a Republican direction. Second, they intended to defend and enlarge 
their majority in 1996. The legacy of their nationalized campaign, combined with the fact 
that the two previous Republican House majorities o f 1946 and 1952 had lost power two 
years later, each played a significant role in shaping Republican governance in the 104* 
Congress. House Republicans had taken a loyalty oath in the 1994 campaign to bring each 
element of the Contract With America to a floor vote in the House within the first 100 days 
of the 104* Congress. This promise dominated the congressional and legislative agenda in
1995 as the new Republican majority furiously raced to keep this 1994 campaign promise
‘ Juliana Gruenwald, “Tremors From Republican Agenda May Reverberate in Fall 
Races,” Congressional Ouarterlv. 29 Jime 1996, pp. 1817-19.
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as a new majority/ House Republicans kept their Contract With America promise as they
governed in 1995, but in the process laid the groundwork for the unraveling of their majority
as the anti-regulatory, budget-cutting agenda of 1995 gave all House Republicans a bad
“brand name” with the electorate. In the 103"* Congress, Democratic euphoria concerning
the first unified Democratic government in 12 years blinded Democratic House leaders and
several key members to the perils of governing from the left in pursuit o f liberal votes.
Likewise, Republican euphoria in the 104* Congress over the first Republican House
majority in 40 years blinded Republican leaders to the perils o f governing from the right in
pursuit of conservative votes. A Republican staff aide described the mood in the House of
Representatives as the new Republican majority raced to keep its Contract With America
promises during the opening days and months o f the 104* Congress:
During the first 100 days, the Republicans who had been out o f power began exercising 
power. Gingrich was viewed as Moses and was given a lot o f discretion by House 
Republicans. It was an unusual situation, and more a result o f the GOP having power for the 
first time in 40 years. It also created havoc for the legislative process. Hearings were 
bypassed, legislation was rolled out that nobody had read, authorizing legislation was written 
into appropriations bills with the policy riders, lobbyists were writing legislation on the 
House floor, and committee chairs were subservient to Gingrich. In retrospect. Republicans 
played fast and loose with the normal legislative process, especially with the hearings 
process.
In terms of a governing platform, the Contract With America agenda both aided and 
hurt the new Republican majority as it took the reigns o f power. The 1992 election had 
generated a need for “change” in a generic sense with the defeat o f  Bush, the election of 
Clinton, and the influx of 110 new House members. But Democratic leaders took the lead
 ^For more on this subject, see: James G. Gimpel, Fulfilling the Contract: the First 100 
Davs. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1996).
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after the 1992 election to interpret what that change meant and how it would be 
implemented, especially in their decision to first tackle deficit-reduction through a 
Democratic budget bill. In contrast, the Contract With America dominated the 1994 
elections from the top Republican House leaders to the conservative base vote in the 
Republican grass roots, and provided a clear agenda and a guiding light for all House 
Republican members as the 104* Congress began. The new Republican majority assumed 
power with a clear mission of passing legislation based on the principles of the Contract, 
from welfare reform to a balanced budget to tax cuts. But the Contract With America also 
contained several items popular with rock-ribbed Republicans but unpopular with the 
population at large, like reforming the nation’s environmental laws in a decidedly pro­
business direction. And while voters supported the concept of a balanced budget, the 
balanced-budget plan advocated by the Contract With America which cut domestic spending 
and entitlement spending lost its luster as the government shutdowns burnished a negative 
image of the new Republican majority.
Republican zeal to balance the budget through restraining federal domestic 
expenditures became the single most important element of the Contract With America and 
Republican governance in the 104* Congress. Republican leaders and House members saw 
passage o f their balanced-budget plan, more than any other item in the Contract With 
America, as the best opportunity for fortifying Republican control o f the House of 
Representatives in the short and long term. To gain the passage o f their balanced-budget 
plan. Republican leaders adopted a shutdown strategy designed to force President Clinton
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to sign the Republican balanced budget plan into law.* The shutdown strategy included two
tactical components: a willingness to close the government to obtain leverage over Clinton,
and a threat to provoke federal default on the national debt by refusing to increase the
nation’s debt limit. Although Republicans grabbed the moral high-ground in their quest to
end three decades o f deficit spending, their shutdown strategy boomeranged against them and
provided Democrats with an edge to regain a House majority. Representative Vernon Ehlers
(R-MI) described the mistakes made by House Republicans as a majority party in 1995:
The majority o f the 73 freshmen elected in 1994 had never served in the state legislatures. 
So they didn’t realize what could and couldn’t be done, at least if  you wanted to win re- 
election. Republicans made two key misjudgments in their governing strategy. First, 
Republicans totally imderestimated Clinton. They thought he was weak. I like to use the 
analogy o f Jim Blanchard in Michigan. Blanchard was the Clinton clone. He was an 
amiable, handsome fellow who had no ideology other than pragmatism. His philosophy, like 
Clinton’s, is to be as liberal as you can without angering voters. Clinton in his first two years 
was just like Blanchard was as governor: floundering aroimd, the Republicans out- 
maneuvering him at every comer. Since Blanchard was defeated in the next election, 1 
thought Clinton would be, too. But Clinton turned out to be much more versatile than I 
could possibly imagine. He hired Dick Morris, moved to the right, stood firm, and did what 
Nixon did in the 1972 campaign in terms o f doing whatever it took to win re-election. 
Second, the Republicans didn’t take into account that the Democrats thought 1994 was an 
aberration and that the natural order of things would return two years later. The anti-Newt 
campaign, the Medicare lies, and the Clinton fund-raising scandal each illustrate a single- 
minded pursuit for power.’
In the budget skirmishing surrounding the government shutdowns in the winter of 
1995-96, House Republicans saw their public support evaporate and their new majority
* For an examination o f the Republican shutdown strategy and the events o f 1995 leading 
to the two government shutdowns, see Elizabeth Drew, Showdown: The Struggle 
Between the Gingrich Congress and the Clinton White House (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1996), and David Maraniss and Michael Weisskopf, “Tell Newt to Shut U p !”  
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
’ Interview with Congressman Vernon Ehlers (R-MI), 23 April 1998.
120
endangered as President Clinton and House Democrats skillfully portrayed them as 
extremists bent on slashing Medicare and providing a huge tax cut to the most wealthy 
individuals in America. Much like the Democratic majority of the 103"* Congress, the new 
Republican majority eschewed a center-out governing strategy in favor of governing to 
please its most conservative supporters both in the House and the country at large. Although 
both majorities addressed important issues like deficit-reduction and health care reform, they 
each paid a political price as determined minority parties seized these governing initiatives 
and used them to launch unrelenting negative attacks designed to gain majority status instead 
of enacting legislation. The government shutdowns radically altered the political balance of 
power in Washington, boosting President Clinton’s anemic poll ratings and lethargic re- 
election campaign and threatening House Republicans with the loss of their majority status 
in the 1996 elections. While Democrats enjoyed a resurgence in the spring of 1996, House 
Republicans spent the remainder of 1996 dealing with the aftermath o f their failed shutdown 
strategy. Unlike the Democratic majority of the 103"* Congress, however. House 
Republicans took corrective action in 1996 to stave off defeat in the fall elections, moving 
to the center in the search o f the swing voter."*
The frenzied legislative pace of the Contract period o f 1995, combined with the failed 
Republican effort to balance the budget in the summer and fall of 1995, consumed vast 
amounts o f precious legislative time on the House floor. In addition to crowding out the
Richard E. Cohen, “O ff Balance,” National Journal. 23 March 1996, pp. 638-42; 
George Hager, “Republicans Throw in Towel On Seven-Year Deal,” Congressional 
Ouarterlv. 27 January 1996, p. 213-16; Jackie Koszczuk, “GOP Faces Campaign Year 
Adrift in Roiled Waters.” Congressional Ouarterlv. 20 January 1996, pp. 139-41.
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consideration o f any other legislative proposals, the failed effort to implement the Republican 
budget plan in 1995 pushed the normal budget and appropriations process in the House 
weeks behind schedule for fiscal years 1996 and 1997. From January to April of 1995, the 
Republican House majority passed each of the Contract items to the exclusion of any other 
legislative business. The negotiations over the Republican plan to balance the budget over 
seven years consumed the remainder of 1995 as Republican House leaders unsuccessfully 
negotiated a budget deal with President Clinton and the government shutdowns threw the 
House into political turmoil.
The budget standoff between President Clinton and the Republican majority forced 
a seven-month delay in passing the spending bills for fiscal year 1996, and delayed both the 
fiscal year 1996 and 1997 appropriations process. Normally, these must-pass appropriations 
bills funding federal government activities would have been finished by October o f 1995. 
The fiscal year 1996 budget and appropriations process did not end until April 16,1996 with 
the passage of a large fiscal 1996 omnibus appropriations package (PL 104-134). An 
unprecedented 14 temporary spending bills, or continuing resolutions, were needed to keep 
the federal government funded during this seven-month delay. This delay placed further 
pressure on the fiscal year 1997 budget and appropriations process as the 1996 elections 
loomed.
At the end o f the 104* Congress, House Republican desires to adjourn early to 
campaign to re-elect their majority and avoid another politically damaging government 
shutdown dominated the governing process. As the Republican majority approached the 
October 1, 1996 deadline for passage of the fiscal year 1997 appropriations bills. House
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Republicans were eager to avoid another politically damaging government shutdown. House 
Republican leaders and members were also increasingly desperate to adjourn Congress early 
to enable Republican incumbents a chance to campaign for the 1996 elections. This desire 
to go home to campaign for the re-election of the Republican majority precipitated 
Republican capitulation in the appropriations process in the fall o f 1996." At the end of the 
103"' Congress, the Democratic majority was ambushed by a minority party hungry for 
majority status. At the end o f the 104**' Congress, the Republican majority prevented a 
minority party ambush by surrendering early to President Clinton and providing substantial 
amounts of “get-out-of-town-money” to fund his domestic spending priorities. In return for 
timely consideration and approval of fiscal year 1997 appropriations measures, President 
Clinton demanded, and received, $6.5 billion in extra domestic spending for education, the 
environment, and anti-terrorism initiatives." Six unfinished appropriations bills were 
wrapped into an omnibus 1997 appropriations bill which contained appropriations for one- 
third of federal spending, almost $600 billion in spending.
Unlike the sense of direction that dominated the Republican majority in 1995, 1996 
witnessed House Republican leaders struggling to regain political advantage while rank-and- 
file Republican members increasingly grumbled about the lack of direction and strategy. A 
power-sharing arrangement between Speaker Gingrich and Majority Leader Armey in 1996 
allowed Armey to run the day-to-day operations o f the House floor, while Gingrich plotted
" “Catchall FY97 Bill Meets Deadline,” CO Almanac 1996. p. 10-21.
"  “Harmony Bom o f Pressure Speeds Spending Wrap-Up,” CO Almanac 1996. p. 10-3.
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election strategy for 1996 and only intervened to resolve disputes when necessary.'^ The 
desire to both preserve their majority status and provide their incumbents with a record to 
campaign on in the 1996 elections spurred Republican compromise with Clinton in the 
summer o f 1996 on raising the minimum wage, passing welfare reform, and passing health 
care portability l e g i s l a t i o n .T h ro u g h  these compromises, and capitulation in the 
appropriations process in the fall of 1996, Republican leaders reminded rank-and-file 
Republican members that their first priority was to retain control o f the House so they could 
return to fight another day.
Throughout the 104th Congress, Republican desire to keep the House in 1996 and for 
several years beyond drove the legislative agenda and legislative process in the House. 
Despite the tumultuous politics o f the 104'*’ Congress, from the Contract With America high 
to the government shutdown low, several pieces of major legislation were enacted into law. 
These legislative accomplishment included a major telecommunications law, a welfare 
reform law that ended the federal welfare entitlement, a farm bill that ended decades of 
commodity subsidy programs, anti-immigration and anti-terrorism legislation, the line-item 
veto, a raise in the minimum wage, and health care portability legislation important to 
Democrats. These accomplishments illustrated the degree to which the governing process 
had been altered in the 104'*’ Congress by competitive pressures. Two-party competition and 
the change in partisan control augmented the governing process and accelerated the passage
“As Elections Loom, GOP Ardor Gives Way to Pragmatism,” CO Almanac 1993. p. 
1-3.
Doyle McManus, “Democrats Debate How to Take Hill,” Los Angeles Times. 31 
August 1996, p. A 14.
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of several substantive reforms. The case study of welfare reform provides one example of 
the role played by the pressures o f two-party competition in the 1990s in the governing 
process.
In the 103'** Congress, House Democratic leaders deliberately ignored welfare reform, 
especially the limit on benefits advocated by both President Clinton and House Republicans, 
due to its unpopularity with liberal base voters and with the majority o f liberals within the 
Democratic Caucus. The two-party competition o f the 1994 campaign and the change in 
party control placed a new Republican leadership team in power which had articulated 
welfare reform as a top legislative priority. The new Republican majority aggressively 
pursued welfare reform in the 104* Congress. President Clinton vetoed two more 
conservative versions of welfare reform before signing a final version in August o f 1996. 
The change in party control in 1994 insured welfare reform would be plucked from the 
obscurity it received in the Democratic 103"^  Congress to legislative prominence in the 
Republican 104* Congress. Additionally, the competitive pressures of the 1996 elections 
forced Republican leaders to compromise with President Clinton to produce a welfare reform 
measure that could be enacted prior to the elections to provide all House Republicans with 
an important campaign issue. In the 105* and 106* Congresses, welfare reform would be 
touted by members o f both parties and by President Clinton as one o f the most significant 
accomplishments o f the 1990s as welfare reform rolls declined 50% and the culture of 
welfare changed as well. In the 103"* Congress, the inability by Democrats to pass any form 
of health care reform legislation denied the Democratic majority bragging rights in the 1994 
elections. The welfare reform law of 1996 provided House Republicans with a campaign
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issue to appeal both to conservative base voters and independent swing voters, and played 
the same role a Democratic victory on health care reform in the 103"* Congress would have 
played in the 1994 campaign.
Democrats on the Attack
House Democratic members and leaders spent their time 104*** Congress recouping 
from their 1994 defeat, organizing against the Republican agenda, and communicating a 
message o f opposition against the new Republican majority. As House Republicans 
implemented their Contract agenda in 1995, they focused on governing from within the 
House Republican Conference, much like the Democratic majority of the 103"* Congress 
focused on finding its governing votes from Democratic ranks. Deprived of any input or 
voice in this process. House Democratic leaders and members began to slowly regain their 
political footing by honing their attacks against the Republican majority, especially against 
proposed Republican budget cuts in federal domestic programs. House Democrats regained 
their political momentum through these attacks, especially in their attacks on the Republican 
Medicare reform plan and the large tax cut contained in the 1995 budget plan.
Through these attacks. House Democrats sought to terminate the Republican majority 
in the 1996 election rather than engage in the process of crafting and improving legislation 
for governing the country. In the summer o f 1996, House Democrats presented the Families 
First agenda, which outlined 21 centrist policy proposals for a Democratic 105*** Congress. 
The Families First agenda provided a serious outline of what a Democratic majority would
Burt Solomon, “At Both Ends of the Avenue...The Democrats Pander and Fall,’' 
National Journal. 7 January 1995, p. 39; Richard E. Cohen, “A Minority Without 
Marching Orders,” National Journal. 21 January 1995, p. 187.
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do in the lOS* Congress if given the majority, performing the same role played by the 
Contract With America for the Republican minority in 1994.'* But despite these similarities. 
Families First differed from the Contract With America in several key aspects. Unlike the 
Contract With America, Families First did not trigger a nationalized effort for House control. 
Unlike Republicans in 1994, Democratic candidates in 1996 did not take a loyalty oath to 
implement the Families First agenda in a Democratic 105"' Congress, and Families First did 
not figure prominently in the House Democratic campaign for majority control in 1996. 
Families First did provide a positive governing direction and agenda for House Democrats 
seeking to regain the majority in 1996, following in the footsteps of the Contract With 
America in terms o f outlining unified party governing agendas.
Although dispirited at the loss o f their long-held majority, House Democratic leaders 
and a majority o f the Democratic Caucus vowed shortly after the 1994 election to oppose the 
Republican agenda of domestic spending cuts, tax cuts, and entitlement reforms. They also 
promised to invoke all procedural devices to halt the newly ascendant GOP agenda.'’ In 
reality, there was little House Democrats could do to stop the Republican agenda in the 
House, where the majority party controls the levers o f power. To stop the Republican 
agenda. House Democrats had to rely on Senate Democratic filibusters and the veto power 
wielded by President Clinton. But House Democrats used the power of symbolic political
'* David Broder, “Two Manifestos,” Washington Post. 30 June 1996, C 7; Charles E. 
Cook, “The GOP ‘Contract’ Vs. ‘Families First’: Challenge Is the Same,” Roll Call. 27 
Jime 1996, p. 6.
'’ Robert Pear, “Democrats Vow to Oppose Part o f Gingrich’s Agenda,” New York 
Times. 18 November 1994, p. A 31.
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gestures in 1995 to articulate opposition to the Republican majority, rhetorically vowing not 
to compromise in their defense o f Medicare and Social Security.'*
Although deprived o f procedural power to affect the legislative agenda. House 
Democrats did have the power to fashion communication strategies to appeal for public 
support in their opposition to Republican efforts to restructure Medicare and other 
entitlement programs like Medicaid, food stamps, WIC, and school lunches. In the months 
leading up to the government shutdowns. House Democrats laid the political rationale for 
opposition to the Republican budget plan. When President Clinton vetoed the Republican 
budget plan, they eagerly rallied around his leadership in opposition to Republican budget 
policies during the government shutdowns. The rapid turn of events against House 
Republicans following the government shutdowns validated this opposition strategy and 
attack politics advocated by House Democrats shortly after the 1994 election. ”  According 
to Minority Leader Gephardt, the government shutdowns caused Americans to “remember 
that some of government, they like. They like Medicare, they like Medicaid, they like 
education.”"® Public reaction against Republican budget cuts in these areas provided House 
Democrats with their message in 1996 for House control.
The school lunch issue in the spring of 1995, during the heyday o f  the Republican’s
'* Morton M. Kondracke, “Gephardt Vows Fight on ‘Principle’ by House Dems,” Roll 
Call. 15 January 1996, p. 5.
”  Benjamin Sheffher, “Democrats Pound GOP Incumbents On Wage Hike Vote,” Roll 
Call Politics. 27 May 1996, p. 15.
Morton M. Kondracke, “Gephardt Vows Fight on Principle’ By House Dems,” Roll 
Call. 15 January 1996, p. 5.
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Contract period, illustrates the efforts made by House Democratic leaders to oppose the 
Republican majority’s legislative program through symbolic appeals in media outlets. 
Through the school lunch issue. House Democrats gained laid important precedents for their 
influential nationalized Medicare campaign in the remainder o f the 104* Congress. As part 
of their 1995 balanced budget plan. House Republicans sought to replace the $4.9 billion 
school lunch program with direct cash payments to the states. House Republicans also 
proposed restraining the growth of the school lunch program from its normal 5.3% increase 
to an increase of 4.5%. House Democratic leaders immediately seized on this restraint in the 
school limch program, and attacked House Republicans by painting an image of school 
children being denied a plate of hot food. In media outlets and news stories, House 
Democrats argued that lower growth rate was a “cut” because the program would not serve 
the same rate o f eligible children.*' On March 19,1995, Minority Leader Richard Gephardt 
and several House Democrats held a “Lunch-In” on the Capitol Steps, where they dished out 
food in a makeshift school lunch line to 2,000 children. At this event, Gephardt attacked the 
Republican majority by stating “it is immoral to take food from the mouths of our children 
to pay for a tax cut for the privileged few in this country.”^
The school lunch issue served as an important political boot camp for House 
Democrats in the art o f using effective media strategies to influence public opinion and 
perceptions. The important lessons of the school-limch issue provided House Democrats
Barbara Vobejda and Ann Devroy, “Republicans Get a Full Plate o f Blame on School 
Lunch Plan,” Washington Post. 9 March 1995, p. A 20.
^  Eric Lapton, “Politicians Serve Sandwiches — And a Pitch for School Limches,” 
Washington Post 20 March 1995, p. C 1.
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with a ready-made template to attack the Republican Congress in other forums on other 
issues like Medicare and the minimum wage. Through each o f these efforts. House 
Democrats used sophisticated media and commimication strategies to paint the House 
Republican leaders and members as too conservative and too eager to cater to the financial 
needs o f the wealthy and well-connected. Much like the Republican minority of the 103"* 
Congress, House Democrats shifted attention away from the underlying public policy 
problems driving the majority party’s legislative proposals, and toward the more unpopular 
aspects o f the specific legislative proposals offered by the majority party.
For instance, both the Democratic majority o f the 103"* Congress and the Republican 
majority o f the 104“* Congress tackled the issue of deficit reduction, a process that can be 
achieved either through tax increases or spending and entitlement cuts. House Democrats 
chose tax increases in 1993 while House Republicans chose spending cuts in 1995. Each of 
these decisions provided openings to minority party attacks. In the 103"* Congress, 
Republican attacks on the tax increases of the Democratic budget proposal drew attention 
away from the fact that the bill reduced the deficit more than inaction. Likewise, in the 104* 
Congress, House Democratic attacks on the specifics of proposed Republican budget cuts 
shifted attention away firom the merits o f a balanced budget and toward the negative effects 
of each proposed cut on an individual constituency
In addition to school limches, House Democrats used similar arguments, tactics and 
political symbolism against the Republican majority in the 104* Congress on Medicare,
^  Richard E. Cohen, “Down But Not Out, Democrats Hit Back,” National Journal. 1 
April 1995, p. 822; Eliza Newlin Carney, “Don’t Count Us Out,” National Journal. 29 
April 1995, pp. 1022-27.
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student loans, Medicaid, the government shutdowns, and the minimum wage. Through these 
efforts. House Democratic leaders and members argued that every Republican spending cut 
was merely freeing up resources to cut taxes for the wealthy. House Democrats repeated a 
common refrain o f saving “Medicare, Medicaid, the environment, and education” from the 
Republican majority during the 104* Congress, much like the Republican minority of the 
103"^  Congress consistently repeated their “tax-and-spend” refrain against the Democratic 
majority. Democratic success on the school lunch issue laid the groundwork for the 
Medicare campaign of 1996 and the successful effort to raise the minimum wage in 1996, 
both priorities o f labor unions and the Democratic base.^“ School lunch. Medicare, and 
raising the minimum wage each illustrated the degree to which an aggressive minority could 
shape public opinion and the legislative milieu as part of a strategy for regaining majority 
control o f the House. The goal of framing public opinion against the Republican majority 
in order to win control of the House in 1996 contained more relevance and importance to 
House Democratic leaders and members than working with the new majority to forge 
legislative compromises. In both the 103"  ^and 104* Congresses, minority parties abandoned 
the acquiescence o f previous minority parties in the House, especially the governing attitude 
of Republican Minority Leader Bob Michel (R-IL) in the 1980-1993 period.
The government shutdowns emboldened House Democrats to be more bold and 
aggressive in their bid to capture the House in 1996, especially in terms of agenda control.^
Dan Baiz, “Minimum Wage Raises Fortunes of Democrats,” Washington Post. 19 
April 1996, p. A 6.
“  Helen Dewar, “After GOP Missteps, Democrats Switch From Defense to Offense,” 
Washington Post 31 January 1996, p. A 6.
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In addition to charting their own independent policy path. House Democratic leaders also 
engaged in negative campaigning against Republican House leaders, especially the gaife- 
prone Speaker Gingrich. Minority Leader Gephardt attacked the Republican majority in the 
same manner that Gingrich had attacked House Democrats in the previous decade, calling 
Newt Gingrich a “trickle down terrorist” and predicting that the Republican House majority 
was a one-term fluke because “every time they’ve taken control o f the Congress, they’ve 
rolled out their real priorities, more tax breaks for the rich.”*® These attacks by the 
Republican minority in the 103"* Congress and the Democratic minority in the 104* 
Congress successfully probed the soft underbellies o f the prevailing House majority parties, 
and forced the marginal members o f the majority party in tough re-election bids to distance 
themselves from their leadership. In addition to these negative attacks. House Democratic 
leaders also focused on constructing their own positive agenda, articulating their own 
priorities, and appealing to both liberal base voters and the important swing voters who 
would determine majority status in the House. The Families First agenda provided important 
clues regarding how Democrats would govern differently from the Republican majority, and 
Democratic House leaders used Families First to present a positive, centrist face on 
Democratic efforts to retake majority status. Minority Leader Gephardt, speaking about the 
role played by Families First, stated “our [House Democrats] agenda will come from 
America’s houses, not from the White House and not from anywhere else.” ’^
“  Michael Wines, “Gephardt Calls for Tax Cut For Incomes Below $75,000,” New York 
Times. 14 December 1994, p. A 20.
Ibid.
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In the 103"' Congress, the Republican governing strategy evolved into opposing and 
even obstructing as much o f the Democratic agenda as possible. Similarly, House 
Democratic governing strategy in the 104* Congress revolved aroimd opposition to the 
Republican agenda on largely class warfare appeals. But unlike the Republican minority of 
1994, the Democratic minority of 1996 could not prevent Republicans from gaining 
legislative accomplishments as part of a grander scheme to retake the House. Unfortunately 
for House Democrats, the intense re-election efforts o f President Clinton in the 104* 
Congress prevented a replay o f the legislative train-wreck at the end of the lOS"' Congress. 
In the 104* Congress, House Democrats rallied around a resurgent President Clinton to ward 
off the threat o f Republican budget cuts during the government shutdowns of 1995. Despite 
this newfound affection, however. President Clinton distanced himself from his more liberal 
House Democratic colleagues in order to present a “New Democrat” image to the country 
to boost his re-election campaign.** This strategy, called triangulation, involved finding a 
third way between the liberalism and class warfare politics o f House Democrats and the 
traditional conservatism of House Republicans. Clinton political strategist Dick Morris, a 
chief architect o f triangulation, described this new governing and electoral strategy in the 
following manner:
1 saw triangulation as a way to change, not abandon, the Democratic party...a president can 
step out ahead o f his party and articulate a new position. The triangle he forms between the 
orthodox views of the two parties at each end of the base and his views at the apex is
•* Rachel Van Dongen, “This Time, Hill Hopefuls Say They Will Run With, Not From, 
Clinton,” Roll Call. 26 August 1996, p. 3; Michael K. Frisby and Jackie Calmes, “Some 
Liberals Consider Clinton as Last Hope For Saving Public Programs from GOP Cuts,” 
Wall Street Journal. 29 November 1995, p. A 16; James Carney, “Correcting His 
Posture,” Time. 20 November 1995, p. 77.
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temporary. Either he will be repudiated by the voters, and slink back into the orthodox 
positions, or he will attract support and, eventually, bring his party with him.”
Triangulation pushed President Clinton in a centrist direction throughout the 104"' 
Congress, pushing him to embrace Republican objectives o f balancing the budget and 
reforming welfare, albeit softening their impact, in order to broaden his base o f support in 
1996. In 1972, a re-election minded President Nixon ran an independent campaign for the 
presidency while tacking left on domestic policy in the pursuit of the median voter. President 
Clinton emulated Nixon’s 1972 strategy in the 1996 election, tacking to the right on public 
policy issues to insure that the dangers confronting all Democrats in 1994 would evaporate 
from him in his own re-election bid 1996. But this triangulation strategy inhibited the House 
Democratic strategy of recapturing the House based on opposition to the Republican 
majority.^"
The competitive politics o f the 1996 presidential and House elections compelled 
President Clinton to triangulate a third way between House Democrats and Republicans. In 
the 104* Congress, Clinton articulated themes of fiscal discipline and a social values agenda 
to distinguish himself from traditional liberal Democrats in the H o u s e . A s  part of this
”  Dick Morris, Behind the Oval Office (New York: Random House, 1998), pp. 80-81.
Mark Shields, “The Lone Ranger Presidency,” Washington P ost 11 November 
1997, p. A 19; William F. Connelly, Jr., and John J. Pitney, Jr., ‘“ Odd Man Out’ Dems 
Recall Frustrated GOP Minority Under Reagan,” Roll Call. 12 May 1997, p. 5.
Juan Williams, ‘“ Morning in America’ - the Sequel,” Washington Post National 
Weeklv Edition, pp. 20-26 November 1996, p. 23; Jackie Koszczuk, “Clinton Embraces 
GOP Rhetoric,” Congressional Ouarterlv. 27 January 1996, p. 211; David S. Broder, “Off 
and Running,” Washington Post National Weeklv Edition. 29 January 1996, p. 11; Gerald 
F. Sieb, “In Social Wars, Clinton Prods GOP Soft Spot,” Wall Street Journal. 3 April 
1996, p. A 22; Dan Balz, “Taking Advantage o f the Advantage,” Washington Post
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triangulation strategy. President Clinton made a balanced budget pledge in 1995, declared 
an end to big government in his 1996 state o f the union, and signed the Republican welfare 
reform bill into law in the summer of 1996.^* Additionally, Clinton advocated V-chips to 
allow parents to block television violence, supported school uniforms, brokered a new TV 
ratings system, and urged a middle ground to be found on the school prayer issue. The 
demands of triangulation also extended to the race for the House as President Clinton never 
made a public case for why the public should elect a Democratic House of Representatives. 
In January of 1996, President Clinton stated he would not make recapturing a Democratic 
Congress a primary goal o f his re-election campaign, stating “The American people don’t 
think it’s the president’s business to tell them what ought to happen in the congressional 
elections.’’^  ^ In response to Clinton’s triangulation. Minority Leader Gephardt (D-MO) 
stated “We’ve got to run campaigns that are run for our needs and he’s got to run a campaign 
for his needs, and we understand that.’’^"*
The bipartisan deals o f 1996 culminating in welfare reform represented the apogee 
of the triangulation, which hurt House Democrats as they struggled to retake the House of
National Weeklv Edition. 6-12 May 1996, p. 12.
Charles E. Cook, “Triangle Strategy: President Jettisons Hill Democrats,” Roll Call. 19 
June 1995, p. 6; Michael K. Frisby and Hilary Stout, “As Campaign Nears, Clinton Is 
Adopting More Centrist Stance,” Wall Street Journal. 3 November 1995, p. A 1; Dick 
Morris, Behind the Oval Office, pp. 79-88; Thomas B. Edsall, “Redefining or 
Abandoning?,” Washington Post National Weeklv Edition. 26 Jime 1995, p. 21.
”  Ann Devroy and John F. Harris, “Clinton Says Record Shows ‘Remarkable 
Consistency’,” Washington Post 31 January 1996, p. A 1.
”  Doyle McManus, “Democrats Debate How to Take Hill,” Los Angeles Times. 31 
August 1996.
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Representatives on nationalized anti-Republican themes. The deals of the summer o f 1996 
aided the incumbent powers-that-be. President Clinton and the Republican Congress, at the 
expense o f the Democratic minority struggling to make the case for why the public should 
elect a Democratic majority. In 1990, a similar situation inhibited congressional Republican 
campaigns in the 1990 midterm elections as President Bush broke his 1988 “no-new*taxes” 
campaign pledge in order to govern with the Democratic majority with the 1990 budget deal. 
Unified government in 1994 presented House Republicans with the perfect opportunity to 
unleash their obstruction strategy on the path to a House majority in the 1994 campaign. But 
triangulation in 1996 undermined House Democratic efforts to insure an empty-handed 
Republican Congress confronted voters in the fall campaigns. House Republicans even used 
triangulation to their benefit in arguing for another term as the House majority in 1996, 
arguing that only a Republican Congress could deliver on Clinton’s election promises to both 
balance the budget and provide a middle-class tax cut.^’
PARTY CULTURE
Governing as a Team, Running as a Team: House Republicans in the 104* Congress
In the 103* Congress, House Republican leaders under the tutelage ofNewt Gingrich 
constructed new tenets o f House Republican party culture of thinking and working as a team 
to achieve majority status in the nationalized campaign of 1994. In the 104* Congress, 
House Republican leaders further molded the party culture o f House Republicans to their 
vision of a unified Republican legislative team that focused on passing domestic reforms to 
change the course of American government and electing a Republican House of
”  Elizabeth Drew, Whatever It Takes (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), pp. 215-27.
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Representatives. To achieve each o f these goals. Republican leaders continued to nurture a 
distinct House Republican party culture committed to the goals o f party-building and electing 
a Republican majority. This change in culture within Republican ranks in the House, driven 
primarily by the competitive pressures o f the fight for majority control in the 1990s, 
represents a significant change in thinking by a congressional party in terms of its goals, 
missions, and internal governing structure.
In the 104“’ Congress, the new Republican majority imparted some of these new 
cultural imperatives on the House institutionally through a series o f congressional reforms 
enacted on the first day o f the Congress. These reforms centralized power in the speaker’s 
office, making congressional leaders stronger, while diminishing the power of the 
committees and committee chairs. The Republican reform package enacted on the first day 
of the 104* Congress slashed committee staff by a third, enacted a six-year term limit on all 
committee chairs, clipped many of the powers enjoyed by committee chairs in the 
Democratic House, and centralized power in the Speaker’s office through the elimination of 
proxy voting and other prerogatives enjoyed by Democratic committee chairmen. In 
addition. Speaker Gingrich formed a Speaker’s Advisory Group (SAG) consisting of the 
same House Republican leaders involved in planning the 1994 takeover: Gingrich, Armey, 
DeLay, Boehner, Paxon, and Walker. These changes altered the power structure o f the 
House. They also sent powerful signals that the demands o f protecting the new Republican 
majority animated House Republican culture. Instead of Republican members solely 
pursuing their independent political objectives and careers, they would in addition be 
confronted with the needs o f re-electing their majority in 1996 and beyond. Throughout
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1995 and 1996, the Republicans first governed as a team and then campaigned as a team to 
re-elect a Republican House majority. This change in thinking from focusing exclusively on 
individual careers and individual advancement by members, to additionally thinking 
collectively as a leam to govern and campaign as a majority party, represents a significant 
difference from the party cultures of the two parties in the previous era o f non-competition.
In addition to reforming the way the House and the committees operate. Republican 
leaders also enlisted the resources of the various committees, especially choice committee 
assignments, in their battle to preserve and enlarge their majority. On the first day of the 
104* Congress, House Republicans kept their Contract With America promise to reshape the 
committee system in the House. During the 1994 campaign. House Republicans nationwide 
had campaigned against long-serving Democratic committee barons like John Dingell (D- 
MI) of the Energy and Commerce Committee and Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL) o f the Ways and 
Means Committee, arguing that these committee chairs had created personal empires and 
fiefdoms at the expense of collective needs and accountability. After the 1994 elections. 
Speaker-elect Gingrich skipped over several senior Republicans to promote three junior 
committee members as committee chairmen.^®
House Republicans placed further curbs on the powers o f committee chairs. They 
abolished three standing committees and several sub-committees, renamed several others to
Speaker Gingrich appointed Representative Robert Livingston (R-LA) as Chairman of 
the Appropriations Committee over four more senior Republicans on the Appropriations 
Committee; Representative Thomas Bliley (R-VA) was appointed chairman of the Energy 
and Commerce Committee over “Old Bull” Carlos Moorhead (R-CA), considered to be 
too conciliatory to become chairman; Carlos Moorhead was once again denied a 
committee chairmanship when Gingrich appointed Representative Henry Hyde chairman 
of the Judiciary Committee despite Moorhead’s more senior status on the committee.
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bring them in line with Republican priorities, eliminated proxy voting (which allowed a 
chairman to cast an absent committee member’s vote in committee), placed a three term limit 
on all committee chairs, and ended the exemption of Congress from federal labor and anti- 
discrimination laws. Each of these actions significantly limited the power o f committee 
chairmen that previous Democratic chairs enjoyed.”  Additionally, Republican freshmen 
received nine o f the ten open seats on the Commerce Committee, seven of the 11 open seats 
on Appropriations Committee, and three of the 10 open seats on the Ways and Means 
Committees. Doling out these choice committee assignments to Republican freshmen facing 
tough re-election races in 1996 further illustrated the cultural shift within Republican ranks 
from individual career advancement to protecting the party’s majority status collectively. 
Speaker Gingrich also demanded loyalty letters from each of the 13 Appropriations 
subcommittee chairmen to the Republican budget-balancing agenda.
The committee reforms enacted by House Republicans sent a powerful signal that the 
previous era o f the large and decentralized Democratic committee system had come to an 
end. In an effort to further bypass committee power. House Republican leaders increasingly 
utilized leadership task forces to draft and enact legislation that was deemed essential to re­
electing the Republican House majority in 1996 and beyond, like the Republican Medicare 
reform plan. Speaker Gingrich appointed 15 task forces in 1995 to address different policy 
areas, which further centralized power in the Speaker’s office.^* From the centralization of
37  « -New Congress Oks Internal Changes,” CO Almanac 1995. pp. 23-28.
Gabriel Kahn, “Gingrich Plan: End to Panels?,” Roll Call. 9 October 1995, p. 22; Newt 
Gingrich, “Leadership Task Forces: The ‘Third Wave’ Way To Consider Legislation,” 
Roll Call. 16 November 1995, p. 5.
139
power in the Republican leadership faction o f Gingrich to congressional reform. House 
Republicans stamped their new majority-forming party culture on the House itself. 
Leadership task forces, in conjunction with the Contract With America, insured that the 
agenda of the new Republican House majority would be set by Speaker Gingrich and his 
leadership team. On Medicare reform policy in 1995, Speaker Gingrich personally took 
charge and overruled committee chairmen on several occasions to insure that the new 
Republican majority delivered on its balanced budget and tax cut promises.^’ To pass 
legislation affecting the party’s fortunes in 1996, like the balanced budget and Medicare 
reform proposals, all House Republicans were expected to be good soldiers and vote to pass 
and implement the new majority’s legislative program. House Republicans, even the 
committee chairs, applauded this centralized arrangement and its mission in the 104'*’ 
Congress. Ways and Means Chairman Bill Archer (R-TX), for instance, stated “In the end, 
you have to be part of the process. You don’t run out there like the Lone Ranger and do 
whatever you want to do.” “^
The six-year term limit on committee chairmen, combined with the term limits 
pledges taken by individual Republican representatives in the 1992 and 1994 campaigns, 
provide important examples of how cultural changes in Republican thinking in the House 
affected the race for majority control in the 1990s. As the Republican minority fought for 
majority status in 1994, the anti-incumbent arguments o f the term limits movement played
”  Jackie Koszczuk, “Gingrich Puts More Power Into Speaker’s Hands,” Congressional 
Ouarterlv. 7 October 1995, pp. 3049-53.
'"Ib id ,p . 3049.
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a powerful role in Republican attack campaigns. Fully 39 o f the 73 House Republicans
elected in 1994 pledged themselves to serving only a fixed number of terms."*' In their
campaign for majority control. House Republicans argued for the necessity of term limits to
prevent the abuses emanating from the “institutional corruption” o f the Democratic majority,
like the House Bank Scandal, the scandal surrounding Ways and Means Chairman Dan
Rostenkowski (D-IL). In an interview, a House Republican described the importance of term
limits in House Republican party culture in the 103"* and 104* Congresses:
40 years of uninterrupted rule made the Democrats arrogant. They thought they were ruling 
by divine right. The 1994 election was a rude reminder that any majority status is temporary. 
I like to argue that beyond term limits for members, we ought to have term limits for parties. 
That would prevent the arrogance o f power that we saw after 40 years of one-party rule. I 
think 40 years is way too long. 20 years is way too long. After a while, you lose focus that 
majority status is dependent on the people’s wishes.
The six-year term limits on all committee chairs, for instance, required the new 
Republican committee chairmen of 1995 to relinquish their posts in 2000 at the end of the 
106th Congress. The self-term limit pledges of Republican House candidates helped the 
Republicans appeal to conservative base voters animated by term limits in order to capture 
the House in 1994. But these same pledges hurt the ability o f the Republicans to hold a 
House majority in 2000 and beyond as those term limit pledges became due. The potential 
retirements o f the term-limited committee chairmen in 2000, many of whom expressed little 
desire to stay in the House after losing a committee chairmanship, combined with the open 
seat vacancies created by the self-term limited Republican House members elected in 1992 
and 1994, provided the Republican majority with its own “Y2K” problem in the 2000
■“ Benjamin Sheffiier, “Self-Imposed Term Limits Affect Nearly Half of House 
Freshmen.” Roll Call. 15 June 1995.
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election. Several Republicans who promised to serve only three or four terms in the 1992 
and 1994 elections, like “giant killer” George Nethercutt (R-WA), began to rethink their 
pledges as the 2000 election approached when the Republicans would hold only a slim five- 
seat majority in the 106th Congress ( 1999-2000).'*^ The term limits and congressional reform 
elements of Republican party culture served as powerful tools for Republicans to appeal to 
their base voters and the Perot voters in 1992 and 1994. But the culture o f term limits within 
the Republican Conference in the 1990s would impede Republican efforts to hold the House 
in 2000 as members like Tom Cobum (R-OK) and Jack Metcalf (R-WA) stood by their self­
term limit promises to vacate their Democratic-leaning seats in 2000.
In addition to clipping the power of the committees. House Republican leaders further 
bended the committee system to the goal of enlarging and protecting their majority in the 
104’*' Congress. In addition to the bypassing of senior members in the appointment of the 
Appropriations Committee, Republican leaders also insured that every committee resource 
was utilized to help enlarge and save the Republican House majority in the 104* Congress. 
In 1995, House Republican leaders used choice committee assignments to help lure party- 
switching conservative House Democratic incumbents into the Republican majority. In 
1995, five conservative House Democrats switched to the GOP, the largest number of party- 
switchers since 1934. Each of these Democrats switched to the GOP out o f firustration with 
the liberalism and class warfare of the leadership and membership o f the Democratic Caucus, 
including Nathan Deal (GA), Greg Laughlin (TX), Billy Tauzin (LA), Mike Parker (MS),
Edward Walsh, “Coming to Terms With Term Limits,” Washington Post National 
Weeklv Edition, 22 March 1999, p. 11.
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and Jimmy Hayes (LA)/^
Republican leaders enlisted their power to appoint members to prime committee slots 
in an effort to iure these party switching Democrats to Republican ranks, illustrating the 
degree to which the war for House control did not formally end with the 1994 election. To 
sweeten the pot for potential Democratic party switchers, the House Republican leadership 
launched a campaign to offer prime committee slots on Ways and Means, Appropriations, 
and Commerce to the first three switchers.'”  Each of the five House Democrats who 
switched to the GOP in 1995 were awarded with better committee zissignments: Nathan Deal 
received a Commerce Committee appointment, Greg Laughlin received a Ways and Means 
assignment, Mike Parker received a coveted slot on the Appropriations Committee, and 
Commerce Committee member Billy Tauzin became the second-ranking Republican on the 
Commerce Committee and received the chairmanship of the Telecommunications, Trade, 
and Consumer Protection subcommittee. House Republicans extended this hospitality to the 
party-switchers in their first re-election campaigns as Republicans. House Republican 
leaders, for instance, intervened heavily to help party-switcher Greg Laughlin (R-TX) in his 
unsuccessful primary bid against Republican challenger and former Libertarian presidential
Nathan Deal switched on 10 April 1995; Greg Laughlin switched on 26 June 1995; 
Billy Tauzin switched on 6 August 1995; Mike Parker switched on 10 November 1995; 
and Jimmy Hayes on 1 December 1995. See: “Majority Party Continues to Grow,” CO 
Almanac 1995. p. 1-29; Juliana Gruenwald, “Deal’s Switch to GOP Exposes Erosion in 
Once Solid South,” Congressional Ouarterlv. 15 April 1995, p. 1084; “Tauzin Makes It 
Official: He’s Now a Republican,” Congressional Ouarterlv. 12 August 1995, p. 2458; 
Jeffrey H. Bimbaum, “Honey, I Shrunk the Party,” Time. 3 July 1995, p. 25;.
”  Gabriel Kahn, “A Switcher’s Market Now,” Roll Call. 29 June 1995, p. 1; Gabriel 
Kahn, “Laughlin to Switch Parties Today,” 26 Jime 1995, p. 1; “Laughlin’s Switch and 
Ensuing Reward,” Congressional Ouarterlv. 1 July 1995, p. 1894
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candidate Ron P au l/’ By using these prime committee slots as bait to lure Democrats to the 
Republican fold, other Republicans had to either wait in line for these positions or give them 
up for the good o f the party.
Loyalty to the new Republican majority by all House Republicans, and helping the 
party extend its rule in the House beyond the 1996 election, became a hallmark of 
Republican party culture in the 104* Congress, especially with the 73 member freshman 
class. Many o f the Republican freshmen elected in 1994 earned staunchly conservative 
reputations dtuing the 104* Congress and exhibited unwavering loyalty to the cause of 
balancing the budget and reforming the federal government.'^ The new Republican House 
majority and the large class of Republican freshmen were each a product o f the 
confrontational politics of the 103"* Congress and the 1994 nationalized campaign. Thirty- 
four o f the new freshmen had defeated Democratic incumbents, and the influx of 73 
conservative House members had radically moved the legislative agenda away from 
expanding the size o f the federal government and toward cutting it back in the 104* 
Congress. Speaker Gingrich commented on the cultural changes brought by this change of 
events, and thinking, especially by the influx of the new freshmen into Republican ranks in 
the House:
They don’t regard being defeated as the end o f their life, just as a change in jobs. Their 
skepticism, their toughness, their idealism, their willingness to question and to change are
Tim Curran, “Speaker’s Punishment of Renegade Republicans Stirs Up a New Storm,’ 
Roll Call. 15 January 1996, p. 1.
^  Philip D. Duncan, “Are GOP Hard-liners Endangered Species?,” Congressional 
Ouarterlv 3 August 1996, p. 2234; Jeffrey Goldberg, “Adventures o f a Republican 
Revolutionarv.” New York Times Magazine. 3 November 1996, p. 42.
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useful traits, and a few years o f that would be good for the House to go through. I am trying 
to accuiturate the House to the freshmen more than acculturate the freshmen to the House.”*’
Further, Speaker Gingrich had called the new Republican members o f  the House “not 
so much politicians as dedicated reformers full o f moral certainty,” and further described 
House Republicans in the following manner;
We are a movement, a group engaged in an effort do nothing less than change the country’s 
habits of governance so that they more truly reflect the manners and morals o f the vast 
majority o f the American people."**
This loyalty to the Republican cause in the House, a multi-Congress project to remake 
the federal government in the image of House Republicans, had direct ramifications on the 
politics and policy of the House in the 1990s. House Republicans ran as a team in their 1994 
nationalized campaign, governed as a Republican legislative party in the 104'*' Congress, and 
ran as a team for re-election in 1996 against the nationalized Democratic campaign of 
Medicare and anti-Gingrich themes.^’ Through each of these efforts. House Republicans 
displayed tenacity to team efforts to re-elect their majority and internal cohesion as they 
defended themselves against Democratic attacks. Despite the fiasco o f the failed shutdown 
strategies, the unpopularity o f the Contract With America and Republican leaders in 1996. 
and the collapse o f the Republican balanced-budget plan, Speaker Gingrich still retained the 
loyalty of the Republican freshmen although House Republicans running in swing seats
■*’ Adam Clymer, “Firebrand Who Got Singed Says Being Speaker Suffices,” New York 
Times. 22 January 1996, p. A 1.
■** Newt Gingrich, Lessons Learned the Hard Wav (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 
1998), pp. 61, 75.
Rich Lowry, “W ho’s Shrinking Whom?,” National Review. 25 December 1995, pp. 34- 
38.
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suffered the effect o f Gingrich’s unpopularity.
Former Representative Bill Gradison (R-OH) explained this loyalty to Gingrich by 
the 1994 freshmen by stating “There is a personal loyalty to him that is without precedent in 
recent history. 1 don’t think anyone ever felt they owed their seat to Jim Wright, Tom Foley, 
or Tip O ’Neill.’’*® Democratic Minority Leader Gephardt (D-MO) commented on this loyalty 
by stating “When you’ve been in the desert for 40 years, your instinct is to help Moses.”*' 
In an interview, a senior House Republican described why most House Republicans 
remained united by Gingrich despite his ethics problems and national unpopularity in the 
104’*' Congress:
The Bonioi strategy of going after Gingrich is an old tactic of the left: lie. The left cannot 
get what it wants at the ballot box. So it resorts to personal ad hominem attacks against 
Republicans. Look what happened to Hutchison when she won her Senate seat in 1993. She 
was indicted and had to spend $800,000 to defend herself. Coverdell was sued in 1992 after 
his victory in Georgia and had to spend S180,000 to defend himself. Chris Cox was sued and 
had to spend thousands to defend himself against a frivolous lawsuit. Bonior filed 75 ethics 
complaints against Gingrich, and 74 were thrown out. He abused the ethics process to try 
to get what he can’t get at the ballot box: a Democratic majority. There is a tension between 
what happens in the home towns and what happens in D C. The Left, comprised of the 
academic and governing classes, comes to Washington, D C. to get protection for policies 
it could never get enacted in the small towns and which Middle America rebels against 
whenever enacted. To silence conservative opposition, the left strikes back with everything 
it has. Milton Friedman stated that when he spoke out against the Great Society, he was 
criticizing the results o f the policy, not the judgment o f those who created it. But anyone 
who criticizes the vision of the left, like we did with our 1994 campaign and the way we 
governed in 1995, is attacked in an ugly, personal manner.
*° Jackie Koszczuk, “Gingrich Puts More Power Into Speaker’s Hands,” Congressional 
Ouarterlv. 7 October 1995, p. 3053.
*' Jason DeParle, “Newt’s Fiercest Fight,” New York Times Magazine. 28 January 
1996, Section 6, p. 39.
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Another House Republican articulated this theme in an interview in regards to 
Republican party culture and the Gingrich ethics case:
Every time we cut back the welfare state, the lifestyle and livelihood o f the Left is threatened 
and placed in jeopardy. The trial lawyers, labor unions, the black civil rights leadership (but 
not blacks, most of whom are conservative), gay groups, and public bureaucracy employees 
are all threatened by the dismantling of the welfare state. They respond by personal attacks 
against Republicans.
In 1989, House Democrats abandoned Speaker Jim Wright (D-TX) when he became 
embroiled in ethics problems. In 1996, House Republicans remained united behind Speaker 
Gingrich despite his ethics problems, in order to maintain surface tmity and hold the House 
in the fall elections. To many House Republicans, the cause of balancing the budget, 
reforming the federal government, and cutting taxes became a messianic quest. This quest 
would have been undermined by the loss of Speaker Gingrich, jeopardizing the entire 
Republican agenda and the long-term project of House Republicans to control the House. 
In 1998 and 1999, House Democrats remained united behind President Clinton despite the 
Monica Lewinsky scandal and impeachment for similar majority-forming reasons. In each 
instance, the fight for majority control, and the power majority status in the House brings, 
became paramoimt in the political calculations o f members.
The distinct Republican party culture created by Gingrich in the 1994 campaign and 
the 104* Congress accounts for much of the difference between the Republican majority of 
the 104* Congress in the Gingrich ethics case and the Democratic majority o f the 101* 
Congress in the Wright ethics case. It also accounts for the differences between the 
Democratic majorities in the non-competitive and the attitudes and cultures o f the two parties 
since 1994. The Republican takeover o f the House after 40 years o f Democratic rule
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provided a unique opportunity for Gingrich to remake the culture o f the House of 
Representatives in his own image, breaking down the old committee fiefdoms and replacing 
them with a disciplined team of Republican legislators dedicated to pursuing leadership goals 
of bringing sweeping changes in the direction o f American government, as illustrated by the 
welfare reform law."
The Republican Medicare education effort in the 104* Congress illustrates the degree 
to which House Republican party culture had become attuned toward the need of protecting 
the Republican majority in a competitive electoral era, and the degree to which a distinct 
House Republican party culture had emerged as a result o f the events o f the 103"* and 104* 
Congresses. In the spring of 1995, the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund issued its 
annual report on Medicare predicting the program would be bankrupt by 2001 unless costs 
were lowered or revenues increased. The Republican Medicare reform plan, which proposed 
$270 billion in Medicare savings over seven years, became ground zero in the war for House 
control in 1996. As House Democrats seized the Medicare issue and used it as a political 
weapon to regain control of the House, House Republican leaders and members adopted the 
risky political strategy of taking their case for Medicare cuts directly to the voters." House 
Republicans, instead of abandoning the Medicare effort after the public relations disaster of 
the government shutdowns, instead banded together as a team to argue on a nationwide basis
"  David Rogers, “OOP’s Rare Year Owes Much to How Gingrich Disciplined the 
House,” Wall Street Journal. 18 December 1995, p. A 1.
"  David Wessel, “In Medicare Battle, Republicans Display Skill At Making Words Mean 
Just What They Choose,” Wall Street Journal. 22 September 1995, p. A 14; Haley 
Barbour, “Why Republicans Ultimately Will Win the Medicare Issue,” Roll Call. 3 Jime 
1996, p. 5.
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for the Republican balanced-budget and Medicare plans.^ A RNCC staffer involved in the 
Republican Medicare education effort described the intense efforts conducted by Republicans 
to argue their position that they were “slowing the growth of the program” instead of “cutting 
Medicare” in order to save the Republican House majority:
The Democratic Mediscare tactics o f 1996, combined with the Clinton and labor ads, was 
open trench warfare. But Republicans won the debate on Medicare. In May of 1995, the 
Medicare trustee’s report came out showing the system was going broke and Republicans 
came out with a budget resolution to cut the rate of growth in the program. Through the 
104'*’ Congress, there was a daily effort by Republican communications staff at all levels. 
We contacted reporters doing Medicare stories to educate them on the facts. This was an 
important thing to do. RNC staffers went through line-by-line and corrected inaccuracies in 
reporting by journalists. We won that debate - we won the terminology war.
Despite this distinct team-mentality that permeated House Republican party culture, 
the ciunulative weight of the negative fallout from the Gingrich speakership weighed heavily 
on House Republicans, especially for Republicans running in swing seats. The lack of a 
vision and agenda after the Contract With America troubled many House Republican 
conservatives, while the conservatism of the Republican agenda and its primarily southern 
Republican leadership team in the House created electoral worries for marginal Republican 
members. The effective Democratic effort to paint the entire Republican agenda, and 
leadership, as too extreme for American politics became an albatross to House Republicans 
seeking re-election in the Northeast and in swing seats. Representative Peter King (R-NY), 
representing a swing seat in New York, criticized the GOP leadership’s “southern, anti-union
^  Adam Clymer, “Both Political Parties Wage Medicare Debate on the Air,” New 
York Times. 16 August 1995, p. A 13; Christopher Georges, “GOP Adopts Risky 
Strategy on Medicare, Taking Case for Cuts Openly to Voters to Blimt Attack Ads,” Wall 
Street Journal. 23 April 1996, p. A 20; Jonathan Weisman, “Republicans Battle Unions 
on Hill and on Airwaves,” Congressional Ouarterlv, 10 August 1996, p. 2250-52.
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attitude that appeals to the mentality of hillbillies at revival meetings.”** King further openly 
oppo«»*d Gingrich’s re-election as Speaker due the negative effect it would have on the 
Republican majority in the short and long term, stating: “There’s no doubt that at least half 
the Republican members of the House believe Newt is a problem. Why do we want to 
reelect the guy we spent the last six months running away from?”** After the 1996 elections 
and in preparation for the 1 OS'** Congress, Representatives Chris Shays (R-CT) and Steve 
Largent (R-OK) joined Peter King in publicly urging Speaker Gingrich to step down for the 
good of the party before the 105* Congress convened. Other House Republicans loyal to 
Speaker Gingrich defended the role he played in the Republican victories o f 1994 and 1996. 
One House Republican stated in an interview:
Gingrich is the best Speaker the Republicans could have. He is intelligent, an excellent fund­
raiser, appeals to the base, and sets direction for the policy. He is focused, and is able to 
drive policy. The balanced budget would not have happened without a Republican Congress 
and Gingrich as Speaker driving the issue. Getting people off the dole with welfare reform 
would not have occurred without Gingrich pushing the issue. In comparison, Tom Foley was 
a weak speaker who couldn’t drive policy and who was a captive o f the committee chairman. 
Gingrich really drives policy in the Republican House.
Throughout the 104* Congress, House Republican party culture articulated the need 
to work and act as a team in order to re-elect the Republican majority in 1996 and beyond. 
In 1996,101 Republican incumbents members contributed $6 million for generic Republican 
advertising to counter the $35 million in labor union ads attacking marginal Republican 
members. In addition. House Republicans banded together as a cohesive team to defend the
55 Richard E. Cohen, “Making the Rounds,” National Journal. 6 July 1996, p. 1475.
** Jim Dwyer, “GOP Views Speaker as a Newtron Bomb,” New York Daily News. 12 
November 1996, p. 7.
150
Medicare plan o f 1995 and fight the nationalized Democratic campaign against Republican 
budget policies. In contrast, the Democratic majority o f the 103"* Congress and the 1994 
campaign splintered as House Democrats ran away from the legislative initiatives o f the 
Democratic majority and ran their own localized election campaigns. This difference 
between the cohesiveness of House Republicans as a majority in the 104**’ Congress and the 
splintered nature of House Democrats as a majority in the 103"* Congress drove the dynamics 
of the two majorities as they faced the competitive politics and nationalized campaigns of 
the 1994 and 1996 elections.
Toward Teamwork: Democratic Party Culture in the 104* Congress
Before Democrats lost their majority in 1994, House Democratic culture remained 
a creature o f extended one-party rule, decentralization, and individualism. Members focused 
on their own committee work and candidate-centered re-election campaigns while 
Democratic leaders managed a diverse Democratic Caucus through coalition management. 
As a newly minted minority party in the 104* Congress, House Democrats were forced to 
examine the causes of their 1994 defeat. In order to win back the majority in 1996, House 
Democratic leaders increasingly exhorted House Democrats to think and act as a cohesive 
legislative and political team in order to win back majority control in 1996. Through these 
efforts. House Democratic leaders stressed the same themes o f cultural change in order to 
retake the majority that animated House Republican culture in the 103"* and 104* 
Congresses.
Unlike the Republican minority o f the 103"* Congress or the Republican majority of 
the 104* Congress, House Democrats confronted different challenges as they examined many
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of the tenets o f House Democratic culture in preparation for building a new Democratic 
majority. Before the change in party control in 1994, a relatively stable party culture 
characterized the House Democratic Caucus based on the tenets o f a decentralized House and 
a large, independent committee system. Deprived of majority status. House Democrats 
watched Republicans centralize power in the speaker’s office and clip the power o f the 
committees. Republican party culture in the early 1990s, especially in the 103"* Congress, 
had increasingly become more attached to party, more ideological, less wedded to the 
committee system, and more willing to gloss over internal party divisions on ideology and 
submit to a more hierarchical leadership structure under the direction of Newt Gingrich. 
House Democratic culture, on the other hand, remained pluralistic, organized by identity 
groups (especially on race), and more heterogeneous ideologically and politically. These 
fundamental principles of Democratic party culture did not easily lend themselves to the new 
centralizing impulses of Republican party culture in the 1990s. As a result. House 
Democratic leaders introduced concepts of teamwork and electoral cooperation in House 
Democratic thinking to lay the groundwork for a new Democratic majority in 1996. Through 
these efforts. House Democratic leaders slowly nudged the members o f their caucus toward 
the goals o f thinking and acting as a unified minority to fight for majority status in 1996, 
although not quite to the extent o f House Republicans in the 103"* and 104*" Congresses.
To recapture the majority, House Democratic culture became infected with many of 
the same cultural attributes of the majority-seeking party culture instigated by Newt Gingrich 
in Republican ranks. House Democratic leaders Richard Gephardt (D-MO) and Martin Frost 
(D-TX) worked closely to instill greater internal unity on election tactics and strategies,
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encourage House Democrats to put a centrist face on the party to improve the party’s fortunes 
and brand name in the pivotal swing districts, and re-think concepts like committee seniority. 
House Democratic culture did not fully embrace the party-led culture o f House Republicans 
hostile to committee power. But the demands of two-party competition in the 104'*’ Congress 
did instill new changes in House Democratic culture more suited to the needs of obtaining 
a House majority through greater party efforts and nationalized campaigns, much like House 
Republicans in the 103"*-105'*’ Congresses.
The most important changes regarded a change in outlook by House Democratic 
leaders regarding their role to regain the majority. Like House Republicans in the 103"* 
Congress, House Democratic leaders laid clear partisan markers between the parties. Much 
like the Republican minority of the 103"* Congress, Democratic leaders in the House pursued 
a more aggressive and partisan stance for ideological and political combat for majority 
control. This new strategy of maximizing party differences required the minimization of 
internal Democratic feuding on policy, strategy, and tactics. Finding surface unity within 
House Democratic ranks against the most draconian elements o f the Republican agenda was 
easy. But on more fundamental issues involving party philosophy and ideology, especially 
on the size and scope of the federal government, finding unity among the Democratic 
minority was harder. This internal fissure for the direction of the soul and direction of the 
Democratic party, between the Clinton “New Democrats” and the traditionally liberal “Old 
Democrats” who dominated House Democratic ranks, would persist into the 1 OS'*" Congress.
After the devastation of the 1994 election and the loss o f majority control. House
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Democrats exhibited a wide range of responses, ranging from confusion to anger.”  
Representative John Dingell (D-MI), for instance, lost not only the chairmanship of the 
Commerce Committee, but also had to let go of 90 staff aides.^* Losing the majority forced 
several House Democrats to re-examine the events contributing to the loss o f their majority 
in 1994. Representative Anthony Beilenson (D-CA), a 16-year veteran of the House, 
commented on the 1994 election by stating ‘i t  wasn’t healthy for one party to be in charge 
for so long. You get insensitive and you don’t feel the need to act.””  From the 1970s to the 
early 1990s, House Democrats had increasingly become more liberal, especially as 
conservative Southern Democrats were replaced by conservative Republicans or more liberal 
Southern Democrats.*” After the 1994 elections, the Democratic Caucus that remained was 
far more liberal than even the Democratic Caucus of 1974, and the ranks o f conservative 
House Democrats had dwindled considerably as southern Democrats were replaced by
”  Richard E. Cohen, "A Minority Without Marching Orders,” National Journal. 21 
January 1995, p. 187; Katharine Q. Seelye, ‘‘Congress’s Lame Ducks Sing Their Swan 
Songs,” New York Times. 30 November 1994; Richard E. Cohen, “Preparing For A Role 
They Don’t Want,” National Journal. 3 December 1994, p. 2856; Jennifer Babson, 
“Already Down, Democrats Face More Punches,” Congressional Ouarterlv. 14 January 
1995, pp. 171-174.
”  Carroll J. Doherty and Jeffrey L. Katz, “Bucking Up: Many Democrats Thrive After 
Shock of ‘94.” Congressional Ouarterlv. 4 Julv 1998, p. 1819.
”  Richard E. Cohen, “Are the Democrats Ready to Reign?,” National Journal. 21 
September 1996, p. 2025.
“  David W. Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House (Chicago: The 
University o f Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 45-58.
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conservative Republicans.*'
The remaining moderate Democrats in the House advocated that House Democrats 
reconnect with the middle class through welfare reform, the fiscal discipline of a balanced 
budget, and the New Democratic path o f President Clinton. Liberal Democrats, on the other 
hand, believed that there was nothing wrong with the liberal message, just in the way it had 
been communicated in the 103^ Congress and the 1994 campaign.*^ Representative Sam 
Gibbons (D-FL), for instance, gained attention in the 104"’ Congress through his populist 
defense of the sick, the poor, and the elderly, and attacked Republican budget priorities as 
a “pure railroad.”*^  Liberal Democrats eschewed the ideological soul-searching affecting 
moderate Democrats, and instead employed class warfare themes to tamish the Republican 
majority and regain majority status.
House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt straddled both sides o f this internal 
ideological feud within the Democratic Caucus, using class warfare rhetoric to assail the 
Republican majority while simultaneously trying to shed the “tax-and-spend” image that
*' “As the Political Parties Polarize, Conservatives Have All But Disappeared From 
Democratic Ranks,” National Review. 28 October 1996, p. 54.
** Steven V. Roberts, “Liberals on the Defensive,” U.S. News & World Report 9 January 
1995, p. 24; Edward M. Kennedy, “Advice to Democrats: Why Sticking to Basic 
Principles is The Best Politics,” Campaigns & Elections. March 1995, p. 33; James M. 
Perry, “Mikulski Prescribes Meat and Potatoes as Diet To Nurse the Democratic Party 
Back to Health,” Wall Street Journal. 1 November 1995, p. A 20.
“  Francis X. Clines, “Democrat Who’s Not Docile in Defeat,” New York Times. 26 
October 1995, p. A 10.
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haunted Democrats in the 103^ Congress and the 1994 election.*” Gephardt spearheaded an 
effort to refurbish the image of House Democrats from the negative liberal “tax-and-spend” 
image of the 103^ Congress to the new image of Democrats in the 104* Congress as centrist 
pragmatists dedicated to commonsense solutions to governing.** In an effort to display 
centrist Democratic credentials in preparation for the 1996 elections, Gephardt stated “We 
have made our share o f mistakes in the past...We’re asking for a second chance. We’re all 
‘New Democrats’ now...we have to be. Times change.”** Gephardt pledged that if 
Democrats regained the majority, they would curb their liberal instincts in order to retain 
their majority, stating:
Losing the place after 40 years was a watershed event. People are not dumb. This was a big 
deal. There wasn’t a Republican incumbent who lost. This was a rejection of the 
Democratic party. And we spent a year and a half listening to people about what it is that 
went wrong and what we need to do to respond to their concerns.*’
In a speech before the National Press Club, Gephardt outlined the Families First agenda and
the change that had taken place among House Democrats during their two-year hiatus from
the majority:
Democrats must resist the temptation to swerve from one extreme to another — to replace the 
GOP revolution with our own coimter-revolution, bom o f the frustrations o f our own
^  Jackie Koszczuk, “Democrats’ Resurgence Fueled by Pragmatism,” Congressional 
Ouarterlv. 4 May 1996, p. 1205.
** Jerelyn Eddings and David Fischer, “Can the Democrats Recapture the Hill?,” U.S. 
News & World Report. 9 September 1996, p. 28.
** Dan Balz, “The New ‘New Democrats’,” Washington Post National Weeklv 
Edition. 23-29 September 1996, p. 6.
*’ Robin Toner, “Middle of Road Beckons in Drive to Overtake G.O.P., ” New York 
Times. 20 September 1996, p. A 29.
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political wilderness. That would only confirm suspicions that Congress is permanently out 
of touch with people’s lives. And quite frankly. Democrats have been guilty o f that in the 
past.**
Through each of these efforts, Gephardt encouraged House Democrats to think about
not only how they would regain majority status collectively, but also how they would govern
collectively as a newly minted majority. A veteran House Democrat described the changes
that developed within House Democratic ranks in the 104* Congress:
Our leadership has gotten a lot better. It will be a different Democratic House when we take 
back the majority. But 1994 had to happen for House Democratic liberals to get the message. 
They became cocky and arrogant when they ran the place. They un-apologetically pursued 
their agenda. But this killed us in the South and West. We saw what occurs when you foist 
a leff-of-center agenda on a population that is moving the other way.
The Families First agenda played an important cultural role for House Democrats in 
1996 in preparation for the 1996 fight for House control. Families First proposed no 
expansive federal programs, and promised a Democratic House of Representatives would 
balance the budget vvdthout raising taxes. House Democratic leaders used the Families First 
agenda to shed the Democratic “tax-and-spend” image and project a new image of 
Democratic moderation and pragmatism.*’ DCCC Chairman Martin Frost explained the 
public relations work Democrats needed to do in order to take back the House, stating 
“Democrats understand that if we are to have a chance at winning the House back, we need 
to be somewhere in the middle politically. And if  we do win it back, we need to stay in the
** “Remarks by House Democratic Leader Richard A. Gephardt “The Families First 
Agenda: Toward a New Practical Politics,” National Press Club, Washington, D C., 28 
June 1996.
*’ John E. Yang, “Hill Democrats Borrow a Few Themes for Center-Looking ‘Families 
First’ Legislation,” Washington Post. 23 Jime 1996, p. A 19.
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middle to keep it.”™
Democrats did not commit themselves to enacting Families First proposals in a 
Democratically-controlled 105"’ Congress, illustrating the degree to which Democratic 
culture in the House remained wedded to its pragmatic, governing roots. Unlike the Contract 
With America, which was imveiled by hundreds o f House Republicans on the Capitol Steps 
in 1994, Families First was unveiled by top Democratic leaders at a press conference in the 
Old Town Hall in Fairfax, Virginia.^' In these respects. Families First complied with many 
fundamental elements o f Democratic party culture which remain unchanged in the 104* 
Congress despite the pressures of two-party competition. The more ideological and 
homogeneous Republican party culture engendered by House Republicans in the 103"* 
Congress and the 1994 campaign demanded a highly programmatic and ideological 
governing platform in the form of the Contract With America. The diverse and 
heterogeneous Democratic party cultiue eschewed strong programmatic promises on policy 
that could ham-string a future Democratic Congress. These more independent Democratic 
committee chairs relished strong committee power, and the prerogative o f using this power 
to address legislative needs was more important than party platforms from the last election. 
Representative Charles Rangel (D-NY), for instance, referred to it as “the Family whatever- 
you-call-it program.”
Like Families First, the re-thinking of the liberalism that characterized and dominated
™ Robin Toner, “Middle o f Road Beckons in Drive to Overtake G.G.P.”
” John E. Yang, “Democrats’ Agenda Aims for the Middle,” Washington Post 24 Jime 
1996, p. A 1.
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House Democratic ranks became important as House Democratic culture changed in reaction 
to the demands of a competitive era. The moderation of the 42-member Democratic 
freshmen class o f 1996 further altered Democratic party culture, moving it away from strict 
liberal orthodoxy and toward the effort by President Clinton to remake the Democratic party 
in a moderate image.^ Twenty-five o f the 42 Democratic freshmen elected in 1996 were 
DLC-styled moderates or fiscal conservatives identifying with President Clinton’s New 
Democratic philosophy.”  Only one of the 42 Democratic freshmen of 1996 would be 
defeated in 1998, as opposed to 14 of the 73 GOP freshmen elected in 1994 and 17 of the 63 
Democratic freshmen elected in 1992. Democratic Caucus Chairman Vic Fazio (D-CA) 
praised the centrist influence of the 1996 Democratic freshmen class, stating “They have 
invested in moving our Caucus to the center. They are showing us the way to the majority. 
We need more like them.” "^* Many o f these new Democratic freshmen sought to emulate 
Clinton’s “New Democratic” triangulation strategy as a credible path to a new Democratic 
House majority. Freshmen Representative Jim Turner (D-TX), stated “It’s difficult to 
convince a Member from Harlem to take a more moderate position. But that’s what we need 
to do if the Democratic Party is going to be the majority in the House.””
”  Graeme Browning, “Seasoned Freshmen,” National Journal. 16 November 1996, pp. 
2494-96.
”  John B. Judis, “Middle March: the post-liberal Democrats,” The New Republic. 21 
October 1996, p. 18.
”  Richard E. Cohen, “The Frosh Move Front and Center,” National Journal. 2 August 
1997, p. 1563.
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The liberalism of House Democratic ranking committee chairmen and leaders became
a large issue in the 1996 campaign for House control, and contributed to Democratic leaders
flirting with abandoning the concept o f committee seniority if  they regained a House
majority. A Democratic takeover in 1996 would have elevated the party’s most liberal
members like William Clay (D-MO), John Dingell (D-MI), George Miller (D-CA), and
Charlie Rangell (D-NY) to committee chairmen. Representative James Moran (D-VA),
chairman o f the moderate Mainstream Forum, commented on this development by stating:
The problem is a disproportionate number of our committees would be chaired by members 
of the liberal Democratic wing, and that wing is becoming the least representative of where 
America is at. If we came up with the traditional, predictable, liberal agenda, I think ‘98 
would be such a tidal wave it would make ‘94 look like a ripple.’*
The more liberal Democratic committee chairs in a future Democratic House had 
spent their entire public careers seeking a larger and more activist government. Many 
questioned the need to balance the budget, and opposed the balanced budget pledges made 
both by President Clinton and by Gephardt in the Families First proposal.”  Representative 
Charles Rangel (D-NY), poised to become chairman o f the House Ways and Means 
Committee in a Democratic House o f Representatives, questioned the Families First 
commitment to a balanced budget by stating “Voters may find a priority that is more 
important than eliminating the federal deficit in six years.” A Democratic takeover of the 
House resulting from the influx of more centrist. New Democratic House candidates, for
’* Dana Milbank, “Ideological Gulf: Two Michigan Races For U.S. House Show 
Democrat’s Dilemma,” Wall Street Journal. 27 August 1996, p. A 1.
”  David S. Broder, “As Committee Chairmen, the Liberal Wing is Ready to Fly,” 
Washington Post National Weekly Edition. 23-29 September 1996, p. 6.
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instance, would have elevated Representative John Conyers (D-MI) to the chairmanship of 
the House Judiciary Committee, despite Conyers’ firmly held liberal beliefs like the 32 hour 
work week, depopulation of U.S. prisons, and reparations for descendants o f  U.S. slaves.’* 
Gephardt flirted with the possibility o f deviating from the principle o f seniority if the 
Democrats retook the majority in the House:
If we win, which is hard to do, you don’t want to squander this opportunity. They’ve learned 
to work as a team. This is not just an aggregation of individuals who can do what’s best for 
their district or their state. Being in a group means you give up some individuality, you give 
up some personal goals to help the group perform as a group.™
In response to this effort to rethink Democratic allegiance to committee seniority, 
Representative John Conyers (D-MI) stated “Gephardt never has and never would tell me 
what to do in my c o m m i t t e e . I n  interviews with House Democrats, none believed House 
Democrats would follow the example o f the Republican majorities of the 1990s in terms of 
abandoning the seniority system, skipping members for committee chairmanships, or 
enacting term limits for committee chairs. But House Democratic leaders did feel compelled 
to flirt with these concepts amidst Republican attacks that electing a moderate House 
Democrat in a swing seat would simultaneously elevate a liberal committee chairman to 
power in a key committee like Ways and Means. The flirtation with merit selection of 
committee chairmen by House Democratic leaders was thus not a serious proposal, but
Dana Milbank, “Ideological Gulf: Two Michigan Races For U.S. House Show 
Democrats’ Dilemma,” Wall Street Journal. 27 August 1996, p. A 1.
™ Dan Balz, “The New ‘New Democrats’,” Washington Post National Weekly 
Edition. 23-29 September 1996, p. 6.
“  James Carney and Karen Tumulty, “Newt’s Nightmare,” Time. 30 September 1996, p. 
24.
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merely a response to the competitive pressures of the 1996 campaign. Although the culture 
of House Democrats would have prohibited a Democratic House majority from actually 
implementing these committee changes, it is significant that competitive pressures to obtain 
a House majority compelled House Democratic leaders to openly think and discuss this 
possibility.
House Democratic leaders had more success in the 104* Congress in promoting a 
new spirit of working as a team for majority control within House Democratic ranks. In the 
1 OS"' Congress, the Republican minority worked as a team by pooling fund-raising resources 
and money from safe incumbents, and by coercing safe incumbents to raise money for needy 
challengers in order to obtain majority control. House Democratic leaders emulated the 
strategies and tactics of Gingrich, DeLay, Armey, and Paxon in the 104* Congress to force 
House Democrats to think and act as a team in the fight for majority control in 1996. 
Gephardt and Frost urged safe Democratic incumbents to look beyond their own races to 
work for the party’s common goal o f retaking the House. They also urged over 100 
Democratic incumbents from safe seats to raise at least $20,000 each for Democratic 
challengers or vulnerable colleagues, and coerced each House Democrat to pay annual dues 
of $5,000 to the DCCC.*‘ This new Democratic emphasis on teamwork and collective fund­
raising mirrored the successful Republican efforts to pool resources together for the good of 
the party in capturing the House. Minority Leader Gephardt stated “It’s a lot harder to win 
the place back than to hold it. It’s absolutely necessary for us to come together to work at
Amy Keller, “Congressional Democrats Heed the Call for Help,” Roll Call. 26 August 
1996.
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this. This is a team effort.”*^  At meetings of House Democrats, Gephardt urged team-work 
to raise and share fund*: for vulnerable Democratic incumbents and promising Democratic 
House candidates. Gephardt even invoked the Olympian self-sacrifice o f U.S. gymnastic 
heroine Kerri Strug, who sacrificed for her team despite a personal injury in order to secure 
victory."
In addition to encouraging House Democrats to think and work as a team for raising 
funds. House Democratic leaders also attempted to use choice committee assignments to 
bolster the campaigns of vulnerable Democratic incumbents in 1996, just like the Republican 
majority of the 104* Congress. For Democrats to recapture the House in 1996, they had to 
keep their own incumbent defeats to a bare minimum. During 1996, Gephardt engaged in 
a behind-the scenes effort to persuade retiring Democratic veterans o f key committees to 
leave their committee assignments early to make room for vulnerable Democratic 
incumbents, urging them to vacate their positions early for the good o f party efforts to retake 
the House. First, Gephardt tried to persuade each of the retiring Democratic members of the 
Ways and Means Committee to leave the committee early to open an assignment for 
Representative Bill Orton (D-UT), a third-term member in a tough re-election fight." 
Gephardt also tried to persuade four retiring Democratic members o f the Commerce
"  John E. Yang, “Democrats Espousing One for All and All for One in Drive to Reclaim 
the House,” Washington Post 28 July 1996, p. A 10.
"  Ed Henry and Timothy J. Burger, “Gephardt Hits Up His Democrats for Cash to Take 
Back the House,” Roll Call. 29 July 1996, p. 1.
"  Ed Henry, “Democrats Open Panel Slot to Help a Vulnerable Rep. Harman Get Seat On 
Intelligence in Session’s Lak Days,” Roll Call. 7 October 1996.
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Committee - Representatives Cardiss Collins (D-III), John Bryant (D-TX), Gerry Studds CD­
MA), and Blanche Lambert Lincoln (D-AR) - to resign from the committee early to create 
positions for two vulnerable freshmen Democrats - Representatives Mike Ward (D-KY), who 
received 44% o f the vote in 1994, and Bill Luther (D-MN), who won election to a 
Republican open seat by 550 votes in 1994.*  ^ Traditionally, members o f the Commerce 
Committee and the Ways and Means Committee attract large corporate campaign 
contributions, and Democratic leaders reasoned that stocking these power committees with 
vulnerable Democrats would provide them with valuable opportunities to raise money for 
their tough re-election races.**
Although the retiring members o f the Commerce and Ways and Means Committee 
refused to leave their assignments early, Gephardt did convince Representative Bill 
Richardson (D-NM), a seven-term member running for re-election in 1996, to resign his 
position on the House Intelligence Committee. This resignation made room for an 
Intelligence Committee slot for Representative Jane Harman (D-CA), a sophomore Democrat 
who won re-election to her swing seat in 1994 by 812 votes.*’ Democratic leaders also told 
corporate contributors that both Ward and Luther were next in line for the next available 
Commerce Committee slots, providing important signals about where their contributions
** Ed Henry, “Leaders Seek to Boot Retirees Off Commerce for Freshmen, “ Roll Call. 29 
August 1996.
86Ed Henry, “Dems Continue efforts to Stock Commerce.” Roll Call. 9 September 1996.
*’ Before the 104* Congress adjourned sine die, retiring Representative Ronald Coleman 
(D-TX) stepped down from the House Intelligence Committee and Richardson was 
immediately put back on the committee.
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should go.** Like the Republican majority, the Democratic minority o f the 104* Congress 
used the committee system as an important campaign tool, and encouraged its members to 
place party goals o f majority control above individual ambition regarding prime committee 
slots. Tiie party culture of both parties converged in this increasing willingness to think and 
act as a team for the greater good o f majority status.
Despite these efforts to persuade House Democrats to think and act as a team. House 
Democrats were not successful in securing the level o f internal cohesiveness and teamwork 
that characterized House Republicans in the 103"* and 104* Congresses. This difference is 
illustrated most clearly by the creation o f the Blue Dog Coalition by conservative House 
Democrats in the 104* Congress. Early in 1995, 23 moderate and conservative House 
Democrats upset with the liberalism of Democratic leaders and the Democratic Caucus, 
formed The Coalition (also known as the Blue Dog Democrats).*’ Conservative, southern 
Democrats had traditionally played a strong role in the Democratic Caucus in the House, 
from the Conservative Coalition of the 1930s-1960s to the Boll Weevil Democrats of the 
1980s who helped pass the Reagan Administration’s tax and budget plans.’® The 1994 
election purged the Democratic Caucus o f several conservatives and moderate New
** Ward lost his re-election bid in 1996 to Anne Northrup (R-KY). Luther received 56% 
of the vote in 1996, and after an unsuccessful bid for the Commerce Committee received 
a committee assignment on the International Relations Committee.
*’ David S. Cloud, “Conservative Democrats Band Together...To Try to Maximize Their 
Influence.” Congressional Ouarterlv. 18 February 1995, pp. 496-97.
’® Eliza Newlin Carney, “Pesky Critters,” National Journal. 29 October 1994, pp. 2507- 
11 ; Viveca Novak, “After the Boll Weevils,” National Joumal.26 June 1993, pp. 1630- 
34.
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Democrats; Representative Charlie Stenholm’s (D-TX) 54 member Conservative Democratic 
Fopjm, for instance, lost 21 of its conservative Democratic members in the 1994 election 
ihrough defeat or attrition.’ ’ Those moderate and conservative Democrats who survived the 
1994 onslaught believed the liberalism o f House Democratic leaders, especially in the 103"* 
Congress, had not only deprived the Democrats of majority status in 1994, but also 
endangered their own electoral viability in swing seats or conservative districts. Five of the 
Blue Dogs eventually switched to the GOP in 1995 due to frustrations o f House Democratic 
opposition to environmental reform, welfare reform, unfunded mandates reform, and 
balancing the budget. Representative Gary Condit (D-CA), co-chair o f The Coalition, stated 
“In The Coalition, there is a high frustration level with the Caucus, the leadership. When the 
hostility gets so high, some people Just leave.”’^
The Blue Dog Democrats represented districts on the firing lines o f two-party 
competition for House control. Blue Dog Bill Orton (D-UT), one of the three House 
Democrat incumbents defeated in 1996, commented on the competitiveness of the Blue Dog 
districts by stating, “If the Republicans are going to increase their margin, it has to come 
from our seats. If the Democrats are to regain control, it would be with moderate-to- 
conservative Democrats who can win in swing districts.”’  ^ Eleven of the 23 original Blue 
Dog seats o f 1995 would become Republican by 1999 through party-switching, open seat
”  Karen Foerstel, “Democratic Leaders Seek Support,” Congressional Ouarterlv. 12 
November 1994, p. 3224.
Gabriel Kahn, “A Switcher’s Market Now,” Roll Call. 29 June 1995, p. 1.
Deborah Kalb, “Endangered Blue Dogs Envision Their Species Restored,” 
Congressional Ouarterlv. 1 June 1996, pp. 1550-52.
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gains, or incumbent defeat. Despite these losses, the Blue Dogs added new members in the
105* and 106* Congresses as it searched for a middle ground between House Democratic
liberalism ana Republican conservatism.^
Most importantly in terms of internal Democratic cohesiveness, the Blue Dogs
divorced themselves politically from the Democratic Caucus and pursued an independent
course designed to enact centrist policy proposals into law. The Blue Dog Democrats formed
their own PAC which raised $180,000 and provided only to Blue Dog House candidates,
supported many of the items of the Contract With America, and provided the legislative
grease for the bipartisan deals on welfare reform and the balanced budget in the 104* and
105* Congresses. Blue Dogs also sought to make their party electable as a House majority,
especially in the most competitive districts, by moving it to the center. The Blue Dogs, in
addition to establishing their political and policy independence, also structured themselves
culturally in a different fashion from the Democratic Caucus. Blue Dog members did not
want their organization to become yet another “redneck caucus” o f conservative Democrats
seeking a forum to vent their frustrations about liberal Democratic leaders. They also did
want to be “DLC-ed,” providing moderate and conservative political cover for endangered
liberal Democrats in competitive races. A Blue Dog member stated in an interview
The DLC became diluted over the years until it was used only as cover for liberal Democrats. 
Liberals would join the DLC so they could call themselves moderates. It was a total sham. 
That is not going to happen to the Blue Dogs. We just don’t let everybody in. We are very 
selective. Only those members who have supported and voted on our issues are let in. 
Initially, Blue Dogs were reviled and even hated in the Democratic Caucus. It didn’t help 
that five Blue Dogs became Republicans. But because of what we did, laying the
^  Jeff Shear, “The Tale of the Dogs,” National Journal. 6 January 1996, pp. 18-22; Lisa 
Leiter, “The Blue Dogs Have Their Dav.”Insight on the News. 5 June 1995, p. 22.
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groundwork for a centrist Democratic policy agenda, the Democratic Caucus as a whole is 
ready to take power. Now, Democrats have repented. They saw what happen in 1994 when 
you let the liberals control the place.
The Blue Dogs worked to create a distinct cultural identity for themselves within 
House Democratic ranks. These efforts did not correspond to the immediate political goals 
of House Democratic leaders hoping to achieve a quick recapture of the House in 1996 
through nationalized appeals against the Republicans on Medicare and the mishaps of 
Speaker Gingrich. This Blue Dog independence contrasts with the unified and homogenous 
Republican party culture of the 103^ and 104* Congresses, which eschewed internal 
divisions on culture and party matters in order to obtain a Republican House majority. In the 
104* and 105* Congresses, the Blue Dogs eschewed obstruction strategies in favor of 
working with the Republican majority to pass Blue Dog policy goals like a balanced budget, 
unfunded mandates reform, and environmental policy reform. The Blue Dogs also operated 
differently than other member outfits on the Hill. Blue Dog members had to actually attend 
Blue Dog meetings and could not send a staffer as a liaison. A Blue Dog member 
commented on this strict requirement of actual member attendance to Blue Dog functions 
by stating:
There still is a need for a Jim Wright and the old committee chairs. They kept this place 
running right. There is a need for more workhorses and less show-horses. That is why the 
Blue Dogs are good. We don’t allow staff in meetings. If a member doesn’t show, then 
tough - they are out. As a party, House Democrats have a Sheila Jackson Lee problem: 
loudmouth Democrats who spout off on the House floor on every subject under the sun on 
topics they know absolutely nothing about. These Democrats give the rest o f us a bad name.
In the 103"* Congress and previous Democratic Congresses, House Democratic 
leaders succeeded due to their coalition management skills and governing a decentralized
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House of Representatives dominated by the heterogeneous culture o f a diverse Democratic 
Caucus. In the 104'*’ Congress, the House Democratic leadership team remained stable 
amidst the chaos o f the 1994 election and the transition from a majority of 258 in the 103"* 
Congress to a mitiurity of 204 in the 104* Congress. Both Richard Gephardt (D-MO) and 
David Bonior (D-MI) were seasoned political veterans who had helped run the Democratic 
House in the 1990s. Unlike the Republican minority in the 103"* Congress, the Democratic 
minority in the 104'*’ Congress did not endure any internal leadership changes in light o f the 
loss o f majority control. Additionally, both Gephardt and Bonior adapted to the needs of a 
competitive era fairly quickly, articulating different agendas and carving unique leadership 
roles for themselves in the fight to retake the House in 1996. David Bonior emerged as the 
leader of an anti-Gingrich strategy, and carved a role for himself as an advocate of aggressive 
attack politics against both Gingrich and the Republican majority.
ELECTIONS
Republicans Protecting Their Majority
Despite bold predictions by House Republicans in early 1995 that they would gain 
30 to 40 House seats in 1996, House Republicans barely managed to hold onto their 
majority.’* House Republicans were hit from several fronts during the 1996 campaign. 
House Democrats, in conjunction with attacks by President Clinton and labor unions, placed 
the Republican majority on the defensive regarding its budget priorities, especially its
’* Deborah Kalb, “GOP Plans To Extend Its Romp, Focusing on Vulnerable Foes,’ 
Congressional Ouarterlv 18 May 1996, pp. 1405-7.
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Medicare reform plan.’* Labor unions, especially the AFL-CIO, launched an aggressive $35 
million campaign to terminate the Republican majority. Republicans were also hit hard by 
the early television advertising from the Clinton-Gore campaign attacking Republican budget 
priorities, especially the Medicare reform plan, and attacking the “Dole-Gingrich Congress.” 
In the final week of the 1996 campaign. House Republicans launched an intensive 
nationalized counter-attack to save their majority, asking voters to re-elect a Republican 
Congress to deprive President Clinton a “blank check” in his increasingly inevitable second 
term. Unlike the Democratic majority o f the 1994 campaign, which splintered as each 
member ran their own localized campaign, the Republican majority of the 1996 campaign 
used nationalized appeals to protect their majority status in the elections.
At the beginning of 1996, a bruised and battered Republican majority faced a short 
tenure in the midst o f the failed shutdown strategy, unfavorable public approval ratings, and 
sustained Democratic attacks on the record of the Republican majority emanating from the 
Contract period o f 1995. Much like the Democratic majority o f 1994, the Republican 
majority was in serious electoral trouble. But unlike the Democratic majority of the 103"* 
Congress, the Republican majority o f the 104“' Congress engaged in a full-scale effort to 
maintain majority control in the 1996 election. The Republican majority shrewdly used the 
legislative process to fashion legislation for a record for the 1996 campaign, used the 
committee system to lure the best candidates to grab conservative seats, raised and spent 
enormous sums of money to defend their majority, and grabbed several open Democratic
^  “Despite Push, Democrats Fail To Topple GOP,” Congressional Ouarterlv. 9 
November 1996, pp. 3225-32.
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House seats (especially in the South) critical to Republican success.’’ House Republican 
leaders slowed down the legislative pace o f the second session o f the 104* Congress and 
abandoned the frenzied Monday-through-Friday schedule o f 1995. By slowing down the 
legislative process in 1996, House Republican leaders were able to keep rank-and-file House 
Republicans in their districts campaigning for re-election and fending off Democratic attacks.
House Republicans engaged in several actions in 1996 designed to maintain their 
House majority in the face of negative public opinion polls, Democratic resurgence, and the 
increasing inevitability of President Clinton’s re-election. In the siunmer and fall of 1996, 
House Republicans moved to the political center and cut several legislative deals with 
President Clinton on welfare reform, health care portability, and raising the minimum wage 
designed to save the Republican majority by providing a record to campaign on.’* Each of 
these bipartisan accomplishments provided Republicans with important political cover for 
the 1996 elections. In 1994, House Democrats were denied political cover as the Republican 
obstruction strategy took its toll on the Democratic agenda at the end of the 103"* Congress. 
In 1996, House Republicans worked with a re-election minded President Clinton to cut the 
legislative deals needed to re-elect the Republican majority. In the fall campaign. House 
Republican incumbents used the legislative accomplishments o f welfare reform, health care
”  Richard E. Cohen, “New Dogs, New Tricks,” National Journal. 10 August 1996, pp. 
1701-5.
’* Charles Cook, “New Republican Image Produces Slight Uptick in Congressional 
Polls,” Roll Call. 29 July 1996, p. 8; Helen Dewar and Eric Pianin, “ Choosing 
Pragmatism Over Partisanship.” Washington Post National Weeklv Edition. 12-18 
August 1996, p. 12; David Rogers and Dennis Famey, “Week in the Sim Gives the GOP a 
Whole New Attitude,” Wall Street Journal. 16 August 1996, p. A 10.
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portability reform, telecommunications reform, and agricultural subsidy reform to argue that 
the Republican Congress had been productive and deserved to be re-elected to finish the job 
of balancing the budget and cutting taxes. Unlike the Democratic majority of the 103"' 
Congress, which confi-onted the electorate in 1994 empty-handed on the biggest Democratic 
legislative priority of health care reform, the Republican majority made an important policy 
down payment in the summer of 1996 with their bipartisan legislative deals with President 
Clinton, and then used this down payment in the fall elections to appeal to the electorate to 
further extend Republican control of the House in the 105"' Congress.
House Republicans, in addition to touting their legislative achievements from the 
104"' Congress, also pursued an electoral strategy designed to spur the conservative base to 
the polls based on advertised fears of a liberal Democratic House majority in the 105* 
Congress. House Republicans dumped their ties to the losing Dole presidential campaign, 
and pleaded with the electorate for the re-election of a Republican House majority as a check 
against a re-elected President Clinton.”  As part of this strategy. Speaker Gingrich pursued 
a stealth campaign in safe Republican districts in the South and West to raise money for 
Republican incumbents and to urge Republican base voters to work for the re-election of the
”  Morton M. Kondracke, “GOP May Soon ‘Dump Dole,’ Try to Save Congress,” Roll 
Call. 17 October 1996, p. 6; Dana Milbank, “No Newt Is Good News: GOP Congressmen 
Sprint To Set Their Distance From Unpopular Speaker,” Wall Street Journal. 14 June 
1996, p. A 14; Michael Weisskopf, ‘“Not a Newtoid’ Says It All,”; Robin Toner, “Put 
Survival Before Dole, Gingrich Savs.” New York Times. 3 October 1996; William 
Schneider, “The Conservative’s Worst Nightmare,” 3 August 1996, p. 1674; Tim Curran, 
“Hill GOPers Ponder: What About Bob’s Effect on Race for Congress?,” Roll Call. 16 
September 1996, p. 1.
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Republican House majority."” Republicans also mounted a vigorous effort to energize their 
conservative base in the final days o f the 1996 campaign, including an 1 Ith-hour spending 
spree designed to preserve the Republican majority and energizing the religious conservative 
base of the Republican party.'"' This “save Congress” strategy encouraged Republican 
congressional candidates to acknowledge that Republican presidential candidate Bob Dole, 
lagging behind President Clinton in the polls throughout 1996, would probably lose. Instead 
of focusing on Dole’s losing campaign. House Republicans focused on warning voters of the 
consequences o f a re-elected Clinton teamed with a liberal Democratic Congress.'"^
As part o f this aggressive Republican effort to save their House majority at the 
expense of the presidential campaign, the NRCC and RNC launched an aggressive direct- 
mail campaign to Republican base voters warning of the dangers a re-elected President 
Clinton teamed with a Democratic Congress and its presumed liberal chairmen like Charles 
Rangel (D-NY) o f the Ways and Means Committee, John Conyers (D-MI) o f the Judiciary
Richard E. Cohen, “Making the Rounds,” National Journal. 6 July 1996, pp. 1473-77; 
Stephen Labaton, “Defying Polls, Gingrich Raises Big Money,” New York Times. 12 
April 1996, p. A 1; Damon Chappie, “GOPAC’s Big Givers Still Love Speaker 
Gingrich,” Roll Call: Republican Convention Issue. 12 August 1996, p. 46.
"" Christopher Georges and David Rogers, “Big Mailing by GOP Aims to Turn Out 
Conservatives, Keep a Hold on Congress,” Wall Street Journal. 31 October 1996, p. A 
24.
Adriel Bettelheim, “GOP Hopes to Keep Control, National Fears Spread to Locals,” 
Denver Post. 29 October 1996, p. A 1 ; Craig Crawford, “New Focus: Who Will Control 
Congress?,” Orlando Sentinel. 27 October 1996, p. A 1; “Wall Street Gets Edgy Over 
Runaway Democrat Victory,” Financial Times. 31 October 1996, p. 3.
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Committee, and John Dingeil (D-MI) o f the Commerce Committee.'" The Republican 
National Committee issued a flyer warning o f the threat of a Democratic Congress which 
stated “What would a Democrat Congress look like? Look Left.” Included in the flyer were 
pictures o f Representative Richard Gephardt (D-MO), Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA), 
and Representative Charles Rangel (D-NY). The NRCC stressed this same theme with its
“Radical Roster” press releases and direct-mailings warning of the dangers o f a liberal 
Democratic Congress, and warned of the dangers o f a Ways and Means Committee 
controlled not by “Representative Charles Rangel o f New York,” but “Representative 
Charles Rangel o f Harlem.”
House Republicans also laimched negative attacks against President Clinton for the 
DNC fund-raising scandal that erupted in October, 1996, with Speaker Gingrich predicting 
that a Democratic Congress would devote itself to “paying off the unions, paying off the trial 
lawyers, paying off the foreign influences, raising taxes, building government bureaucracies, 
and covering up Clinton Administration conspiracies.” '"  Through these efforts. House 
Republicans argued that re-electing the Republican House majority in 1996 for the 105* 
Congress would prevent Clinton from returning to his liberal governance o f the 103"* 
Congress in terms o f raising taxes and spending, ignoring tax cuts, undoing the welfare
Juliet Eilperin, “Both Parties Put Spin On Democratic House,” Roll Call. 17 October 
1996, p. 1.
Adam Clymer, “G.O.P. Pushes Congress Strategy That Shuns Dole,” New York 
Times. 23 October 1996, p. A 1.
Karen Hosier, “Leading Liberals Would Rule if Democrats Win Congress,”
Baltimore Sun. 2 November 1996, p. A 1.
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reform law of 1996, and lowering national defense spending. Representative David Dreier 
(R-CA), summed up the Republican campaign in October, 1996 by stating “We’re the only 
thing that stands between Clinton and devastation.” '®*
As part of their aggressive campaign to defend their narrow majority. House 
Republican leaders used their institutional powers, and persuasion skills, to enlist the best 
candidates to grab or defend seats necessary for the continuance of the Republican 
majority.'®’ Several Republican incumbents were in serious electoral jeopardy in 1996, and 
many of the 18 defeated Republican incumbents were beyond political repair. In North 
Carolina’s Fourth district, with a median household income of $34,569, Republican freshman 
Fred Heineman stated his $133,600 congressional salary and $50,000 police pension made 
him “lower middle class”; he was defeated by the incumbent he ousted in 1994, Democrat 
David Price.'®* In Oregon’s Fifth district. Republican freshman Jim Bunn had divorced his 
wife and married his 31-year-old chief of staff whom he was paying $97,500; the negative 
fallout from this issue allowed Democrat Darlene Hooley to defeat Bunn 51%-46%."” 
Michael Flanagan, the Republican insurgent who upset scandal-plagued Ways and Means 
Chairman Dan Rostenkowski in 1994, lost in a landslide to Democrat Rod Blagojevich as
'®* James Carney and Karen Tumulty, “Newt’s Nightmare: His Rival Dick Gephardt Is 
Eyeing to Take Over the House,” Time. 30 September 1886, p. 24.
David Rogers, “Gingrich Demands Campaign-Proof Spending Bills,” Wall Street 
Journal. 4 June 1996, p. A 20.
'®* Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, The Almanac o f American Politics 1998 
(Washington, D.C.: National Journal, 1997, p. 1067.
Ibid., pp. 1192-93.
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the district returned to its traditional. Democratic roots. Most o f the 18 defeated House 
Republican incumbents in 1996 represented swing districts lacked important political skills 
or were vulnerable due to scandal. Fourteen o f the House Republicans defeated in 1996 
represented swing seats, and three more were GOP freshmen elected as flukes to solidly 
Democratic seats in the 1994 tsunami. Democrats managed to recapture only one o f the 21 
GOP-leaning seats they lost in 1994 by defeating Representative David Funderburk (R-N.C.) 
of North Carolina’s fourth district, who faced a personal scandal in his re-election bid.
To stave off further incumbent losses. House Republican leaders engaged in a policy 
of selective intervention to keep endangered seats in Republican ranks. Republican freshman 
Wes Cooley (R-OR), elected to Oregon’s Second district in 1994, ran into trouble in the 
spring o f 1996 after it was discovered he had lied about serving in the Korean War, 
concealed his marriage so his wife could continue to collect benefits as the widow of a 
Marine, and threatened physical violence against a pregnant reporter."® House Republican 
leaders put extreme pressure on Cooley to resign after polls showed he would lose his 
Republican-leaning district to his Democratic opponent in the 1996 election. ' ' ' Republican 
leaders then lured former Representative Bob Smith (R-OR), who represented Oregon’s 
Second district from 1982 until 1994, to run for his old seat again. Republican leaders
John E. Yang, “Rep. Cooley’s Mountain of Miscues,” Washington Post. 2 May 
1996, p. A 1; John E. Yang, “Cooley’s Predecessor: ‘Step Aside,”’ Washington Post 10 
June 1996, p. A 10.
' ' ‘ Benjamin Sheffiier, “Own Party Puts Up Pressure On Cooley to Quit,” Roll Call. 6 
June 1006, p. 1 ; “Cooley Takes Himself Out Before Democrats Get a Chance,” Roll Call. 
8 August 1996, p. 1; Michael Wines, “Bowing to Party Pressure, A Republican Drops 
Out,” New York Times. 7 August 1996, p. A 8.
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offered Smith the chairmanship of the Agriculture Committee in the 105* Congress as 
compensation for keeping Oregon’s second district seat in Republican r a n k s . S m i t h  
retained the seat for the GOP in 1996, while a grand jury later convicted Cooley of lying to 
voters.
House Republican leaders also encouraged scandal-plagued freshman Enid Greene 
Waldholtz (R-UT), whose husband embezzled $ 1.6 million from her campaign treasury, to 
step aside. Republican Merrill Cook retained this seat for Republicans in 1996. In 
Oklahoma’s traditionally Democratic Third District, House Republican leaders recruited 
former Democratic Representative Wes Watkins to run for his old seat as a Republican. The 
entire House Republican leadership even promised in writing to assign Watkins to the Ways 
and Means Committee if he won his old congressional seat as a Republican in 1996."'’ 
Watkins won the open seat race in the Third District as a Republican, bringing a conservative 
Democratic seat into ranks o f the Republican House majority. Through each o f these 
interventions. Republicans protected their majority by trying to find the most electable 
Republican candidate to either retain or grab conservative seats.
This effort to defend and capture conservative seats to augment the Republican House
Robert Marshall Wells, “Smith May Try To Reclaim 2nd As Cooley Ends His Bid,” 
Congressional Ouarterlv. 10 August 1996, p. 2271; Benjamin Sheffiier, “GOP Leaders 
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Call. 1 August 1996, p. 1.
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majority also extended to Republican House incumbents. House Republican leaders began 
an informal policy that Republican members should not work against other sitting members 
in primary elections, and threatened Republican members who violated these policy with the 
inability to offer amendments or bills on the House floor, a ban on travel that must be 
approved by the Speaker, the possible loss o f subcommittee chairmanships, and the inability 
to be appointed to conference committees. The first test o f this policy came with a primary 
challenge to incumbent Representative Sue Kelly (R-NY), a moderate pro-choice member. 
In the summer o f 1996, Kelly faced a stiff primary race from former Representative Joseph 
DioGuardi (R-NY), an ardent opponent of abortion. The House Republican leadership sent 
a letter to DioGuardi demanding he withdraw his candidacy, and demanded pro-life 
Representatives Bob Doman (R-CA) and Chris Smith (R-NJ) cease their active campaign 
efforts for DioGuardi in the primary election after they attended a DioGuardi fund-raiser."’ 
When Doman and Smith refused to cease their efforts on behalf o f DioGuardi’s candidacy, 
the House Republican leadership attempted to punish the two prodigal members by removing 
them from conference committees, banning their official overseas travel for the House, and 
using the Rules Committee to block any amendments or bills the two members offered."* 
Although Republican leaders later retreated from actually implementing these punitive 
measures. Speaker Gingrich blocked Representative Smith (R-NJ) fi-om being an election 
observer in Bosnia while Doman, the chairman o f the National Security military personnel
" ’ Damon Chappie, “GOP Leaders Try to Quash Primary Challenge to Kelly,” Roll Call. 
1 July 1996, p. 7.
' ** Damon Chappie, “Two Republican Rebels Say Gingrich Backs Off On Their 
Punishment,” Roll Call. 1 August 1996, p. A 1.
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subcommittee, was kept off the defense authorization conference committee. ' Each of the 
punishments, except for the travel ban, were lifted after both members annoimced they had 
become “inactive” in the DioGuardi campaign.
House Republicans also used their new majority status to raise the money needed to 
defend their majority in 1996, raising enormous sums of money that previously had been off- 
limits to them as a House minority."® GOP House members raised a cumulative war chest 
of $58 million in 1995 to defend their new majority. Gingrich, Paxon, and Armey urged 
Republican lawmakers to share their wealth to maintain majority status by donating $10 
million to counterattack organized labor’s multimillion dollar, anti-GOP advertising effort. 
This money funded a last-minute spending blitz coordinated by the RNCC and RNC at the 
end of the 1996 campaign, which helped save the Republican House majority by attacking 
the Clinton foreign money scandal in October, 1996. This last-minute advertising campaign, 
conducted by the NRCC on a nationvride effort to help the most embattled and vulnerable 
Republican incumbents, stated that a Democratic Congress would allow President Clinton 
free reign to push through a liberal agenda in the 105* Congress."’ In addition, key 
Republican allies like the Christian Coalition used phone banks and voter guides on a 
nationwide basis to help protect the Republican House majority, playing the same role as
Damon Chappie, “Leadership Lifts Sanctions on Doman, But Plans to Codify Rule He 
Violated,” Roll Call. 5 August 1996, p. 6.
"® Benjamin Sheffiier, “House Republican Campaign Arm Rakes In Three Times Cash 
of Dems,” Roll Call Politics. 22 April 1996, p. 1; Benjamin Sheffiier, “GOP Shatters 
Money Records For 1996,” Roll Call. 14 March 1996, p. A 1.
' ”  James Grimaldi, “GOP Hits Sanchez With Radio Ad,” Orange Countv Register. 1 
November 1996, p. B 4.
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interest groups on the left did to fight for a Democratic House majority in 1996.'^°
As part o f a strategy to boost GOP ftind-raising while denying Democratic donations. 
Republican Majority WTiip Tom DeLay (R-TX) maintained records showing which lobbying 
groups had given to the GOP, and which had given to Democrats. Adopting a successful 
tactic employed by DCCC chairman Tony Coehlo in the 1980s, DeLay bluntly told lobbying 
groups that if  they wanted access to the new Republican majority, they had to boost their 
GOP contributions and deny funds to Democrats.'*' DeLay defended his reputation as “The 
Hammer” by stating “There are liberal Democrats in this town who are trying to destroy the 
revolution, and I’m not going to be their fnend. I’m their enemy, their most deadly 
enemy.”'"  Additionally, the 73-member Republican freshman class of 1994 quickly learned 
the fund-raising tactics previously mastered by the Democratic House majority.
Republican fxmd-raising advantages, however, could not save the 18 Republican 
incumbents defeated in 1996. The overall political environment, the Medicare and “get 
Newt” nationalized campaigns of Democrats, and Republican missteps in the 104* Congress 
produced an inhospitable political environment for several vulnerable Republican 
incumbents running in swing seats and strongly Democratic districts. In addition, no amount
'*° Mike Doming and James Warren, “Labor Regains Relevance; Conservative Christians 
Flex Their Muscle,” Chicago Tribune. 7 November 1996, p. 20.
'*' David Maraniss and Michael Weisskopf, “Cashing In,” Washington Post National 
Weeklv Edition. 4-10 December 1995, p. 6.
Nancy Gibbs, “Where Power Goes...,” Time. 17 July 1996, p. 21.
Jonathan D. Salant, “Freshmen Embrace Capitol Ways As They Go for PAC 
Donations,” Congressional Ouarterlv. 20 April 1996, pp. 1068-69; “Freshman’s War 
Chest Deters Challengers,” Congressional Ouarterlv. 24 August 1996, pp. 2663-66.
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of money could “de-energize” the energized Democratic base vote, illustrating the limits of 
money in a period o f intense, two-party competition. Unlike the Democratic majority of the 
103^ Congress, the Republican majority of the 104'*' Congress was well aware o f the threat 
facing its majority status and defended itself against a nationalized campaign by an 
aggressive minority. Republicans engineered the rules o f this new form of congressional 
politics in 1994 with their nationalized campaign and attacks on the Democratic majority; 
in 1996, they used similar tactics at the 11 hour o f the battle for the House to keep their 
majority status.
The Democratic Nationalized Campaign for House Control
To recapture the House in 1996, Democrats nationalized the congressional elections 
on the twin themes of the excessive and extreme Republican budget cuts o f the 104'*’ 
Congress and Speaker Newt Gingrich’s unpopularity and ethics troubles. Although House
Democrats failed to retake control of the House, they managed to defeat 18 Republican 
incumbents, gain a net of nine House seats, and shrink the Republican House majority from 
236 to 227. Through coordinated attacks with labor unions, senior-citizens groups, teachers 
unions, trial lawyers, and environmental groups. House Democrats embarked on an 
ambitious, nationalized campaign to terminate the Republican majority using any tactics 
n e c e s sa r y . T h e s e  attacks allowed Democrats nationwide to regain their political footing,
Jerelyn Eddings and David Fischer, “Can the Democrats Recapture the Hill?,” U.S. 
News & World Report. 9 September 1996, p. 28; “The House in the Balance,” The 
Economist. 26 October 1996, pp. 29-30.
Howard Fineman, “Crashing to Earth,” Newsweek. 30 September 1996, p. 28; James 
Bennett, “Liberal Use of ‘Extremist’ Is the Winning Strategy,” New York Times. 7 
November 1996, p. B 1.
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energize their base voters, and put the once-triumphant Republicans on the defensive in 
1996. The budget battle o f 1995-96, resulting in two extended government shutdowns, 
became the foimdation for Democratic strategies to retake the H o u s e . H o u s e  Democrats 
attacked Republican budget policies as too extreme, attacked the ethical troubles and 
rhetorical gaffes o f Gingrich, and amplified this anti-GOP, anti-Gingrich message through 
the campaign messages of other Democratic candidates and the campaign efforts of liberal 
interest groups comprising the Democratic base.
To regain the majority. House Democrats targeted the 73 member Republican 
freshmen class o f 1994, especially the 47 freshmen Republicans elected with 55% of the vote 
or less. Former Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn (D-TX) once stated “Anyone can be 
elected once by accident, but beginning with the second term, it’s worth paying attention.” 
Preventing the re-election o f these Republican freshmen in 1996, before they could “tame” 
their districts, became pivotal for House Democratic hopes to regain the House in the 1990s. 
House Democratic efforts to capture the House In 1996 were aided by massive expenditures 
by labor unions and the 1996 Clinton-Gore re-election campaign. Organized labor spent over 
$35 million in the 1996 election on television advertising attacking House Republicans, and 
sent over 300 imion operatives to the districts of 75 vulnerable GOP incumbents to increase 
voter turnout among Democratic base voters. In addition, the AFL-CIO targeted the districts 
of 29 vulnerable GOP freshmen who won by fewer than 5,000 votes in 1994, attacking them
Juliana Gruenwald and Deborah Kalb, “Quick Democratic Comeback in House Faces 
Obstacles,” C o n g re s s ional O u a rte r lv  24 February 1996, pp. 454-58.
Guy GugJiotta, “GOP Freshmen Top House Democrat’s Hit List,” Washington Post. 1 
April 1996, p. A 1.
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throughout the 104* Congress with paid campaign ads on television. O f the 73 Republican
freshmen elected in 1994, only three grabbed truly Democratic districts: Michael Flanagan 
(Illinois 5), Steve Stockman (Texas 9), and Greg Ganske (Iowa 4); an additional 35 
Republican freshmen elected in 1994 represented swing seats. The remaining 35 GOP 
freshmen either held an open GOP seat or grabbed a Republican-trending seat from a retiring 
Democratic incumbent that would be difficult for Democrats to regain.
The Democratic Medicare campaign against Republicans became the chief weapon 
in the arsenal o f the nationalized Democratic campaign, attracting and recruiting Democratic 
candidates to challenge Republican incumbents, and playing the same role as the Clinton 
Health Care plan did for House Republicans in the 103^ Congress. The cuts in domestic 
spending required to achieve a balanced budget by 2002, in particular the restraint in growth 
of the Medicare and Medicaid programs, provided Democrats with important rhetorical tools 
in their fight for majority control in 1996.'^’ In the 103^ Congress, House Republicans 
attacked the Clinton Health care plan both because they thought it was bad policy and 
because it helped elect scores of Republican freshmen. In the 104* Congress, Democrats 
attacked the Republican Medicare plan for precisely the same reasons. House Democrats
Paul Gigot, “For Unions, 1996 Is Armageddon,” Wall Street Journal. 29 March 
1996; Glenn Burkins, “AFL-CIO Sets Drive to Back Labor,” Wall Street Journal. 22 
February 1996, p. A 2; Peter T. Kilbom, “With New Militancy, Nation’s Unions Hope to 
Drive Republicans From Congress,” New York Times. 19 February 1996, p. A 8; Juliana 
Greunwald and Robert Marshall Wells, “At Odds With Some Workers, AFL-CIO Takes 
Aim at GOP,” C o n g re ss io n a l O iiartgrlv . 13 April 1996, p. 933; “Labor Mounts Big Get- 
Out-the-Vote Push For Democratic Congressional Hopefuls,” Wall Street Journal. 28 
October 1996, p. A 16.
Jackie Calmes, “Fight Over Balanced Budget Could Prove to Be Defining Moment for 
Gingrich and His Agenda,” Wall Street Journal. 6 November 1995, p. A 20.
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quickly attacked the Republican budget plan as “extreme,” arguing that it cut too deeply into 
entitlement and domestic programs in order to provide a large tax cut for the rich.'“
As part of their campaign to regain House control. House Democrats linked the 
restraint in growth in the Medicare program advocated by Republicans to the $245 billion 
tax cut plan offered by Republicans. House Democrats linked the two Republican policies 
into one, arguing the Republicans were cutting Medicare to give a tax break to the rich. This 
line of attack became the core of the Democratic nationalized campaign of 1996.'^' 
Democratic Minority Leader Richard Gephardt called the Republican House members who 
voted for the Republican Medicare reform plan, which trimmed $270 billion from Medicare 
over seven years, “231 Hemlock drinkers,” and urged Democratic House candidates to seize 
the Medicare vote in the fight for the H o u s e . H o u s e  Democratic candidates all over the 
country ran ads linking Medicare cutbacks to Republican plans to use budget savings to offer 
tax cuts for the w e a l t h y . I n  an interview, a House Democrat involved in the Democratic 
Medicare campaign stated:
We demagoged the hell out of Medicare against the GOP. We’ll admit it now. We had to 
do it if we were going to win the majority. O f course, the Republicans demagoged the hell 
out o f us in the 1 0 3 Congress on tax and budget issues. And don’t forget what they did to
John M. Goshko, “Bipartisanship on Budgeting Fades Quickly,” Washington 
Post. 9 January 1995, p. A 6.
Tim Curran, “Geren and Hall Still Democrats, For Now,” Roll Call. 30 October 1995.
Tim Curran and Timothy J. Burger, “Medicare Renegades Face GOP Retaliation,” 
Roll Call. 23 October 1995, p. 1.
Morton M. Kondracke, ‘“New Paradigmer’ On Where the GOP is Really Headed,” 
Roll Call. 6 November 1995, p. 8; Eric Schmitt, “In House Races, Democrats Play to 
Fears on Medicare,” New York Times. 10 September 1996, p. A 17.
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us on guns and the Clinton health care plan. We both did it - both sides are guilty as charged.
In addition to attacking proposed Republican budget cuts, several House Democrats 
under the leadership o f Democratic Minority Whip David Bonior (D-MI) engaged in an 
“anti-Nev.'t” strategy designed to demonize the new House Speaker and turn him into a 
political liability for all R e p u b l i c a n s . T h e  Democratic “get-Newt” strategy entailed 
transforming both Gingrich and Republican budget policies into a single, unattractive 
package.'”  Early in the 104* Congress, House Democrats realized that if they wanted to 
derail the new Republican majority they had to personally attack Speaker Gingrich and turn 
him into an electoral albatross for House Republicans. Gingrich was an easy target for 
demonization and attack. A Pew poll conducted in the summer o f 1994 discovered that 65% 
of Americans had never heard of Gingrich.'”  Speaker Gingrich’s public visibility level 
increased dramatically in 1995 as the speaker temporarily eclipsed President Clinton as the 
center and focus o f political attention, culminating in Gingrich’s nationally televised “state 
of the union” address at the conclusion of the first 100 days o f the 104* Congress.'”  House 
Democrats believed that repeatedly reciting Gingrich’s name in a negative manner was one
Richard E. Cohen, “Will the Anti-Newt Strategy Succeed?,” National Journal. 24 
August 1996, p. 1814.
'”  Robin Toner, “Be Less o f a Target, House Republicans Urge Gingrich,” New 
York Times. 23 November 1995, B 18.
'”  Jackie Koszczuk, “Unpopular, Yet Still Powerful, Gingrich Faces Critical Pass,” 
Congressional Ouarterlv. 14 September 1996, p. 2573.
'”  David S. Cloud, “Speaker Wants his Platform to Rival the Presidency,” Congressional 
Ouarterlv. 4 February 1995, pp. 331-35; Norman J. Omstein and Amy L. Schenkenberg, 
“The 1995 Congress: The First Himdred Days and Beyond,” Political Science Ouarterlv 
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o f their most potent weapons in the war for House control. California Democrat George 
Miller described the rationale behind the “get-Ncwt” strategy;
Newt is the nerve center and the energy source. Going after him is like trying to take out 
command and control. Newt Gingrich is neither here nor there. He’s the intellectual basis, 
the architect, and the moving force behind the things that will hurt the groups and people 1 
represent.'^*
House Minority Whip David Bonior (D-MI) led the “get-Newt” effort, and began his 
attacks on Gingrich two weeks after the 1994 election. Bonior’s “get-Newt” strategy was 
simple: undermine Gingrich’s credibility, make his political life miserable, and drive him 
from the speakership.'^’ In a series of press conferences in 1994 and 1995, Bonior attacked 
Gingrich’s ethics and called for the appointment o f an independent counsel to investigate the 
ethics charges leveled against Gingrich. Bonior’s congressional office became a 
clearinghouse for negative information on Speaker Gingrich. Through numerous press 
conferences, multiple ethics complaints, and numerous attacks both in the House and on the 
campaign trail, Bonior succeeded in raising scrutiny of Gingrich both in and out of the House 
chamber.
The “get-Newt” strategy succeeded in weakening Gingrich’s political position in the 
House as speaker. As illustrated in Table 3-1, Speaker Gingrich’s approval ratings 
plummeted in the 104* Congress as Democrats relentlessly attacked him politically and
138 Elizabeth Drew, Showdown (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), p. 76.
Lloyd Grove, “The Whip Lashes Out,” Washington Post 26 December 1995, C 1; 
Paul Gigot, “The King o f Crash and Bum,” Wall Street Journal. 12 January 1996, p. 
A 14.
Mark R. Levin, “The Bitter Bit?,” National Review. 6 November 1995, p. 24.
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personally. After an investigation by a special counsel in 1996, the House Ethics Committee 
in January o f 1997 reprimanded Gingrich and fined him $300,000. Much like Gingrich 
during the early 1990s, Bonior used ethics as a political weapon, vigorously attacked the 
majority party for its ethical and political lapses, and assailed the majority party’s budget 
priorities in order to draw clear partisan lines in the electoral sands. Representative John 
Lewis (D-GA), a key ally in Bonior’s anti-Gingrich effort, defended Bonior’s attacks on 
Gingrich by stating “1 think all of us remember when it became Newt’s business, day in and 
day out, to bring down Jim Wright... We were all affected by it. But I don’t think this is any 
kind of get you’ payback time.”'"*'
Tibto 3-1: Spoaker N«wt GingncX's 
Approval Rating. 1994-1997
Ltgtna
Lloyd Grove, “The Whip Lashes Out,” p. C 1.
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Many House Democrats joined Bonior’s anti-Gingrich campaign, including John Lewis (D- 
GA), George Miller (D-CA), Rosa DeLauro (D-CT), Cynthia McKinney (D-GA), Harrold 
Volkmer (D-MO), and Patricia Schroeder (D-CO). Through numerous news conferences, 
television talk-show appearances, and town hall meetings. House Democrats continually 
raised questions about Gingrich’s character and e t h i c s . T h e s e  members also coordinated 
their one-minute speeches on the House floors to launch attacks on Speaker Gingrich, often 
in violation o f House rules. Representative Rosa DeLauro (D-CT) appeared on the House 
floor 370 times to attack the Republican majority and Speaker Gingrich. Through these 
aggressive attacks. House Democrats succeeded in transforming Gingrich into a liability for 
House Republicans, especially in the Northeast and in swing districts. Each of the ethics 
charges were designed to supersede the particulars o f the ethics case against Gingrich in 
order to affix a larger public stigma against the Republican House m a j o r i t y . H o u s e  
Democrats rallied behind the anti-Gingrich strategy in the 104'*' Congress as the key to retake 
the House in 1996. The “get-Newt” strategy provided struggling House Democrats with a 
common purpose and a common target for attack, much like the role played by Bill Clinton 
for House Republicans in the 103"* Congress. Democratic candidates nationwide aired ads 
“morphing” their Republican opponent’s face into that o f Newt Gingrich, utilizing the same
'■*• Kevin Merida, “Speaker Has Faced Determined Attack; Democratic Pressure Grew 
From ‘94 Defeat,” Washington Post 6 January 1997, p. A 1.
Robin Toner, “Be Less Of a Target, House Republicans Urge Gingrich,” New 
York Times. 23 November 1995, p. B 18; Richard Morin, “Newt Gingrich’s Negatives,’ 
Washington Post National Weeklv Edition. 19-25 June 1995, p. 37.
Weston Kosova, “Jam Session, “ The New Republic. 12 Jime 1995, pp. 20-21.
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tactic Republicans had used with success in their morphing of Clinton in 1994.''** DCCC 
Chairman Martin Frost (D-TX) told 70 potential Democratic House candidates “Your 
opponent’s middle name is Gingrich.” '"** Additionally, a DCCC fund-raising letter referred 
to Gingrich as a “political terrorist.” '"*’ Like the Republican minority o f the 103"* Congress, 
House Democrats discovered that opposing the agenda of the majority party and labeling it 
in a negative fashion served the needs o f obtaining a majority better than any other electoral 
device. In particular, the Families First proposal o f House Democrats drew only lukewarm 
response from Democratic House candidates, while the nationalized Medicare and “get- 
Newt” strategies produced immediate political gains for Democrats in the 1996 campaign. '** 
House Democrats almost took back the House in 1996. Several vulnerable 
Republican incumbents in swing and Democratic seats were positioned to lose their races in 
1996, especially weak Republican incumbents in swing seats or Democratic-leaning 
d i s t r i c t s . I n  October of 1996, revelations the Democratic National Committee (DNC) had
'"** “Mighty Morphing - Democratic Style,” Campaigns & Elections. September 1995, pp. 
8-9.
'"** Tim Curran, “Seize the Medicare Vote, DCCC Tells Recruits,” Roll Call. 16 October 
1995, p. 26.
'"*’ Kenneth J. Cooper, “Democrat Offers Gingrich Apology for Harsh Words,” 
Washington Post 6 May 1995, p. A 8.
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Candidates,” Wall Street Journal. 24 June 1996, p. A 24; Benjamin Sheffiier, “Dems 
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solicited over $2.8 million in illegal foreign contributions from Indonesian and Chinese 
sources hurt House Democrats in close open seat races or challenging Republican 
incumbents. These revelations depressed Democratic momentum to take control o f the 
House in the last month of the 1996 campaign. Additionally, the anti-Gingrich and Medicare 
strategies lost resonance the closer the election came, especially in the South.”® A 
Democratic House leader described the impact o f the DNC fund-raising scandal on House 
Democratic campaigns in 1996:
The campaign finance scandal in the last weeks o f the campaign prevented the Democratic 
takeover. There is no doubt about that. Until the campaign finance scandal broke. 
Democrats were trending well in about 15-20 moderate swing districts. People in those 
districts were ready to vote for the Democratic candidate. But then the Clinton fund-raising 
scandal hit and a lot of voters in these districts thought “Well, wait a minute. Can we really 
trust giving all the power back to the Democrats?” So in these districts. Republicans won 
just enough to keep their majority. But it was a very narrow victory. If 12,000 votes had 
switched, then Democrats would have won a majority.
The drive to win the House required House Democratic leaders to spend a large 
amount of time recruiting the candidates capable of beating vulnerable Republican 
incumbents and retaining Democratic open seats. Before the 104* Congress, previous 
Democratic majorities did not invest much effort into the recruitment process compared to 
the massive farm team efforts by House Republicans in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
especially in candidate recruitment and training. The Democratic majority traditionally relied 
on lop-sided Democratic majorities at the state and local level to produce a steady stream of
Gerald F. Seib and Christopher Georges, “Democrats Can Regain the House, but 
Don’t Bet on It,” Wall Street Journal. 20 September 1996, p. A 16.
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quality Democratic House candidates.'^' This political calculus, however, did not work in 
the newly minted Democratic minority’s favor in the 104* Congress. The Democratic 
strategy to retake the House in 1996 required Democrats to keep their incumbent losses to 
a minimum, hold as many of the 30 open Democratic seats as possible, and defeat at least 
two dozen Republican incumbents. From the vantage o f minority status, this strategy for 
capturing the House presented numerous challenges for House Democratic leaders to 
overcome.
The large number o f Democratic retirements from the House in the 104* Congress, 
prompted by the unappealing nature of minority status, presented the biggest challenge to 
Democratic efforts to retake the House in 1996.”* In early 1995, Minority Leader Richard 
Gephardt and DCCC chairman Martin Frost met with senior Democratic House members 
contemplating retirement and urged them to serve at least two more y e a r s . A l t h o u g h  
several Democratic veterans eventually retired in the 104* Congress, the 104* Congress 
represented the first lobbying campaign against large-scale retirements by Democratic 
leaders. Twenty-nine House Democrats eventually retired, resigned or ran for the Senate in 
1996, continuing a trend of high Democratic House retirements in the 1990s. In the 1992- 
1996 election cycles, 98 House Democrats retired, as opposed to 65 House Republicans.
' '^ For an examination of candidate quality, see Alan Ehrenhalt, The United States of 
Ambition (New York: Times Books, 1992); Thomas A. Kazee, ed.. Who Runs for 
Congress? (Washington. D C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1994).
'■* Eliza Newlin Carney, “Exodus,” National Journal. 20 January 1996, pp. 108-13.
Juliana Gruenwald, “Democrats Look for Candidates Who Don’t Mind Tough Odds,” 
Congressional Ouarterlv. 17 June 1995, p. 1768; Richard L. Berke, “Losing Hope of 
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Nineteen o f the 29 Democrats who retired in the 104'* Congress vacated districts in the South 
vulnerable to Republican capture, and Republicans captured seven o f these open southern 
Democratic seats. In 1996, House Democrats were forced to defend a larger number o f open 
seats than Republicans, as in 1992 and 1994. In the 1992-1996 election cycles. House 
Democrats lost a total of 27 open seats to Republicans. This bleeding o f open seats cost 
Democrats their majority in 1994, inhibited takeover in 1996, and forced Democratic leaders 
to spend their time and resources on the time-consuming process of candidate recruitment.
Democratic leaders not only had to discourage Democratic retirements, but also had 
to recruit quality candidates who could defeat vulnerable House Republicans and win critical 
open seat contests, especially the Republican freshmen representing swing seats. In their 
ascent to the majority in the early 1990s, House Republicans enjoyed the luxury of time in 
building a farm team of Republican candidates in the 1990-1994 election cycles. The new 
Democratic minority did not have this luxury of time as it prepared for a Democratic capture 
of the House in 1996. Instead, House Democrats relied on a patchwork recruitment process 
of former members defeated in 1994, candidates with extensive local government experience, 
and wealthy candidates willing to invest their own resources into House campaigns. House 
Democratic leaders recognized that Democrats could not win back the House in the 1990s 
without finding the candidates best suited ideologically and politically for their districts. In 
response. Democratic leaders launched a “fit-the-district” strategy of encouraging moderate 
and conservative Democrats with connection to the business community to run for swing
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seats or in Republican-leaning districts. This recruitment process, though time-consuming, 
did yield some successes in 1996 in the form of winning challengers Darlene Hooley (D- 
OR), Debbie Stabenow (D-MI), Ellen Tauscher (D-CA), Nick Lampson (D-TX), Tom Allen 
(D-ME), and Dennis Kucinich (D-OH).'”
The loss o f their majority in 1994 deprived House Democrats o f their traditional 
fund-raising advantages. Previously, House Democrats monopolized labor campaign 
contributions and held a firm majority from business FACS. After the 1994 election, fund­
raising advantages tilted toward the new Republican majority as the GOP raked in enormous 
sums of campaign cash. Despite the Republican fund-raising advantage as the new House 
majority. House Democratic leaders embarked on a serious campaign to instill teamwork 
among House Democrats as they approached the goal o f capturing a House majority. 
Democratic leaders adopted many of the same tactics o f the Republican minority in the 103^ 
Congress to raise funds, especially in urging House Democrats to think and work as a team 
for the purposes o f achieving a House majority. Unity and fealty to the cause o f achieving 
a House majority became the key organizing principle o f House Democrats, transforming 
fund-raising activities from individual pursuits to collective causes.
In addition to the $5,000 in annual dues from each Democratic incumbent. 
Democratic members firom safe seats were required to contribute $20,000 so the DCCC 
could provide the maximum $65,000 into 120 winnable races. The leadership also shamed
Richard L. Berke, “Skipping the Race: Rim for Congress? Parties Find Rising Starts 
Are Just Saying No,” New York Times. 15 March 1998, Section 1, p. 1.
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the “deadbeat” Democrats who did not contribute to this collective fund-raising cause, much 
like the efforts o f House Republican in the 103^ Congress. House Democrats also adopted 
the same hardball fund-raising techniques Republicans put to good use in the 1994 campaign: 
pressing incumbents to contribute to winnable races, leaning on businesses with legislation 
pending before committees to get money flowing to promising challengers, and targeting 
resources on those races that would tip the balance o f power in the House.”*
Through these fund-raising tactics. Democrats were able to provide the resources to 
Democratic candidates in winnable races. In the new race for the House, funding every 
election was not necessary; instead, targeting the handful o f races that could tip the balance 
was the best use o f limited financial resources. House Democrats focused their resources on 
those challengers who could actually win seats in 1996, not futile challengers against safe 
Republican incumbents. Although Republicans out-raised Democrats $63 million to $21 
million by June, 1996, Democrats were competitive in those races that made the difference 
in the 1996 campaign. For instance, the average House Democratic challenger spent 
$319,472 in the 1996 campaign. But the 18 Democratic challengers who defeated 
Republican incumbents in 1996 spent an average o f $1,063,039. Democrats made gains in 
1996 by focusing resources on those races they won instead o f allowing them to be spent 
unwisely on un winnable races or on incumbents from safe seats.
Conclusion
The events of the 104* Congress illustrated the extent to which House changed
”* John E. Yang, “Democrats Espousing One for All and All for One in Drive to 
Reclaim the House,” Washington Post 28 July 1996, p. A 10.
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institutionally and electorally in the midst o f extreme two-party competition. Both parties 
sought to alter their electoral strategies, governing strategies, and party cultures toward the 
goals of capturing a House majority in a competitive era. Although both parties failed in 
their fundamental political strategies, with Republicans failing to cement a long-term control 
of the House Democrats unsuccessful in their campaign to retake the majority, their strategies 
and actions in the 104“’ Congress and 1996 campaign illustrated the degree to which 
majority-forming precepts organized congressional action and behavior. A distinct 
Republican culture as a majority party emerged which pushed for a very ideological agenda 
in the House. House Democrats, meanwhile, confronted challenges and internal divisions 
as it attempted to attune its coalitional and heterogeneous characteristics to the centralized 
rhythm set by the Republican majority in the 1994 campaign and 104* Congress. House 
Democrats encountered great success in nationalizing the 1996 election on their Medicare 
and anti-Gingrich themes, emulating the Republican nationalization strategy of the 1994 
campaign. Both parties, meanwhile, exhibited greater unity o f purpose in terms of 
coordinating their efforts on the nuts and bolts of candidate recruitment and fund-raising.
Much like the Republican minority o f the 103^ Congress, the Democratic minority 
of the 104* Congress focused efforts on opposing the majority party’s legislative agenda and 
seeking to terminate it in the election through attack politics and the drawing of sharp 
partisan distinctions. House Republicans, meanwhile, placed a premium on remaining 
unified as a Republican legislative party in the 104* Congress to maintain their majority 
status. Additionally, Republican leaders used the committee system to lure candidates to 
boost the Republican majority, either through party switching or recruiting the best
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candidates to win conservative seats. Through each o f these actions and activities, the two 
parties became more distinct from one another as they attempted to become more united 
internally. The House as an institution continued to shift in the 104* Congress to the 
contours of two-party competition and majority-seeking activities by the two parties. In 
1994, the Democratic legislative agenda became a train-wreck amidst Republican obstruction 
and opposition. In 1995 and 1996, the appropriations process in the House became a train 
wreck amidst both aggressive Democratic attack politics and Republican majority-retention 
efforts. Although both the 103^ and 104* Congresses produced several tangible legislative 
accomplishments, like NAFTA, deficit reduction, national service legislation, welfare 
reform, and farm policy overhaul, these achievements were overshadowed by the more 
partisan and aggressive fights for House control.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE 105* CONGRESS AND THE 1998 CAMPAIGN
The Triumph o f the Race for the House, 
institutionally and Electorally
The 105* Congress and the 1998 election witnessed continued dueling by the two 
parties for majority control. The war for House majorities continue to dominate 
congressional action, and wimessed both parties crafting legislative and electoral strategies 
designed to secure a House majority in the 1998 elections. In many respects, the 105* 
Congress was a bifurcated Congress between the bipartisan governance of 1997 and the 
extreme partisan caviling o f 1998. In 1997, the Republican majority and the Clinton 
Administration negotiated a bipartisan deal to balance the budget by 2002 and provide the 
largest tax cut since 1981. In 1998, the two parties squared off in partisan confrontation as 
a sex and peijury scandal culminated in President Clinton’s impeachment by the House of 
Representatives. Throughout 1998, the Republican majority focused its political and 
legislative resources on expanding its narrow majority in the 1998 midterm elections, while 
House Democrats focused their efforts on closing the ten-seat deficit that separated them 
from majority status. As the drive for House control by the two parties reached a crescendo 
in the 1998 election and the quagmire o f impeachment, the competitive demands o f the fight 
for majority control dominated the legislative and political contours o f the House.
Nationalized campaigns by determined minority parties drove the dynamics of the 
1994 and 1996 elections in the 103* and 104* Congresses. In the 105* Congress, however, 
no large scale issues involving the budget, the economy, or health care emerged to provide 
either party with a strategic edge. An improving economy and a contented electorate
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characterized the 105*'’ Congress, and the nation at large remained tranquil politically and 
economically despite the storm of impeachment. The good economy flooded the Treasury 
with tax revenues. These new tax receipts, in conjunction with the tight spending caps of the 
budget deal o f 1997, produced a balanced budget in 1998 that ended 29 years o f deficit 
spending. The deficit fell to $22 billion in fiscal year 1997, and a budget surplus of $70 
billion emerged in fiscal year 1998.' In addition, the Congressional Budget Office predicted 
surpluses surpassing $1.6 trillion dollars over the next ten years.
Improving economic conditions and a balanced budget abated many of the social and 
economic problems that had plagued the United States for the previous 30 years.^ Interest 
rates, the unemployment rate, and violent crime rates fell to their lowest levels in 25 years, 
while the number o f welfare recipients dropped by 25%. Each of these improvements 
benefitted incumbents of both parties, and presented new challenges and opportunities as the 
legislative agenda in Washington shifted away from cutting the deficit and toward dealing 
with budget surpluses.^ In addition, the anti-incumbent sentiment o f the 1990-1994 elections 
waned. President Clinton’s approval ratings remained high throughout the 105* Congress, 
and Congress’ approval rating even reached an unprecedented high o f 68% in February,
' Andrew Taylor, “Hill Warms to Idea of Budget Surplus,” Congressional Ouarterlv. 13 
December 1997, p. 3058-59; David E. Sanger, “A Booming Economy Made It All Much 
Easier,” New York Times. 2 May 1997, p. A 12.
* Clay Chandler, “After Decades of Deficits, Expectations of Surplus,” Washington 
Post. 1 January 1998, p. A 1; Clay Chandler and John M. Berry, “What to Do With a 
Budget Surplus?,” Washington Post 17 March 1998, p. C 1.
 ^“Much Ado About Nothing,” The New Republic. 25 May 1998, p. 7.
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1998."
Despite this contentment in the country at large, the drive for majority control 
continued unabated by the two parties after the 1996 elections and throughout the 105* 
Congress.’ The Republican majority, which emerged with a narrow 10-seat majority in the 
1996 elections, became obsessed with enlarging its slim majority in 1998. The Democratic 
minority, meanwhile, followed in the path o f determined and aggressive attack politics it first 
laimched in the 104* Congress with the Medicare and anti-Gingrich strategies. Minority 
House Democrats further emulated the tactics and strategies o f minority House Republicans 
in the 103"* Congress, where obstruction of the majority party’s rule and governance in the 
House became a virtue in itself. This jockeying for House control determined the fate of the 
105* Congress, as the Republican majority played it safe in the hope o f midterm gains and 
the Democratic minority aggressively pursued closing its own ten-seat deficit for majority 
control.
The two parties continued to move farther apart on political and policy issues 
throughout the 105* Congress as they increasingly played to their bases of support and 
sought to brighten party distinctions for strategic or tactical benefits in the 1998 election. In 
the 1998 elections. House Democrats defied history and gained five House seats in the 
second midterm o f a Democratic presidency, pushing the already narrow Republican House 
majority o f 228 down to 223. This Democratic gain emboldened House Democrats for a
" Alison Mitchell, “House G.O.P. Content to Make Ripples,” New York Times. 11 
March 1998, p. A 14.
’ Charles E. Cook, “Partisan Frustrations Endanger Congress’s Ability to Legislate,” Roll 
Call. 23 June 1997, p. 10.
199
2000 takeover o f the House, and forced House Republicans into an all-out-effort to save their 
decaying majority in the 106* Congress. As the 1990s came to an end, both parties focused 
their political and legislative resources on the fight for majority control, ensuring that the war 
for House control that began in 1994 would continue beyond the year 2000.
Intensely partisan national warfare for House control dominated the 1998 campaign, 
much like it had in the 1994 and 1996 nationalized elections for House control. The 
Republican majority launched an unified national advertising campaign for House seats, 
focused on a one-chamber strategy in the House to appeal to conservative base voters, and 
adopted a “recess strategy” to prevent controversy in the 1998 elections. House Democrats, 
meanwhile, eschewed the legislative process and governing with the Republican majority in 
order to sharpen party differences, attack the Republican majority, and focus campaign 
efforts on appealing to Democratic base voters. In addition. House Democratic leaders 
concentrated their electoral strategy on wirming the critical open swing seats that would 
determine House control in 1998/
Through this fight for majority control, both parties placed a premium on internal 
party cohesion, preferred conflict over compromise and governance between the two parties 
in the House, and focused political and legislative efforts on winning the critical swing and 
open seats. These trends, evident in the 103^ and 104* Congresses, became the defining 
features o f the House of Representatives in 1998. The bipartisan compromise and
* Rachel Van Dongen and John Mercurio, “Everything You Always Wanted to Know 
About House Open Seats,” Roll Call. 15 September 1997, p. A27-34; Charles E. Cook, 
“With No National Wave, Open Seats Will Decide Who Runs the House,” Roll Call. 22 
September 1997, p. 6; Ceci Connolly, “Parties Look to Open Races for Their Greatest 
House Gains,” Washington Post. 25 October 1998, p. A 20.
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governance that did occur in the 105* Congress, primarily the 1997 budget agreement, was 
a product o f bipartisan negotiation between Republican congressional leaders and a legacy- 
minded Clinton White House. Much like the bipartisan legislative deals o f 1996 between 
President Clinton and House Republicans, the 1997 budget deal provided gains to a 
Democratic presidency and Republican Congress while cutting out House Democrats, 
especially House Democratic liberals like Minority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO).
Throughout the 105* Congress, the narrow Republican majority was caught in the 
cross-hairs o f two-party competition as it attempted to reconcile the needs o f governing as 
a majority party while appealing to its conservative base itching for a partisan fight with 
Democrats. The Republican majority suffered several fractures as it searched for the best 
strategy to cement its tenuous House majority o f 228 members. House Republicans 
encountered problems in governance throughout the 105* Congress, from their disastrous 
handling of the disaster relief bill in 1997, to a failed coup attempt against Speaker Gingrich 
by disgruntled conservative lawmakers, and finally to the breakdown of the budgetary 
process in 1998. Speaker Gingrich’s resignation following the Republican loss o f House 
seats in the midterm election, coupled with the negative fallout to Republicans emanating 
from their impeachment o f President Clinton, created further cleavages and challenges as the 
razor thin Republican majority o f 223 entered the 106* Congress. Following Gingrich’s 
resignation. Appropriations Chairman Bob Livingston (R-LA) emerged as the Republican 
nominee for the speakership in the 106* Congress. After allegations of adultery surfaced in 
the midst of the impeachment process of December, 1998, Livingston abruptly resigned and 
House Republicans quickly rallied behind Chief Deputy Whip Dennis Hastert (R-IL) as the
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new Republican nominee for speaker.
House Democratic leaders, like their Republican counterparts, pursued a course of 
action designed to produce a House majority in the 1998 elections. But the relative 
contentment o f the electorate in the 105* Congress mitigated against employing a vigorous 
nationalized campaign. Instead, House Democrats pursued a seat-by-seat strategy designed 
to capture the most competitive open Republican seats. In the 104* Congress, House 
Democrats were disorganized after losing their majority in 1994, and confronted further 
setbacks in 1996 with the large number o f Democratic retirements. In the 105* Congress, 
House Democrats enjoyed the victory o f gaining nine House seats in the 1996 election and 
the further narrowing of the Republican majority. In the 104* Congress, House Democrats 
pursued a nationalized campaign strategy based on Medicare and anti-Gingrich themes. 
Unlike the 104* Congress, however, the Democratic minority o f the 105* Congress pursued 
a localized strategy which focused on targeting and winning the critical open competitive 
seats that would determine majority control in 1998. This seat-by-seat strategy required the 
investment o f time by Democratic leaders in recruiting quality candidates and teaching these 
candidates how to raise the ftmds needed to win their elections. This focus on individual 
seats coincided with Democratic efforts to silently motivate the Democratic base and boost 
the turnout o f key Democratic constituencies.^ In the 1998 election, a Republican air war 
encountered a Democratic ground campaign, and the Democratic ground war won.
The Democratic gain o f five seats in 1998 marked the first time since 1934 that a
 ^Stuart Rothenberg, “The Interest Groups’ Game Plan: How They Plan to Mobilize the 
Base in 1998,” Roll Call Politics. 13 November 1997, p. 13.
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president’s party picked up seats in a midterm election, and the first time since 1822 that a 
president’s party picked up seats in the second midterm election o f a presidency. As 
illustrated in Table 4-1, between 1946 and 1994 the party controlling the White House lost 
House seats in every midterm election. The largest losses for a president’s party has occurred 
in the second midterm election as part o f a “six-year-itch” scenario, although the Democratic 
loss of 52 House seats in the first midterm election of the Clinton presidency represents the 
largest loss o f House seats in a midterm election since 1942. The historical legacy of 
midterm elections figured prominently in the campaign strategies o f the two parties in the 
105* Congress.
Table 4-1: M idterm Election Results, 1946-1998
Year President Party House Seats
1946 Truman Democrat -45
1950 Truman Democrat •29
1954 Eisenhower Republican -18
1958 Eisenhower Republican -48
1962 Kennedy Democrat -4
1966 Johnson Democrat ■47
1970 Nixon Republican -12
1974 Ford Republican -48
1978 Carter Democrat -15
1982 Reagan Republican -26
1986 Reagan Republican -5
1990 Bush Republican -8
1994 Clinton Democrat -52
1998 Clinton Democrat +5
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Both parties pursued radically different strategies to minimize or capitalize on the 
history o f the “six-year-itch,”and formulated strategies designed to secure a majority in 1998. 
But a key divergence from history provided both parties with a new political dynamic. 
Unlike previous presidencies, Clinton had lived a “reverse” presidency, beginning his 
presidency with low popularity, and progressively becoming more popular. As Clinton 
became more popular in the 104* and 105* Congresses, House Democratic incumbents and 
candidates performed progressively better in their own elections. House Republican leaders, 
meanwhile, banked on the “inevitable” six-year itch in their electoral strategy to boost their 
majority in 1998, especially in the midst o f the Monica Lewinsky sex and peijury scandal.
Although important from a political and historical viewpoint, the Democratic gain 
o f House seats in the 1998 midterm obscures the larger and more important development of 
the diversion o f party efforts in the House away from the governing process and towards an 
intense focus on gaining a House majority in a competitive two-party environment. During 
the 103 ‘^‘-105* Congresses, the fight for majority status became the defining motivator of 
congressional action. The Democratic minority of the 105* Congress conducted itself as a 
successful minority party seeking the majority, much like the Republican minority of the 
103^ Congress and the Democratic minority of the 104* Congress. Like the Republican 
minority o f the 103^ Congress, the Democratic minority of the 105* focused its efforts on 
electing Democrats to the House and imdermining the political and legislative strategies of 
the majority party. But unlike the Republican minority o f 1994 and the Democratic minority 
of 1996, each o f which pursued nationalized strategies to gain House seats, the Democratic 
minority of 1998 pursued a different strategy which eschewed a nationalization strategy in
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lieu of grabbing open Republican seats and defeating marginal Republican incumbents.
Through these actions. Democrats hoped to cobble together a narrow Democratic 
majority in the 106* Congress. Although Democratic strategy deviated in 1998 from the 
nationalized norms of 1994 and 1996, the permanent campaigning for House majorities by 
both parties continued to dominate the House politically. This unceasing war for House 
majorities conducted by both parties in the ICS"*-105* Congresses illustrated the triumph of 
majority-seeking behavior by the two parties as the driving force in House politics in the 
1990s. The House Democratic focus on campaigning for a House majority in the 105* 
Congress at the expense of governing and legislating paid off. House Democrats defeated 
five Republican incumbents and captured six open Republican seats, while House 
Republicans defeated only one Democratic incumbent and captured five open Democratic 
seats. 1998 represented the first Democratic net gain of open seats since 1990, and the 
lowest number o f Democratic incumbent defeats since 1986. Eight of the 11 previously 
Republican House seats gained by Democrats in 1998 were competitive swing seats. The 
Democratic gains o f 1998 placed House Democrats within six seats o f majority control for 
the 2000 campaign.
House Republicans, meanwhile, were presented with ominous signs that their fragile 
House majority would become non-existent in 2000, only six years after their historic victory 
in 1994. In 1992 and 1994, Republican attack politics and farm team efforts defeated a net 
42 Democratic incumbents and provided a net gain of 21 open seats, as illustrated in Table 
4-2.
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Table 4-2: House Seats That Changed Party, 1990-1998
Year Total
Changes
Incumbent
Defeated:
D-*R
Incumbent
Defeated:
R-»D
Open Seat: 
D -R
Open Seat: 
R -D
Party 
Seat Gain
1990 21 6 9 0 6 +9 D
1992 43 16 8 11 8 + 10R
1994 60 34 0 22 4 +52 R
1996 35 3 18 10 4 +9D
1998 17 I 5 5 6 +5D
Total 176 60 40 48 28 +39 R
These large gains fueled the Republican surge to majority status in 1994. In the 1994-1998 
period, however, House Republicans only defeated four Democratic incumbents and gained 
a net of five open seats. In that same period. House Democratic attack politics defeated 23 
Republican incumbents and produced a net gain of one open seat in 1998. In the 104* and 
105* Congresses, House Democrats honed their message, tactics, and strategies to the goal 
o f capturing the House, primarily through focusing resources on capturing open Republican 
seats and the competitive swing seats while minimizing Democratic incumbent defeats. The 
Republican majority, meanwhile, vigorously defended its majority status by bending the 
political and legislative resources o f the House to the goal o f increased Republican gains in 
the 1998 election.
GOVERNING
The Republican Recess Strategy
Republican House leaders crafted a governing agenda for 1997, and then focused on 
campaigning to increase the Republican House majority in 1998. In the 104* Congress,
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House Republicans confronted President Clinton in 1995 and then cooperated with him in 
1996. In the 1 OS'*" Congress, just the opposite occurred. House Republican leaders initially 
governed in a bipartisan fashion with President Clinton to negotiate the Balanced Budget Act 
and the Taxpayer Relief Act in 1997. They then engaged in a partisan strategy in 1998 to 
gain Republican House seats by attacking President Clinton on a wide variety of 
administration scandals, from the Monica Lewinsky affair to the campaign finance abuses 
of the 1996 campaign to allegations of Chinese espionage. House Republican leaders 
launched the impeachment process against Clinton, and attacked House Democrats for their 
collusion in defending Clinton Administration scandals.
In 1997, the Republican majority joined the Clinton Administration in brokering two 
pieces of legislation to both balance the budget by 2002 while simultaneously providing $95 
billion in tax relief. The Taxpayer Relief Act o f 1997 (TRA) provided $275 billion in tax 
relief over a ten-year period through $500-per child tax credit, expansion of IRA 
opporttmities, and the lowering of estate and capital gains taxes. The Balanced Budget Act 
o f 1997 (BB A) balanced the budget over five years by placing strict caps on federal domestic 
spending between 1997 and 2002, which trimmed $263 billion in domestic spending 
including $115 in Medicare reductions.' The BBA and TRA, dubbed “The Incumbent 
Protection Acts,” allowed the Clinton Administration and the Republican Congress to both 
govern together and take credit for the good economy and budget surpluses o f the late 1990s.
Despite the pro-incumbent mood of the 105* Congress, however, the narrow
* Alison Mitchell, “Return o f Partisanship to Capitol Hill,” New York Times. 14 
November 1997, p. A 1.
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Republican majority confronted several problems in governing as it became squeezed 
between the duties o f governing with a slim majority while protecting its small majority of 
228 in the upcoming competitive midterm election.’ The Republican majority faced a 
quandary in governing throughout the 105* Congress as it attempted to govern in a manner 
that satisfied the more confrontational conservatives in the Republican Conference while also 
attracting enough moderate Republican and Democratic support to pass bills on the House 
f l o o r . F r e q u e n t l y ,  these competing demands overloaded the capabilities of the 
Republican’s ten-seat majority. Confronted with this situation. Republican House leaders 
in 1998 crafted a recess strategy designed to keep House Republicans in their districts to 
campaign for re-election, thus helping to keep incumbent defeats low, and to avoid the messy 
consequences of governing with a ten-seat majority whose moderate and social conservative 
wings often collided on process, policy, and politics." Republican leaders kept Congress in 
session only 89 days in 1998, one-third fewer than usual and down from the previous low of 
119 days in 1956. After the passage of the balanced budget agreement in August o f 1997, 
Republican House leaders believed that no further legislative accomplishments were really 
necessary to improve Republican electoral fortunes in 1998. They also believed that further
’ House Republicans won 227 seats in the 1996 elections. In May of 1997, the 
Republican majority added an additional seat when Republican Bill Redmond captured 
the Third District o f New Mexico in a special election, after incumbent Representative 
Bill Richardson (D-NM) was named Ambassador to the United Nations.
Jeffrey L. Katz, “DeLay: A Pugilist Discovers the Demands o f Governing,” 
Congressional Ouarterlv. 4 July 1998, pp. 1827-30.
"  Richard E. Cohen and Alexis Simendinger, “Gone Fishin’,” National Journal. 7 March 
1998, pp. 500-504; “Inactive Congress Just Playing It Safe,” USA Today. 6 July 1998, p. 
A 9.
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attempts to pass large ticket legislative items would divide the tenuous Republican majority 
and only provide House Democrats with an angle to launch negative attacks.'*
These fears were justified. At the end of the 103"* Congress, the ambitious 
Democratic proposal to pass universal health care reform floundered amidst a divided 
Democratic Caucus in the House. This defeat splintered the even larger Democratic majority 
of 256 and provided the Republican minority with a perfect opportunity to attack all House 
Democratic House candidates in the 1994 midterm election. To prevent the nightmare 
precedent of the health care reform fight of 1994, the Republican recess strategy insured no 
major legislation would pass in 1998 beyond must-pass appropriations legislation. Instead 
of legislating. Republicans would campaign. Instead o f risking their majority on a potential 
legislative minefield on the House floor in 1998, Republicans chose to take their fight into 
the country and battle for an even larger Republican majority for future legislative victories 
in the 106* or 107* Congresses.'^
House Republican leaders believed that the Balanced Budget Act and Taxpayer Relief 
Act o f 1997, in conjunction with the welfare reform law of 1996, would be sufficient to 
satisfy their conservative base voters and thereby expand the Republican House majority in 
1998.''* One senior House Republican defined the Republican governing strategy of 1998
'■ Paul Gigot, “GOP Heaven: No Agenda, No Problem!,” Wall Street Journal. 13 March 
1998, p. A 16.
Helen Dewar and Juliet Eilperin, “ 105* Congress Runs in Place in Pursuit of 
Campaign Goals,” Washington Post. 9 August 1998, p. A 4.
'■* “GOP to Define Itself for Voters,” Washington Post. 15 July 1998, p. A8; Charles E. 
Cook, “Balanced Budget May Be Incumbent’s Hero for the 1998 Election,” Roll Call. 11 
December 1997, p. 6.
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by stating;
Our plan is to pass a balanced budget that sticks to the spending caps, vote on the key bills 
in our agenda, draw a few lines in the sand to sharpen our differences with the Democrats, 
but to do as little as possible beyond that. Then we go home early to campaign, and pick up 
more seats in the fall so we can come back in a stronger position to fight for bigger reforms 
next year.
Not every House Republican was convinced of the wisdom of the recess strategy. 
Representative Mark Foley (R-FL), for instance, derided the recess strategy by stating “I 
don’t want to be a part-time U.S. Airways attendant —which I feel like going back and forth 
to come up for two or three votes.”' ’ But the allure o f the recess strategy increased among 
House Republicans as the 105* Congress progressed. Public approval of the Congress 
improved whenever it was out o f session in the 105* Congress. The booming economy 
played a large role in the public’s appetite for limited government action and even more 
limited action by Congress in the 105* Congress, mirroring the era of President Calvin 
Coolidge in the 1920s and President Dwight Eisenhower in the 1950s.'* Representative Joe 
Scarborough (R-FL) captured the increasing success o f the Republican recess strategy when 
he stated, “‘You look at the polls and you can’t really argue. We’ve decided to sit on our 
lead.”"
The Republican recess strategy and drive for re-election in 1998 insured few
” Jeffrey Katz, “Productivity Likely to be Low as GOP Sets Slow Pace,” Congressional 
Ouarterlv. 7 March 1998, p. 531.
16 ‘*1 0 5 '*' Congress May be Stuck with ‘Do-Nothing’ Tag,” Roll Call. 9 July 1998, p. 1; 
George F. Will, “In Praise of Inactivity,” Newsweek. 22 June 1998, p. 90.
Helen Dewar and Guy Gugliotta, “Recess Strategy Working for Congress,” Washington 
Post 16 March 1998, p. A 19.
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legislative accomplishments in the 105* Congress beyond the bipartisan budget deal with 
President Clinton in 1997. The meager legislative accomplishments of 1998 included 
renaming Washington National Airport after former President Ronald Reagan and enacting 
a massive six-year $217 billion highway re-authorization bill that increased highway 
spending by 40%. The six-year highway bill (BESTEA) contained a record 1,467 
“demonstration projects” - pure pork for incumbents - compared to 539 similar projects in 
the 1991 highway bill passed by the Democratic House majority. Republicans also passed 
into law legislation to reform the unpopular Internal Revenue Service, which had been 
plagued with stories of mis-management and bureaucratic mis-rule throughout 1997 and 
1998.
As Republican leaders ran out the clock waiting for an enlarged Republican House 
majority in the 1998 midterm election, they turned off the legislative process in the House 
in terms o f trying to pass major pieces of legislation into law. This strategy not only 
minimized the likelihood of legislative accomplishments in 1998, but also hampered the 
mandatory appropriations process. The inability to deal effectively with the budget and 
appropriations process in 1998 later undermined the Republican majority during budget 
negotiations in the fall as the midterm election loomed. In the 103"* Congress, Democratic 
House leaders shut down the legislative process to conservative policy proposals pushed by 
the Republican minority and conservative House Democrats. In the 105* Congress, 
Republican House leaders pursued a similar strategy to prevent the passage o f any agenda. 
Democratic or Republican. Re-electing the Republican House majority, not passing 
legislation, became the driving passion of Republican leaders in 1998.
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While Republican House leaders turned off the spigot o f legislation in 1998, they 
simultaneously turned up their legislative and political efforts to appeal to their conservative 
base. Republican leaders and members adopted a more confrontational stance with the 
Clinton Administration on the campaign finance scandal and the sex and peijury accusations 
of the Monica Lewinsky scandal, unleashing ten House committees and subcommittees to 
pursue various Clinton Administration scandals.'* Republican leaders also devoted their 
efforts on the House floor to passing legislation that appealed to social conservatives and the 
business community, but would never overcome Democratic filibusters in the Senate or 
President Clinton’s veto. As the Monica Lewinsky scandal further eroded Clinton’s 
credibility with Republican House members. Republican House leaders killed the ambitious 
Democratic domestic agenda for 1998 through inaction, delay, or outright defeat on the 
House floor.”
While partisan caviling between the two parties dominated each legislative day in 
1998, no clear Republican agenda emerged to capture public attention. Instead, public 
attention focused on the issues being actively pushed by President Clinton and House 
Democrats m the country at large, including managed care reform, campaign finance reform, 
a $516 billion anti-tobacco bill, and the numerous expansions of federal domestic programs
'* Jackie Koszczuk, “House GOP Casts a Wide Net In Renewed Scandal Hunt,” 
C o n g re ss io n a l O iia rte rlv , 17 January 1998, pp. 111-114.
” Jeffirey L. Katz and Dan Carney, “Clinton’s Latest, Worst Troubles Put His Whole 
Agenda on Hold,” Congressional Ouarterlv. 24 January 1998, pp. 164-65; Paul A. Gigot, 
“Win a Case, But Lose a Presidency,” Wall Street Journal. 3 April 1998; Paul A. Gigot, 
“Scandal’s Price: GOP Chops Up Bill’s Agenda,” Wall Street Journal. I May 1998, p. A 
14.
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proposed by the Clinton budget. Republican House leaders firmly believed that enactment 
of any o f these agenda items would harm the Republican majority’s hold on power. In the 
lOT* Congress, Democratic House leaders similarly blocked term limits, congressional 
reform, and domestic spending cuts on the House floor for fear o f its deleterious effect on 
the Democratic majority’s grasp on power in the short and long term.
The efforts by the Republican leadership to kill campaign finance reform in the 105* 
Congress illustrates the degree to which the Republican majority exercised procedural 
prerogatives on the House floor in order to protect their slim majority in the 1998 elections 
and in future elections. House Republican leaders believed that the soft money ban 
contained in the campaign finance reform proposal of Representatives Chris Shays (R-CT) 
and Martin Meehan (D-MA) would kill the Republican party’s grip on power, especially its 
majority status in the House.'" In 1996, Democratic soft money advertising from the labor 
unions and the Clinion-Gore campaign almost hammered the Republican majority into 
extinction, contributing to the defeat o f 18 Republican incumbents. Republicans swept every 
major office in the 1997 off-year elections using their soft money advantages, which allowed 
the party to unleash unlimited advertising on behalf of its gubernatorial and House 
candidates. Republican leaders planned to use overwhelming soft money advantages in 
1998 to increase their narrow majority and regain some of the seats they lost in the 1996 
election.
But first, they had to prevent the passage of the soft money ban of the Shays-Meehan
“The Plot to Bury Reform,” New York Times. 30 March 1998, p. A 16; Amy 
Keller, “Campaign Finance Reformers Frustrated,” Roll Call. 18 Jime 1998, p. 1.
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campaign finance reform bill or any other campaign finance legislation. Republican leaders 
used their procedural powers both on the House floor and in the House Rules Committee to 
stall and delay not only the Shays-Meehan proposal, but any campaign finance reform 
proposal. On March 30,1998, Republican leaders sabotaged the Shays-Meehan proposal by 
bringing to the House floor, under suspension of the rules, a comprehensive campaign 
finance reform bill imacceptable to campaign finance reformers.^' Only non-controversial 
legislation can pass on the House floor under suspension, since it requires a two-thirds vote 
for passage, prohibits any amendments, and limits floor debate.^ Predictably, this campaign 
finance overhaul legislation failed, 74-337.
Following this defeat, 12 moderate Republicans joined a unified House Democratic 
Caucus to bring the Shays-Meehan proposal to floor using a discharge petition. This 
discharge petition effort by House Democrats in the 105* Congress mirrored similar tactics 
used by House Republicans and conservative Democrats in the 103”* Congress to bypass 
Democratic House leaders and enact stricter deficit reduction through the “A-to-Z” proposal. 
As Republican leaders faced the very real prospect of losing control of the floor debate on 
campaign finance reform due to growing support within the House for a discharge petition 
for campaign finance reform. Speaker Gingrich relented and agreed to a wide-open debate 
on campaign finance reform. But Republican leaders once again structured the process to 
prevent any substantive change in campaign finance reform laws in the 105* Congress by
*' Amy Keller and Jim VandeHei, “Shays Rebellion Irks Gingrich, Sparks Campaign 
Reform War.” Roll Call. 30 March 1998, p. I.
“  Jeffrey L. Katz, “All-But-Doomed Overhaul Bill Meets Its Expected End,” 
Congressional Ouarterlv. 4 April 1998, p. 863.
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granting an open rule for campaign finance reform debate, and forcing the Shays-Meehan 
legislation to compete with ten additional substitute proposals.^ Majority Whip Tom DeLay 
(R-TX), meanwhile, formed a “free speech coalition” o f Republican members opposed to 
campaign finance reform, and spearheaded efforts on the House floor to undermine Shays- 
Meehan through an endless amending procedure in the summer o f 1998. An unprecedented 
600 amendments were filed to the competing 11 substitutes, forcing endless debate on each 
amendment throughout the summer and insuring no major campaign finance reform would 
be enacted into law in the 105* Congress.*'’
Although not focused on legislative accomplishments in 1998, Republican leaders 
passed several items of legislation in the House designed to energize the Republican base 
for the 1998 elections.*^ The Republican base became de-energized in 1998, with prominent 
social conservative leaders like Dr. James Dobson expressing public disappointment with 
the lack of progress on conservative policy priorities by the Republican Congress since the 
zenith of the Contract With America in 1995.^ ® To gin up apathetic social conservatives and
^ Jeffrey L. Katz. “Dueling Campaign Finance Bills Threaten Overhaul's Chances,” 
Congressional Ouarterlv. 16 May 1998, pp. 1283-89.
Jeffrey L. Katz, “Supporters of Campaign Finance Overhaul Grow Waxy as House GOP 
Leaders Signal a Summer of Protracted Debate,” Congressional Oueuterlv. 23 May 1998, 
p. 1379.
Jerry Gray, “Gingrich Tries to Deflect Charges, But Christian Coalition Attacks,”
New York Times. 7 March 1997, p. A 1; Norah M. O'Donnell, “Dobson’s Choice,” Roll 
Call. 14 May 1998, pp. 17-28; Thomas B. Edsall and Ceci Connolly, “A Gaping GOP 
Rift,” Washington Post. 27 March 1998, p. A 1.
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spur the corporate community to flood Republican campaign coffers with contributions. 
Republican leaders used their control o f the House floor to pass conservative legislative 
priorities in the House in order to draw the sharp distinctions with Democrats.”  For 
instance, conservative policy riders were once again attached to the annual appropriations 
bills, as in the 104* Congress, despite the fact that these riders drew immediate White House 
veto threats and threatened another government shutdown in the fall.**
The Republican majority also passed several bills in the House they knew would 
never be enacted into law, but which provided important cues to their base, including a 
partial-birth abortion ban, termination of the Internal Revenue Code, education savings 
accounts, bankruptcy reform, and the elimination o f the marriage penalty tax.”  Additionally, 
Speaker Gingrich proposed using part of the budget surplus for a $1 trillion tax cut over ten
to Their Base in 1998,” Roll Call. 17 November 1997, p. 8; William Schneider, “What 
Else Do They Want?,” National Journal. 16 May 1998, p. 1150.
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pp. 1447-48.
”  Carroll J. Doherty, “Lots o f Inertia, Little Lawmaking as Election ‘98 Approaches,” 
Congressional Ouarterlv. 18 July 1998, p. 1925; Andrew Taylor, “Despite the Ominous 
Rumblings, Another Train Wreck Looks Unlikely,” Congressional Ouarterlv. 22 August 
1998, p. 2271.
”  Thomas B. Edsall, “OOP’s Agenda Pleases Backers,” Washington Post 19 July 
1998, p. A 6; Carroll J. Doherty, “Lots of Inertia, Little Lawmaking as Election ‘98 
Approaches.” Congressional Ouarterlv. 18 July 1998, pp. 1925-27.
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years to further cut the capital gains rate to 15%, phase out the marriage penalty tax, and 
repeal the 1993 Clinton tax increase on Social Security beneficiaries.^® Through these 
actions. House Republican leaders pursued a one-chamber strategy designed to energize 
conservative voters and make them excited about what an enlarged Republican House 
majority could enact in the 106* Congress, rather than focusing on producing legislation that 
both chambers o f Congress could pass and send to the president to be enacted into law in the 
105* Congress. Representative Charles Canady (R-FL) reflected on the Republican base 
voter strategy by stating “There’s no question that we’ll sometimes bring up proposals we 
know are unlikely to succeed but that reflect the principles to which we’re committed.” '^ 
Representative John Linder (R-GA) justified this strategy by stating “We’ve got to energize 
our base by going back to the issues that define our party. We don’t have to have the win, 
but let’s have the fight.’’^ *
The fiscal year 1999 House budget resolution is a perfect example of this Republican 
strategy of bringing up proposals that would never survive Senate filibuster or Clinton’s veto 
pen, but which defined the party in a positive manner for conservative base voters. House 
Republican leaders and Republican conservatives used the budget resolution, normally used 
to provide important signals to House and Senate appropriators regarding spending priorities
“  Andrew Taylor, “Republicans Set Their Sights on Further Reduction in Capital Gains 
Tax Rate,’’ Congressional Ouarterlv. 27 June 1998, p. 1750; Gerald F. Seib, “Trillion 
Dollars: Enough to Start a Great Debate,’’ Wall Street Journal. 22 July 1998.
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for the next fiscal year, as a campaign document to sharpen party distinctions in the same 
manner as the Contract With America in 1994. Several House Republican conservatives, 
most prominently the 40-member Conservative Action Team (CATS), warned that 
Republicans could not win in the 1998 elections running solely on the coattails of the 1997 
budget agreement. Representative David McIntosh (R-IN), leader o f the CATS, repeatedly 
urged the Republican House leadership and the Republican Conference to advocate a more 
aggressive agenda that pushed the issues driving conservative base voters, including 
additional tax cuts, cutting federal discretionary spending further, and eliminating several 
federal agencies like the Departments o f Commerce and Education.”  In 1994, House 
Republicans gained 52 seats pushing similar anti-tax and anti-government spending themes, 
which energized the Republican base. To many House Republican conservatives, the recess 
strategy of the 105* Congress, itself a product o f the government shutdowns and the failed 
effort to enact the 1995 Republican budget plan, laid the groundwork for disaster in 1998.
Responding to these concerns. House Budget Committee Chairman John Kasich (R- 
OH) developed a fiscal year 1999 budget resolution that cut spending and taxes far deeper 
than the 1997 budget accord. This budget proposal contained $154 billion in additional 
domestic spending reductions over five years, while eliminating the marriage penalty tax at 
a cost of Si 00 billion over five years. Prominent social conservatives, especially Focus on 
the Family President James Dobson, had demanded the elimination of the marriage penalty
”  Alison Mitchell, “House Republicans Battle Over Beliefs and What They Mean to 
Budget,” New York Times. 17 May 1998, p. A 23; Ethan Wallison and John Bresnahan, 
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tax in return for their support o f Republican candidates in the 1998 elections.^ The Kasich 
budget attempted to revive the aggressive strategies that brought the GOP to majority status 
in the House in 1994, especially the anti-tax and anti-deficit themes o f the 1994 nationalized 
campaign and the Contract With America.”
To pay for the marriage penalty tax cut, the Kasich budget proposed billions of 
dollars in politically unfeasible domestic cuts, including the elimination o f the Departments 
o f Commerce and Energy and cuts in Amtrack, Medicare, Job training, public broadcasting, 
food stamps, and entitlement programs for the poor.”  House Republican leaders and 
members knev/ the austere Kasich budget proposal could never be enacted into law over the 
objections of President Clinton, Senate Democrats, and Senate Republican moderates.”  
House Appropriations Committee Chairman Bob Livingston (R-LA) called the Kasich 
budget “la-la land,” while the Republican Senate ignored the Kasich budget plan and passed 
a fiscal year 1999 budget resolution based on the 1997 budget agreement.”  Similar 
proposals to cut spending and eliminate government agencies in 1995 sparked the two
”  Michael J. Gerson, “A Righteous Indignation,” U.S. News & World Report 4 May 
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government shutdowns and laid the groundwork for the Democratic nationalized campaign 
on Medicare, Medicaid, the environment, and education. These fierce Democratic “MMEE” 
attacks almost cost the Republicans their House majority in 1996 as public opinion swayed 
against the “Republican Revolution” o f 1995.
Despite these potential pitfalls, however. House Republican leaders used their 
procedural and political powers in the House to pass the Kasich budget resolution to give a 
taste to conservative base voters o f what an expanded Republican majority in the 106* 
Congress (1999-2000) could pass into law. Passing the conservative Kasich budget 
resolution, over moderate House Republican and Democratic objections, became a key battle 
for House Republican leaders in the fight for the House in 1998. If passed, the Kasich 
budget resolution could be used as an important prop for Republican House candidates to 
appeal to conservative base voters in the Republican coalition. A defeat, on the other hand, 
would be extremely embarrassing, provide Democrats an avenue for attack, and illustrate to 
conservative base voters that the Republican majority elected in 1994 on clear conservative 
principles had become indistinguishable from the liberal Democratic majority it replaced.
House Republicans not only used their procedural powers to score political points 
against the Democratic budget proposal, but also undercut its usefulness on the House floor 
and on the campaign trial as a viable alternative to Republican budget policies. To insure 
the victory of their budget resolution on the House floor. Republican leaders stacked the 
procedural deck against the competing budget resolutions. They did not permit the Blue Dog 
budget resolution as a competing substitute, which closely followed the 1997 budget 
agreement, for fear it might pass. They also undermined the Democratic budget resolution,
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based on President Clinton’s proposed 1999 budget, by first forcing all House members to 
approve its 36 new user fees and taxes in a separate vote. The Democratic budget relied 
heavily on the $ 128 billion in new revenue emanating from these proposed taxes and fees to 
both pay for new domestic spending and keep the budget in balance. When the House 
unanimously rejected these new taxes and user fees, the Democratic budget substitute 
suddenly “unbalanced” the balanced budget and quickly lost support from deficit-conscious 
House Democrats. Through heavy pressure on the floor. House Republicans passed their 
fiscal year 1999 budget resolution on June 5, 1998 by a vote of 216-204. Despite this 
victory, a House-Senate conference budget resolution never materialized in 1998 and the 
fiscal 1999 House budget resolution became a campaign document for conservative 
Republicans in the 1998 campaign instead of actually driving budget policy in a new era of 
budget surpluses.”
The recess strategy, combined with the inability to pass a conference budget 
resolution to a budget blueprint for appropriators, delayed the start o f the appropriations 
process in the summer of 1998. This delayed passage o f the 13 must-pass appropriations 
bills as a new fiscal year, and the threat o f a government shutdown, loomed in the fall of 
1998. The Republican Congress raced toward the October 1st deadline for the new fiscal 
year, and the November 3rd midterm election, bereft of a compelling and winning agenda 
for the budget and legislative process, much less for the campaign trail. To avoid another 
politically damaging government shutdown. Republican leaders negotiated a major omnibus
”  Andrew Taylor, “House Budget Resolution Wins Passage But No Real Vote o f GOP 
Confidence,” Congressional Ouarterlv. 6 June 1998, p. 1515.
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spending bill with President Clinton and congressional Democratic leaders at the end of the 
105* Congress. The omnibus bill gave President Clinton all o f the leverage in the budget 
negotiations, because his signature was needed not only to pass the bill but also to avoid 
another government shutdowns as the Congress limped from one temporary spending 
measure to another. As in the 104* Congress with the government shutdowns and the “get- 
out-of-town-money,” Republican leaders relented in budget negotiations and provided 
President Clinton and congressional Democrats much o f what they asked for in order to wrap 
up budget talks and adjourn Congress for the fall campaign.
House Republican leaders capitulated on nearly every item in the omnibus bill 
important to its conservative base. The $500 billion omnibus appropriations bill provided 
funding for nearly half the federal government, including 10 Cabinet departments and several 
federal agencies whose fiscal 1999 appropriations bills were never enacted in 1998.'*° House 
Republican leaders abandoned the $80 billion tax cut passed by the House in September, 
funded President Clinton’s request o f $18 billion to replenish the International Monetary 
Fund, provided $1.1 billion in new education spending demanded by Democrats, and 
provided $6 billion in aid to farmers proposed by congressional Democrats.*' The budget 
agreement tapped $20 billion of the federal budget surplus for “emergency” defense and
*° Carroll J. Doherty, “Riding the Omnibus O ff Into the Sunset,” Congressional O u arte rlv  
17 October 1998, pp. 2794-96; Andrew Taylor, “Congress Wraps Up and Heads Home 
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222
domestic spending, undermined the tight budget caps of the 1997 budget deal, and unleashed 
a bipartisan orgy of pork-barrel spending/^
Each o f these developments further depressed an already listless conservative 
Republican base, and successfully shifted the legislative agenda away from the looming 
impeachment process confronting President Clinton and toward the problems and divisions 
confronting the Republican majority. The omnibus budget o f 1998, which provided 
important victories to Democrats while few tangible victories for Republicans, became an 
electoral albatross to Republican campaigns in 1998 and became one of several of a long 
litany of complaints against the Republican Congress by the Republican base. Much like 
the Democratic majority of the 103"* Congress and the Republican majority o f the 104* 
Congress, the Republican majority ended the 105* Congress without controlling the debate 
or agenda driving the fall campaigns. Like the majorities of the 103"* and 104* Congresses, 
the Republican majority of the 105* Congress also lost House seats in the fall elections. 
Democrats on the Attack
Throughout the 105* Congress, House Democrats focused their efforts on attacking 
the Republican majority and honing their own message and agenda for the 1998 election. 
Through these efforts, the Democratic minority successfully employed the strategy of the 
Republican minority o f the 103^ Congress, eschewing the governing process in order to 
concentrate its appeals to the Democratic base. House Democratic leaders focused their 
efforts on painting the Republican majority as too extreme for the pivotal swing districts and
Robert Novak, “Clinton Wins Big as GOP Caves In,” Chicago Sun-Times. 15 
October 1998.
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sharpening partisan differences for the liberal Democratic base/^ On key issues that worked 
to the advantage of House Democrats, like education. House Democratic leaders did not want 
legislation passed that would undermine Democratic attacks on Republicans in the fall 
campaign. Inaction on the Democratic issue agenda served House Democratic purposes of 
retaking the House in 1998, much like it had for the Republican majority at the end of the 
103^ Congress.
House Democrats once again confronted divided government and the triangulation 
strategy o f the Clinton presidency in the 105* Congress, just as they did in the 104* 
Congress. In 1998, however, the governing strategies of House Democrats to retake the 
House became intricately linked with the political strategies o f President Clinton, unlike the 
103^ and 104* Congresses where determined minority parties battled for a House majority 
without the benefit o f the presidency. In 1997, Democrats were often at odds with the 
Clinton Administration on the balanced budget, tax cuts, and fast-track trade authority. The 
Republican recess strategy of 1998, combined with the swirl of impeachment hounding 
President Clinton, united House Democrats and President Clinton around their unified 
agenda o f 1998. This agenda involved “quality o f life” issues o f managed care reform, 
protecting Social Security, boosting federal spending on education, and environmental 
protection.'”
Through this agenda. House Democrats appealed to both their liberal base, and
Charles E. Cook, “Partisan Frustrations Endanger Congress’s Ability to Legislate,” Roll 
Call. 23 June 1997, p. 10.
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wooed critical swing suburban voters, by attacking House Republicans for ignoring issues 
of concern to ordinary Americans, like managed care reform. In the 103^ Congress, the 
Republican minority used tax and budget issues both to attack House Democrats and rile the 
conservative Republican base. In the 104“’ Congress, House Democrats energized their 
liberal base through defense o f the welfare state and attacks on Gingrich. In the 105“’ 
Congress, the Democratic minority adopted a similar strategy of appealing to their liberal 
base through attacks on the policy and political decisions o f the Republican majority. The 
Democratic issue agenda of 1998 and attacks on the Republican impeachment effort against 
President Clinton mirrored the successful Republican effort to highlight the House Bank 
scandal in the 102"“ Congress, the Republican attacks on the Democratic budget and health 
proposals in the 103'“ Congress, and the Democratic “get-Newt” strategy of the 104“’ 
Congress. In each instance, the minority party in the House successfully defined the terms 
of debate in the fall election, undermining the governing and electoral strategies of the 
majority party. Although the minority party in each Congress did not control the House floor 
to formally structure the agenda, they bypassed this impediment by focusing on the informal 
channels o f media attacks, campaign attacks, and base-voter appeals.
At the beginning of 1998, President Clinton and House Democrats unveiled an 
ambitious Democratic domestic policy agenda designed to energize liberal Democratic base 
voters and paint clear partisan divisions between the two parties in the fight for House 
control.''^ In the low turnout election cycle o f 1998, appealing to liberal Democratic base
Richard A. Gephardt, “Gephardt Lays Out the 1998 Democratic Agenda,” The Hill. 28 
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voters became crucial to Democratic efforts to retake the House, just as the Republican 
majority appealed to conservative base voters."** The 1998 Democratic agenda included 
legislative proposals to expand health insurance for uninsured children, raise the minimum 
wage, pass a “patient’s bill o f rights” that played to voter concerns about problems in the 
managed care industry, expand Medicare to people imder age 65, enact a $21 billion child 
care proposal, and expand the Peace Corps."*  ^ Democrats also sharpened party differences 
on the education issue, as President Clinton proposed a $17.4 billion plan to hire 100,000 
new teachers and renovate inner city public schools."** In addition. President Clinton’s State- 
of-the-Union call to “Save Social Security First” successfully undermined Republican efforts 
to cut taxes in 1998, and provided Democrats with an important rhetorical weapon to 
energize liberal constituency groups, especially labor unions, against the dangers of 
Republican budget priorities."*’ In addition, the Clinton Administration submitted a fiscal 
year 1999 budget proposal that proposed creating 39 new entitlement programs and 85 new
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domestic spending programs while increasing domestic spending $150 billion over a five 
year period. Each of these proposals sought to move federal policy to the left through 
increased spending, taxation, and regulation - policy actions that appealed to liberal 
Democrats and energized the Democratic base. This agenda provided liberal base voters 
with a compelling reason to vote for Democratic House candidates in the 1998 elections, 
much like the Contract With America did for Republicans in 1994.
The fight over how to conduct the 2000 census provides an important example of 
how President Clinton and House Democrats appealed to their through the legislative process 
to win back the House. Although the 1990 census counted 98.4% of the population using 
a traditional head count, the 1.6% of the population missed consisted of approximately 8.4 
million African-Americans and Hispanics living in urban areas. To avoid the undercounts 
o f the 1990 census, the Clinton Administration proposed using statistical sampling 
techniques in the 2000 census. This plan called for a traditional headcount for 90% of the 
census, and then using complicated statistical sampling methods to estimate the remaining 
10%. President Clinton and House Democrats used the issue of statistical sampling in their 
appeals to minority interest groups, arguing that a more accurate census would lead to more 
federal dollars and more federal representation in the House for depressed inner-city areas.
House Republicans adamantly opposed sampling, arguing it would lead to a 
fraudulent census and the loss of over 26 Republican House seats through massive 
redistricting to primarily Democratic urban areas.”  Representative Dan Miller (R-FL),
”  Christina Duff, “Plans for Census ‘Sampling’ Anger GOP in Congress,” Wall 
Street Journal. 12 June 1997, p. A 20.
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chairman o f the census subcommittee of the House Government Reform and Oversight 
Committee, chided Clinton for “peddling statistical snake oil to the public,” while President 
Clinton and House Democrats warned that the undercounting of minorities in 2000 would 
lead to further racial problems in the 21st century.” The fight between the two parties on 
statistical sampling contributed to President Clinton’s veto o f the 1997 supplemental disaster 
relief bill, which contained a Republican-sponsored measure barring statistical sampling in 
the 2000 census. Statistical sampling also emerged as one o f the key issues threatening 
another government shutdown during the budget negotiations in the fall of 1998. The fight 
over statistical sampling provided House Democrats and President Clinton with an excellent 
forum to appeal to minority voters and boost their level o f intensity for Democratic 
congressional candidates in the 1998 election. This fight also illustrated the extent to which 
jockeying for House control in the short and long term directly molded a more partisan 
governing environment in the House.
Although the Republican Congress either ignored or eviscerated much o f the 
ambitious Democratic legislative agenda of 1998, President Clinton and House Democrats 
had considerable success in setting the political agenda and terms of debate for the 1998 
elections.’* Despite the defeat of much of the Democratic legislative agenda on the House 
floor. House Democrats gained powerful issues to use in campaigns in the most competitive
” Terry M. Neal, “President Makes Push for Census ‘Sampling’,” Washington Times. 
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districts much as House Republicans had in the 1994 campaign. This development, in 
conjunction with the impeachment process, pushed President Clinton and House Democrats 
into close political cooperation, unlike the 1994 campaign and the 104* Congress when they 
frequently pursued differing governing and electoral strategies. In 1994, several House 
Democrats ran away from President Clinton as they localized their elections in efforts to 
escape the Republican’s nationalized campaign. In the 104* Congress, President Clinton 
successfully used a triangulation strategy to separate himself from left-leaning House 
Democrats to secure his own re-election, while Democrats pursued their own strategies to 
secure a House majority.
In 1998, however, President Clinton and House Democrats joined together 
politically, although more out of political self-interest than loyalty. President Clinton, facing 
impeachment in the Republican House of Representatives, used his proposal-a-day 
presidency and savvy use o f the media to repair his fractured relations with House 
Democrats. This unity allowed Democrats to pursue a common issue agenda for use in the 
1998 campaign to retake the House. Clinton had made the Democratic party electable again 
at the national level through his 1992 and 1996 election victories. Now, Clinton focused his 
efforts on making the Democratic party a majority again in the House of Representatives, 
both for practical political considerations and to boost his own political legacy among 
Democrats.
Much like President Ronald Reagan, President Clinton possessed a unique gift of 
communication through which he successfully articulated and sold to the public an ambitious 
Democratic domestic policy agenda against a Congress controlled by the other party.
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Through skillful administrative regulation, public exhortation, and a sophisticated 
management o f media outlets, however. President Clinton’s “preacher presidency” efforts 
far surpassed the successful news management efforts o f the Nixon and Reagan 
administrations, much less the communication capabilities o f congressional Republicans.”  
President Clinton encouraged House Democrats to exploit Republican inaction on the 
Democratic agenda in the 1998 election. All House Democratic incumbents and candidates 
benefitted from these efforts by President Clinton to secure his presidential legacy through 
a new Democratic House majority.”  Despite this congruence between President Clinton and 
House Democrats on the common goal of electing a Democratic House of Representatives, 
one House Democrat complained in an interview that the Clinton triangulation strategy still 
persisted in 1998:
Bill Clinton has no political principles. He is a poll-driven, “I’m-for-being President” 
politician who is neither liberal or conservative. Unfortimately, this benefits Republicans 
because they have been able to drive a conservative agenda from the House and Clinton has 
signed off on most o f these bills, like welfare reform.
Democratic success on promoting and using the issue on the “patient’s bill o f rights” 
and managed care reform illustrated the degree to which the Democratic House minorit)-
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Parts o f Its Sum,” New York Times. 8 December 1997, p. A 1; Peter Baker and John F. 
Harris, “To Boost His Presidency and Party, Clinton Leaps Into the Policy Void,” New 
York Times. 11 January 1998, p. A 1; Ronald Brownstein, “Clintonism,” U.S. News & 
World Report. 26 January 1998, pp. 22-37; Howard Kurtz, Spin Cvcle: Inside the Clinton 
Propaganda Machine (New York: the Free Press, 1998).
”  Helen Dewar, “Party Rallies Around the President,” Washington Post 13 February 
1998, p. A 4; Stuart Rothenberg, “The Man Without a Party Needs One Now More Than 
Ever,” Roll Call Politics. 19 March 1998, p. 16; Carl M. Cannon, “Clinton’s Chance for 
Redemption,” Baltimore Sun. 3 May 1998, p. A 1.
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managed to affect the legislative agenda and the Republican majority’s control of the House 
floor. The managed care issue served the same purpose for Democratic efforts to retake the 
House in 1998 as anti-tax and anti-deficit themes did for House Republicans in the early 
1990s. In early 1998, House Democrats unveiled managed care legislation that gave 
consumers the right to sue their Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and provided 
more access to other health care providers.”  Republican leaders and the business community 
strongly opposed any managed care legislation like the “patient’s bill of rights” that increased 
litigation against HMOs, preferring market solutions to problems in the HMO industry.
The managed care issue placed the Republican majority in a quandary. 68% of voters 
wanted some form of HMO regulation, but managed care providers and the business 
community strongly opposed any expansion of federal regulation and litigation in the 
managed care industry.”  In response to Democratic success on the managed care reform 
issue. Speaker Gingrich launched a Republican managed care task force, under the leadership 
of Chief Majority Whip Dennis Hasten (R-IL), which produced managed care legislation that 
provided political cover for House Republicans.*’ House Democrats labeled the 
Republican’s “Patient Protection Act” an election-year political fig leaf while the White 
House threatened a veto. Although House Republicans passed the “Patient Protection Act”
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on July 24, 1998, no managed care legislation passed into law in the lOS*** Congress.
House Democrats, meanwhile, used the “patient’s bill o f rights” as a useful electoral 
tool to hammer Republican candidates in the fall campaigns, much like the role played by 
congressional reform and the balanced budget for House Republicans in the 103"* Congress 
and the 1994 campaign. Democratic managed care appeals proved especially useful to 
appeal to swing, suburban voters - the type of voters both parties needed to grab in order to 
win a House majority. In the 105* Congress, the Democratic agenda o f managed care 
reform, education, and campaign finance reform helped Democrats set the debate for the 
1998 elections, drive the congressional agenda, and successfully framing the debate against 
the majority party. In many respects, the Democratic minority had further perfected and 
refined the aggressive tactics used by the Republican minority o f the 103"* Congress. Both 
minority parties sought to sabotage the passage of legislative accomplishments in order to 
secure House majorities.
In addition to pushing an aggressive agenda. House Democrats also attacked the 
Republican majority as a “do-nothing” Congress more interested in investigating President 
Clinton than in passing legislation. These attacks echoed President Truman’s attacks against 
the “do-nothing” Republican 80* Congress in his come-from-behind 1948 re-election 
campaign.^* The 80* Congress actually had several substantive legislative achievements, but 
each of these were vetoed by President Truman and used as a foil in campaign appeals to the
** John Harwood and Jackie Calmes, “Election Politics 101 : Impeachment Isn’t a 
Winning Agenda,” Wall Street Journal. 5 November 1998, p. A 1 ; Richard L. Berke, 
“Without a New Tune to Whistle, G.O.P. Kept Humming ‘Scandal’,” New York Times. 5 
November 1998, p. A 1.
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Democratic base o f farmers and labor. In the 105* Congress, House Democratic leaders used 
the “do-nothing” attacks to amplify the Democratic issue agenda over the din o f scandal and 
impeachment that surrounded President Clinton, energizing the liberal Democratic base for 
1998.”  Democratic leaders assailed the Republican House majority for ignoring or 
undermining Democratic legislative priorities like managed care reform, inner city school 
construction, and anti-tobacco legislation. DCCC chairman Martin Frost (D-TX) encouraged 
House Democratic challengers to attack their Republican opponents as part of a “do-little, 
do-nothing Congress,” and urged Democratic candidates to “take every opportimity to remind 
the voters in your district and your local media that if you were in Congress, instead of the 
current Republican congressman, the job would be getting done. I’ve been here for 20 years 
and this is the most do-nothing Congress I’ve seen. They have personal rivalries, dissension 
within their caucus, they have no program.”^  Gephardt chided the Republican majority by 
stating “This is a Bart Simpson Congress — underachievers and proud of it,”*‘ and called the 
Republican recess strategy a strategy of “no hits, no nms, no errors.”*^
Despite these “do-nothing” attacks, the Republican Congress o f the 105* did have
”  Lindsay Sobel, “GOP Session Agenda Produces Dem Complaints,” The Hill. IS 
February 1998, p. 3; John Breshnahan, “As Recess Begins, Democrats Blast ‘Low 
Productivity’ on Hill,” Roll Call. 2 April 1998, p. 1; Alison Mitchell, “Democrats Find 
Campaign Trail in the Capital,” New York Times. 12 October 1998, p. A I.
60 Shop Talk,” Roll Call. 9 March 1998, p. 15.
Alison Mitchell, “As Vacation Begins for Congress, Problems Follow G.O.P. Home,’ 
New York Times. 11 August 1998, p. A I.
“  Helen Dewar and Guy Gugliotta, “Recess Strategy Working for Congress,” 
Washington Post. 16 March 1998, p. A 19.
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several substantive legislative accomplishments, like the 1997 budget agreement, the 1998 
highvvav bill, and reform of the Internal Revenue Service. But these were not the type of 
accomplishments that would appeal or excite liberal voters in the Democratic base. In 
addition, the experience of the 103"* Congress illustrated how a majority could pass into law 
several legislative accomplishments but lose the message war o f the overall image of the 
Congress in the elections to determined minority party attacks. The Republican minority of 
the 103"* Congress derided a “non-productive” Democratic Congress in the 1994 campaign, 
despite the record o f national service legislation, the crime bill, the 1993 deficit-reduction 
bill, and family leave legislation. Both the Democratic majority o f the 103"* Congress and 
the Republican majority of the lOS*** Congress governed in their own distinct manner 
consistent with their party beliefs and principles. In each Congress, however, aggressive 
minority parties mined greater legislative wealth from attacking the inevitable inaction of the 
majority party on the minority party’s legislative agenda. The symbolic usefulness of 
attacking a “do-nothing” Congress far outweighed the particulars o f the legislative record of 
the majority.
House Democrats, in addition to joining with President Clinton to push the unified 
Democratic agenda of 1998, also used the numerous Republican investigations o f Clinton 
to attack the Republican majority and energize Democratic base voters for the 1998 election. 
The Monica Lewinsky investigation conducted by Whitewater Independent Counsel Kenneth 
Starr proved especially useful to House Democrats seeking to portray the Republican 
majority as too fixated on scandal and impeachment instead o f issues and legislation. The 
Lewinsky scandal erupted as one of the unpredictable variables in the race for House control
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in the 105* Congress, much like the Persian Gulf War in 1991 where House Republicans 
hoped to use Democratic opposition to the popular war as a potent campaign issue in 1992. 
In both instances. House Republicans firmly believed that these developments would play 
to their advantage in the House races; however, in both cases the expected political gains 
never materialized. On December 19, 1998, the Republican majority brought four articles 
of impeachment against President Clinton to the floor. The House impeached Clinton, 
almost entirely with Republican votes, on two of the articles o f impeachment relating to 
peijury in a federal grand jury and obstruction ofjustice. Only five House Democrats voted 
for impeachment, as the majority of House Democrats stuck together united behind Clinton. 
This unity insured that the impeachment vote in the House became a partisan impeachment 
process, killing any chance of conviction in a Senate trial.*  ^ To show their disgust with the 
impeachment process. House Democratic leaders and members walked in masse off the floor 
and out o f the Capitol after House Republicans denied a censure vote against Clinton.
Although House Democrats did not condone President Clinton’s deceptions and 
behavior in the Monica Lewinsky matter, they did see political benefit in portraying a 
Republican majority more interested in investigating than in legislating. On the campaign 
finance inquiry. Democrats gained symbolic political advantage as the Government Reform
“  The five House Democrats who voted for the articles o f impeachment were Virgil 
Goode (D-VA); Paul McHale (D-PA), who retired at the end of the 105* Congress; Gene 
Taylor (D-MS), who represented an extremely conservative district in Missisippi that 
gave 56% of its 1996 presidential election vote to Republican candidate Bob Dole; 
Charlie Stenholm (D-TX), a Blue Dog member who narrowly won re-election in 1996; 
and Ralph Hall (D-TX), the most conservative Democrat in die 104th and 105* 
Congresses who voted consistendy with the Republican majority on policy matters, and 
even procedural matters.
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and Oversight Committee’s probe under Chairman Dan Burton (R-IN) stumbled. A senior 
House Democrat stated in an interview:
Dick Armey and Dan Burton are the best thing going for Democratic chances to take back 
the House in 1998. I hope we see and hear more from them. Guys like that just don’t 
understand that what plays in conservative districts in the House Just doesn’t fly in other 
areas of the country, especially in the Northeast and in the swing seats.
The successful House Democratic effort to turn the impeachment process into a 
partisan Republican impeachment of President Clinton paid off. House Democrats 
discovered that the Starr investigation worked to their favor by energizing Democratic base 
voters outraged over a partisan Republican “witch hunt” against a twice-elected Democratic 
president."^ By remaining united in attacking congressional Republicans, House Democrats 
focused public attention on Republican “vindictiveness” and “anti-Clinton” attitudes and 
away from the DNC campaign fund-raising and Monica Lewinsky scandals.®’ This effort 
successfully inflicted enduring damage to the image of the Republican party in preparation 
for the 2000 elections. The Republican party’s favorability ratings with the public 
plummeted in early 1999 as the impeachment process reached a crescendo in the Senate trial, 
with Republicans holding a 2-to-l unfavorable image.®® This represented the worst
®^ Lizette Alvarez and Eric Schmitt, “House Democrats Seek Party Unity on 
Impeachment,” New York Times. 7 October 1998, p. A 1; Richard L. Berke, “As 
Scandal’s Role Dims, Parties Reassess Prospects,” New York Times. 18 October 1998; 
Dan Carney, “Democrats on the Hill Appear Underwhelmed by Probe, Await Starr 
Report to House,” Congressional Ouarterlv. 18 April 1998, p. 987.
®’ Jill Abramson, “How Republican Determination Upset Clinton’s Backing at Polls,” 
New York Times. 21 December 1998, p. A 1.
®® Thomas B. Edsall and Dan Balz, “GOP Analysts Fear Long-Term Damage,” 
Washington Post. 10 January 1999, p. A 1.
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favorability ratings of any political party since Watergate. President Clinton’s approval 
rating, meanwhile, soared amidst the Monica Lewinsky scandal and reached a high o f 72% 
in February, 1998. House Democrats rallied around these high approval ratings, amidst the 
fallout of the revelations o f the perjury allegations, to push the “big four” issues of the 
Democratic agenda: saving Social Security, managed care reform, education, and the 
environment.*’ In 1994, Democrats fled from President Clinton on the campaign trail as his 
presidency floundered. In 1996, President Clinton abandoned House Democrats in pursuit 
of his triangulation strategy and personal re-election victory. In 1998, politics and policy 
drove the White House and House Democrats together instead o f pushing them apart.
House Democrats not only attacked the Starr investigation o f Clinton, but also 
attacked the 31 different Republican investigations o f the Clinton Administration in 10 
different congressional committees.*® Through these efforts. House Democrats skillfully 
painted an image o f a “do-nothing, investigate-everything Congress,” much like the 
Republican minority o f the 103"* Congress painted the Democratic House majority as 
“corrupt” and the Democratic minority o f the 104* Congress painted the Republican House 
majority as “extreme.” Gephardt attacked the different Republican investigations in the 
House against Democrats by stating “It’s unlimited in terms in terms o f time. It’s unlimited
*’ William Schneider, “Clinton’s Improbable Life Raft, National Journal. 7 March 1998, 
p. 546.
** David Nyhan, “Moakley Laments a House Divided,” Boston Globe. 26 Jime 1998, 
p. A 23.
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in terms of money -- and apparently unlimited in terms o f people’s right to privacy.”*® House 
Democrats assembled information on the different Republican investigations in a report 
entitled “Politically Motivated Investigations by House Committees,” which catalogued 39 
investigations o f the Clinton Administration and Democrats in 11 committees at a cost of 
$ 17 million.™ As the Republican majority pursued impeachment in 1998, House Democrats 
profited politically.™ Like the Republican minority o f the 103"  ^Congress, House Democrats 
were free to pursue their own issues and agenda, irrespective o f the agenda and governing 
prerogatives o f the majority party. Unlike 1994, where House Democrats deserted President 
Clinton as his fortunes sagged. House Democrats rallied around a scandal-plagued President 
Clinton in 1998 in order to achieve a Democratic majority in 1998.
PARTY CULTURE AND PHILOSOPHY 
Party Building Reigns Supreme
House Republican party culture in the 105* Congress continued to evolve in the 
direction of molding a united legislative and political team o f House Republicans dedicated 
to preserving their majority in the short and long term. House Republican party culture 
served as an important force to change both the organization and politics o f both the House 
of Representatives and American politics, from the Contract agenda o f 1995 to the sustained
Alison Mitchell, “Gingrich Attacks Clinton as Democrats Are Criticizing G.O.P.,”
New York Times. 30 April 1998.
™ David Nyhan, “Moakley Laments a House Divided,” Boston Globe. 26 June 1998, 
p. A 23; “Democrats Plan Attack On GOP Clinton Probes,” Roll Call. 6 April 1998, p. 1; 
“Democrats Prepare Laundry’ List o f GOP Abuses,” Roll Call. 1 June 1998, p. 12.
™ Richard L. Berke, “Without a New Tune to Whistle, G.O.P. Kept Humming ‘Scandal’,” 
New York Times. 5 November 1998, p. A 1.
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efforts to save the Republican majority in 1996. In the 103"* Congress, Newt Gingrich and 
his leadership team formed a distinct Republican party culture in the House that united all 
House Republicans around the goals of achieving a Republican House majority. In the 104* 
Congress, this change in thinking helped House Republicans maintain their majority amidst 
fierce Democratic attacks as House Republicans worked as a team to defend their precarious 
majority, either through fund-raising for vulnerable members or helping to propagate the 
party message on Republican balanced budget and Medicare plans. In the 105* Congress, 
this distinct party culture continued to conform to the needs o f defending a slim majority in 
a new competitive era.
Mew challenges confronted the Republican majority in the 105* Congress that did not 
exist in the 104* Congress. In addition to losing a net o f nine House seats in the 1996 
elections. House Republicans also lost 18 solidly conservative Republican incumbents. The 
loss o f  these conservative votes meant not only a smaller Republican majority, but the loss 
of a working conservative majority on the House floor. In the 105* Congress, House 
Republican leaders and members attempted to fashion House Republican party culture 
around the precepts o f working as a team to keep and maintain the Republican majority in 
1998. In the aggregate. Republican party culture in the 105* Congress continued to revolve 
around the precepts o f party-building and preserving and enlarging the Republican majority. 
This concept o f teamwork to achieve and defend the Republican House majority, evident so 
clearly in the 103"* and 104* Congresses, had become the chief defining attribute of 
Republican party culture in the 105* Congress.
In the summer of 1997, several Republican House members attempted to overthrow
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Speaker Gingrich for reasons related to keeping a Republican majority in the 1998 elections 
amidst intense competitive pressures. On May 15, 1997, the Republican majority passed a 
$8.6 billion supplemental appropriations bill containing emergency disaster relief for the 
victims o f floods in North Dakota and other northern states. Contained in the disaster relief 
bill were two provisions important to conservative Republicans for the fight to maintain 
Republican majority control both in 1998 and beyond 2000: an anti-government shutdown 
provision designed to take away President Clinton’s ability to “blackmail” House 
Republicans with a government shutdown at election time, and a provision banning the use 
of “statistical sampling” in the 2000 census. President Clinton vetoed the disaster relief bill 
on June 9, 1997 due to these two provisions. The public overwhelmingly sided with 
Democrats in blaming congressional Republicans for blocking needed disaster relief to North 
Dakota, much like they blamed congressional Republicans for the government shutdowns 
of 1995. House Republican leaders subsequently removed both items from the disaster relief 
bill and President Clinton signed it into law on June 12,1997. The fight over the flood relief 
bill represented a major public relations victory for Democrats, and a major fiasco for House 
Republicans.
Several disgruntled House Republican conservatives, upset with the outcome of the 
disaster relief fight with Clinton and fearful o f Republican leadership blunders in the 1998 
elections, began an effort in July of 1997 to remove Gingrich as speaker. A group of 11 
conservative Republican House members led by Representative Lindsey Graham (R-SC) met 
with House Republican leaders to plot a coup attempt against the speaker through a vote of 
no confidence on the House floor. To many House Republicans, Gingrich had become a
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liability for the Republican majority both politically in Washington, in terms of quagmires 
like the disaster relief fight, and electorally in the country at large, in terms o f risking 
marginal Republican members to further Democratic “get-Newt” attacks. Gingrich’s 
abysmal national approval ratings, his ethics problems, and his lack o f direction in the 1 OS"* 
Congress vis-a-vis the Democrats made him unpalatable to the coup plotters. The plot to 
depose Gingrich quickly expanded to include several members o f the House Republican 
leadership team.^ The coup attempt against Gingrich, however, resembled a Keystone Cops 
adventure, and unraveled almost as quickly as it was concocted. The failed coup attempt 
split the Republican Conference among competing leadership factions as charges o f duplicity 
mounted.^ Representative John Kasich (R-OH) captured the dissension in Republican ranks 
by stating “This is like an Indiana Jones movie. I mean, you’ve got arrows, you’ve got 
boulders, you’ve got poisonous snakes, you’ve got everything.’’^ " As the coup attempt fell 
apart, each Republican House leader provided a differing account o f their own involvement 
or non-involvement in the coup attempt, further undermining confidence among House 
Republicans in the leadership o f the Republican Conference in the 105* Congress.’^
^  Gerald F. Seib, “Newt’s Enemies: A (Mis) reading of GOP Reality,” Wall Street 
Journal. 23 July 1997, p. A 20; Jackie Koszczuk, “Gingrich Under Fire as Discord 
Simmers From Rank to Top,” Congressional Ouarterlv. 21 Jime 1997, pp. 1415-18.
^  Karen Tumulty, “Julius Speaker”, Time. 30 June 1997, p. 33; James Carney, “Ready, 
Aim, Misfire,” Time. 28 July 1997, pp. 50-1; Paul A. Gigot, “Coup de GOP: Off With 
Our Own Heads!,” Wall Street Journal. 18 July 1997, p. A 14.
John E. Yang, “Paxon Quits House GOP Leadership,” Washington Post. 18 July 
1997, p. A 1.
David Rogers, “Armey, in a Letter, Implicitly Blames Other Leaders for Plot to Oust 
Gingrich,” Wall Street Journal. 23 July 1997, p. A 6.
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Historically, the Republican party has been a relatively homogenous party that unites 
behind the prevailing leadership faction to focus on big ideas like individual freedom, limited 
government, cultural conservatism, and free enterprise/^ This fundamental element of party 
culture based on leadership factions has remained consistent over time, providing a solid 
base upon which most internal Republican politics operate. In the 1980s, for instance. 
President Ronald Reagan provided a clear sense of direction and unity for the Republican 
party. Gingrich filled the leadership void in Republican politics in the post-Reagan era in 
the IGS'** and 104'*’ Congresses as he led the Republicans to victory in achieving their first 
House majority in 40 years. By the 105'*’ Congress, however, Gingrich had lost his luster, 
and his leadership subsequently waned. Gingrich’s numerous gaffes o f the 104'*’ Congress 
combined with the Democratic ethics attacks had made him the most unpopular politician 
in American political history. Despite this unpopularity, Gingrich still possessed support 
from House Republican loyalists. One veteran House Republican praised Gingrich’s role in 
the House Republican Conference by stating:
Newt is a professor. He is a visionary. He is a military strategist. He is a leader. He is an 
excellent politician. He is a teacher for the Republican Conference. Newt is still performing 
these functions in 1998. He stands up there as a teacher o f the House to teach Republicans 
what to do in terms of process, policy, and politics. He still stands up in front o f an easel 
with a grease pen outlining where he wants us to go.
The coup attempt illustrated the degree to which Gingrich was both a boon and a bane 
to House Republicans as they fought to obtain their House majority in 1994 and retain it in
Jo Freeman, “The Political Culture of the Democratic and Republican Parties,” Political 
Science Ouarterlv 101 (3), 1996, pp. 327-56.
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1996 and 1998.^ One rank-and-file Republican member admitted in an interview “I don’t 
trust Newt. I don’t trust Armey. I don’t trust DeLay. I can’t trust any o f them. I hate to say 
that, but it is the truth.” After the coup. House Republican leaders went their own way.’* 
Speaker Gingrich removed Bill Paxon (R-NY) from his appointed leadership post as 
chairman o f the Speaker’s leadership operations, but was unable to enact revenge against the 
other Republican House leaders who held elected leadership positions. Gingrich further 
solidified his tenuous grip on the speakership through a coalition of Republican moderates 
and loyalist conservatives. Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-TX) increased his base of 
support in the whip organization, Paxon pursued a stealth campaign for the speakership imtil 
his resignation from the House in 1998, while Majority Leader Dick Armey (R-TX) was 
marginalized as a player in the House.”  The internal feuding emboldened House Democrats 
about chances o f capturing the House in 1998, and hurt the morale and recruitment of 
Republicans in the 105* Congress. Republican leadership divisions also led to additional 
challenges to Gingrich’s hold on the speakership. After the 1998 election. Appropriations 
Chairman Robert Livingston (R-LA) launched an open campaign to replace Gingrich as 
speaker in the 106* Congress. In the previous era of Democratic rule, such a challenge by
”  Adam Clymer, “The Revolution Is Dead. Long Live the Revolution,” New York 
Times. 27 July 1997, p. E 6; Hanna Rosin, “The Madness of Speaker Newt,” The New 
Republic. 17 March 1997, pp. 23-26.
’* Adam Clymer, “The Revolution Is Dead. Long Live the Revolution,” New York 
Times. 27 July 1997, p. E 6; “House Leadership Battle Mirrors Deeper Conflict,” 
Washington Post. 20 July 1997, p. A 1.
”  Eliza Newlin Carney and Richard E. Cohen, “Newt’s Kitchen Cabinet,” National 
Journal. 2 August 1997, p. 1560.
243
a sitting committee chairman would have been unthinkable. In an interview, a House 
Republican stated:
Every member of the Republican leadership is a professional politician, pure and simple. Do 
they go out and drink beer together every night? Of course not. But they were successful 
in driving their agenda through the House, on issues as diverse as welfare reform, reforming 
the Internal Revenue Service, and balancing the budget.
In 1998, two developments occurred that illustrated the degree to which House 
Republicans as a party continued to move in the direction of greater teamwork as a majority 
party on both the House floor and in House elections around the country, much like they had 
in the 103'“* and 104* Congresses. First, several junior House Republicans began a petition 
drive to change Republican Conference rules to punish those Republican members who sided 
with the Democratic minority on key procedural votes which aided Democratic efforts to 
embarrass the Republican majority in the runup to the 1998 campaign. Second, Republican 
leaders leaned heavily on safe Republican incumbents in 1998 to contribute their unneeded 
campaign monies to national party advertising to boost the Republican majority in the 1998 
elections. Each of these efforts illustrated the degree to which the party culture o f the House 
Republican Conference had permanently changed from the individualized party culture 
which prevailed until the early 1990s, and the new majority-seeking party culture first 
molded by Gingrich in the 103"* and 104* Congresses.
In 1998, several Republican freshmen and sophomores under the leadership of 
Representative Robert Ehrlich (R-MD), including Representatives George Radanovich (R- 
CA), Dave Camp (R-MI), Pete Sessions (R-TX), Ed Pease (R-IN), and George Nethercutt 
(R-WA), began a petition drive to change Republican Conference rules to deny members
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who voted against the party on key policy and procedural votes the rewards of majority 
power. Throughout the 105* Congress, House conservatives lost several close votes on 
Republican priorities, including legislation protecting private property rights, preventing 
“salting” by unions, requiring prior permission from individuals before labor union dues are 
taken from paychecks for political purposes, and two anti-affirmative action amendments 
involving set-aside quotas in federal transportation contracts.*® This petition effort sought 
to deprive moderate Republicans o f their committee and subcommittee chairmanships for 
failing to support the party on procedural votes, consistently voting with the Democrats on 
policy votes, and helping Democrats set the agenda by signing discharge petitions.
The Ehrlich group’s petition sought to instill further the concept o f thinking and 
acting as a majority team, especially on procedural votes that determined control of the 
House chamber. The petition drive also sparked a growing feud within the Republican 
Conference between the majority o f Republican conservatives and the smaller cadre of 
Republican moderates.*' As illustrated in Appendix D, the Republican moderates sparking 
the petition drive included Sherwood Boehlert (R-NY), Michael Forbes (R-NY), Nancy 
Johnson (R-CT), Jim Leach (R-IA), Chris Shays (R-CT), Wayne Gilchrest (R-MD), Sue
*° The conservative legislation sparking the Ehrlich petition were H.R. 992, “The Tucker 
Shuffle Relief Act” allowing greater liability flexibility to property landowners; H.R. 
3246, “The Fairness for Small Business Act,” preventing union salting of small 
businesses; The Boehlert Amendment to H.R. 2525 involving environmental mandates to 
logging roads; H.R. 2608, “The Paycheck Protection Act” requiring prior permission by 
individuals before labor dues are withdrawn from paychecks for political purposes; and 
the Roukema Amendment to H.R. 2400 prohibiting set-aside affirmative action quotas on 
federal transportation contracts.
*' Jackie Koszczuk, “On the Hill and at Home, GOP Is Tom by Internal Strife,” 
Congressional Ouarterlv. 4 April 1998, pp. 859-61.
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Kelly (R-NY), and Connie Morelia (R-MD). Republican conservatives expressed especial 
concern with Banking Committee Chairman Jim Leach (R-IA) and Government Reform and 
Oversight Subcommittee Chairman Chris Shays (R-CT), both of whom signed the campaign 
finance reform discharge petition.
To many House Republicans, these moderate defections were interpreted as disloyalty 
to the cause o f re-electing the Republican majority in 1998.”  House Republican leaders 
supported the petition drive, while Republican moderates vociferously opposed it due to the 
constraints it would impose on their own political viability in marginal and swing districts. 
Republican Whip Tom DeLay (R-TX), a proponent o f the Ehrlich petition, defended it by 
stating “I do not think it’s fair for our members to turn the floor over to the other side.””  
Representative Joe Scarborough (R-FL), however, responded to the constraints it imposed 
on Republicans from marginal seats by stating “What the hell are they going to do? Tell 
Chris Shays and Jim Leach to go to the Democrats?”^  Speaker Gingrich and Speaker-elect 
Livingston both supported the Ehrlich petition and planned to add them to Republican 
Conference rules in the lOb* Congress. Although not formally added to Republican 
Conference rules, the threat of the petition effort did not escape the notice of moderate 
Republican committee chairs, and dampened their enthusiasm and support for signing
82 Jim VandeHei, “Gingrich Signs On To Ehrlich Petition,” Roll Call. 22 June 1998, p. 1.
”  Jessica Lee, “GOP House leaders warn Members to Toe the Line,” USA Todav. 13 July 
1998, p. A 7.
^ Robert Novak, “GOP Pressure Politics,” Washington Post. 29 June 1998, p. A 15.
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discharge petitions proposed by House Democrats in the 106* Congress.”
In addition to placing increased emphasis on thinking and voting as a majority party. 
House Republican leaders also placed a high priority on campaign contributions from safe 
Republican incumbents toward the goal o f protecting the narrow Republican majority. To 
fund “Operation Breakout,” Republican leaders leaned heavily on safe Republican 
incumbents to give campaign funds to the greater goal o f increasing the Republican majority. 
The blunt appeal for massive contributions from safe Republican incumbents to “Operation 
Breakout” far surpassed previous efforts by Republican leaders in the 103^ ** and 104* 
Congresses to cajole safe Republican incumbents to give money to the cause of securing a 
Republican House majority in the 1990s. In special elections in 1997 and 1998, this 
member giving increased dramatically in order to allow Republicans to claim victory in 
“bellwether” contests in the war for the House in 1998. In the race to succeed retiring 
Representative Susan Molinari (R-NY) in 1997, Republican candidate Vito Fossella(R-NY) 
received $199,250 from 154 Republican members. In the special election in New Mexico 
to replace deceased Representative Steven Schiff (R-NM), Republican candidate Heather 
Wilson received $290,000 from 178 Republican incumbents.
Through these incumbent contributions to efforts to maintain Republican control of 
the House, party-building increasingly displaced seniority as the route to leadership positions 
and committee chairmanships in the Republican House of Representatives. Instead of
”  In the 106* Congress, several political commentators attributed the lack of Republican 
signatories to the campaign finance reform discharge petition to deference to new House 
Speaker Denny Hastert. Instead, the threat o f losing committee and subcommittee 
assignments served as a more powerful motivation against discharge petition signatures in 
the 106* Congress after the threat o f the Ehrlich petition in the 105* Congress.
247
automatically receiving a key committee chairmanship through seniority, financial 
commitments to help expand the Republican majority to a healthy margin became the new 
standard for gauging worthiness to wield committee power. During the period of Democratic 
non-competitive rule, individual House Democrats focused on their own re-election effort, 
with the overall Democratic majority not jeopardized by the loss of any single seat. In the 
competitive era o f the 1990s, every seat counted for majority status. Loyalty to the cause of 
preserving the Republican majority became a key element of House Republican party culture.
In this new order, contributions from Republican incumbents toward the goal of 
protecting the Republican majority trumped the traditional seniority route to power that 
prevailed in the era of non-competitive, one-party Democratic rule. For those House 
Republicans not deemed “team players” by Republican leaders in terms o f their financial 
contributions to expand the majority, the routes to committee chairmanships were placed in 
doubt as more aggressive House Republicans, eager to display their majority-seeking 
credentials, eagerly sought to buy committee chairmanships by giving more to the 
Republican cause than anyone else. In “Operation Breakout,” Republican leaders sought to 
raise $16 million in donations from safe Republican House incumbents as “seed money” to 
convince the business community that the Republican majority was not only safe, but would 
expand with the financial resources of additional corporate contributions. In 1996, 
vulnerable House Republican incumbents were hit hard by millions of dollars in labor union 
advertising while safe Republican incumbents sat on $35 million in their respective 
campaign chests.
In 1998, House Republican leaders increasingly viewed these large campaign cash
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reserves o f safe House Republicans as communal property in the fight for Republican 
majority control.** To protect their ten-seat majority in the 1998 elections. House Republican 
leaders leaned heavily on the 170 House Republican incumbents facing no serious opposition 
in their individual elections. These members held a collective wealth of over $60 million in 
their campaign coffers. Republican leaders designed “Operation Breakout” to tap these 
unneeded campaign funds to help the greater goal of protecting the Republican majority and 
enlarging it so all Republican members could benefit in the 106* Congress with better 
committee assignments and an enlarged majority to pass Republican legislative priorities.
To fund “Operation Breakout,” Republican leaders demanded mandatory 
contributions from all Republican committee and subcommittee chairmen. Speaker Gingrich 
defended this policy by stating “It’s a team. But all I am going to say to Members is very 
straightforward. Do you like being chairman? Well guess what - it takes 218 votes to be 
chairman.”*^  House Republican leaders Gingrich, Armey, and Linder asked 130 House 
Republicans facing little or no opposition to contribute $100,000 each to pay for the issue 
advocacy ads of “Operation Breakout,” raising a total sum of $13 million.** The mandatory 
contributions from Republican chairmen and subcommittee chairmen to “Operation 
Breakout” illustrated the degree to which Republican party culture had changed in the midst 
of the 1994 nationalized campaign for majority control and the competitive 1996 and 1998
86 Jim VandeHei, “Armey Wants Millions for Ads,” Roll Call. 13 July 1998, p. 1.
*’ “Gingrich Promises to Focus on Taxes, Not Impeachment,” Roll Call. 16 July 1998, p. 
1 .
** Jim VandeHei, “Armey Wants Millions For Ads,” Roll Call. 13 July 1998, p. 1.
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elections to retain the majority. House Republicans became increasingly acclimated as a 
party lo the goal o f protecting, preserving, and enlarging their House majority.
During the campaign to raise funds from safe Republican committee chairmen for 
■‘Operation Breakout,” Speaker Gingrich and NRCC Chairman Linder complained that 
several subcommittee chairmen, particularly House Appropriations Subcommittee Chairmen 
John Porter (R-IL), Sonny Callahan (R-AL), Harold Rogers (R-KY), and Ron Packard (R- 
CA), had failed to contribute or raise their required stun o f $100,000 a piece.*’ To motivate 
contributions to “Operation Breakout,” Speaker Gingrich announced that committee and 
subcommittee chairmen should not assiune they will hold the same job titles in the next 
Congress if they refuse to help Republican candidates in November.*® Republican leaders, 
especially the Speaker, openly stated that “Operation Breakout” contribution figures would 
be looked at closely when committee assignments for the 106* Congress were assigned.
As an example. Republican leaders pointed to the poor fund-raising performance of 
Representative Philip Crane (R-IL), a 29-year veteran of the Ways and Means Committee 
and the second-ranking Republican on the committee. Republican leaders stressed the need 
for Crane to be a team player in the effort to expand the majority in 1998, and stated that 
Crane’s poor fund-raising performance for “Operation Breakout” could preclude him from 
becoming the next chairman when the current Ways and Means Chairman, Bill Archer (R-
*’ Jim VandeHei, “GOP Chairmen Warned About Contributions,” Roll Call. 1 October 
1998.
*®Ibid.
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TX), retired in 2000.”  In contrast. House Oversight Chairman Bill Thomas (R-CA), seeking 
to succeed Arche»’ as Ways and Means Chairman in 2000, pledged to raise $500,000 for 
“Operation Breakout.”
Through these statements and actions. Republican leaders sent blunt signals to 
Republican chairmen and subcommittee chairmen, as well as prospective committee 
chairmen, that seniority alone would no longer warrant choice committee assignments or 
chairmanships. Instead, incumbent contributions to Republican candidates and efforts to 
hold the House, in combination with voting with the party on key votes and abstaining from 
helping the Democratic minority articulate its agenda through discharge petitions or 
advancing liberal legislation, would determine a member’s status in regards to committee 
assignments and influence within the House Republican Conference. These actions by the 
Republican majority in the 105* Congress differed remarkably from previous Democratic 
majorities of the 1980s and early 1990s.
Democratic Cohesiveness in the 105* Congress
Throughout the 104* and 105* Congresses, Republican party leaders remade 
Republican party culture in the image of a united legislative team committed to the goal of 
re-electing the Republican majority. In the 104* Congress, House Democratic leaders 
encouraged House Democrats to think and work as a team with similar attributes in order to 
regain the majority, but faced the challenges o f a coalitional and more heterogeneous party. 
Likewise, in the 105* Congress, Minority Leader Gephardt and other Democratic party
” Jim VandeHei, “GOP Chairmen Warned About Contributions,” Roll Call. 1 October 
1998.
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leaders like DCCC Chairman Martin Frost (D-TX) and Representative Steny Hoyer (D-MD) 
continued to exhort House Democrats to think and act as a united team to fight for the 
majority But like the 104* Congress, Democratic leaders faced challenges in managing a 
caucus that contained extremely liberal urban members while at the same time more 
conservative Blue Dog members. In the 105* Congress, Democratic leaders had to contend 
with a new coalitional group, the New Democratic Forum (NDC). NDC Democrats, like the 
Blue Dogs o f the 104* Congress, sought to move the party in a centrist direction with issues 
like free trade and a balanced budget. As they dealt with the new challenges o f trying to hold 
House Democrats together in the 105* Congress, House Democratic leaders welded 
prevailing House Democratic culture, especially its coalitional and heterogeneous aspects, 
to the cause o f obtaining a new Democratic House majority.
House Democratic party culture continued to be different from the highly centralized, 
homogenous House Republican culture of the 103"'-105* Congresses. House Republican 
party culture in the 104* and 105* Congresses exhibited clear lines o f communication and 
authority on governing and campaign matters such as the 1994 nationalized campaign, the 
Contract With America, and using the perks of majority power to cherry-pick House seats 
into Republican ranks. House Democratic party culture in the 105* Congress remained less 
centralized, more heterogeneous, and more ideologically diverse than the culture o f the 
Republican majority. The impeachment o f President Clinton, combined with the Democratic 
gain o f seats in the 1998 election, each brought greater internal cohesion and unity among 
House Democrats as they savored the prospect o f majority control in 2000. But this 
temporary unity on impeachment issues and the prospect o f majority control in 2000 masked
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policy divisions between liberal Democrats and a growing cadre o f moderate and 
conservative House Democrats. House Democratic party culture continued to slowly drift 
toward the needs o f the competitive demands for House control, but the realities o f the 
Democratic Caucus pushed these changes in different directions than the Republican 
Conference in the 1990s.
Throughout the 105"' Congress, House Democratic leaders encouraged House 
Democrats to work together as a team to achieve a Democratic majority in 1998. Unlike the 
more unified and more homogeneous Republican majority, however. House Democratic 
leaders managed a coalitional party with multiple power centers. The Congressional Black 
Caucus, Hispanic members, and traditional liberals serving as committee chairmen served 
as traditional power blocks within the Democratic Caucus. These traditional power groups 
were joined in the 104* Congress by the fiscal conservatives o f the Blue Dogs, and in the 
105* Congress by the creation of the New Democratic Forum. In the 105* Congress, 
Democratic leaders focused on managing this diverse coalition and focusing its efforts on 
achieving a numerical majority in 1998. As they fought for a majority. House Democratic 
leaders had to minimize divisions within Democratic ranks, especially between Blue 
Dog/NDC members and the liberal majority o f the Democratic Caucus. In the 105* 
Congress, Democratic leaders continued their efforts to exhort Democratic members to think 
about obtaining and retaining a Democratic majority, thoughts that did not permeate House 
Democratic culture in the previous era of non-competition.
House Democratic leaders were successful in implementing a mandatory 
contributions plan to move money from safe Democratic incumbents to the most competitive
253
races that could help propel Democrats into the majority in 1998. Much like House 
Republicans in the 1 OS'*' Congress, Democratic leaders Gephardt and Frost requested that all 
House Democratic incumbents from safe seats, in addition to all House Democrats in 
leadership positions or in ranking committee positions, contribute money in a “share-the- 
wealth” strategy to help take back the House.”  Members o f the Democratic leadership and 
the 101 ranking Democrats on the committees and subcommittees were expected to 
contribute $50,000 a piece to the DCCC and $25,000 a piece to other candidates and 
vulnerable Democratic incumbents.’  ^ This represented the first time House Democrats had 
set any standards for giving to candidates, and followed the example set by the Republican 
minority in the 103"' Congress and aggressively pursued by the Republican majority in the 
105“' Congress.
Despite this unity on campaign matters. House Democrats faced an internal debate 
in the 105“’ Congress regarding the ideology and direction o f the caucus as it searched for the 
best route to a new majority. In the 104“* Congress, the Blue Dog Democrats divorced 
themselves politically from many aspects of caucus activities and pursued an independent 
course designed to eventually bring the caucus away from its liberal extremes and back to 
the center. In the 105“* Congress, the Blue Dogs were joined by another group o f centrist 
Democrats, the New Democratic Forum. Representatives Cal Dooley (D-CA), Tim Roemer 
(D-IN), and James Moran (D-VA) created the New Democratic Forum (NDC) in early 1997 
to provide a forum for pro-growth moderate House Democrats. NDC members attempted
”  Amy Keller, “Helping Each Other Out,” Roll Call. 15 June 1998, p. 1.
”  Amy Keller, “DCCC Wants More Money From Leaders,” Roll Call. 22 June 1998, p. 1.
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to fashion a new centrist House Democratic cultural groundwork in order to attract and 
recruit centrist Democratic candidates to win the swing seats needed for a new Democratic 
majority. Through these efforts, the New Democratic Coalition attempted to lay the 
groundwork for electing a moderate Democratic House majority.
Members o f the New Democratic Coalition differed from the Blue Dogs in several 
important aspects. The Blue Dogs created a culturally separate political entity within House 
Democratic ranks for moderate and conservative Democrats representing primarily rural and 
exurban districts. NDC members, in contrast, did not divorce themselves culturally from 
House Democratic ranks and represented suburban districts immersed in the high-tech 
economy of the 1990s.^" Blue Dog members addressed primarily economic and fiscal issues, 
like the balanced budget, unfunded mandates legislation, and welfare reform. In addition to 
addressing traditional “New Democrat” issues like fiscal discipline, NDC members also 
stressed other issues as diverse as encryption technology, securities litigation reform, 
education, and international trade. Unlike the Blue Dogs, many o f whom opposed Clinton 
in the 103"' Congress, the NDC members patterned themselves politically after Clinton’s 
triangulated New Democratic policy stances and became key allies o f the White House in the 
Congress to help pass the 1997 balanced budget agreement.
While the Blue Dogs kept strict barriers to joining their group in order to preserve 
their policy independence and political integrity, the NDC kept looser requirements for 
membership and encouraged rapid growth in its ranks in order to achieve maximum political 
effect in the Democratic Caucus. NDC founder James Moran stated “We’re probably more
^  Peter Beinart, “Why the Center Can’t Hold,” Time. 24 November 1997, p. 52.
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of a threat to the traditional Democratic Party than the Blue Dogs are. The vast majority of 
the Democratic Party would never become a Blue Dog. We would be far more likely to 
influence the mainstream of the caucus.”’* Despite these differences, the two groups shared 
similar objectives o f moving the Democratic caucus to the center and electing a centrist 
Democratic House majority. Together, for instance, members o f these two groups assailed 
the AFL-CIO for targeting free-trade Democrats in the 1998 elections, attacked Minority 
Whip David Bonior’s 500-mile “Journey For Economic Justice” bus trip touting the defeat 
o f fast-track trade legislation, and worked closely to help implement centrist New 
Democratic policies in the 105* Congress.’*
Together, the 23 member group of Blue Dogs and the 41 member New Democratic 
Coalition attempted to move House Democrats as a caucus in a centrist direction in order to 
elect House Democrats to the critical swing seats and eventually elect a new moderate 
Democratic House majority. These centrist House Democrats also advocated the selection 
of moderate and centrist Democrats to the liberal dominated leadership and committee posts 
in the House Democratic hierarchy.”  On a traditional Democratic priority like raising the 
minimum wage, these members argued against an increase in the 105* Congress to avoid
’* A. B. Stoddard, “New Democrat Coalition, Blue Dogs Share Goals and Members, But 
Differ On Style and Strategy, “ The Hill. 12 November 1997, p. 16.
’* A.B. Stoddard, “Bonior Bus Tour on Trade Assailed for Dividing Party,” The Hill. 18 
February 1998, p. A l; Jim VandeHei, “New Labor Ads Could Backfire with Dems.” Roll 
Cafl, 26 June 1997, p. 1.
”  Jim Vande Hei, “The House ‘New Democrats’ Aspire to Leadership,” Roll Call. 15 
September 1997; Al From, “Prepare for a Long March,” The New Democrat July/August 
1998, p. 28; Dan Balz, “Dragging the Democrats Behind Him,” Washington Post 
National Weeklv Edition. 27 January 1997, p. 11.
256
alienating fiscal conservatives and small business owners in swing districts critical for a 
Democratic recapture of the House.’* Traditionally, the issue o f a minimum wage increase 
proved politically popular for Democrats in wooing both the Democratic base and swing 
voters.
NDC co-chairman Cal Dooley (D-CA), a close ally o f President Clinton and Vice- 
President Al Gore, called the NDC a home for centrist and conservative Democrats. He 
also told the 1996 Democratic freshmen “If your experience has been anything on the 
campaign trail like ours, you have probably found that advocating traditional Democratic 
policies did not get you elected.””  Sixty-four of the 207 House Democrats in the 105* 
Congress were members of either the Blue Dogs or NDC, and 26 of the 42 Democratic 
freshmen elected in 1996 joined either the Blue Dogs or NDC. But strongly liberals House 
Democrats held virtually every leadership post or ranking committee position. The 58- 
member House Progressive Caucus, for instance, represented liberal Democrats who did not 
subscribe to the centrist philosophy of the Blue Dogs, the NDC, or New Democrats. These 
Democrats eschewed the philosophical direction of New Democrats, and subscribed to 
liberal principles like a single-payer health care system, dramatic reductions in defense 
spending, restoring the highest tax bracket to its 1977 level, and mandated paid family and 
medical leave. O f the 18 major committees in the House, eight ranking House Democrats 
belonged to the House Progressive Caucus.
’* “’Blue Dogs’ Wary of Wage Push,” National Journal’s ConeressDailv. 2 April 1998.
”  Mike Tobin, “Dooley Trying to Woo Recruits To His New Democrat Coalition,” States 
News Service. 21 November 1996.
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The struggle in the 105* Congress between the majority liberal Democrats and the 
smaller growing minority of Blue Dog/NDC members became the true flashpoint for action 
in House Democratic internal politics. The struggle between the two groups on policy and 
political issues was in reality a fight for the heart and soul o f the Democratic part}' in the 
post-1994 political environment."” Throughout the 105* Congress, Gephardt publicly 
opposed the Clinton Administration on several New Democratic policies, including 
extending Most-Favored Nation status to China, extending fast-track trading authority to the 
president, and the 1997 balanced budget agreement with the Republican majority. Minority 
Leader Gephardt heatedly opposed the Balanced Budget Act, and strongly denounced it on 
the House floor on May, 1997. Gephardt also lambasted New Democratic politics and policy 
measures at a speech at Harvard in December, 1997. While strongly denouncing “some who 
now call themselves new Democrats,” Gephardt advocated a traditional liberal legislative 
agenda consisting o f opposition to Social Security reform, opposition to the balanced budget 
agreement o f 1997, and opposition to many of the free trade measures o f the 1990s.'°‘ 
Gephardt’s positions and Harvard speech especially angered the leadership o f the NDC, 
which had strongly supported fast-track trading authority for President Clinton and worked 
closely with Clinton to find common ground on balancing the budget and cutting taxes in 
tandem with the Republican majority in 1997. NDC co-chairman Tim Roemer (D-IN)
James A. Bames and Richard E. Cohen, “Divided Democrats,” National Journal. 15 
November 1997, pp. 2304-07.
Jim VandeHei, “Gephardt’s Speech Riles His Colleagues, Who Fear Party Divisions 
Will Hurt Chances in 1998,” Roll Call. 8 December 1997; John E. Yang, “Gephardt 
Speech on Party Angers Some Democrats,” Washington Post. 6 December 1997, p. A 6.
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responded to Gephardt’s Harvard speech by stating “If the strategy is one of moving further 
to the left, we’ve had that debate - it was called the 1994 Republican landslide.” '^
The jockeying by New and Old House Democrats for the future of the Democratic 
party in the 105''* Congress became intimately related to the fight for House. This 
philosophical struggle among Democrats is similar to the internal struggle within House 
Republican ranks in the 1980s and early 1990s during their period in the minority. In both 
instances, insurgent party members challenged the mainstream thinking within the prevailing 
minority party culture in order to better position the party to retake the House of 
Representatives. Newt Gingrich and his followers in the Conservative Opportunity Society 
in the 1980s and early 1990s repeatedly clashed with the Old Bull Republicans led by 
Minority Leader Bob Michel regarding the need for more confrontation with Democrats in 
order to retake the House. The centrist and conservative House Democrats o f the 104**' and 
105**' Congresses likewise repeatedly clashed with the liberal House Democrats regarding the 
best ideological posture for Democrats to take to both capture the House and govern with a 
House majority. The Republican minority struggled primarily over the strategies and tactics 
necessary to secure a House majority, with the confrontational, nationalized brand o f politics 
created by the Gingrich Republicans ultimately reshaping House Republican culture in the 
early 1990s.
Internal House Democratic feuds as a minority party, however, have revolved on 
issues related to the ideology and philosophy of the House Democratic caucus, and in what
“Centrist Democrats Angry at Gephardt, ” International Herald Tribime. 8 December 
1997, p. 3.
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direction the next Democratic House majority would govern. Blue Dogs and NDC members 
demanded the shaping of a new centrist Democratic party culture, while traditional liberal 
Democrats eschewed a move to the right and believed that the Democrats could retake the 
House due to Republican incompetence and mismanagement. While the Republican 
minority argued internally regarding which tactics and strategies were most beneficial to 
breaking the Democratic lock on the House on a nationwide basis, the Democratic minority 
has argued internally over the best ideological stance suited to electing and retaining a 
Democratic House majority on a nationwide basis, especially with the importance of swing 
seats. In both instances, minority party members attempted to remake the cultural outlook 
of their party to best accommodate obtaining a House majority.
ELECTIONS 
"Operation Breakout”
House Republicans relied heavily on the pro-incumbent political environment o f the 
105* Congress, and the historical precedent o f the party not controlling the presidency to 
pick up House seats in a midterm election, in the formulation o f their electoral strategy to 
boost their majority in 1998.'“  A senior Republican captured the Republican electoral 
strategy of the 105* Congress by stating:
We will gain seats in 1998. The only Republican open-seat in danger is Riggs in the First 
district o f California. The rest aren’t perfectly secure, but the GOP will do well in them. 
There has been a significant move to the right since the 1980 election. This is a center-right 
country which has been electing center-right leadership. Clinton won re-election in 1996 by 
moving to the right. Over 366 Democrats have switched parties to the GOP since Clinton’s 
election in 1992. Republicans now control over 30 governor’s mansions, and the GOP just
Benjamin Sheffiier, “Republicans, Counting on History, Expect More House Seats 
Next Year,” Roll Call Politics. 13 March 1997, p. 13.
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won control o f the Wisconsin legislature. All of this is significant, and proves the GOP will 
pick up seats in 1998.
As economic and social indicators improved, all incumbents. Republicans and Democrats, 
became more secure."" 83 House incumbents, including 51 Republicans, faced no 
opposition 1998. This represented the highest number of unopposed incumbents since 1958, 
when 96 incumbents faced no opponent.'®^ In all, 130 House Republicans either faced no 
opposition or token opposition. While Democrats focused their efforts on a seat-by-seat “fit- 
the-district” strategy, Republicans aimed to enlarge their numbers in 1998 through national 
television advertising financed by superior fund-raising abilities. Large Republican gains 
in the 1998 elections, in addition to providing a healthy Republican House majority in the 
106* Congress, would have laid the groimdwork for a new era o f Republican control of the 
House.'®’
In the 1997 off-year elections. Republicans used massive soft-money advertising to
"" David S. Broder and Terry M. Neal, “A ‘98 Campaign of Skirmishes: Next November 
Looks Good for Incumbents,” Washington Post. 9 November 1997, p. A I; “Many 
Lawmakers Will Coast to Re-election Unchallenged,” Washington Times. 13 April 1998, 
p. A 10.
Mary Lynn F. Jones and Robert Schlesinger, “83 Unopposed House Members Set 40- 
year Record,” The Hill. I July 1998, p. I; Jim O’Connell, “No-stress Elections For Many 
in House,” Washington Times. 29 Jime 1998, p. A 4.
John Mercurio and Rachel Van Dongen, “NRCC Chairman Predicts 20-Seat Pickup 
for GOP,” Roll Call Politics. 31 July 1997, p. 13; Stuart Rothenberg, “Governors, Open 
Seats Keep GOP Optimistic About House Control,” Roll Call Politics. 2 April 1998, p. 
18; Ceci Connolly, “Suddenly, Things Are Looking Much Brighter,” Washington Post 
National Weeklv Edition. 14 September 1998, p. 13.
David S. Broder and Thomas B. Edsall, “What If They Held an Election and Nobody 
Came?,” Washington Post National Weeklv Edition. 14 September 1998, p. 12.
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propel Republican candidates to victory in every major race, especially in the New York 
mayoral race and gubernatorial races in New Jersey and V i r g i n i a . T h i s  strategy helped 
insure the close re-election effort of Governor Christine Todd Whitman (R-NJ), and helped 
to elect Vito Fossella (R-NY) to the seat o f retiring Representative Susan Molinari (R-NY) 
in New York City.'®’ This winning strategy in 1997 served as an important template for 
Republican efforts to enlarge the Republican House majority in 1998. To score major gains 
in the midterm election. House Republicans focused their time and energies on raising funds 
for an expensive 1998 campaign, while also sharpening party distinctions with Democrats 
to spur the conservative base to the polls.
House Republican leaders banked their hopes on expanding their narrow majority in 
1998 with “Operation Breakout,” a $37 million television advertising campaign launched in 
October, 1998 and designed boost the Republican majority with double-digit House gains. ‘ ' '
John Linder, “Why the GOP Winning Streak Will Continue,” The Hill. 15 July 1998, 
p. 29.
Alan Greenblatt, “ 'Soft Money’ Helps Propel GOP to Victory in Key Races,” 
Congressional Ouarterlv. 8 November 1997, pp. 2784-87; Robert N o v ^ , “Bad Day for 
Democrats,” Washington Post. 6 November 1997, p. A 23; Davis S. Broder, “Election 
Solidifies GOP,” Washington Post. 6 November 1997, p. A 1; Terry M. Neal, “Off-Year 
Elections Get Huge Infusion of GOP Spending,” Washington P ost 2 November 1997, p. 
A 1.
' Ceci Connolly and Juliet Eilperin, “For Fall Races, House GOP Has a Playbook of 
Sound Bites,” Washington Post 31 July 1998, p. A 6.
Jim VandeHei, “GOP Plans To ‘Break Out’ in Fall Election,” Roll Call. 23 July 1998, 
p. 1; Rachel Van Dongen, “Making Their Case a Coast-to-Coast Offensive,” Roll Call. 8 
October 1998; Jill Abramson, “Republican National Committee Funding $20 Million 
Advertising Campaign,” New York Times. 26 October 1998, p. A 1; Richard L. Berke, 
“Gleeful Democrats Assail Ads by G.O.P. on Clinton Scandal,” New York Times. 29 
October 1998, p. A 1.
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Through “Operation Breakout,” House Republicans attempted to do in the majority what they 
had dnne with great success as a minority party in their nationalized 1994 campaign: 
articulating differences between the two parties, making nationalized appeals for House 
control, and articulating what a Republican Congress would do as opposed to a Democratic 
Congress. During the era of non-competition and one-party Democratic rule, the Democratic 
majority never felt compelled to engage in national party-building efforts represented by 
“Operation Breakout.” Instead, each House Democratic incumbent and challenger focused 
on their own individual campaign since the Democratic majority was never felt to be in 
jeopardy. In the 103"* Congress, the Democratic House majority followed this same strategy, 
only to be ambushed by the Republican nationalized campaign and the Contract With 
America in 1994.
The Republican majority of the 105* Congress, in comparison, felt an intense need 
to defend its majority on a nationwide basis in 1998, given the intense efforts by House 
Democrats, organized labor, and liberal interest groups to terminate the Republican majority 
in the 1996 and 1998 elections. In 1996, organized labor spent $35 million to defeat the 
Republican majority, and in 1998 labor spent $17 million on the Democratic ground 
campaign. Through “Operation Breakout,” Republican leaders hoped to spur the business 
community and safe Republican incumbents to provide the resources necessary to both 
defend and expand the narrow Republican House majority so all Republicans could benefit 
from greater legislative and policy victories in the 106* Congress, laying the groundwork for 
a unified Republican government in 2000 with the election o f a Republican president to 
accompany a Republican Congress. In 1995 and 1996, President Clinton unleashed $40
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million in soft money advertising to secure his own re-election. In 1998, House Republicans 
to follow a similar strategy to re-elect and boost their majority.
The name of “Operation Breakout” recalled the time Patton’s Third Army sought to 
punch through a weakened German line and shorten World War II. Its mission, according 
to Speaker Gingrich, was to “define the debate, give exposure to our ideas and shape the 
political environment,” especially through highlighting Republican achievements on tax cuts, 
health care portability, and the federal budget surplus."* Republican House leaders hoped 
this massive advertising campaign would boost Republican House gains in 1998 from the 
expected five to ten seats to double-digit gains of twenty-five seats and beyond. Achieving 
double-digit gains would raise the House Republican majority beyond 250 seats in the 106* 
Congress, laying the foundation for a Republican House o f Representatives for decades to 
come. The large Democratic gains in the 1958, 1964, 1974, and 1982 elections played 
similar roles in cementing the Democratic House majority and insuring its long-term 
survival.'"
“Operation Breakout” involved advertising in 62 television markets targeting 50 
hotly contested House races in 30 states."'* In several television markets, like Indianapolis, 
the Operation Breakout ads were at saturation levels throughout October o f 1998. As soft
Joel Connelly, “’Operation Breakout’ Seeks to Swing House,” Seattle Post- 
Intellieencer. 7 October 1998, p. B I.
Jim VandeHei, Norah M. O’Donnell, “Gingrich Sees 250 Seats for GOP,” Roll Call 
Politics, p. 15.
"■* Ralph Z. Hallow, “TV Ad Blitz Touts Accomplishments o f GOP Congress,” 
Washington Times. 7 October 1998, p. A 1.
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money issue ads, the “Operation Breakout” advertising did not explicitly call for the election 
or defeat of particular candidates, and therefore did not count against the $65,100 each party 
could directly give to support its congressional candidates. At the end of October, House 
Republican leaders launched “Operation Breakout” ads in 30 competitive congressional 
districts attacking President Clinton’s integrity in the sex and peijury allegations o f the 
Lewinsky matter. But this aggressive advertising failed. O f these 30 competitive districts, 
House Republicans only won 12."*
In addition to “Operation Breakout,” Republican leaders engaged in a seat-by-seat 
campaign in the 105* Congress to save the Republican majority, much as they had in the 
104* Congress. In the 103"* and 104* Congresses, Democratic retirements created openings 
for Republicans to gain the majority in 1994 and maintain it in 1996. In the 105* Congress, 
several House Republicans vacated their swing seats to run for the Senate, including 
Representatives Linda Smith (R-WA), Jim Bunning (R-KY), Mark Neumann (R-WI), Frank 
Riggs (R-CA), and John Ensign (R-NV). Democrats won each of these four Republican 
open seats created by ambitions for higher office. These Democratic open seat gains 
reversed the trend of net Republican gains in open Democratic seats in the 103"* and 104* 
Congresses."*
To stave further losses o f the already narrow majority in the 105* Congress and the 
1998 election. Republican leaders engaged in selective intervention in several Republican
"* Richard L. Berke, “Without a New Time to Whistle, G.O.P. Kept Humming 
“Scandal’,” New York Times. 5 November 1998, p. A 1.
"* Charles E. Cook, “Retirements Hurt, But in Swing Districts They Can Be Deadly,’ 
Roll Call. 19 May 1997, p. 8.
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seats where death, retirement, or scandal threatened to move a Republican seat into 
Democratic ranks. House Republican leaders also engaged in additional interventions to 
save the Republican majority on a seat-by-seat basis, much like they did in the 104'*’ 
Congress. They persuaded Representative Wes Watkins (R-OK) to reconsider his decision 
to retire in 1998 due to health problems, which kept Oklahoma’s traditionally Democratic 
Third District in Republican hands."’ House Republican leaders also intervened heavily to 
help elect Heather Wilson (R-NM) in the special election of New Mexico’s First district 
following the death o f Representative Steven Schiff (R-NM).
Through each of these interventions, Republican House leaders placed their political 
capital and prestige on the line to defend their narrow majority. But there were limits to how 
far these interventions could be successful in expanding the narrow Republican majority. 
In the special election race for the 22"'* district o f California to succeed deceased member 
Walter Capps (D-CA), Speaker Gingrich recruited moderate Republican Brooks Firestone 
to run for the Republican nomination."* Republican House leaders believed the strongly 
pro-choice Firestone had the best choice to capture the 22™* district, a moderate swing seat, 
and bring it back into the Republican majority after conservative Representative Andrea 
Seastrand (R-CA) lost the district to the more liberal Capps in 1996. Gingrich’s recruitment 
and endorsement o f Firestone, who opposed a ban on partial-birth abortion, outraged anti-
Republican House leaders recruited Wes Watkins to run as a Republican in 1996 to 
win the Third District o f Oklahoma. Republican leaders believed that no other candidate 
other than Watkins could win the seat for the Republicans in 1998.
' '* Mark Sherman, “Republicans in California Snub Gingrich Interference,” The Atlanta 
Journal and Constitution. 15 January 1998, p. A 4.
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abortion conservative Republicans in the district and sparked the candidacy of conservative 
Republican Tom Bordonaro."’
In his campaign against Firestone, Bordonaro stated that “Gingrich’s attempt to 
anoint Brooks Firestone as the next representative from the Central Coast was a disservice 
to the voters and just plain wrong.” '*® Bordonaro used this meddling in local politics by the 
Speaker to energize conservative base voters, and pledged not to vote for Gingrich for 
speaker if  elected to the House. Further, Bordonaro relied heavily on a $100,000 issue 
advertising campaign launched by conservative activist Gary Bauer’s anti-abortion 
organization, the Campaign for Working Families.'^' This issue advertising campaign 
prominently featured Bordonaro ’ s opposition to partial-birth abortion. In the three-way open 
primary in January, 1998, Lois Capps, the widow of Walter Capps, won 45% of the vote 
while Bordonaro beat out Firestone, 29%-25%, for the right to confront Capps as the 
Republican nominee in the special election. In the special election in March, 1998, however, 
the socially moderate Capps soundly defeated Bordonaro’s Gary Bauer-style social 
conservatism, 53%-45%. The Firestone-Bordonaro fight represents a classic example o f an 
ideologically pure candidate winning the primary only to be trounced in the general election 
in a race where moderation, not ideological purity, became the winning political formula.
Lou Cannon, “California Race Leaves ‘Passionate Centrist’ Behind,” Washington 
Post. 15 January 1998, p. A 9.
'*° Janet Hook, “ 1998 Dawns as Period of Turmoil for GOP,” Los Angeles Times. 15 
January 1998, p. A 3.
'*’ Alan Greenblatt, “California House Race Shapes Up As a Duel o f Interest Groups,’ 
Congressional Ouarterlv. 17 January 1998, p. 137.
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Despite the seat-by-seat campaign to save the Republican majority and the massive 
advertising of “Operation Breakout” in the 105* Congress, the expected double-digit 
Republican House seat gains fizzled into a net Republican loss o f five seats. In the 103"^  
Congress, House Democratic leaders expected a midterm loss o f seats in 1994, but not the 
loss of their majority. In the 105* Congress, House Republican leaders expected at least a 
modest midterm gain of House seats, but not the loss of seats. In the 1997 off-year elections. 
Republican candidates coupled a compelling vision and governing agenda with 
overwhelming financial resources to win election. In Virginia, for instance. Republican 
gubernatorial candidate James Gilmore seized the issue o f eliminating the state’s car tax in 
order to win a convincing victory. Gilmore then used the “no car tax” vow to cherry-pick 
Democratic open state House seats in special elections to help achieve a Republican majority 
in the state General Assembly in 1997 and 1998.
House Republican leaders possessed the resources to laimch a nationwide advertising 
campaign with “Operation Breakout,” but lacked a compelling agenda to motivate voters to 
elect Republican House candidates in the pivotal competitive d i s t r i c t s . T h e  lack of a 
coherent message, the last minute budget deal with President Clinton in 1998 that raised 
domestic spending while avoiding a tax cut, and a focus on impeachment had the combined 
effect of energizing the Democratic base while discouraging the Republican base.‘“  While 
Democratic base voter turnout soared in the 1998 elections, the Republican base vote did not
Ceci Connolly, “Three Years o f Missteps, One Sudden Fall,” Washington Post. 8 
November 1998, p. A 1.
Jeanne Cummings, “Democrats Gain at Least 4 House Seats,” Wall Street Journal. 
5 November 1998, p. A 3.
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turn out with the same intensity. Republicans, for instance, garnered only 54% of the vote 
from social conservatives in 1998, down from 67% in 1994.'^“* The Republican majority did 
not animate its base voters with a compelling agenda in 1998, while House Democrats picked 
off several open Republican seats with the right type o f Democratic candidate espousing the 
Democratic issue agenda. House Republicans, despite their massive “Operation Breakout” 
ads, did not back up these efforts on the ground through turnout efforts for House Republican 
candidates. Although unsuccessful in boosting the Republican majority, “Operation 
Breakout” mirrored the Republican’s nationalized Contract With America campaign of 1994 
and the Democratic “get-Newt” and Medicare campaign of 1996.
Each o f these efforts entailed members o f minority and majority parties, in a 
competitive environment for House control, banding together for the common purpose of 
attaining a House majority. Before 1994 and the change in party control, congressional 
politics had been characterized as candidate-centered and involving individual quality House 
candidates winning elections based national and local issues. Although these attributes still 
dominated individual campaigns and House races, the 1994 and 1996 nationalized campaigns 
for House control laid important precedents that affected all House races. These nationalized 
efforts for House control altered the overall strategic and electoral terrain in the 1990s with 
the larger-scale party efforts to achieve majority status. In 1998, House Republicans used 
this same template o f nationalization with “Operation Breakout.” These intense efforts for 
majority status would continue in the 106* Congress as neither party cemented a solid House 
majority in the 1990s, insuring the continuance o f the competitive environment that
Ibid. p. A 10.
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characterized the 103'"'-105* Congresses.
The Democratic “Fit-the-District” Strategy
While Republicans focused on their massive air campaign with “Operation 
Breakout,” House Democrats focused their efforts on achieving a narrow majority in the 
106* Congress through a seat-by-seat “cherry-picking” strategy of open Republican swing 
seats. A shift o f 1 1.889 ballots in 11 congressional districts in 1996 would have produced 
a Democratic House majority in the 105* Congress. A shift o f 9,537 ballots in six 
congressional districts in 1998 would have produced a Democratic House majority in the 
106* Congress. House Democratic leaders knew they would be out-spent by the better- 
funded Republican majority in the 1998 elections. As a result they targeted the most 
competitive districts in the country, especially swing seats and open marginal Republican 
seats, with intense recruiting, fund-raising, and turnout efforts.'** The House Democratic 
strategy for majority status in 1998 required holding all but two o f nine open Democratic 
seats, winning eight open Republican seats, defeating nine Republican incumbents, and 
losing only three Democratic i n c u m b e n t s . T h i s  strategy, if executed, would have led to 
a narrow Democratic majority o f 222 in the 106* Congress.
The absence o f salient issues, especially with the rise o f budget surpluses, created 
an incumbent-friendly environment in the 105* Congress that mitigated against the type of
125 Gephardt Goes Housecleaning,” U.S. News & World Report. 9 Jime 1997, p. 24.
'** Albert Eisele, “Martin Frost’s Game Plan for Getting to 218,” The Hill. 8 April 1998, 
p. 20; “Why We Will Win in 1998,” Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee 
web-site presentation, 30 October 1997, http://www.dccc.org/win/index.html; Stuart 
Rothenberg, “How Democrats Can Finally Break a 60-Year Midterm Election Jinx,” Roll 
Call Politics. 26 March 1998, p. 18..
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nationalized campaigns for House control conducted by the Republican minority in 1994 and 
the Democratic minority in 1996. This incumbent friendly political environment presented 
a campaign quandary to House Democrats as they sought a change in party control in the 
relatively placid 1998 election cycle. In 1994 and 1996, the Republican minority and 
Democratic minority made bold, nationalized appeals for House majorities based on 
dissatisfaction with the incumbent House majority. In 1998, House Democrats followed a 
strategy o f silently energizing Democratic base through voter turnout drives, while focusing 
electoral resources on a seat-by-seat strategy to overthrow the narrow Republican majority 
without the aid of a nationalized campaign. Through these strategies and tactics. House 
Democrats managed to pick up five House seats despite the historical nemesis o f midterm 
election results that plagued them throughout the lOS* Congress.
House Democrats had several advantages working in their favor in the 105'*' 
Congress, despite the historical odds favoring a Republican pick-up in House seats.'** First, 
political controversies engulfed the Republican House majority in the 105* Congress. 
Republican infighting involving the coup attempt against Gingrich, the flood relief bill o f 
1997, and the lack o f a legislative agenda in 1998 each weakened the narrow Republican 
House majority. Second, President Clinton consistently enjoyed highly favorable polls in the 
105* Congress, despite the campaign finance scandal investigation of 1997 and the Monica 
Lewinsky controversy in 1998. Third, the public consistently gave Democrats a sizable lead
“With Major Issues Fading, Capitol Life Lures Fewer,” Congressional Ouarterlv. 25 
October 1997, pp. 2625-29.
'-* Charles E. Cook, “High Approval Ratings, Good Economy are Balm for ‘Six-Year- 
Itch’,” Roll Call. 24 November 1997, p. 6.
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in generic preference polls for House control throughout the lOS*** Congress.'*’ The public 
by large margins gave Democrats higher favorability on a wide variety o f issues, including 
the environment, health care, jobs, and education. Democrats scored evenly with 
Republicans even on traditionally strong Republican issues like taxes, crime, and economic 
prosperity. In addition, with no national wave favoring either party in the 1 OS'" Congress, 
the open seat races emerged as the key to House control in 1998.'^' Unlike the previous 
elections o f the 1990s, the open seat dynamics in 1998 favored House Democrats. 
President Clinton carried 15 of the 16 open Democratic seats in his 1996 re-election 
campaign. In addition, Clinton carried seven of the 15 open Republican seats.'”
In 1998, House Democrats focused their political strategies around an energized 
Democratic base vote as part o f a larger nationwide Democratic base-voter strategy. The 
Democratic ground war of 1998 involved massive turnout efforts o f the party’s key 
constituency groups, especially African-Americans and members o f labor unions, through 
one-on-one voter contacts involving highly partisan appeals for a Democratic House of
Rachel Von Dongen, “’Generic Ballot’ Tests Give Democrats Early Edge to Take 
Back House in ‘98,” Roll Call Politics. 2 October 1997, p. 13.
Terry M. Neal, “Poll Rates President, Democrats Favorably,” Washington Post. 3 
April 1998, p. A 20.
Rachel Van Dongen and John Mercurio, “Everything You Always Wanted to Know 
About House Open Seats...,” Roll Call. 15 September 1997, pp. A-27-34.
Ceci Connolly, “Parties Look to Open Races for Their Greatest House Gains,” 
Washington Post. 25 October 1998, p. A 20.
'”  Gerald F. Seib, “House Races: Open and Shut? Well, Maybe Not,” Wall Street 
Journal. 8 April 1998, p. A 24.
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R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . 24% of the voters who turned out in the 1998 elections were union 
members, as opposed to 14% in 1994; 71% of union members voted for Democratic 
candidates in 1998, as opposed to 60% in 1994.'^^
The Democratic campaign to “increase the juice” in its base led to the adoption of 
several hard-ball strategies and tactics characteristic of attack politics. This emphasis on 
attack politics by Democrats mirrored similar aggressive efforts by the Republican Minority 
in the early 1990s. Republican farm team efforts in the early 1990s encouraged Republicans 
to attack Democrats in the starkest political language possible. In the 1998 campaign. 
Democratic campaigns returned fire with their own red-meat appeals to their liberal 
Democratic base. In Kansas City, for instance, the Democratic party sponsored radio ads 
targeting conservative Republican freshman Vince Snowbarger (R-KS) in the black 
community that warned “When you don’t vote, you allow another cross to bum.” These ads 
implicitly tied Snowbarger to the 72 arsons committed against black churches in the South 
in 1995 and 1996, and allowed winning Blue Dog candidate Dennis Moore (D-KS) to appeal 
both to up-scale suburban voters in Johnson Coimty, Kansas and minority voters in heavily 
Democratic Kansas City, Kansas. Similar Democratic turnout efforts focused on eight states 
critical to victory in 1998, including California, Washington, Iowa, Wisconsin, North
Dennis Famey, “Minorities, Especially Blacks in the South, Put Democrats Over the 
Top in Key Races,” Wall Street Journal. 5 November 1998, p, A 10.
Steven Greenhouse, “Republicans Credit Labor for Successes by Democrats,”
New York Times. 6 November 1998, p. A 28.
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Carolina, Kentucky, Georgia, and Nevada.'^®
In the 103"  ^ Congress, Democratic inattention to large-scale House Democratic 
retirements and the open seats these vacancies created helped sink the Democratic majority. 
In the 104'*’ Congress, recruitment problems plagued House Democratic leaders as they 
attempted to stave off open seat losses resulting from the retirement o f long-serving Southern 
House Democrats who thought the party didn’t have a chance at recapturing the majority in 
1996. These retirements provided Republicans with valuable open seat opportunities in the 
South, enabling them to save their narrow majority in the 1996 campaign. Early in the 1 OS'*" 
Congress, Democratic leaders urged senior Democratic House incumbents not to retire in 
1998. If a House Democrat did decide to retire in 1998, Democratic leaders urged them to 
announce their decision early in order to provide Democrats ample time to recruit a suitable 
candidate who could hold the seat.
House Democratic leaders addressed the open seat and recruitment problem by 
pursuing a “fit-the-district” strategy to retake the House.'”  The “fit-the-district” strategy 
entailed recruiting the right kind of Democrat, often moderates or conservatives, to run for 
the most competitive open seats or marginal Republican seats. House Democratic leaders 
then concentrated their campaign resources on achieving victory in these competitive races 
to take over several Republican House seats. A House Democrat involved in this “fit-the-
“National Press Club Luncheon With Jim Nicholson, Chairman of the Republican 
National Committee, and Steve Grossman, Chairman o f the Democratic National 
Committee,” 4 November 1998, Federal Information Systems Corporation.
Morton M. Kondracke, “GOP Won House by 11,889 Votes; ‘98 Is Up for Grabs,” Roll 
Call. 16 January 1997, p. 5.
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district” recruitment effort stated:
The key thing for Democrats winning the majority is fielding moderate Democratic 
candidates in swing seats that can win. The real secret o f the 1994 blowout was that the 
liberals remained safe in their inner city and heavily unionized districts. It was the moderate 
and conservative Democrats in the South and West who paid the price for the liberalism of 
the 103"* Congress. And they were the people we needed to win back the House in 1996! 
It is a travesty. You had southern Democrats voting for a BTU tax and gun control, and 
being associated with Clinton’s big tax and spend 1993 budget. The Democrats in the swing 
seats we needed for majority control got nuked by the Republicans as a result.
Shortly after the 1996 election. Minority leader Richard Gephardt criss-crossed the 
country searching for viable Democratic House candidates as part o f a massive recruiting 
drive to find Democratic House candidates ideologically in tune with their districts. These 
efforts continued every weekend through the summer o f 1997. Through these recruiting 
drives to over 20 states, Gephardt quickly signed up several quality contenders for 1998.'^* 
This massive commitment to recruitment focused on finding the right type o f Democratic 
candidate to win open seats vacated by Republican incumbents. Additionally, this “fit-the- 
district” strategy focused on finding the best quality candidates that could challenge the 26 
Republican incumbents elected in 1996 with under 51% o f the vote.
The “fit-the-district” strategy in the 105'*’ Congress led to the recruitment o f several 
conservative Democratic candidates whose politics meshed with the character o f a particular 
district better than that of a traditionally liberal Democratic House candidate.'^’ The
138 ‘Dems in Overdrive,” Business Week. 5 May 1997, p. 110.
Terry M. Neal, “Democrats See Favorable Numbers, Hard Wins in Southern House 
Bids,” Washington Post. 29 March 1998, p. A 16; Benjamin Sheffiier, “Scratching the 
‘Six-Year Itch’ Democrats Hoping to Build the Perfect House Candidates,” Roll Call. 13 
February 1997; “Can a ‘Different Kind of Democrat’ Retake the House?,” Business 
Week. 30 March 1998, p. 47; E.J. Dionne, “The New Drumbeat: Moderation,” 
Washington Post, p. C 1.
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Democratic “fit-the-district” strategy was similar to the Republican farm team effort in many 
critical aspects. Both efforts involved minority parties trying to fight against the inherent 
campaign disadvantages o f a party out o f power. Both efforts involved minority party leaders 
actively engaged in the recruitment process of House candidates. The Republican farm team 
effort coincided with basic elements o f Republican party culture, and then augmented this 
culture into a distinct fighting force o f relatively homogeneous candidates battling for 
majority status under a centralized leadership command-and-control structure.
The Democratic “fit-the-district” strategy, on the other hand, coincided with basic 
elements o f Democratic party culture, which values diversity, heterogeneity, and a less 
centralized leadership structure. Republican farm team efforts recruited, trained, and elected 
a relatively similar cadre o f conservative House members dedicated to the same Gingrich- 
inspired themes o f attacking Democratic corruption, renewing American civilization, 
remaking the federal government, and responding to the challenges o f an information-age 
economy. House Democratic leaders, on the other hand, eschewed these farm team efforts 
in lieu of building a Democratic House majority seat-by-seat irrespective o f party ideology 
and governance.
House Democratic leaders Gephardt, Frost, and Hoyer recruited several conservative 
Democratic candidates who supported traditionally Republican stances on public policy 
issues, including free trade, a balanced budget amendment, opposition to abortion, and 
support o f conservative “takings” le g is la tio n .T h e  Democratic “fit-the-district” recruits 
were often more conservative and closer to the business community than the Republicans
Dana Milbank, “Party Crashers,” The New Republic. 15 June 1998, pp. 21-25.
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they were running against. For instance, in the race to succeed retiring incumbent Joseph 
McDade (R-PA) in Pennsylvania’s Tenth District, House Democratic leaders recruited Pat 
Casey, a pro-life Democrat. Pat Casey’s father, former Governor Bob Casey (D-PN), had 
been barred from speaking at the 1992 Democratic convention due to his pro-life stance.'"*' 
But the imperative of achieving the eleven seats required for a Democratic House majority 
in 1998 overcame previous Democratic demands of ideological and liberal purity within 
party ranks.
In addition to Casey, House Democratic leaders recruited other social and economic 
Democratic conservatives to run for crucial open seats or against vulnerable Republican 
incumbents, including Joe Tumam (D-AL), David Phelps (D-IL), Chris Gorman (D-KY), 
Richard Stallings (D-ID), Ken Lucas (D-KY), and Loy Sneary (D-TX). As Table 4-3 
illustrates, the Democratic “fit-the-district” candidates helped Democrats gain six previously 
Republican seats and retain two Democratic open seats vulnerable to Republican capture. 
In the race for the House in 1998, Democratic desires for a House majority superseded 
concerns o f ideology or governance in a Democratic House with a slim majority. According 
to Paul Frick, political director of the DCCC, “The only real litmus test we have is, ‘Who are 
you going to vote for for Speaker?’” '"**
'"*' Rachel Van Dongen, “Pro-Life & Pro-Democrat, ” Roll Call Politics. 20 April 1998, p. 
15.
'"*^ Ibid.
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Table 4-3: The Democratic “fit-the-district” Strategy
Democratic Candidate District 1998 seat status 1998 election result
Joe Tumham Alabama 3 Inc., Bob Riley (R) Republican hold
Mike Thompson* California 1 open Republican seat Democratic gain
Richard Stallings Idaho 3 open Republican seal Republican hold
Baron Hill Indiana 9 open Democratic seat Democratic hold
David Phelps Illinois 19 open Democratic seat Democratic hold
Dennis Moore* Kansas 3 Inc., Vince Snowbarger (R) Democratic gain
Chns Gorman Kentucky 3 Inc., Anne Northrup (R) Republican hold
Ken Lucas* Kentucky 6 open Republican seat Democratic gain
Mai]orie McKeithen Louisiana 6 Inc., Richard Baker (R) Republican hold
Ronnie Shows* Mississippi 4 open Republican seat Democratic gam
Glenn Jemigan North Carolina 8 open Democratic seat Republican gain
Thomas Udall* New Mexico 3 Inc., Bill Redmond Democratic gain
Shelley Berkley* Nevada 2 open Republican seat Democratic gain
Roxanne Quails Ohio 1 Inc.. Steve Chabot Republican hold
Pat Casey Pennsylvania 10 open Republican seat Republican hold
Roy AfTlerbach Pennsylvania 15 open Democratic seat Republican gam
Loy Sneary Texas 14 Inc., Ron Paul Republican hold
Lydia Spotrwood Wisconsin 1 open Republican seat Republican hold
In addition to recruiting conservative Democrats to help propel Democrats to majority 
status in the House, House Democratic leaders also intervened to support them in Democratic 
primaries against more liberal Democratic House candidates. In the 104* Congress, House
Republican leaders intervened in several key races to insure the most electable Republican 
candidate became the party’s nominee in the general election. These Republican 
interventions helped the Republican majority to save or grab conservative districts in Utah,
Norah M. O ’Donnell and John Mercurio, “Dems Play Favorites in Key Seats,” Roll 
Call Politics. 2 April 1998, p. 13.
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Oklahoma, and Oregon. In the 105'’’ Congress, House Democratic leaders likewise 
intervened in several primary elections to insure the most electable, mainstream Democratic 
House candidate would face a Republican opponent in the general election, helping 
Democrats to win the critical swing seats for victory in 1998. In the race for the Tenth 
District of Pennsylvania, Democratic leaders encouraged pro-choice House candidate Joe 
Cullen to drop out in favor of pro-life “fit-the-district” House candidate Pat Casey. 
Democratic leaders and DCCC officials also intervened in the California 1, Nevada 2, and 
Kentucky 6 primary races, each open seat races due to Republican incumbent retirements, 
to insure the victories of “fit-the-district” candidates Mike Thompson (D-CA), Shelley 
Berkley (D-NV), and Ken Lucas (D-KY).'”
Other conservative Democratic House candidates receiving primary intervention by 
Democratic leaders included Glenn Jemigan in North Carolina’s Eight district (for the race 
to replace retiring Democrat Bill Heffner), pro-life Democrat Chris Gorman in Kentucky’s 
Third district (to challenge vulnerable Republican freshman Anne Northrup), and social 
conservative Joe Tumham in Alabama’s Third district (to challenge vulnerable Republican 
freshman Bob Riley). Through this activity. Democratic leaders picked winners and losers 
as they attempted to find the most electable candidate to win open seat races, defeat 
vulnerable Republican incumbents, and help achieve a new Democratic majority in the 1 Oô***
Thomas B. Edsall, “1998 Could Bring Power Shift in House,” Washington Post 
15 February 1998, p. A 8; Candidates Thompson, Berkley, and Lucas each won a 
Republican open seat in the 1998 election.
John Mercurio and Norah M. O’Donnell, “Frost Is Bullish on Clinton, Democrats 
Retaking the House,” Roll Call Politics. 16 February 1998, p. 11. Despite these “fit-the- 
district” Democratic candidates. Republicans won all three seats.
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Congress.
In terms o f financing elections. House Democrats knew they would be outspent by 
the better-funded Republican majority in the 1998 elections. The DNC’s debt from the 1996 
election, combined with its legal bills from the 1997 congressional campaign finance 
investigations, contributed to a large $ 15 million debt at the beginning o f 1998. For the 1998 
election cycle, the NRCC significantly out-raised the DCCC, raising $43 million as opposed 
to $19 million raised by the DCCC. As they confronted the Republican money advantage. 
House Democratic leaders made two key decisions that affected their victory in 1998. First, 
they decided to maintain the DCCC staff levels of the 1996 campaign through 1997 in order 
to provide the quality Democratic House recruits with additional instruction on how to raise 
campaign f u n d s . I n  addition to recruiting their “fit-the-district” candidates. House 
Democratic leaders taught them the art of fund-raising and urged them to raise money early 
and often to blimt the inevitable Republican soft money advantage at the national level. 
DCCC Executive Director Matt Angle stated “We don’t pretend that we’re going to compete 
with the [GOP] financially. The question is do you have enough money to play in the 
districts that are really in question, and in those districts do you have enough money to tell 
your story emd we feel that we do.” '"*^
This “teach-them-to-fish” effort, which mirrored similar efforts by GOPAC and Newt 
Gingrich in the early 1990s, gave early boosts to the campaigns o f winning Democratic
Adam Clymer, “Democrats Lead G.O.P. in an Early Money Race,” New York Times. 
7 March 1998, p. A 9.
Ceci Connolly and Ruth Marcus, “GOP Launches Aerial Attack; Democrats Struggle 
Against Torrent o f Money,” Washington Post 18 October 1998, p. A 1.
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candidates Mike Thompson (D-CA), Ken Lucas (D-KY), Shelley Berkley (D-NV), Brian 
Baird (D-WA), and Dennis Moore (D-KS). Each of these winning candidates captured a 
previously Republican House seat in 1998.'“* Second, House Democratic leaders decided 
not to support Democratic candidates in races against guaranteed Republican winners, 
leaving 51 Republican incumbents unopposed in 1998.'“’ Instead of funding futile 
challenges to inevitable Republican victors. House Democratic leaders chose to focus 
resources on the most winnable open seat races. As a result. House Democratic candidates 
in open seat contests out-raised their Republican opponents, enabling Democrats to score key 
victories in their seat-by-seat trench warfare for House control.
Conclusion
The fight for House control dominated the politics and legislative process of the 105''’ 
Congress, much like it had in the previous Congresses o f the 1990s. In the 103"' Congress, 
a determined Republican minority defeated a complacent Democratic majority at the end of 
the session. In the 104'" Congress, a determined Democratic minority confronted a 
Republican majority bent on saving itself at the end of the session. In the 105''’ Congress, 
however, the drive for majority status consumed the politics o f both parties throughout 1997 
and 1998. House Democrats began fighting for a Democratic majority in 1998 as soon as 
the ballots o f the 1996 election were counted, focusing on recruitment and the “fit-the- 
district” strategy. House Republicans structured the 105'*’ Congress to defend their majority
'“* John Mercurio and Rachel Van Dongen, “Challengers Get Jump in Money Chase,” 
Roll Call. 10 April 1998, p. 1.
'“’ Guy Gugliotta and Ceci Connolly, “Money Imbalance Is Driving Campaign Tactics,’ 
Washington P ost 14 June 1998, p. A 4.
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in 1998, from the bipartisan budget deal o f 1997 to the recess strategy of 1998 to “Operation 
Breakout” o f the 1998 campaign. In the process, the legislative process became used 
primarily as a campaign vehicle for parties angling for House majorities instead of a vehicle 
to pass legislation into law. The two parties used the legislative process to appeal to their 
bases, accentuate conflict and partisan divisions, and seek ways to embarrass the other side 
in preparation for the 1998 midterm election.
This intense focus for majority status led the House o f Representatives to be governed 
in a different manner than in the previous era o f non-competition, much as it did in the 103'** 
and 104"' Congresses. In the 103"* Congress, the Democratic majority attempted to govern 
the country from the left under the auspices of the first tmified Democratic government in 
12 years. In the 104'*' Congress, the Republican majority attempted to govern the country 
from the right under the auspices of the first Republican House majority in 40 years. In both 
Congresses, the majority party lost seats in the following election. In the 1 OS'** Congress, the 
Republican majority’s recess strategy attempted to play it safe in order to avoid risking a slim 
ten-seat majority. House Democrats, meanwhile, pursued a base-voter strategy in 1998, and 
used the impeachment process and the “do-nothing” moniker to both appeal to their most 
committee liberal voters and spur a higher turnout in the midterm election. But as House 
Democratic leaders pursued a base voter strategy designed to increase liberal turnout, they 
also had to contend with a caucus comprised o f a growing Blue Dog/New Democratic 
Coalition cadre o f moderate and conservative members. These members demanded a more 
centrist face on the House Democratic Caucus, both in terms o f politics and policy, in order 
to win and maintain a secure Democratic majority in 1998 and beyond.
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Like the Democratic majority of the 103"* Congress, the Republican majority o f the 
105* Congress kept a tight grip on the House floor in order to protect its hold on power. In 
both instances, this effort to keep a tight majority party grip on the House procedurally 
sparked discharge petition fights from the minority party in efforts to embarrass the 
prevailing House majority and create campaign issues for the fall campaign. The end result 
was a series o f Congresses in the 1990s dominated by intense partisanship, little or no 
compromise between the two parties in the House on the major legislative proposals, and the 
triumph of attack politics as a key weapon for majority status.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Discussions and Conclusions
Implications for Analysis, Practice, Theory, and 
American Democracy
As the examinations of the 103"*-105'*’ Congresses illustrate, two-party competition 
for House control in the 1990s is having a tangible effect on the electoral and institutional 
foundations of House politics. The competitive pressures o f the 1990s are not merely 
isolated phenomenon with minor effects on the House. Instead, competitive pressures 
provide important an important analytical framework to better understand and explain the 
House of Representatives. This chapter concludes the current examination o f the House of 
Representatives by analyzing how the race for the House in the 1990s shapes contemporary 
House politics and expands on current theoretical understandings of the Congress. In 
addition, this chapter examines how the current period of two-party competition for House 
control influences the nature and operation o f American government. As citizens, it is 
important that we think about how legislative changes either enhance or negate the American 
experiment in democratic self-government.
Implications for Analysis and Practice: Two-Party Competition and the 103rd-105th 
Congresses
The examinations of the 103"*-105'*’ have shown how the battle for majority control 
has affected electoral strategies, governing strategies and tactics, and the party cultures o f the 
Republican Conference and the Democratic Caucus. In terms of electoral strategies, the two 
parties now operate more from a concern to obtain a House majority than from ideological 
concerns. In terms o f party culture, the two parties are acting more like unified teams and
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less like loose conglomerations o f individual entrepreneurs. And finally, in terms of 
governing strategies, the two parties are deploying more partisan governing tactics aimed at 
producing political punishment on the opposing party in the electoral arena instead of 
legislative successes in the governing arena. The drive for House majorities by the two 
parties dominates the politics o f the institution, from high-level leadership decisions and 
actions to the most obscure House races in far-flung districts. This focus on seeking House 
majorities by the two parties affects congressional action from the Speaker’s office down to 
the most obscure House race. As competitive pressures ripple through the political system, 
all prevailing political forces and tactics have become aligned with the over-riding mission 
of capturing the House. Until one of the party solidifies an enduring, stable majority, two- 
party competition will continue to affect and dominate the politics o f the House of 
Representatives, both institutionally and on the campaign trail. The end result is a more 
partisan institution where principles of party-building dominate most political action.
In terms o f electoral strategies, a clear and distinct shift has occurred. House 
campaigns still remain candidate-centered affairs based largely on local issues, and their 
outcomes are still largely determined by the absence or presence of quality candidates. But 
the larger strategic terrain upon which all campaigns operate has now been changed in the 
nationalized campaigns of 1994,1996, and 1998. Congressional politics have been skewered 
in favor of strategies and tactics that are successful in obtaining and retaining a House 
majority. Nationalized campaign strategies have emerged as one o f the most successful 
strategies to grab control o f the House. In each of these nationalized campaigns for House 
control in the 1990s, attack politics has played a prominent role as the weapon o f choice for
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achieving majority status. The nationalized precedents o f the 1994-1998 campaigns provide 
a new avenue of analysis for congressional elections in addition to the traditional candidate- 
centered analytical framework currently offered by political science.
The chief incentive for both parties in this competitive environment is not to work 
together in a civil manner, but to divide into opposing teams whose chief mission is to 
embarrass and harangue the other side in the House. In this environment, the tactics of 
Gingrich differ little from the tactics of Bonior. Both congressional leaders deployed their 
own version of attack politics to fuel nationalized drives for House control. These tactics 
amplify the politics o f “revelation, investigation, and prosecution” first conceptualized by 
Ginsberg and Shefrer. But while Ginsberg and Shefter illustrated how the politics o f R.I.P. 
had supplanted electoral combat with institutional combat, the competitive pressures of the 
1990s have forced this institutional combat out o f the halls o f Washington, D.C. and onto the 
campaign trail in the nationalized fights for majority control. As the two parties have 
bitterly fought for House control in the 1990s, obtaining a House majority has emerged as 
the ultimate method to inflict political damage and “revenge” on the other party.
The race for the House is also shaping other aspects o f the electoral process. Both 
parties have placed more emphasis on the recruitment o f House candidates, although in 
manners that reflect their distinct party cultures. Republican farm team efforts in the early 
1990s and Democratic “fit-the-district” efforts in the late 1990s each illustrate the degree to 
which competitive pressures have infected the recruitment process in individual House races. 
The imperative o f gaining a House majority has compelled the leaders of both parties in the 
House to selectively intervene in close races and districts around the country to insure the
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election o f their most electable House candidates. These activities by party leaders are 
having a direct effect on which party ultimately controls in the House of Representatives, 
boili in the short and long term. Republican leaders have intervened in competitive and 
conservative districts all across the United States to insure their majority status continued 
beyond the 104* Congress. House Democratic leaders have likewise adopted a similar 
interventionist stance to influence individual House elections in order to build a new 
Democratic majority. In the process, these exogenous interventions in various House races 
have altered the traditional norm of “candidate-centered” campaigns based solely on local 
issues. Now, the imperatives o f grabbing or keeping a House majority force the dynamics 
of House races to be influenced by political players from far outside the local politics of a 
House district.
In addition to the nature o f House elections, two-party competition is tangibly 
changing the party cultures of the Republican Conference and the Democratic Caucus. 
Competitive pressures are forcing both parties to work as tighter political teams to obtain and 
maintain House majorities. This represents a big shift in thinking from the more 
individualistic party cultures prevalent in both parties during the previous non-competitive 
era. Both parties are now displaying collective loyalty to their party in order to reap the 
collective gains emanating from majority control. From the Contract With America to 
“Operation Breakout,” competitive pressures have molded House Republican culture around 
the precepts of teamwork and collective party accoimtability. These political developments 
have molded House Republican party culture into a united fighting machine adept in the art
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of protecting a fragile majority- amidst a fiercely contested environment.' Competitive 
pressures have likewise molded House Democratic culture in the direction of increased 
teamwork.
Competitive pressures have forced a re-thinking within both parties about basic party 
beliefs and ideology. House Republicans enjoyed great success in their highly ideological 
1994 victory, but lost ground in the 1996 and 1998 elections. As they confront an intense 
battle to keep their narrow majority in the 2000 elections, competitive pressures have forced 
the adoption of a more pragmatic outlook by Republican House leaders. Competitive 
pressures have likewise affected House Democrats, who engaged in ideological soul- 
searching following their 1994 defeat and loss o f majority control. The competitive wake-up 
call of the 1994 election sparked immediate change within the Democratic party. While 
President Clinton abandoned House Democratic liberals and embarked on a centrist 
triangulation strategy. House Democratic leaders and members engaged in much-needed 
dialogue about basic party principles and beliefs. Much of the change in the Democratic 
Caucus between 1994 and 2000. from the Blue Dogs to the New Democratic Coalition, can 
be ascribed to the competitive pressures emanating from the loss of majority' control in 1994 
and the inabilitv to regain the House in 1996.
' There will always be a tension between ideology and constituency within House 
Republican ranks. While House Republican culture has increasingly advocated a unified 
team approach to governing as a House majority, several Republican moderates and 
conservatives have bucked this team-oriented thinking in the 104*-106* Congresses. The 
more ideological Republicans are less likely to be team players, but are cross pressured 
by leadership pressures and party culture to become team players. The 
Democrats have been more autonomous and pragmatic.
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In addition to elections and party cultures, the new era o f competition for House 
control has altered the governing and legislative process. Competitive pressures and the fight 
for majority control have sparked a flurry o f new governing strategies, from triangulation to 
shutdown politics to using the legislative power of the House to pursue a base-voter strategy. 
In addition, competitive pressures have forced both parties to spell out clear and defined 
agendas that can satisfy both their base voters and more moderate and apolitical swing 
voters. But most importantly, the competitive race for the House in the 1990s has molded 
a new governing paradigm for the House of Representatives based on conflict, extreme 
partisanship, and the absence of compromise and civility. Now, pursuing a partisan agenda 
designed to gamer votes and increased House seats in the fall elections has become the most 
profitable political stance by the two parties, especially the minority party. Instead o f mutual 
concession, there is obstruction. Instead o f bipartisanship, there is gridlock. Instead of 
civility, there is venom and conflict. This shift from compromise and civility to partisan 
conflict and intense partisan combat has changed the nature and character o f the House of 
Representatives in the 1990s and beyond. The key motivation now governing congressional 
action in the U.S. House is the struggle to obtain the 218 seats to organize and control the 
House of Representatives. This shift to a partisan, electorally-minded House in a competitive 
environment provides an important analytical and theoretical prism fi’om which to understand 
electoral and institutional developments in House politics.
Although the current era o f competition presents new challenges to both the majority 
and minority parties, competitive pressures have especially squeezed each of the House 
majorities o f the 1990s, fi’om the 103"* Congress to the 106* Congress. Each of the House
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majorities o f the 1990s has lost seats as it lost ground to more determined and aggressive 
minority party campaigns for House control. The evidence o f the 103"*, 104*, and 105* 
Congresses provides no good answer regarding the best manner in which a House majority 
can balance the competing political needs o f keeping its base secure while still being able to 
present a moderate and “commonsense"’ image to swing voters. For each o f the Congresses 
under review, the majority party leadership hurt its party's chances in the general elections 
through the type o f agenda, or lack o f agenda, pursued. As a result, controlling the 
legislative and political agenda has emerged as one o f the most important lessons for both 
parties in the war for House control in the 1990s. When the Republican minority controlled 
the agenda in 1994, it won both 52 House seats and majority status. In 1996, the Democratic 
minority seized control of the agenda in the period after the government shutdowns, but the 
Republican majority managed to re-establish its own control of the agenda with its bipartisan 
deals with President Clinton in the summer of 1996. This situation produced a mixed 
election result, with the Democrats gaining seats but the Republicans maintaining House 
control. In 1998, the Republican majority offered no clear agenda in the fall campaign while 
the Democratic minority pushed a clear agenda that contained bold appeals to its liberal base 
and centrist policy proposals to attract swing voters. While the Democrats remained united 
around its activist agenda, the Republican majority floundered as it presented no unified 
agenda to either its base or to swing voters while choosing misguided electoral strategies and 
tactics.
The political necessities o f two-party competition for House control in the 1990s 
presents both the majority and minority party with a quandary. Both parties must appeal to
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their more ideological bases o f support while appearing centrist and pragmatic in order to 
win the votai swing seats that determine House control. The evidence of the 103"'-105'*' 
Congresses illustrates that this task is easier for the minority party than the majority party. 
While majority parties have the responsibility of governing and campaigning, the minority 
party can operate under the political radar screen, creating mayhem and mischief for the 
majority party and hobbling it in preparation for the fall elections. The tactics and strategies 
of the Republican minority of 1994 are very similar to that o f the Democratic minority since 
1994. In each case, the minority party managed to use media outlets, public relations 
gimmicks, and political rhetoric to help set the agenda for the fall elections. House minority 
parties can more easily take their base o f support for granted since they do not control the 
legislative agenda and thus have fewer opportunities to upset their base voters. The plight 
of the Republican House majority in the 104'** and 105* Congresses is instructive to any 
future House majority. In 1996 and 1998, the Republican House majority confronted a 
listless and de-energized conservative base, while having trouble articulating themes that 
could appeal to swing voters amidst sustained attack politics from the Democratic minority. 
After the clarity o f the Contract With America in 1994 and 1995, the Republican base 
became upset with the compromises with President Clinton in 1996 and 1997 by Republican 
congressional leaders. The Republican House majority shrunk in the 1996-1998 period as 
a result.
The key trick for majority parties in this environment is to implement into law 
legislation that both satisfies its base vote while at the same time building a positive 
reputation o f the party for swing voters in the fall elections. The competitive pressures of
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the race for the House practically demands majority parties to adopt a lowest common 
denominator governing strategy. This strategy not only helps members running in safe seats, 
but also enables candidates in swing seats to attract their respective base voters and appeal 
to swing voters. The Republican majority o f the 1990s has encountered its best political 
success when it pursued lowest common denominator governing strategies, from welfare 
reform to fiscal discipline to tax cuts. A future Democratic House majority could likewise 
adopt a similar governing strategy on issues like campaign finance reform, managed care 
reform, education issues, and gun control. When the majority party confronts voters in low 
turnout elections empty-handed, like the Democratic majority o f 1994 and the Republican 
majority of 1998. then it loses politically as it becomes squeezed between angry swing voters 
and a de-energized base. When it confronts voters with clear agendas and numerous 
legislative accomplishments, like the Democratic majority of 1988 and, to some extent, the 
Republican majority o f 1996, then it can both satisfy its base and appeal to more independent 
voters.
The events of the 103"^-105* Congresses illustrate how the current competitive 
environment of House politics demands clear and defined leadership and agendas from the 
parties in order for them to be successful. The case study of Representative Newt Gingrich 
is instructive to congressional leaders o f both parties in a competitive environment where 
House control is up for grabs. In 1994, Minority Whip Newt Gingrich provided a clear 
agenda and undisputed leadership in the quest for a Republican House majority. In 1996 and 
1998, Speaker Gingrich was damaged political goods who, despite his strengths in terms of 
fund-raising and appealing to Republican base voters, hurt his party in the pivotal swing
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districts. During his tenure as House Speaker, Gingrich played the role o f 1) legislative 
leader and Speaker o f the House, 2) philosophical leader of the Republican party, 3) chief 
Republican election strategist, 4) party leader, primarily chief fund-raiser o f the Republican 
party, and 5) shadow presidential candidate in the 1996 and 2000 Republican presidential 
primaries. When the Democratic *‘get-Newt” strategy succeeded in transforming Gingrich 
into a liability for Republicans, the Republican center of gravity was upset and the 
Republican House majority endangered.
The competitive era that began in the 1994 campaign continued unabated in the 1996,
1998, and 2000 election cycles. No matter which party wins the House or presidency in 
2000, the groundwork will be laid for another competitive contest for House control in the 
2002 midterm. In all likelihood, any House majority obtained in 2000 will be a narrow and 
tenuous majority, much like the slim majorities o f the 104*-106"" Congresses. If Republicans 
manage to hold their tenuous five-seat majority in the 2000 elections while winning the 
presidency, they will face the historical burden o f keeping their House majority amidst 
inevitable midterm burdens in 2002. If Democrats win the House and the presidency in 
2000, they will in all likelihood possess a narrow House majority that would likewise be 
vulnerable in the 2002 midterm. A Republican presidential win combined with a Democratic 
victory in the House (or vice-versa) would produce interesting political developments, but 
would still produce a competitive environment for House control in 2002. The 1998 election 
results, where Democrats gained five House seats despite the historical onus of second-term 
midterms and the cloud of scandal and impeachment swirling around President Clinton, 
illustrate the extent to which the actual election results in the current competitive era are
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difficult to predict. Whatever the 2000 election results dole out to the two parties in terms 
of House control, the changes emanating from the race for the House will continue for the 
foreseeable future until the electoral foundations of this competitive era change.
Currently, the two parties have achieved parity in terms of their regional 
representation in the House. The Republicans have secured a base o f support o f House seats 
in the South, buttressed by their tremendous gains in southern, conservative House seats in 
the 1994-1998 elections. The Democrats have likewise secured a base o f support in the 
Northeast, on the Pacific coast, and in the inner city urban areas that has been solidified in 
the 1994-1998 elections. These regional developments have produced larger minority parties 
and smaller majority parties in each of the Congresses under review. Both parties can easily 
control roughly 187+ seats. The remaining sixty swing seats, now equally divided between 
both parties, have become political nomads waiting to be tamed by one of the parties. Until 
this situation changes, either due to a massive political realignment, economic depression, 
or artful redistricting, then a competitive environment for House control will persist into the 
near future. This competitive era will remain a significant development in House politics, 
and will provide fruitful avenues for research and study.
Although no electoral basis exists as o f yet for another era o f one-party non­
competitive rule, there are plenty o f opportunities for both parties to achieve stable, working 
majorities that approach 240-250 seats. The swing seats needed to comprise such a 
majority, however, would always be vulnerable to attack from the minority party. But the 
majority party in this situation would be able to use the “better to be in the majority” 
mentality to attract savvy political entrepreneurs to its ranks who argue that a particular
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district’s legislative needs are best served by a representative o f the majority party. Under 
this scenario, the majority party could then “tame” several swing seats using this logic. Both 
parties have the potential of capturing and “taming” competitive swing seats, much like in 
the previous non-competitive era where politically savvy House Democrats “tamed” 
moderate and conservative House districts around the country.
Since their 1994 victory. House Republicans have lost ground in 30 seats they 
controlled in either the 104'*' or 105'*' Congresses. The Democratic nationalized campaign 
of 1996. the Medicare and anti-Gingrich campaigns, and the successful Democratic “fit-the- 
district” strategy of 1998 have each been effective in depriving the Republican majority of 
a stable majority, capturing 33 Republican House seats and bringing them into Democratic 
ranks. If the Republicans had maintained control o f these 33 competitive seats, they would 
have possessed a stable majority o f around 250 seats in the 106'*' Congress (1999-2001). 
Since 1995. however. Republicans have only defeated four Democratic House incumbents 
while House Democrats have defeated 23 Republican House incumbents. Unless House 
Republicans can make a successful effort to defeat more Democratic incumbents in the 2000 
and 2002 elections. House Democrats will have an advantage in the 2000 elections as they 
fight for majority status, much like House Republicans had the advantage in 1992 and 1994 
as they minimized Republican incumbent defeats and grabbed over 60 Democratic House 
seats. The potential vacancies o f self term limited Republican members, or the retirements 
of moderate Republicans holding traditionally Democratic House seats, also provide ripe 
targets for House Democrats. Successful and adept electoral and governing strategies could 
provide an opportunity for one o f the parties to cobble together a majority by grabbing these
295
seats and taming them over several election cycles. But this majority would remain a 
tenuous majority like the majorities of the 103"*-105* Congress, and would face determined 
and aggressive efforts by the minority party to regain majority status.
The Race for the House Continues: the 106* Congress*
The competitive pressures driving congressional action in the 103"*-105* Congresses 
continued to drive congressional action and behavior in the 106* Congress. After the 1998 
elections. House Republicans emerged with a mere five seat majority. Only 50 of the 
original 73 members o f  the class of 1994 remained in the House after the 1998 midterm 
election. As the 106* Congress started. House Republicans confronted ominous poll 
numbers, campaign debts emanating from the 1998 campaign, and the challenges of keeping 
their majority in 2000 as seven House Republicans prepared to step down from their seats 
to keep their self-term limit pledges.* The extreme narrowness o f the Republican majority 
changed the political calculus of the 106* Congress remarkably, with House Democrats 
viewing a takeover in 2000 as extremely possible and House Republicans struggling to find 
new strategies and tactics to preserve their six year old House majority.^
The competitive pressures of the 106* Congress had a profound affect on House 
Republican governing, leadership, and agenda strategies. The new Republican leadership 
team under the leadership o f Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-IL) attempted to put a new
* Juliet Eilperin and Dan Balz, “House GOP Leaders Sound an Alarm,” Washington 
Post. 5 February 1999, p. A 4.
 ^Juliet Eilperin, “In Divided House, All Eyes on 2000,” Washington Post. 3 Jime 1999, p. 
A 3; David S. Broder, “Stakes High in 2000: Voters Can Redirect 3 Federal Branches,” 
Washington Post. 21 June 1999, p. A 1.
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pragmatic political face on the Republican majority. The extreme competitive pressures of 
keeping the House in Republican hands in 2000 forced House Republicans to pursue a 
lowest common denominator strategy in the 106* Congress consisting of four core 
Republican policy issues: protecting and preserving Social Security, passing additional tax 
relief, addressing problems in the nation’s educational system, and addressing concerns about 
the nation’s national security."* Competitive pressures in 1998 led to Republican adoption 
o f a recess strategy in the 105* Congress. Competitive pressures in 1999 had the opposite 
effect o f spurring the Republican majority o f the 106* Congress to quickly pass several 
legislative achievements, especially by passing the fiscal year 2000 budget resolution before 
the April 15th deadline. Through each of the efforts. House Republicans hoped to burnish 
their negative perceptions with voters as they faced a tough fight to keep their majority in the 
2000 elections. But the difficulty of governing the House and the country with a five-seat 
majority hobbled the Republican majority in the first six months of the 106* Congress.
To save their imperiled majority, 114 Republican House members endorsed the 
presidential bid o f Republican front-runner Texas Governor George W. Bush before the 
summer o f 1999.* These House Republicans, impressed with Bush’s double-digit lead over 
Democratic presidential candidate Vice-President Al Gore and his ability to appeal to women 
and minority votes, hoped that a strong Republican presidential victory in 2000 would help 
carry House Republicans to another term as a majority party in the 107* (2001-2002)
* Ceci Connolly and Juliet Eilperin, “Hastert Steps Up to Leading Role,” Washington 
Post 5 January 1999, p. A 1; Alison Mitchell, “G.G.P. Picks Its Fight,” New York Times. 
13 March 1999, p. A 1.
* Fred Barnes, “The Anointed One,” The Weeklv Standard. 14 June 1999, pp. 19-21.
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Congress/ The House Republican embrace of Governor Bush illustrates how competition 
for House control not only impacts politics in the House o f Representatives, but has also 
spilled over into the realm o f presidential politics. The competitive pressures emanating 
from the new race for the House have forced the 2000 presidential election to become 
intertwined with the battle for House control. Just as Republicans rallied around Bush’s 
front-runner status. Democrats rallied around the presidential candidacy o f Vice President 
Al Gore, hoping to avoid a messy primary that could rob the party of electoral successes in 
2000. Meanwhile, competitive pressures have affected not only presidential politics, but 
presidential legacies as well. President Clinton, angered at the Republican effort to impeach 
him in 1998, vowed political revenge on the Republican majority in the 2000 elections.’ 
Although unable to run for re-election in 2000, Clinton viewed a Democratic recapture of the 
House in 2000 as a pivotal part of his political legacy, especially after the 1994 Democratic 
defeat and the 1996 Democratic failure to retake the House.
Competitive pressures likewise affected House Democrats in the 106* Congress as 
they intensely fought for a new Democratic House majority in the 2000 elections. The 1998 
election results emboldened Democrats for a takeover effort in 2000 after six years in 
minority status. This task of retaking the House became easier as several Republican 
members elected in 1994 intended to keep their self-term limit promises in 2000 and vacate 
their Democratic-Ieaning seats, including Representatives Tom Cobum (R-OK) and Jack
* Dan Balz and Ceci Connolly, “Poll Shows Bush Gains With Women, Hispanics,” 
Washington Post. 25 June 1999, p. A 7.
’ Richard L. Berke and James Bennet, “Clinton Vows Strong Drive to Win a House 
Majority, Advisers Say,” New York Times. 11 February 1999, p. A 1.
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Metcalf (R-WA). In addition, four House Republicans won election in 1998 with under 50% 
of the vote, providing Democrats with excellent opporttmities to gain seats. Each of these 
situations presented numerous opportunities for House Democrats to use “fit-the-district” 
candidates to win an additional six seats and a House majority in 2000.
The narrow six-seat margin of Republican majority control in 1999 whetted 
Democratic desires for capturing the House in 2000, igniting a thirst for majority status by 
all House Democrats and their political allies in Democratic base. This thirst for majority 
status structured many of the political developments in the Democratic Caucus in 1999. The 
AFL-CIO, for instance, pledged $46 million to keep union political operatives in the field 
over the course of the 106* Congress to help Democrats win back control 2000.* Minority 
Leader Gephardt, meanwhile, announced in early 1999 he would not seek the Democratic 
presidential nomination in 2000 in order to concentrate all o f his efforts on retaking the 
House. Throughout 1999, Gephardt pursued an extremely partisan agenda that eschewed 
compromise with the Republican agenda while accentuating partisan divisions between the 
two parties in order to present voters with a clear choice in the 2000 elections.’ President 
Clinton also worked closely with House Democrats throughout the early months o f the 106* 
Congress to embarrass and attack the Republican majority through issues like gun control, 
HMO reform, campaign finance reform, school construction funds. Medicare, and Social
* Frank Swoboda, “AFL-CIO Plots a Push for Democratic House,” Washington Post.
18 February 1999, p. A I.
’ Michael Grunwald, “Gephardt Works Tirelessly to Take Back the House,” Washington 
Post. 12 July 1999, p. A 1.
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Security. Through these developments. Democrats worked together to lay the groundwork 
for capturing the House in 2000, adopting many of the same strategies and tactics first 
pioneered by the House Republican minority in the 102"  ^and 103'" Congresses. Each of 
these developments illustrate how the race for the House remains a central motivating force 
in U.S. politics in the 1990s and the beginning of the 21“ century.
Theoretical Implications o f Two-Party Competition for Congressional Scholarship
The new era of two-party competition clearly affects our theoretical understanding 
of the U.S. House. The drive for House majorities by the two parties provides a new 
determinant of congressional action and behavior. Thinking about the House in terms of the 
presence or absence of two-party competition makes a theoretical contribution to the 
discipline of political science and the study of the House, especially in regards to the nature 
of House elections, party culture, and governing strategies in the U.S. Congress. Current 
theories of the U.S. House do not account for the vagaries o f two-party competition in the 
103"'-105‘*' Congresses. As political scientists and observers o f the modem Congress, it is 
imperative that we begin thinking about the House of Representatives fi’om the perspective 
offered by the tenuous majority and two-party competition. Failure to incorporate this aspect 
of House politics into our thinking could lead to a misleading and inaccurate account o f what 
is truly driving congressional action in the House of Representatives amidst sustained two- 
party competition.
Take the case study of the 13* district of Pennsylvania in the 1990s. In 1992,
Rachel Van Dongen, “Struggle for Control, House in Balance, Both Parties See 
Competitive 2000 Cycle,” Roll Call. 18 January 1999.
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Democratic candidate Maijorie Margoiies-Mezvinsky defeated Republican Jon Fox by 1,373 
votes. In 1994, Jon Fox (R-PA) defeated freshman Representative Maijorie Margoiies- 
Mezvinsky (D-PA) by the close margin of 49%-45% after Mezvinsky cast the deciding vote 
to pass the 1993 Clinton budget plan that increased taxes. In the 1996 elections, 
Representative Jon Fox (R-PA) won re-election to his swing seat in the House by a bare 84- 
vote margin as Democrats attacked his association to the unpopular Newt Gingrich. In 1998, 
Jon Fox lost his bid for re-election. In the previous era o f non-competition, the rise and fall 
of Maijorie Margoiies-Mezvinsky and Jon Fox would be an interesting case study of 
members o f both parties struggling to tame a swing seat.
In the era of the tenuous majority of the 103""-105* Congresses, however, the see­
sawing o f this swing seat has significance not only to Jon Fox and Mezvinsky, but also the 
political careers o f every other member of their respective parties in the House. Mezvinsky’s 
loss in 1994 contributed to the Republican takeover, which affected every surviving House 
Democrat in the 104* Congress serving in minority status. Likewise, the Republican 
majority of the 104* and 105* Congresses depended on the Jon Foxes in their ranks to 
provide Republicans with enough seats to be able to organize the House. Fox's loss in 1998 
endangered not only his own personal political fortunes, but also jeopardized the Republican 
majority's hold on power in the 106* Congress as they clung to mere five seat majority. The 
realization by members of both parties that their collective futures are dependent not only on 
their own political skills, but the political skills o f every other member o f their party to win 
a majority of 218, is forcing members o f the House to think and act collectively in terms of 
winning a House majority.
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In terms o f the re-election thesis, an additional perspective must be added. Members 
are indeed still single-minded pursuers of re-election. But the era of the tenuous majority 
also forces them to be single-minded pursuers of majority status. The re-election thesis must 
be adapted to account for this dual re-election perspective, both by members individually in 
their districts and nationwide in terms of securing a House majority. Richard Fenno has 
stated that all House members share similar goals of re-election, gaining influence within 
the House chamber, and implementing good public policy. We must now add a fourth goal 
to Fenno's analysis that all members o f the House now share: securing a House majority. 
For instance, when House Republicans won a House majority in 1994, this immediately 
increased their ability to gain influence in the House and implement their vision o f good 
public policy. Likewise, when House Democrats lost their majority in 1994. they 
immediately lost influence in the House and the ability to structure the agenda toward their 
policy goals. Probing the tension between members’ individual and collective re-elections 
to the House will provide fruitful avenues of research to future scholars of the Congress.
In terms to the re-election thesis, the quality candidate thesis o f congressional 
scholarship must be altered as well. While House victories still remain contingent on the 
presence of quality candidates capable o f running good campaigns, the image of completely 
autonomous and indigenous House campaigns needs to be abridged in light o f the evidence 
o f the 103"^-105“’ Congresses. Legislative parties and leaders in the U.S. House are 
increasingly playing larger roles in determining the outcome o f individual House races 
through recruitment efforts, the training of candidates, leadership FACs, and nationalized 
appeals that provide a cookie-cutter agenda to each congressional candidate. Gary Jacobson's
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strategic politician thesis, which marginalized the role played by party leaders and party 
organs must also be adapted in light of the evidence o f the 103"*-105‘*' Congresses. 
Jacobon's thesis still holds, just not in the manner he originally envisioned. Republican farm 
team efforts in the early 1990s, combined with the Democratic “fit-the-district” strategy of 
the 1 OS'** Congress, each illustrate the extent to which parties are actively working to shape 
electoral outcomes at the candidate level. House candidates are not only springing from the 
earth indigenously, as the candidate-emergence research states, but are also being cultivated 
in terms o f nationwide recruiting and training efforts by national party leaders. 
Congressional leaders are now salting the districts with their own selected candidates 
groomed and trained in their vision of what their future House majority should look like.
The party government thesis o f Cox and McCubbins in Legislative Leviathan must 
also be steered toward the new realities of two-party competition. The majority party still 
works its will on the system of the House, as Cox and McCubbins argue, but the majority 
party is also working its will in individual House races to help individual candidates secure 
victory in the war for the House. Information theory presented congressional committees as 
serving important informational specialization roles for a majority party and its members. 
This view o f committees remains valid, however both parties are also using the committees 
in an electoral fashion as bait to lure or convert members or help marginal members raise 
important campaign cash in the midst of a competitive re-election campaign.
Both the party government view of Cox and McCubbins, and the informational theory 
of Krehbiel, state that parties in the House seek to preserve their brand name through 
committee specialization, and as a result its top committee members are not policy outliers
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who could hurt the party electorally. The evidence o f the 103"'-105* Congresses illustrates 
that this is not always the case. In the 103"* Congress, several Democratic members 
complained that the liberal committee chairs and leaders who controlled the agenda hurt the 
Democratic party electorally in 1994. In the 1996 campaign. House Republicans used the 
liberal ranking Democrats on the congressional committees as bogeymen to motivate 
Republican base votes in a semi-nationalized campaign for House control. In addition, 
elements within each party have worked to reshape their respective party cultures to make 
the party more electable. Sometimes, the party's leaders and top committee members can be 
considered “outliers” hurting efforts to gain or enlarge a House majority. In the 104* and 
105* Congresses, the Blue Dog Democrats and the New Democratic Coalition organized to 
move the House Democratic Caucus away from the liberalism of its ranking committee 
chairs and toward a moderate perception o f the party. In the 105* Congress, conservative 
House Republicans launched a petition drive against moderate Republican committee and 
subcommittee chairs which bucked the party on key procedural votes. In both cases, 
members o f the House believed that elements o f their leadership were hurting their efforts 
to obtain or enlarge their respective parties electorally.
The evidence o f the 103"*-105* Congresses also illustrates the changes in incentive 
structures affecting House leaders in the 1990s due to the demands o f two-party competition. 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, congressional scholars accurately portrayed a more partisan 
House leadership exercising strong procedural control of the House agenda and of the House 
floor. In the era of two-party competition, congressional leaders are not only flexing a 
tightened procedural grip on the House floor, but also in the dynamics of individual races
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across the country. In the 103" ,^ 104“’, and 105* Congresses, Republican House leaders 
intervened heavily in special elections and general election contests to insure the right 
Republican nominee won the primary and won election to the House. The strong, centralized 
leadership o f Speaker Jim Wright in the 100th Congress ( 1987-1988) has taken a new twist 
in the 1990s as centralized leadership dominated not only the institution of the House but 
also spilled over into House elections all over the country.
In Unorthodox Lawmaking. Barbara Sinclair illustrates how the traditional textbook 
model which describes the lawmaking process has been supplanted by new unorthodox 
legislative processes. Variety, instead of uniformity, now characterizes the contemporary 
legislative process." But this emphasis on unorthodox lawmaking should not stop at the 
Capitol steps. Congressional leaders and members now face new, unorthodox pressures 
emanating from the demands of securing a House majority in the midst o f an intensely 
competitive era. Just as the textbook description of the “how-a-bill-becomes-a -law” model 
has changed in favor of a more varied and chaotic process, so too has change descended upon 
the textbook model of how congressional leaders and members organize their time, 
institutionally and electorally. These changes are creating new rules and methods of political 
operation for House leaders as they cope with the demands of the governing prerogatives 
emanating from competition for majority control. The new race for the House and the 
resulting narrow, tenuous majorities force us to re-examine the congressional process, 
electorally and institutionally, both in the House chamber and in the various House
" Barbara Sinclair, Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. 
Congress (Washington, D C.: CQ Press, 1997), pp. 217-33.
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campaigns at large. We must now re-think our traditional images o f how congressional 
members and leaders conduct their affairs, inserting the needs of securing a House majority 
in the midst o f increasingly hectic and atomized political careers and activities. 
Implications o f Two-Party Competition for American Constitutional Government
The current period of two-party competition has broader implications for the health 
of the American political system at the dawn of a new century. The intense two-party 
competition for House control that has emerged in the 1990s directly effects the substantive 
and time-less issues confronting Congress in the political system. The study o f Congress is 
really a study o f the role o f Congress in a system of separated institutions sharing powers. 
The effectiveness o f the U.S. Congress in the separated American system of government is 
shaped by whether it is stable or in flux, responsive or responsible, centrifugal or centripetal. 
Now, whether the House is under a period of competition or non-competition also shapes its 
effectiveness as a legislative body. In addition, issues o f collective accountability and the 
power o f Congress as an effective legislative body are each influenced by the current race for 
the House.
Two-party competition for House control is relevant in examining each o f these 
concerns, because not too long ago congressional scholars were talking about an entirely 
different set of issues and problems in terms of the House of Representatives. The topics of 
an entrenched Democratic majority, the pros and cons of divided government between a 
Republican presidency and a permanent Democratic House, and the problem of exploding 
deficits resulting from the gridlock o f divided government each drove American politics and 
scholarly examinations o f the Congress. We are now witnessing a new era o f intense
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competition for the House and as a result, new issues and concerns in contemporary House 
politics like triangulation, shutdown politics, budget surplus politics, and omnibus budget 
processes. These developments are conditioning the House o f Representatives as a 
legislative body and its accountability to the citizens it represents. While we are witnessing 
this process now, it is worth thinking about how it impacts the health of our democratic 
institutions.
Periods o f two-party competition are fundamentally good for the institution. A 
common and consistent refrain made by House Democrats and Republicans during my 
interviews was that 40 years of one-party had a deleterious effect on the institution. 
Members o f both parties complained that the Democratic leaders and committee chairs had 
become so accustomed to majority status that they became arrogant, out of touch, and 
ignored policy proposals like the balanced budget and welfare reform that could have 
presented a better image for all House Democrats running for election. A similar argument 
could be made in regard to the Republican majorities o f the 104* and 105* Congresses, 
especially on the issues of the government shutdowns, campaign finance reform, and the 
partisan impeachment process of 1998. Nelson Polsby has described the U.S. Congress as 
a transformative legislative body which possesses the independent capacity to mold and 
transform policy proposals from whatever sources into law.'* The transformative quality of 
the U.S. Congress makes it different from the other legislatures of the world which are 
primarily parliamentary arenas for the formalized interplay o f political forces. Periods of
'* Nelson Polsby, “Legislatures,"’ in Handbook o f Political Science v. 5, (Reading, 
Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1975), pp. 277-303.
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competitive pressures and two-party competition in the 1990s have sharpened the 
transformative abilities o f the U.S. House by bringing more linkage between what happens 
on the campaign trail to what happens on the House floor, and vice-versa.
The Contract With America and the Families First platform each delineated clear 
issue agendas to the American public regarding what the two parties would accomplish with 
a House majority. These clear agendas are fundamentally good for the institution because 
they improve the collective accountability of the House and make it more effective in 
responding to issues o f concern articulated in the previous election. This, in turn, helps 
improve the legitimacy of the House as a legislative body. For instance, in the 103"* 
Congress Democratic House leaders deliberately prevented welfare reform, term limits, 
further deficit reduction based on spending cuts, tax reduction, and congressional reform a 
chance to be enacted into law. The Republican minority and a growing cadre of moderate 
and conservative Democrats were forced to resort to discharge petitions in attempts to 
circumvent the procedural bottlenecks of House Democratic leaders. The change of party 
control in 1994 insured that each of these items were addressed by the Republican majority 
in the 104'*’ Congress, providing each with a policy outlet and procedural forum on the House 
floor. In the 105'*' Congress, Republican House leaders deliberately prevented campaign 
finance reform, school construction legislation, and managed care reform from being 
honestly debated on the House floor, much less enacted into law. The Democratic minority 
and a growing cadre o f Republican moderates resorted to discharge petitions in a failed 
attempt to circumvent the intransigence of Republican leaders. A change in party control to 
the Democrats would insure that each of these legislative items would be given a chance to
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pass into law unhindered by procedural roadblocks.
The sharpening of party lines provided by the nationalized campaigns o f the 1990s 
also translates into the sharpening of conceptions o f what Republican and Democratic House 
majorities are elected to accomplish. The Democratic majority o f  the 103"* Congress made 
universal health care reform a top priority of the 103"* Congress. The failure to enact health 
care reform hurt the Democratic majority in the 1994 election. The Republican majorities 
of the 104'*’ and 105'*' Congress were elected for very specific reasons, primarily balancing 
the budget, reforming welfare, cutting taxes, and holding the line on federal discretionary 
spending. In both Congresses, the Republican majority successfully accomplished each of 
these goals. In terms of fiscal discipline, the change in party control in 1994 had a clear 
impact on federal spending levels. Federal discretionary domestic spending increased $102 
billion in the Democratic controlled 101”-103"* Congresses (1989-1994). In the Republican 
controlled 104'*’ Congress (1995-1996), domestic discretionary spending fell by $10.9 
billion.'^ When the Republican majority tapped $20 billion o f the budget surplus for new 
spending initiatives in the 1998 budget accord, it suffered at the polls as its conservative base 
turned out with less intensity than in 1994 or 1996.
The 1994, 1996, and 1998 elections witnessed extremely negative campaigns for 
House control by the two parties, which helped produce wider partisan gulfs between the two 
parties in the House. The most significant and important legislation and events o f the 1990s, 
from budget fights to impeachment, have witnessed the two parties squared off in partisan
“Trends In Congressional Appropriations: Fiscal Restraint in the 1990s,” Joint 
Economic Committee, United States Congress, April 1998.
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confrontations and divisions. The comity and civility o f the House, which many members 
nostalgically yearn for in a previous Elysian era o f House politics, no longer exists.'^ This 
is one of the unfortunate byproducts o f the cturent partisan war for the House. Many 
scholars and political observers of the House o f Representatives have commented on the 
increasing incivility within the House chamber in the 1990s as the two parties square off in 
partisan s k i r m i s h e s . I n  February of 1997, over 200 Members of the House and their 
families attended a bipartisan leadership retreat in Hershey, Pennsylvania to improve the 
discourse between members of the two parties after the rancorous 104'*' Congress.'®
In many respects, however, unrelenting war for House control is the major culprit in 
the rise of incivility and the decline o f comity in the Congresses under review. The 
aggressive, anti-Democratic rhetoric o f the Gingrich Republicans of the 1990s, combined 
with the aggressive anti-Gingrich and anti-Republican rhetoric of a majority of House 
Democrats in the 104'*’ and 1 OS'** Congresses, have each poisoned the well of the House. 
Attack politics indeed polarizes the House on a partisan basis while reflecting poorly on the 
general reputation of the Congress. But in the current era o f two-party competition, attack
'■* Dan Wilfensberger, “In Search of Civility: Vigorous Debate Doesn’t Have to Hiut,” 
Roll Call. 22 April 1997, p. 5; R. W. Apple, Jr., “Changes Times in Capital Come With 
High Costs,” New York Times. 18 March 1997, p. A 1.
Albert R. Himt, “A 20'*’ Centiuy Giant Going Strong at 95,” Wall Street Journal. 26 
March 1998, p. A 23; “Civility in the House o f Representatives,” A Backgroimd Report 
prepared for the Bipartisan Congressional Retreat by Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Professor 
and Dean of the Annenberg School for Communication at the University o f Pennsylvania, 
March 1997.
'® Francis X. Clines, “‘Bipartisan Retreat’ Hopes to Overcome Animosity in House,”
New York Times. 6 March 1997, p. A 1.
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politics also gets results: it stopped the Clinton health care plan in 1994, halted the 
Republican budget plan of 1995, forced an ethics inquiry into Speaker Gingrich in 1996, and 
insured a partisan impeachment of President Clinton in 1998 that insured the defeat of his 
conviction in the Senate in 1999. Attack politics, the cornerstone o f the nationalized 
campaigns for House control in the 1990s, has provided the electorate with clearer agendas 
and a more concise picture o f the direction of their government over the course o f a two-year 
period.
The intense campaigns for House control in the 1994-2000 period augment the innate 
transformative nature of the U.S. House o f Representatives. The two-party competition of 
the 103^-105* Congresses has jolted an often placid citizenry into confronting stark choices 
in the direction of their government through the House of Representatives, especially on the 
“big-ticket” policy and political items of the 1990s. Universal health care reform, the drive 
for deficit reduction and the balanced budget, the size and scope o f the federal government, 
tax cuts, and the impeachment o f President Clinton have each been directly affected by the 
drive by the two parties to secure a House majority. The change in party control in 1994, 
driven by the Contract With America and the Republican’s nationalized campaign, set the 
Republican House o f the 104* Congress on a different policy direction than the Democratic 
House of the 103'** Congress or even the policy direction o f a hypothetical Democratic House 
in the 104* Congress. A change in party control to the Democrats in election o f 2000 or 
beyond would similarly set the Congress on a different policy course.
The nationalized campaigns for House control o f 1994, 1996, and 1998 have 
presented voters and citizens with sharpened differences between the parties and a clear
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choice on the direction of domestic policy Unlike a change in presidents, which occurs on 
a constitutionally-mandated timetable every four or eight years, a change in party control in 
the House has a direct and tangible impact on the direction o f U.S. domestic policy. Federal 
spending patterns clearly and consistently reflect the preferences o f the majority parties in 
the Congress. House Democrats in the 103"^  Congress stressed universal health care reform, 
cutting the deficit based on tax increases, protecting federal domestic spending, and 
addressing quality o f life concerns like family leave and the anti-crime measures in the 1994 
crime bill. House Republicans since 1994 have stressed reforming entitlement programs, 
cutting taxes, balancing the budget through spending cuts, and reforming the Internal 
Revenue Service and other government agencies. House Democrats since 1994 have stressed 
protecting and preserving Medicare and Social Security programs and quality of life issues 
like managed care reform, education, protecting the environment, and campaign finance 
reform. Changing the direction of the American separated system of government is much 
like turning aroimd an aircraft carrier. Both require a lot o f time before a new course and 
direction can be implemented. But a change in party control in the House speeds this process 
of change more rapidly than a change in the Senate or the presidency. The House of 
Representatives still remains the unruly hot cup in American politics as depicted by George 
Washington over 200 years ago.
Periodic eras of two-party competition bring rapid change to the House, alter the 
course of federal policy, and bring more accoimtability to the institution through the intense 
efforts of both parties to woo swing voters and address the concerns of their respective bases. 
Of course, lengthy periods o f two-party competition could have a malignant effect on the
312
U.S. House if its politics become totally warped by intense politics over several consecutive 
election cycles. The experience o f the Italian parliamentary government, which has 
experienced 56 changes in party control since World War II, is not an acceptable model for 
the U.S. House o f Representatives. But occasional periods o f intense two-party competition 
inject health doses of representation, collective accountability, and change into the institution 
of the House, both institutionally and electorally. Between the Civil War and the 1950s, 
House majorities endured between four and sixteen years. Changes in majority control every 
four, eight, or twelve years create more windows of opportunity for change and responsive 
in the U.S. political system.
The Framers o f the U.S. Constitution designed a republican government which has 
persevered for over two centuries as a democratic model for the world. This republican form 
of government is rooted in the liberal concepts of legitimacy and consent o f the governed 
first advocated by John Locke. The American House of Representatives is a messy 
institution which attempts to reconcile effective government while preserving the freedoms 
and liberty of the citizens it represents. Periodic doses of two-party competition for House 
control, combined with actual changes in House control, serve as well-needed jolts of 
accountability and legislative change in American government. The threat o f losing majority 
status serves as a powerful check on the parties, further limiting the persistent dangers of 
despotism and majority faction inherent in any democratic system o f government.
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APPENDIX A: CHANGES IN PARTY CONTROL OF THE HOUSE 
SINCE THE CIVIL WAR
Congress Years President Number of 
Representatives
Democrats Republicans Other
Parties
Vacant Majority Party Margin 
over Minority
39th 1865-67 A Johnson (R) 191 46 145 99 (R)
40lh 1867-69 A Johnson (R) 193 49 143 94 (R)
41st 1869-71 IJ. Grant (R) 243 73 170 97 (R)
42nd 1871-73 U Grant (R) 243 104 139 35 (R)
43rd 1873-75 U. Grant (R) 293 88 203 2 115(R)
44th 1875-77 U. Grant (R) 293 181 107 3 2 74(D)
45th 1877-79 R. Hayes (R) 293 156 137 19(D)
46th 1879-81 R. Hayes (R) 293 150 128 14 1 22 (D)
47th 1881-83 C Arthur (R) 293 130 152 11 22 (R)
48th 1883-85 C Arthur (R) 325 200 119 6 81(D)
49th 1885-87 G. Cleveland (D) 325 182 140 2 1 42(D)
50th 1887-89 G Cleveland (D) 325 170 151 4 19(D)
SIst 1889-91 B. Harrison (R) 330 156 173 1 17 (R)
52nd 1891-93 B Harrison (R) 333 231 88 14 217(D)
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Congress Years President Number of 
Representatives
Democrats Republicans Other
Parties
Vacant Majority Party Margin 
over Minority
53rd 1893-95 G. Cleveland (D) 356 220 126 10 94 (D)
S4th 1895-97 G. Cleveland (D) 357 104 246 7 142 (R)
55Ü1 1897-99 W McKinley (R) 357 134 206 16 1 72 (R)
56th 1899-
1901
W McKinley (R) 357 163 185 9 22 (R)
57th 1901-03 T. Roosevelt (R) 357 153 198 5 1 45 (R)
58th 1903-05 T. Roosevelt (R) 386 178 207 1 29 (R)
59th 1905-07 T. Riwsevelt (R) 386 136 250 114(R)
60th 1907-09 T. Roosevelt (R) 386 164 222 58 (R)
61st 1909-11 W. Taft (R) 391 172 219 47 (R)
62nd 1911-13 W. Taft (R) 391 228 162 1 66 (D)
63rd 1913-15 W. Wilson (D) 435 290 127 18 163 P )
64th 1915-17 W Wilson (D) 435 231 193 8 3 38(D)
65th 1917-19 W. Wilson (D) 435 210 216 9 6(R)
66th 1919-21 W. Wilson (D) 435 191 237 7 46 (R)
67th 1921-23 W Harding (R) 435 132 300 1 2 168 (R)
68th 1923-25 C Coolidge (R) 435 207 225 3 18(R)
0\
Congress Years President Number of 
Representatives
Democrats Republicans Other
Parties
Vacant Majorit) Party Margin 
over Minority
69lh 1925-27 C. Coolidge (R) 435 183 247 5 64 (R)
70th 1927-29 C. Coolidge (R) 435 195 237 3 42 (R)
71st 1929-31 H Hoover (R) 435 163 267 1 4 104 (R)
72nd 1931-33 H. Hoover (R) 435 216 218 1 2(R)
73rd 1933-35 F. Roosevelt (D) 435 313 117 5 196 (D)
74th 1935-37 F. Roosevelt (D) 435 322 103 10 219(D)
75th 1937-39 F. Roosevelt (D) 435 333 89 13 244 (D)
76th 1939-41 F. Roosevelt (D) 435 262 169 4 93 (D)
77th 1941-43 F. Roosevelt (D) 435 267 162 6 105 (D)
78th 1943-45 F. Roosevelt (D) 435 222 209 4 13(D)
79th 1945-47 H Truman (D) 435 243 190 2 53 (D)
80th 1947-49 H Truman (D) 435 188 246 1 58 (R)
81st 1949-51 H Truman (D) 435 263 171 1 92 (D)
82nd 1951-53 H Truman (D) 435 234 199 2 35 (D)
83rd 1953-55 D. Eisenhower (R) 435 213 221 1 8(R)
84th 1955-57 D. Eisenhower (R) 435 232 203 29 (D)
85th 1957-59 D. Risenhower (R) 435 234 201 33 (D)
wCongress Years President Number of 
Representatives
Democrats Republicans Other
Parties
Vacant Majority Party Margin 
over Minority
86th 1959-61 D. Kisenhower (R) 436 283 153 130(D)
87lh 1961-63 J. Kennedy (D) 437 262 175 87 (D)
88(h 1963-65 L Jolmson (D) 435 258 176 1 82 (D)
89th 1965-67 L Johnson (D) 435 295 140 155(D)
90th 1967-69 L. Johnson (D) 435 248 187 61 (D)
91st 1969-71 R. Nixon (R) 435 243 192 51 (D)
92nd 1971-73 R. Nixon (R) 435 255 180 75(D)
93rd 1973-75 R. Nixon (R) 435 242 192 1 50 (D)
94 th 1975-77 ü. Ford (R) 435 291 144 147 (D)
95th 1977-79 J. Carter (D) 435 292 143 149 (D)
96lh 1979-81 J Carter (D) 435 277 158 119(D)
97th 1981-83 R. Reagan (R) 435 243 192 51 (D)
98th 1983-85 R Reagan (R) 435 268 167 101 (D)
99th 1985-87 R. Reagan (R) 435 253 182 71 (D)
lOOlh 1987-89 R. Reagan (R) 435 258 177 81 (D)
lÜIst 1989-91 G. Bush (R) 435 259 174 2 85 (D)
102nd 1991-93 G Bush (R) 435 268 166 1 102(D)
Congress Years President Number of 
Representatives
Democrats Republicans Other
Parties
Vacant Majority Party Margin 
over Minority
103rd 1993-95 13 Clinton (D) 435 258 176 1 82(D)
104th 1995-97 B. Clinton (D) 435 204 230 1 26 (R)
lOSlh 1997-99 13 Clinton (D) 435 207 227 1 20 (R)
106lh 1999-01 13 Clinton (D) 435 211 223 1 12 (R)
Note; Bold indicates a change in party control of the House of Representatives
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APPENDIX B: THE SWING SEATS OF THE 1990s
District 1992 Winner 1994 Winner 1996 Winner 1998 Winner 1988 prez. 1992 prez. 1996 prez
Arkansas 4 Dickey (R); 52%* Dickey (R); 52% Dickey (R). 64% Dickey (R); 58% Bush 52% Clinton 57% Clinton 60%
Arizona 6 English (D); 53%* 1 iaywortli (R), 
55%*
1 la>'worth (R). 
48%
1 layworth (R). 52% Bush 59% Bush 38% Clinton 47%
California 1 Hamburg (13); 48%* Riggs (R). 53%* Riggs (R), 50% Thompson (D). 
62%*
Dukakis
52%
Clinton 57% Clinton 48%
California 3 Fazio (D), 51% Fazio (D). 50% Fazio (D). 54% Ose (R); 53%* Bush 55% Clinton 41% Clurton 45%
California 10 Baker (R). 52%* Baker (R), 59% Tauscher (D), 
49%*
Tauscher (D), 53% Bush 58% Clinton 42% Clinton 48%
California 22 Michael Huffmgton 
(R); 53%*
Seasli and (R); 
49%*
W. Capps (D), 
48%*
L Capps (D), 55% Bush 56% Clinton 41% Dole 44%
California 24 Beilenson (D); 56% Beilenson (D), 
49%
Sherman (D). 
49%*
Sherman (D), 58% Bush 57% Clinton 48% Clinton 52%
California 27 Moorhead (R), 50% Moorhead (R), 
53%
Rogan (R); 50%* Rogan (R). 50% Bush 57% Clinton 44% ('linton 49%
California 36 Harman (D), 48%* 1 larman (D), 48% Harman (D). 52% Kuykendall (R), 
49%*
Bush 60% Clinton 41% Clinton 47%
California 38 Horn (R), 49% Horn (R); 58% Horn (R), 53% 1 lorn (R), 53% Bush 56% Clinton 44% Clinton 53%
California 42 Brown (D); 51% Brown (D), 51% Brown (D). 50% Brown (D). 50% Bush 54% Clinton 45% Clinton 53%
California 46 Doman (R), 50% Domim (R). 57% Sanchez (D). 
47%*
Sanchez (D). 56% Bush 62% Bush 40% Clinton 49%
u>
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District 1992 Winner 1994 Winner 1996 Winner 1998 Winner 1988 prez. 1992 prez. 1996 prez
California 49 Schenk (D); 51%* Bilbray (R), 49%* Bilbray (R), 
(53%)
Bilbray (R), 49% Bush 57% Clinton 43% Clinton 49%
Connecticut 2 Oejdenson (D). 51% Oejdenson (D), 
43%
Oejdenson (D). 
52%
Oejdenson (D). 
61%
Bush 51% Clinton 43% Clinton 53%
Connecticut 5 Franks (R); 44% Franks (R), 52% Maloney (D); 
52%*
Maloney (D), 50% Bush 59% Bush 42% Clinton 48%
Illinois 11 Sangmeister (D), 
56%
Weller (R);61%* Weller (R), 52% Weller (R). 59% Bush 57% Clinton 43% Clinton 51%
Illinois 20 Durbin (D), 57% Durbin (D). 55% Shimkus (R); 
50%*
Shimkus (R); 61% Bush 51 % Clinton 46% Clinton 47%
Indiana 8 McCloskey (D); 
53%
Hostettler (R). 
55%*
Hostettler (R). 
50%
1 lostettler (R), 52% Bush 57% Clinton 42% Clinton 46%
Indiana 9 Hamilton (D), 70% Hamilton (D); 
52%
Hamilton (D), 
56%
Hill (D),51%* Bush 58% Clinton 41% Clinton 48%
Kansas 3 Meyers (R); 58% Meyers (R). 57% Snowbarger (R), 
50%*
Moore (D), 52%* Bush 54% Clinton 38% Dole 50%
Kentucky 3 Mazzoli (D), 53% Ward (D); 44%* Northrup (R). 
50%*
Northrup (R), 52% Bush 51% Clinton 50% Clinton 53%
Maine 2 Snowe (R), 49% Baldacci (D), 
46%*
Baldacci (D), 72% Baldacci (D), 76% Bush 55% Clinton 78% Clinton 51%
Mass 7 Torkildsen (R), 
55%*
Torkildsen (R). 
51%
l iemey (D); 
48%*
Tierney (D). 55% Dukakis
51%
Clinton 43% Clinton 59%
K)
District 1992 Winner 1994 Winner 1996 Winner 1998 Winner 1988 prez. 1992 prez. 1996 prez.
Michigan 8 Carr (D). 48% Chrysler (R), 
52%*
Stabcnow (13). 
54%*
Stabcnow (D), 
57%
Bush 56% Clinton 40% Clinton 49%
Michigan 10 Bonior (D); 53% Bonior (D); 62% Bomor (13); 54% Bonior (D), 52% Bush 62% Bush 41% Clinton 49%
Michigan 12 Levin (D), 53% Levin (13). 52% Levin (13). 57% Levin (D), 56% Bush 58% Clinton 42% Clinton 52%
Michigan 13 Ford (D); 52% Rivers (13); 52%* Rivers (13); 57% Rivers (D). 58% Bush 51% Clinton 49% Clinton 58%
Minnesota 1 Penny (D); 74% Gutknecht (R); 
55%*
Gutknecht (R). 
53%
Gutknecht (R). 
55%
Bush 51% Clinton 38% Clinton 48%
Minnesota 2 Mingc (D); 48%* Mingc (D). 52% Minge (D). 55% Minge (D). 57% Bush 52% Clinton 37% Clinton 45%
Missouii 9 Volkmer (D); 48% Volkmer (D); 
50%
Hulshof(R).
49%*
Hulshof(R).62% Bush 54% Clinton 41 % Clinton 44%
Montana AL Williams (D), 48% Williams (D). 
49%
Hill (R). 52%* Hill (R); 53% Bush 52% Clinton 38% Dole 44%
Nevada 1 Bilbray (D); 58% Lnsign (R), 48%* linsign (R). 50% Berkley (13), 49%* Bush 56% Clinton 43% Clinton 51%
New
Hampshire 1
Zelitï(R). 53% ZchlT(R). 66% Sununu (R). 50%* Sununu (R). 67% Bush 64% Bush 39% Clinton 48%
New
Hampshire 2
Swett (D), 62% Buss(R). 51%* Bass (R). 51% Bass (R). 53% Bush 62% Clinton 40% Clinton 50%
New Jersey 8 Klein (13). 47%* Martini (R); 50%* I’ascrell (13). 
51%*
Pascrell (13). 62% Bush 55% Clinton 45% Clinton 58%
wDistrict 1992 Winner 1994 Winner 1996 Winner 1998 Winner 1988 prez. 1992 prez. 1996 prez
New Jersey 12 Zimmer (R); 64% Zimmer (R). 68% Pappas (R), 50%* Holt (D). 50%* Bush 61% Bush 43% Clinton 48%
New York 1 1 iochbrueckncr (D), 
52%
Forbes (R), 53%* Forbes (R), 55% Forbes (R), 64% Bush 61 % Bush 40% Clinton 51%
New York 4 Levy (R), 50% Frisa ( R); 50%* McCarthy (D). 
57%*
McCarthy (D). 
52%
Bush 57% Clinton 47% Clinton 56%
New York 26 Hinchey (D); 50%* Hinchey (D); 49% Hinchey (D); 55% 1 linchey (D), 62% Bush 52% Clinton 44% Clinton 51 %
North Carolina 
4
Price (D), 65% Heineinan (R); 
50%*
Price (D), 54%* Price (D); 57% Bush 53% Clinton 47% Clinton 49%
Ohio 1 Mann(D); 51%* Chabot (R); 56%* Chabot (R); 54% Chabot (R), 53% Bush 55% Clinton 43% Clinton 50%
Ohio 6 Strickland (0). 
51%*
Cremeans (R); 
51%*
Strickland (D). 
51%*
Strickland (D). 
57%
Bush 59% Bush 40% Clinton 44%
Ohio 10 lioke(R), 57%* Hoke iR); 52% Kucinich (D); 
49%*
Kucinich (D). 67% Bush 52% Clinton 41% Clinton 51%
Ohio 18 Applegate (D), 68% Ney (R), 54%* Ney (R). 50* Ney (R), 60% Bush 52% Clinton 43% Clinton 47%
Ohio 19 Fingerhut (D), 53%* La I’oiirette (R), 
48%*
LaTourette (R), 
55%
LaTourette (R). 
66%
Bush 53% Clinton 40% Clinton 48%
Oregon 5 Kopetski (D), 64% Bunn (R), 50%* Hooley (D), 51%* I looley (0), 55% Dukakis
50%
Clinton 40% Clinton 47%
Penn 13 Mezvinsky (0), 
50%*
Fox (R), 49%* Fox (R). 49% Hocfiel (D). 52%* Bush 60% Clinton 44% Clinton 50%
u>
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District 1992 Winner 1994 Winner 1996 Winner 1998 Winner 1988 prez. 1992 prez. 1996 prez
Penn 15 McHale (D). 52%* McHale (13), 48% McHale (13), 55% Toomey (R), 55%* Bush 55% Clinton 41% Clinton 46%
Penn 21 Ridge (R). 68% Lnghsh (R), 49%* Lnglish (R), 51% linglish (R), 63% Dukakis
51%
Clinton 45% Clinton 49%
Tennessee 3 Lloyd (D), 49% Wamp (R), 52%* Wamp (R), 56% Wamp (R), 66% Bush 61% Clinton 44% Dole 47%
Texas 1 Chapman (D), 
unopposed
Chapman (D). 
55%
Sandlin (13), 
52%*
Sandlin (D), 59% Bush 55% Clinton 39% Dole 46%
Texas 5 Bryant (D), 59% Bryant (13), 50% Sessions (R), 
53%*
Sessions (R), 56% Bush 53% Clinton 40% Clinton 46%
Virginia 11 Byrne (D), 50%* Davis (R); 53%* Davis (R), 64% Davis (R), 83% Bush 61% Bush 43% Clmton 48%
Washington 1 Cantwell (D); 55%* Wliitc (R); 52%* White (R), 54% Inslee (D), 51%* Bush 52% Clinton 42% Clinton 51%
Washington 2 Swift (D), 52% Metcalf (R), 
55%*
Metcalf (R), 49% Metcalf (R), 55% Bush 51% Clinton 39% Clinton 47%
Washington 3 IJnsoeld (D); 56% Smith (R), 52%* Smith (R), 50% Baird (D), 55%* Dukakis
52%
Clinton 42% Clinton 49%
Washington 5 Poley (D). 55% Nethircutt (R), 
51%*
Ncthcrcutt (R), 
56%
Ncthcrcutt (R), 
57%
Bush 51% Clinton 40% Clinton 44%
Washington 9 Kreidler (0); 52%* Tate(R); 52%* Smith (D); 50%* Smith (13), 65% Bush 52% Clinton 42% Clinton 51%
Wisconsin 1 Aspin (13); 58% Neumann (R), 
49%*
Neumann (R). 
51%
Ryan (R), 58%* Dukakis
51%
Clinton 41% Clinton 50%
Wisconsin 8 Roth (R). 70% Roth 1R), 64% Johnson (13), 
52%*
(ireen (R), 54%* Bush 53% Bush 40% Clinton 46%
* denotes new member
There are 60 swing scats depicted in this table
5 1 have seen a change in party control in the 1990s
18 have seen more than two changes in representatives in the 1990s
1992: Democrats win 44 of tlie swing seats. Republicans win 16 
1994: Republicans win 41 of the swing seats, Democrats 19 
1996: Republicans win 33 of the swing seats. Democrats 27 
1998: Republicans win 32 of the swing seats. Democrats 28
1988: George Bush carries 54 of the swing districts (average of 55.4%) 
1992 : Bill Clinton carries 50 of the swing districts (average of 42 8%) 
1996: Bill Clinton carries 55 of the swing districts (average of 49 4%)
w
APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW LIST
Members of Congress
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Representative John Boehner (R-OH) 
Representative Ben Cardin (D-MD) 
Representative Gary Condit (D-CA) 
Representative Pat Danner (D-MO) 
Representative Cal Dooley (D-CA) 
Representative David Dreier (R-CA) 
Representative Tom DeLay ( R-TX) 
Representative Vernon Ehlers (R-MI) 
Representative Robert Ehrlich (R-MD) 
Representative Vic Fazio (D-CA) 
Representative Martin Frost (D-TX) 
Representative Lee Hamilton (D-IN) 
Representative Wally Merger (R-CA) 
Representative Steny Moyer (D-MD) 
Representative John Kasich (R-OM) 
Representative Barbara Kennelly (D-CT)
Representative
Representative
Representative
Representative
Representative
Representative
Representative
Representative
Representative
Representative
Representative
Representative
Representative
Representative
Ray LaMood (R-IL)
John Linder (R-GA)
Bill McCollum (R-FL) 
David Minge (D-MN) 
Mike Parker (R-MS)
Bill Faxon (R-NY)
Ed Pease (R-IN)
Collin Peterson (D-MN) 
Tim Roemer (D-IN)
John Shadegg (R-AZ) 
Chris Shays (R-CT) 
David Skaggs (D-CO) 
Charlie Stenholm (D-TX) 
J C Watts (R-OK)
Congressional StalT/Press
Jeffrey Biggs, Press Sectary, Office of Speaker Thomas Foley
George Behan, Press Secretary, Office of Representative Norm Dicks
Mark Brownell, Administrative Assistant, Office of Representative Collin C Peterson
David Broder, Washington Post
Adam Clymer, New York Times
Mary Crawford, Communications Director, National Republican Congressional Committee 
Arne Christenson, Chief of Staff Office o f Speaker Newt Gingrich 
w Monica Maples Dixon, Chief of Staff Democratic Caucus
O' Scott Douglas, National Republican Congressional Committee
Steve Elmendorf Chief o f Staff Office of Minority Leader Richard Gephardt 
Roger France, Administrative Assistant, Office o f Representative Charlie Taylor 
Ed Goeas, Political Consultant
Tony Hammond, National Republican Congressional Committee 
Terry Holt, Press Secretary, Republican Conference 
Barry Jackson, Executive Director, House Republican Conference 
Charles Johnson, House Parliamentarian
Ed McDonald, Administrative Assistant, Office of Representative Howard Coble 
Laura Nichols, Communications Director, Office of Minority Leader Richard Gephardt 
Don Sallick, Director o f Communications, Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee 
Sam Stratman, Press Secretary, Office of Representative Henry Hyde 
Cokie Roberts, ABC News 
Don Ritchie, Senate Historian
APPENDIX D: Moderate Republican Vote Dissensions, 105th Congress
H R 992: The Tucker 
Shuffle Relief Act 
(Passed 3/12/98; 230- 
180). Member voted 
against
H R 3246:
Fairness for Small 
Business Act 
(Passed 3/26/98; 
202-200) Member 
voted against
Boehiert
Amendment to II R 
2515 (Passed 
3/26/98,200-187) 
Member voted in 
favor
H R 2608 The 
Paycheck Protection 
Act (Defeated 
3/30/98, 166-246) 
Member voted 
against:
Roukema
Amendment to II R 
2400 (Defeated 
4/1/98, 194-225) 
Member voted 
against:
Tax Limitation 
Amendment 
(Defeated 
4/22/98,238- 
186). Member 
voted against:
(Allows landowners 
suits to be heard in 
either U.S. Distnct 
Court or U.S. Court of 
Federal Claims)
(Prevents "salting” 
by unions)
(Requires all 
logging roads to 
eomply with all 
cuixent and pending 
environmental 
regulations)
(Requires prior 
permission by 
individuals before 
union dues are taken 
from paychecks for 
political purposes
(Prohibits 
afflrmative action 
and preferential 
racial U e^atment in 
federal
transportation
contracts)
(Requires a 2/3 
majonty of 
Congress to 
increase taxes)
Bass X X X
Bilbray X X
Boehiert X X X X X X
Campbell X X
Castle X X X X
Davis (VA) X X X
Diaz-Balart X X X X
Ehlers X X X X
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H R. 992: The Tucker 
Shuffle Relief Ael 
(Passed 3/12/98; 230- 
180). Member voted 
against
H R 3246:
Fairness for Small 
Business Act 
(Passed 3/26/98, 
202-200) Member 
voted against
Boehiert
Amendment to II R 
2515 (Passed 
3/26/98, 200-187) 
Member voted in 
favor
H R 2608: The 
Paycheck Protection 
Act (Defeated 
3/30/98, 166-246) 
Member voted 
against:
Roukema
Amendment to H R 
2400 (Defeated 
4/1/98, 194-225) 
Member voted 
against:
Tax Limitation 
Amendment 
(Defeated 
4/22/98, 238- 
186) Member 
voted against:
Hnglish X X X
Hawell X X
Forbes X X X X X X
Fox X X X X X
Franks
(NJ)
X X X X
Gilchrest X X X
Gilman X X X X
Greenwood X X X
Horn X X
llougliton X X X
Johnson
(CT)
X X X X X X
Kelly X X X X X
Klug X X
Lai lood X X X
wH R 992: The Tucker 
Shuffle Relief Act 
(Passed 3/12/98. 230- 
ISO) Member voted 
against
H R 3246:
Fairness for Small 
Bus ness Act 
(Pass,:d 3/26/98; 
202-200) Member 
voted against
Boehiert
Amendment to H R 
2515 (Passed 
3/26/98; 200-187) 
Member voted in 
favor
H R 2608: The 
Paycheck Protection 
Act (Defeated 
3/30/98, 166-246) 
Member voted 
against:
Roukema
Amendment to H R 
2400 (Defeated 
4/1/98; 194-225) 
Member voted 
against:
Tax Limitation 
/Amendment 
(Defeated 
4/2:/98; 238- 
186) Member 
voted against:
LaTourette X X X X
Lazio X X X X X
Leach X X X X
Lobiondo X X X
McDade X X
Morella X X X X X
Pappas X X X
Pétri X X X
Porter X X X
Quinn X X X X X
Ramstad X X
Régula X X
Roukema X X
Saxton X X X
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H R 992: The Tucker 
Shuffle Relief Act 
(Passed 3/12/98, 230- 
180) Member voted 
against
H R 3246:
Fairness for Small 
Business Act 
(Passed 3/26/98, 
202-200) Member 
voted against
Boehiert
Amendment to H R 
2515 (Passed 
3/26/98,200-187) 
Member voted in 
favor
H R 2608: The 
Paycheck Protection 
Act (Defeated 
3/30/98, 166-246) 
Member voted 
against:
Roukema
/Amendment to H R 
2400 (Defeated 
4/1/98, 194-225) 
Member voted 
against:
Tax Limitation 
Amendment 
(Defeated 
4/22/98; 238- 
186) Member 
voted against:
Shays X X X X
Smith (NJ) X X X X
Walsh X X X X X
Weldon X X X X
Weller X X
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